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Abstract 
This thesis examines patterns of military mutinies in West and Central Africa 
from 1960 to 2012. The research explores the ways in which primarily rank and file 
soldiers express their discontent within a military structure. The view from the lower 
ranks has been neglected within research on African militaries, but is key to 
comprehending how militaries function, and particularly to understanding internal 
struggles which can threaten their ability to function effectively. The thesis 
differentiates mutinies from coups and makes the case that mutinies deserve 
scholarly attention separate from coups due to variations between the two events as 
regards participants, tactics, and goals. The research moves away from the more 
standard approach of viewing mutinies as singular, exceptional events, and instead 
examines mutinies as a recurring phenomenon in the region. Using an original fifty - 
two year dataset, the thesis examines trends in when and why mutinies most often 
occur in West and Central Africa. While there are a variety of factors that go into a 
unit's decision to revolt, the thesis identifies several situations that may serve as 
triggers for mutinies. Particular attention is paid to a trend of mutinies following 
deployments and the link between mutinies and democratization. The dataset is 
complemented by three case studies: Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, and The Gambia, 
developed through field research involving interviews with former mutineers and 
others familiar with the events. They allow for more detailed analysis of incidents of 
mutiny, including the perspective of those involved. 
The thesis shows that mutineers in West and Central Africa are usually driven 
by a combination of material demands and shared values concerning perceived 
injustice. Mutineers' complaints in West and Central Africa are often grounded in a 
history in which divisions between the ranks have increased as the military has 
become involved in politics. Close examination shows that mutinies are often based 
on larger issues than their initial grievance suggests. This helps explain why their 
impact is often more significant than might be expected. Using the dataset and case 
studies, the thesis analyzes trends in tactics used during mutinies. While some 
tactics have remained consistently popular amongst mutineers throughout the last 
half -century, the largest change in tactics involves the incorporation of media and 
new technologies into mutinies. Despite tactical shifts over the last couple of 
decades, `traditional' and new tactics share a common goal of communication. This 
thesis will demonstrate that mutinies serve as a method by which soldiers attempt to 
open a dialogue with their hierarchy and vocalize their expectations, in an 
environment that intentionally stifles the voices of the junior members. 
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Chapter One- Introduction 
1.1. The Popular Intrigue and Academic Neglect of Mutinies 
Militaries have played a significant role in shaping post- independent African 
states and there is a correspondingly large amount of academic literature on African 
militaries. Within this research coups d'état have been a primary focus as 
researchers have struggled to determine why Africa has experienced more coups than 
any other continent over the last half century.' The large number of successful coups 
has led to another important concentration, the military as political leaders.2 With no 
shortage of case studies to draw from, academics have proposed various typologies 
to help identify different ways military regimes have ruled once in control of a state.3 
Despite a variety of military leadership styles, there is a general consensus that 
military heads of state overall have not had a stronger record than civilians in 
economic management or the advancement of political and civil liberties.4 In recent 
decades academic research, as well as policy analysis, has shifted focus to military 
disengagement from politics.' In contrast to studies of the military's political 
behavior, there have been fewer studies on their military behavior.6 However, 
military capabilities have gained some traction among researchers in relation to 
sustained civil wars and multinational missions in recent years.' Within the wide 
I Jonathan M Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New 
Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2 (2011): 249 -259. 
2 There have been at least 88 successful coups on the continent between 1952 and 2012. Issaka K 
Souaré, "The African Union as a norm entrepreneur on military coups d'etat in African (1952- 2012): 
an empirical assessment," The Journal Of Modern African Studies 52, no. 1 (March 2014): 60 -94. 
3 Some examples include W.F. Gutteridge, Military Regimes in Africa (Suffolk:Methuen & Co. Ltd., 
1975); Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1976). 
4 Paul Nugent, Africa Since Independence 2 "d Ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 261 -263. 
5 Some examples include Claude E. Welch, "Military Disengagement form Politics: Lessons from 
West Africa," Armed Forces & Society 9, 4 (Summer 1983): 541 -554; George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Pita 
Ogaba Agbese, eds. The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and 
Constitutional Control (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004). 
6 Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001): 2. 
7 For example, there have been in -depth studies of military performance at the tactical and operational 
level for peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, such as `Funmi Olonisakin, 
Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008). 
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range of studies of military activities in Africa, which span numerous disciplines, 
military mutinies have been consistently neglected. 
Mutinies are by no means an innovation among soldiers and therefore the 
lack of attention cannot be attributed to novelty. Mark Weitz argues that "mutiny is 
as old as soldiering," with the first recorded case of mutiny occurring amongst 
Roman troops in the first century CE.8 Yet neither is the tactic outdated. As 
Raymond Callahad explains, mutinies are "one of the constants in the history of 
military organizations. "9 One needs only to look back over the last couple years in 
West Africa to support the idea that mutinies are an "unfailingly timely topic" within 
military studies.10 
However despite their persistence throughout history, mutinies are a topic 
that military personnel, particularly officers, are not keen to discuss. Military 
historian Richard Watt dramatically portrays this when he explained that "a mutiny is 
like a horrible, malignant disease and the chances that the patient will die an 
agonizing death are so great, that the subject cannot be mentioned aloud. "" Rather 
than declare the dreaded word, military commanders use a variety of other terms to 
describe the act. For example, militaries often instead refer to the action as an 
"incident," "strike," "protest," "disaffection," or in a recent case amongst American 
soldiers in Iraq, a "temporary breakdown in discipline." 12 Although commanders are 
uneasy with the topic, there is also an ongoing intrigue with mutinies that extends 
beyond just military historians and has inspired numerous fictional novels as well as 
classic Hollywood films such as Mutiny on the Bounty and The Caine Mutiny. Jane 
Hathaway explains the dual fascination and fear that surrounds mutinies by stating 
"mutiny is surely one of the most terrifying, yet fascinating, forms of rebellion since 
s Mark Weitz, "Desertion as Mutiny: Upcountry Georgians in the Army of Tennessee," in Rebellion, 
Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective, ed. Jane Hathaway (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 2001): 3. 
9 Raymond Callahan, "The Indian Army, Total War and the Dog that Didn't Bark in the Night," 
Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective, ed. Jane Hathaway 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001): 119. 
19 Jane Hathaway, "Introduction" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative 
Perspective, ed. Jane Hathaway (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001), XI. 
Richard Watt, Dare Call it Treason (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963): 155 -156 in Elihu Rose, 
"The Anatomy of Mutiny," Armed Forces and Society, 8 No. 4 (Summer 1982): 561. 
12 Elihu Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," Armed Forces and Society, 8 No. 4 (Summer 1982): 568; 
latter quote from Julie Rawe, Christopher Allbritton, Alice Jackson Baughn, and Constance E. 
Richards, "Mutiny on the Convoy ?" Time Magazine, October 25, 2004, accessed September 10, 
2013, http: / /www.time.com/ time/ magazine /article /0,9171,995475,00.html 
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it erupts within the very military institutions that are supposed to ensure a society's 
order and security." 13 
Given the long history of mutinies, the concern they raise among the military, 
and the popular interest they inspire, it is surprising that there is limited academic 
work on the topic. Howard Coombs notes the deficit by stating, "rigorous study of 
military protest is long overdue. "14 Similarly Hathaway explains that "scholarship 
on mutiny is so underdeveloped that a synthetic treatment of the topic, giving due 
weight to the many possible meanings and manifestations of mutiny, is not yet 
conceivable. "15 Existing literature on mutinies is dominated by individual case 
studies, with few studies that look at mutinies as an ongoing phenomenon. 
The "first book to take up mutiny as a topic of comparative inquiry" was 
published as recently as 2001.16 While this work significantly adds to the 
understanding of mutiny as a military tactic, it also admittedly lacks attention to 
African mutinies. The editor explains that the one "regret" of the edition "is the 
absence of chapters treating mutinies in Africa. "17 She goes on to state "One can 
only hope [that other volumes will] give due space to mutinies in various African 
societies. "18 However, this hope has not come to fruition and there remain few 
studies focused on African mutinies, especially in a post -colonial context. 
The general neglect of research on African mutinies does not represent a lack 
of mutinies on the continent. Colonial powers were challenged by mutinies within 
the Gold Coast Artillery Corps in 1858 and 1863, Sudanese troops in 1897 -1898, the 
Royal Niger Constabulary in 1898, the Sierra Leone Frontier Force in 1900, and the 
West African Regiment in 1901.19 There were also mutinies leading up to the end of 
13 Hathaway, "Introduction" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative 
Perspective, XI. 
14 Howard G. Coombs, "Introduction" in The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant: Case Studies of 
Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to Present, ed. Howard G Coombs (Ontario,Canada: 
Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), 16. 
15 Hathaway, "Introduction" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative 
Perspective, XII. 
16 Ibid., X1. 
17 Ibid., XVII. 
iA Ibid. 
19 Festus B. Aboagye, The Ghana Army: A Concise Contemporary Guide to its Centennial Regimental 
History, 1897 -1999 (Accra: Sedco Publishing Limited, 1999): 95 -96; David Killingray, The Mutiny 
of the West African Regiment in the Gold Coast, 1901," International Journal of African Historical 
Studies, 16, no. 3(1983): 443. 
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the colonial period as well as during World War II.Z° In 1944 soldiers in Belgian 
Congo plotted an unsuccessful mutiny against low pay and poor health conditions 
and later carried through with an uprising opposing mandatory smallpox 
vaccinations.21 The same year Senegalese soldiers mutinied in Dakar to demand 
back wages, better food and housing.22 This mutiny, and subsequent massacre of 
many of the mutineers, is depicted in the movie Camp de Thiaroye (1988), directed 
by Ousmane Sembene. The Somali Camel Corps was particularly known for their 
rebellious behaviour and conducted mutinies over pay and conditions in 1937 and 
1944.23 In assessing a number of these mutinies, John Iliffe notes, "African colonial 
troops used mutiny both as collective bargaining and to defend their honour." 24 My 
analysis of post- colonial mutinies will demonstrate that modern mutinies in Africa 
have similar aims. 
African mutinies gained some popular and academic attention in the early 
1960s when a series of mutinies followed quickly after independence. Congolese 
soldiers wasted little time in initiating their first post -colonial mutiny just days after 
the country gained independence.25 Soldiers in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda also 
orchestrated mutinies soon after independence.26 A series of mutinies, spread over 
several months, which preceded the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution have also received 
academic attention.27 However, beyond these examples there are a limited number of 
studies of mutinies in recent decades in Africa, perhaps giving the impression that 
mutinies -have decreased since the 1960s and 1970s. My research shows that 
mutinies have neither decreased since the early independence years nor is there an 
end in sight to the tactic. However, there have been changes in the tactics used in 
mutinies over the last several decades, particularly the increased use of media by 
mutineers, which Chapter Two will examine. Additionally, mutinies continue to 
20 Timothy H. Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2003): 13. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Jama Mohamed, "The 1937 Somaliland Camel Corps Mutiny: A Contrapuntal 
Reading." International Journal of African Historical Studies 33, no. 3 (2000): 100. 
24 
John Iliffe, Honour in African History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 241. 
25 
Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960- December 1961 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1965). 
26 Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa. 
27 Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopia Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009): 34 -44; Robin Luckham, "Radical Soldiers, New Model Armies and Nation -State in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea" in Political Armies: The Military and National Building in the Age of 
Democracy, eds. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (London: Zed Books, 2002): 238 -266. 
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have major consequences for African states. For example, mutinies in Burkina Faso 
in 2011 led to the largest government changes in President Compaoré's twenty -five 
year reign and a mutiny in Mali in 2012 preceded a coup which ended over two 
decades of democratic transitions of power. 
1.2 Research Questions and Contributions 
Mutinying is exceptional behaviour with potentially severe consequences for 
individuals, militaries, and states. The act is universally illegal, often carrying a 
potential sentence of capital punishment for the mutineers, making it a highly risky 
decision for soldiers. My research examines when and why soldiers in West and 
Central Africa decide to make the risky choice to mutiny and how they typically 
carry out the act. These questions are intentionally broad, partially due to the lack of 
research on the topic, particularly in an African context. There is no existing 
published dataset to provide the most basic information about mutinies in Africa, 
such as how many have occurred, what the soldiers commonly demand and what 
tactics they use to make their demands. While the lack of existing data and research 
on African mutinies was often challenging, it also allowed for the opportunity to 
explore broader themes which have not yet been examined in other research. 
When I began the research I had an initial hypothesis that mutinies would 
follow patterns; however I had few ideas of what those patterns would be. My goal 
was to collect original data on mutinies, both through a dataset covering a large time 
frame and geographic region as well as through several case studies in order to look 
for trends within the data. I was specifically looking for trends in when soldiers 
mutiny and how they mutiny in order to provide new insight into why soldiers 
choose this tactic. Many of the patterns that I observed after data collection 
surprised me and led me into fields I had not intended to focus on from the start. For 
example, the trends I observed within my mutiny dataset caused me to further 
examine mutinies in relation to peacekeeping and democracy (the themes of 
Chapters Three and Four). 
My research provides a new look at ways in which primarily rank and file 
soldiers express their discontent within a military structure. This view from the 
lower ranks is one that has been neglected within research but is key to 
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comprehending how militaries function, and particularly in understanding internal 
struggles which can threaten their ability to function effectively.28 My research is 
original because it examines mutinies as a recurring phenomenon in West and 
Central Africa, rather than the more common approach of viewing them as singular, 
exceptional events. I suggest that there are common situations and problems within 
military organizations that heighten the chance of mutinies throughout the region. 
Understanding common triggers to mutinies is the first step to developing ways to 
reduce them, a goal that governments, military leaders, and even rank and file 
soldiers would likely support. 
1.3 A Revised View of Mutinies 
This thesis has two overarching themes. The first is that mutineers are 
usually driven by a combination of material demands and shared values concerning 
perceived injustice. Mutinies therefore usually represent much larger issues than the 
initial demands suggest and regularly have larger impacts than the immediate 
mutiny. Secondly, soldiers use mutinies to communicate with senior leadership. 
Through the mutiny they attempt to open a dialogue with their hierarchy and 
vocalize their expectations. Together these themes challenge the standard way in 
which mutinies are often viewed, either as pay disputes or acts of indiscipline. 
Instead, -I argue that they should more accurately be viewed as soldiers 
communicating deeper perceptions of tensions and injustices within a military 
environment. 
These themes have similarities with observations found in studies of mutinies 
in regions outside of Africa in both historical and more modern times. This section 
will situate these themes in wider research on mutinies. As previously mentioned, 
there is limited research on African mutinies and thus most of this review of 
literature will involve research from a non -African context. The overlap between the 
themes of my research on modern African mutinies and others' research on (mostly) 
28 Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, "Introduction," in The Military and Militarism in Africa, 
eds. Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1998): VI; Robin Luckham, "The 
Military, Militarisation and Democratisation in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues," in The 
Military and Militarism in Africa, eds. Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily (Dakar: CODESRIA, 
1998): 22 -23. 
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Western mutinies from a historic context suggest that there are some universal traits 
to mutinies. However, section 1.6 will also show that there are significant 
differences, particularly in when and how soldiers in West and Central Africa 
mutiny. 
Despite the widely different context in which mutinies have occurred over 
time, they share a universal trait of challenging authority and this makes them 
universally feared by military commanders. Militaries are founded on a system of 
discipline, which is based on strict hierarchy.29 Within any military hierarchy there 
are two distinct sectors: enlisted soldiers and officers.30 The enlisted ranks make up 
a bulk of the personnel in nearly all militaries and there are few opportunities for 
enlisted ranks to move into the officer corps.31 The enlisted ranks serve as the 
"physical production of force," while officers are responsible for the directive 
function.32 In the words of Samuel Huntington, the enlisted specialize in the 
application of violence, while the officers are the managers of violence.33 Enlisted 
ranks are always subordinate to the officer corps and required to show obedience to 
their superiors. 
When soldiers mutiny they challenge their superiors and directly contradict 
the foundation of a military structure. As Elihu Rose explains, a mutiny "is more 
than a breach of regulations; it is a negation of the military essence. "34 He argues 
mutinies are "the antithesis of discipline ", and therefore they are detested by 
militaries universally. However, this thesis will challenge the idea of mutiny as the 
"antithesis of discipline" and show that there is often a level of discipline within 
mutinies. Additionally, mutinies should not be seen as an attack on the hierarchy but 
29 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 562. 
30 This system is universally used in militaries; however the terminology can vary by country (and 
even vary within different branches in the same country). The terms "ranks," "other ranks," and "rank 
and file" all refer to enlisted soldiers, while "officers" refers to commissioned officers, which make up 
the officer corps. For those unfamiliar with military hierarchies, confusion may come about with the 
term "non- commissioned officers" (NCOs). These are the top levels of the enlisted ranks but they are 
not part of the officer corps and are always subordinate to commissioned officers. 
31 Guinea Bissau is one exception as they currently have more officers than enlisted ranks. However, 
this is highly unusual. Birgit Embaló, "Civil- military relations and political order in Guinea -Bissau," 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 50, no. 2 (June 2012): 257. 
32 Eboe Hutchful, "Institutional Decomposition and Junior Ranks' Political Action in Ghana," in The 
Military and Militarism in Africa, eds. Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bath ily (Dakar: CODESRIA, 
1998): 248. 
33 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil- Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957): 18. 
34 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 562 -563. 
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an objection to particular individuals or behaviours within that hierarchy. This is 
consistent with research on other African mutinies. For example, Nestor Luanda 
found that during the Tanganyika mutinies in 1964 there were "continual efforts of 
the mutineers to recreate (rather than destroy) hierarchy." 35 
Generally, mutinies are viewed by military authorities and non -specialists as 
being primarily sparked by mundane material issues such as pay, living conditions, 
and food. The grievances are regularly seen as "basic and immediate. "36 Although 
material grievances may be easy to understand, recent scholarship on mutinies from 
a worldwide perspective has at times criticized both military commanders and the 
more classic academic studies of mutinies for an over -emphasis on the material 
grievances, which paint a deceptively simple explanation of mutiny. Focusing too 
heavily on such grievances is unhelpful in assessing how or when soldiers decide to 
mutiny. Christopher Ankersen questions at what point "things get bad enough" for 
soldiers to decide to mutiny.37 This is a particularly relevant question for West and 
Central African militaries because there are ample opportunities for grievances 
among rank and file soldiers in most states in the region. At any given time, soldiers 
in the region could find fault with their uniforms, equipment, housing, food, or 
salaries. Still, we do not see rank and file soldiers in Africa in constant revolt, nor 
are mutinies limited to times of extreme hardship, suggesting that there are other 
aspects beyond material conditions that contribute to the decision to mutiny. 
Ankersen argues that one reason why the material school of thought has long 
been dominant is that rank and file soldiers have historically been less educated and 
from lower- socioeconomic classes and often treated as unsophisticated, both within 
academia and military organizations. Therefore, when they mutiny it is also viewed 
as an unsophisticated, instantaneous reaction, rather than a planned and logical 
protest.38 This observation can be applied to an African context as well, where "the 
35 Nestor Luanda, "The Tanganyika Rifles and the Mutiny of January 1964," in The Military and 
Militarism in Africa, Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, eds. (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1998): 203. 
36 Geoffrey Parker, "Forward" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative 
Perspective, ed. Jane Hathaway (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001): viii. 
37 Christopher Ankersen, "Beyond Mutiny? - Instrumental and Expressive Understandings of 
Contemporary 'Collective Indiscipline "' in The Unwilling and the Reluctant: Theoretical Perspectives 
on Disobedience in the Military, ed. Craig Leslie Mantle (Ontario, Canadian Defence Academy Press, 
2006): 121. 
38 Ankersen, "Beyond Mutiny? - Instrumental and Expressive Understandings of Contemporary 
'Collective Indiscipline, "' 123. 
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ranks have remained invisible, in theory as well as in research. "39 There has been 
little academic attention on the corporate claims and material conditions in the life of 
ordinary soldiers in Africa, perhaps suggesting a notion that their actions are not as 
worthy of the analysis that has been given to the officer corps.4° The tendency to 
downplay or simplify actions by rank and file soldiers may help explain the lack of 
attention to mutinies within literature on African militaries. 
Another cause for the heavy focus on material issues may be "institutional 
vanity. "41 Rose explains that mutinies are "antithetical to an ethos whose 
fundamental tenets are duty, loyalty, honour, and patriotism, and the unit that 
participates in a mutiny brings discredit upon itself, its officers, and its service. "42 It 
is therefore more convenient for military leadership to make claims that mutineers 
are primarily material- driven than to address issues that may bring dishonour to the 
organization, particularly the officer corps, and thus undermine its key tenets. 
Regardless of why there is a preference to focus on material aspects of 
mutinies, there is a consensus among many who have recently written about mutinies 
that we must look beyond "the mundane material grievances that have become 
cliché" in order to discover the less tangible motivations.43 In Rose's "categories of 
discontent" he describes these non -material grievances as issues of legitimacy, which 
"stems from the belief by the troops that an aspect of their service is unacceptable for 
ethical, moral, intellectual, or political reasons. "44 Ankersen labels them as 
`existential issues,' which he defines as the desire of soldiers to feel that they are 
valued and not being taken for granted. 4' Like these authors, I also believe that 
soldiers are usually motivated to mutiny by values concerning what they believe is 
unfair treatment and irresponsible behaviour by superiors within a military context.46 
The case studies in particular will provide details to these feelings of injustice, which 
are often not clearly portrayed in media reporting of the events. 
se Hutchful and Bathily, "Introduction," The .Military and Militarism in Africa, VI. 
40 Luckham, "The Military, Militarisation and Democratisation in Africa: A Survey of Literature and 
Issues," 22 -23. 
41 Ankersen, "Beyond Mutiny? - Instrumental and Expressive Understandings of Contemporary 
`Collective Indiscipline, "' 124. 
42 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 563. 
43 Hathaway, "Introduction" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative 
Perspective, XV. 
44 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 566. 
45 Ankersen, "Beyond Mutiny? - Instrumental and Expressive Understandings of Contemporary 
`Collective Indiscipline, "' 122. 
46 Ibid. 
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Along the same lines of Ankersen's question about what makes material 
conditions "bad enough," one could also question when are perceptions of injustice 
"unacceptable enough" to trigger a mutiny? This is a complex question, with no 
singular answer. Just as mutinies do not only occur when salary payments are late, 
neither do they occur simply because officers suddenly begin to act poorly. My 
research suggests that by observing trends within the occurrence of mutinies, we can 
identify shifts in shared beliefs of what soldiers find acceptable as well as what they 
believe they are entitled to. Furthermore, I will demonstrate two situations in which 
the views of acceptable treatment by superiors among soldiers appears to shift at the 
same time that material grievances also increase, causing the perfect conditions for 
mutiny. This occurred in West and Central Africa during the democratization period 
of the 1990s. Chapter Three will argue that the democratization movement inspired 
an altered sense of expectations within the military which drew from many of the 
demands made by civilians at the time. Just as civilians were increasingly focused 
on issues of accountability among politicians, so too were soldiers towards their 
superiors. This occurred at a time in which economic constraints also led to 
increased economic hardships for the soldiers. The overlap between civilian and 
military demands is not limited to the 1990s and Chapter Seven will show a similar 
trend in recent mutinies in Burkina Faso. Chapter Four will demonstrate another 
pattern of altered expectations alongside increased hardships but this time as a result 
of deployment experiences. Amongst soldiers there appears to be a heightened sense 
of injustice surrounding a lack of pay for veterans than there is for soldiers who are 
stationed at home. In the case of deployments, the sense of injustice appears linked 
to perceptions of a broken contract. 
This thesis will show that material grievances and perceptions of injustice are 
closely intertwined. For example, accusations made by rank and file soldiers over 
corruption by officers are also usually linked to suspicions that their payment delays 
are due to corrupt practices. Understanding that material grievances are often 
working in conjunction with feelings of injustice helps explain why mutineers' 
actions often appear disproportionately risky to their material demands. For 
example, Chapter Six will detail a mutiny in The Gambia over 15 days pay. The risk 
taken for a relatively small amount of money may seem illogical in a material sense 
but becomes more understandable when viewed as an attempt to alter the behaviour 
10 
of the hierarchy into a manner which they find acceptable and which could 
potentially have longer term benefits. These soldiers not only demanded their pay 
but also insisted that the officers who were responsible for the delay be held 
responsible. 
Additionally, when mutinies are seen as more complex than requests for 
material demands, it becomes easier to see why they often have much larger 
consequences than the immediate mutiny. Addressing material complaints is a fairly 
easy task; however the deeper divisions of mistrust, suspicion, and disrespect that 
often accompany the mutiny are much harder to fix and can create long lasting 
divides within a military. The idea that even seemingly small mutinies can have 
great effects is a theme in my research that I share with other scholars studying 
mutinies. For example, Geoffrey Parker's work on mutinies within the Spanish army 
between 1572 and 1607 showed that even though the soldiers lacked political 
motivations, their actions had political significance.47 Although looking at a very 
different case than Parker, Ali Mazrui and Donald Rothchild make a similar 
observation about the East African mutinies in 1964. They explain, "Army mutinies, 
even when concerned with pay, have an importance that extends beyond the mutinies 
themselves. They have repercussions which always exceed the intentions of the 
mutineers. "48 Similarly Rose, looking at mutinies from a broad perspective, states, 
"The military may regard mutiny as a purely internal matter but its effect can easily 
spill over the institutional boundaries and affect society at large. "49 
The image of mutinies exposing deeper discontent is closely linked to the 
other key theme of my thesis- communication. When mutinies are viewed as 
demands for material items or as acts of indiscipline, the mutiny is "normally 
summarily addressed by the authorities with little introspection concerning the 
genesis of the event. "50 Instead I will argue that it is more valuable to view mutinies 
as a form of communication, in which mutineers are taking a great risk to convey a 
47 Geoffrey Parker, "Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders 1527- 1607," Past & 
Present, no. 58 (Feb. 1973): 47. 
48 Ali A. Mazrui and Donald Rothchild, "The Soldier and the State in East Africa: Some Theoretical 
Conclusions on the Army Mutinies of 1964," The Western Political Quarterly 20, no. 1 (Mar 1967): 
82. 
49 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 572. 
50 Howard G. Coombs., "Dimensions of Military Leadership: The Kinmel Park Mutiny of 4-5 March 
1919," in The Apathetic and the Defiant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1812 to 
1919, ed. Craig Leslie Mantle (Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy, 2007): 407. 
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message to their hierarchy. Military hierarchies intentionally stifle communication 
and direct it in a one -way manner down the chain of command, thus giving rank and 
file soldiers few means to communicate their grievances to higher authority, 
especially if their grievances involve their immediate seniors. Mutinies are used by 
(mostly) junior soldiers, as a way to open a dialogue with senior leadership in an 
environment in which the voices of the lowest in the structure are often unheard. 
My analysis of common tactics amongst African mutineers will show that the 
main purpose of their actions is to draw attention and communicate a message. 
While some of the more recent studies also note that mutinies "can be visualized as a 
form of communication through collective action," it is not the dominant way of 
thinking about mutinies, especially amongst military personnel. For example, in an 
official investigation into one of the only notable mutinies among the British Royal 
Navy during World War II, there seems to be surprise in the report which states "no 
particular precautions were taken to keep this meeting [about common grievances] 
secret" and suggests that "the men in fact wanted it to be discovered. "51 My research 
suggests that it is not uncommon for soldiers to openly discuss complaints and the 
idea of mutiny. This is understandable if one views mutiny as a mode of 
communication in which the function is to convey a message, not keep it a secret. 
Additionally, there is an element of bluff in the pre- warnings mutineers often give as 
soldiers seem to hope even the hint of a mutiny will be enough to bring attention to 
their grievances (and examples throughout this thesis will show that it often works). 
I will focus particularly on how mutineers utilize the media as a mode of 
communication, an aspect that is changing quickly with new forms of media and one 
that has been neglected in other research on mutinies. The thesis will look both at 
mutinies as a form of communication and how soldiers communicate their 
grievances during the mutiny. It will show that the messages portrayed both by the 
mutineers themselves and through the act of mutinying allow for a unique glimpse 
into the tensions within the military, which are often hidden internally by strict 
hierarchy and externally by a military culture of exclusivity. 
51 Christopher Bell, "Mutiny and the Royal Canadian Navy" in The Unwilling and the Reluctant: 
Theoretical Perspectives on Disobedience in the Milita .'y, ed. Craig Leslie Mantle (Ontario, Canadian 
Defence Academy Press, 2006): 97. 
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1.4 Identifying Mutiny 
Scholars who write about mutinies share a common frustration with defining 
the term. On one end of the spectrum are authors like Craig Mantle, whose edited 
volume simply states that "unlike nearly every other work on the subject, this volume 
will neither argue about nor dwell on the definitions" instead leaving the term open 
to a wide variety of actions.52 On the other end is Christopher Bell, who not only 
defines mutinies but also creates sub -categories of various different kinds of mutinies 
(minor, major, seizure of power, and secession).53 However, most authors fall 
somewhere in between, by providing a definition but also noting that exceptions to 
the definition are likely. For example, Hathaway explains that the "ambiguous" 
meaning of the term was an obstacle to their edited volume and as a result "Part I" of 
the book is titled "Problems in Defining Mutiny. "54 Elihu Rose and Timothy Parsons 
both devote attention to debating the topic in their writings, while others such as Joel 
Hamby prefer to quote directly from military codes of conduct of given countries. 
The debate around the definition of mutiny centres on its vagueness. Dean Black 
explains that mutiny is "the accepted legal term for almost every refusal to obey 
orders. "55 Therefore, vastly different actions can fall into the category of mutiny. 
While scholars often disagree about the particulars of what constitutes a 
mutiny, Rose's definition, based on its first use in 16th century France, seems to be 
generally accepted as a starting point for classifying mutiny. He defines a mutiny as 
"an act of collective insubordination, in which troops revolt against lawfully 
constituted authority. "56 There are several key aspects to this definition. One is the 
word `collective,' which shows that a mutiny must involve a group of soldiers. A 
single individual who refuses orders is guilty of insubordination but a group who acts 
together can be charged with mutiny. Additionally, the definition indicates that 
mutinies involve soldiers who are currently a part of the state's security structure 
52 Craig Leslie Mantle, "Introduction" in The Unwilling and the Reluctant: Theoretical Perspectives 
on Disobedience in the Military, ed. Craig Leslie Mantle (Ontario, Canadian Defence Academy Press, 
2006): 3. 
5' Christopher Bell, "Mutiny and the Royal Canadian Navy," 88. 
54 Hathaway, "Introduction" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative 
Perspective, XII. 
55 Dean C. Black, "Murder by Spitfire? Probing for Mutiny and Indiscipline in Canada's Second 
World War Air Force," in The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant: Case Studies of Canadian 
Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to Present, ed. Howard G. Coombs (Ontario,Canada: Canadian 
Defence Academy Press, 2007): 146. 
56 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 561. 
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revolting against their legitimate authority figures who are also part of the structure. 
This is important because it helps distinguish a mutiny from a rebellion, in which the 
aggressors may be targeting official authorities but doing so from the outside. The 
fact that mutineers are still employed by the military, and generally want to keep that 
status, is an important trait that guides their tactics. 
My study will add to Rose's definition and identify mutinies as an act of 
collective insubordination, in which troops revolt against lawfully constituted 
authority in order to express primary grievances other than the desire for political 
power. While the term `mutiny' generally implies an expression of corporate 
grievances, not the desire for direct political power I felt it necessary to explicitly 
add this to the definition due to the prevalence of coups in the region I am studying. 
This addition helps differentiate mutinies from coups, a topic I will further elaborate 
on in the following section. It is possible to argue that my definition creates an 
artificial divide between mutinies and coups. However, to make sure that I am not 
reclassifying and reanalyzing coups or coup attempts as mutinies I have compared 
my own dataset to Patrick McGowan's dataset on coups and coup attempts, which 
shows a minimal number of overlapping cases. This data will be presented in more 
detail in section 1.9.4 of this chapter. 
1.5 Differentiating Coups and Mutinies 
The lack of academic research on African mutinies stands in stark contrast to 
extensive research on African coups d'état. Mutinies have received some attention 
among coup theorists; however, they are often only mentioned in their relation to 
coups. For example, Ruth First classified mutinies as the initial stage of a coup cycle 
and Robin Luckham explains that mutinies have been the first phase in the military's 
incursions into politics in Africa.57 Media reports are unhelpful in differentiating the 
two events, often claiming mutinies are coup attempts, even when there is little 
evidence of desire for political control. While there are certainly cases in which a 
mutiny can escalate to a political overthrow, my research will demonstrate that most 
57 Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'État (London: Penguin 
Press, 1970): 205; Luckham, "The Military, Militarisation and Democratisation in Africa: A Survey of 
Literature and Issues," 23 -24. 
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mutinies do not lead to coups or coup attempts. An underlying argument of my 
research is that mutinies and coups are inherently different events and thus coup 
research and theories are limited in their applicability to mutinies. While coup 
leaders and mutineers may have similar grievances, for example lack of promotion 
opportunities, the manner in which they attempt to address their grievances is very 
different, as further explained below. 
The most basic distinction between mutinies and coups is found in the 
definitions of the two events. A coup is defined as 
events in which existing regimes are suddenly and illegally displaced 
by the action of relatively small groups in which members of the 
military, police, or security forces of the state play a key role, either 
on their own or in conjunction with a number of civil servants or 
politicians.58 
While definitions of mutinies vary, they never stipulate that mutinies require the 
removal of a regime. 
The differences go beyond just the definition to include variations in 
participants, tactics, and goals. Although both coups and mutinies involve the 
military, they typically originate from different sectors of the military. Coups 
generally originate from the officer ranks while mutinies usually include mostly rank 
and file soldiers.59 Craig Jenkins and Augustine Kposowa explain, "the major 
architects of African coups have been those with significant power, not [those] on the 
periphery of the system. "60 By contrast, mutinies in Africa are almost the complete 
opposite. They originate at the periphery and typically focus their grievances against 
those with significant power. Even in cases where officers have been involved in the 
mutiny, they are generally officers who lack close links to the ruling political 
structures. Chapter Five will show an example of this through the case study of 
Sierra Leone. 
58 Patrick J. McGowan, "African Military coups d'etat, 1956 -2001: Frequency, Trends and 
Distribution." The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 3 (2003): 343. 
59 Jimmy Kandeh, Coups From Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillian, 2004): 43; There is some flexibility in this pattern, as senior enlisted soldiers 
and junior officers at times participate in both coups and mutinies. However it is safe to say that 
junior enlisted would be unlikely to orchestrate a coup just as senior officers rarely start a mutiny. 
60 Craig J. Jenkins and Augustine J Kposowa. "Political Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic 
Competition, Military Centrality, and Struggle over the Postcolonial State." International Studies 
Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992): 290. 
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In addition to the particular actors, the number of participants varies between 
the two events. A coup typically includes very few individuals, at least in the 
planning phases. 61 Coups are intended to be exclusive and secretive.62 In a coup 
"the conspiratorial strike is the secret to its success, not the mobilization of popular 
masses. "63 Mutinies are exactly the reverse. Mutineers want to include many 
participants and are generally seen to gain strength with increased numbers. 
Mutinies risk failure without many participants; coups risk failure with too many 
participants. 
Since a coup can be conducted with very few individuals, the act itself does 
not require any approval beyond those involved. A mutiny must draw a larger 
number of participants and therefore the grievance must have some level of popular 
appeal amongst their peers. This is a significant difference between a coup and a 
mutiny because it also relates to the motive. A coup can be conducted for individual 
personal greed and power.64 A small group of individuals can be the sole 
beneficiaries of a coup. A mutiny must appeal to the larger mass and its goals mist 
benefit a wider group. This is not to imply that mutinies cannot involve greed as 
well. However, a mutiny is more likely to be initiated over a communal grievance. 
As previously mentioned, there are different goals when soldiers conduct a 
coup compared to when they conduct a mutiny. The former want political control, 
while the latter want a specific grievance addressed. Coups can be seen as an `all or 
nothing' scenario in which they strive to take complete political control. Mutinies 
want their grievances addressed and their conditions improved but are usually more 
flexible in how their concerns are addressed. As will be explained throughout this 
thesis in greater detail, the tactics used by mutineers are designed to extract 
concessions or negotiations and are thus different from the zero -sum mentality of 
soldiers that attempt coups. The flexibility of mutinies and their longer timeframe 
often makes them less unpredictable during the execution phase than coups. The 
goals of mutineers are often more vague and shift over time and the size of the group 
can change as other units join. Their tactics also shift, usually escalating the level of 
violence and threats. 
61 Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook (London: Penguin Press, 1968): 24. 
6'- Kandeh, Coups From Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa, 43. 
G3 First, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat, 19. 
64 Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style, 20 -21. 
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While differentiating coups from mutinies, my research will also show that in 
practice the two events are often interrelated.65 I agree with Parsons' explanation 
that there is a "broad continuum of indiscipline in the military...One form can lead to 
another, or each type of indiscipline can remain a separate and discreet incident. "66 
Mutinies can escalate to a coup when soldiers' demands are not met or when a 
zealous member decides to take control. Alternatively, a series of mutinies can lead 
to a "creeping coup," as was the case in Ethiopia in 1974.67 This gray area between 
coups and mutinies has led to a shorthand used by scholars who avoid categorizing 
the action by combining the terms, such as Luckham's description of events in Sierra 
Leone in 1968 as "the coup- mutiny" or Boubacar N'Diaye's identification of events 
in Guinea in 1996 as "mutiny /coup. "68 The case study of Sierra Leone, Chapter 
Five, will demonstrate the blurred lines between the two events. 
I will refer to aspects of coup theories throughout the thesis to highlight 
similarities or differences in my observations of mutinies. Additionally, coup 
research has helped guide the scope of my research, as will be described in the 
section 1.7. However, I argue that mutinies deserve detailed scholarly work, which 
treats these incidents as distinct from coups. Examining mutinies as a separate 
phenomenon from coups, adds more depth to our understanding of this continuum of 
indiscipline and a more nuanced understanding of the various ways African 
militaries make demands and challenge authority. 
1.6 Unique Aspects of Modern African Mutinies 
My observations while studying African mutinies and the observations of 
others working on non -African cases have similarities in relation to the function of 
mutinies within a military context and their potential impact. However, other 
65 Kandeh, Coups From Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa, 40; Luckham, 
"The Military, Militarisation and Democratisation in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues," 17; 
Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa, 5. 
66 Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa, 5. 
67 Robin Luckham, "Radical Soldiers, New Model Armies and Nation -State in Ethiopia and Eritrea," 
243. 
68 Luckham, "The Military, Militarisation and Democratisation in Africa: A Survey of Literature and 
Issues," 23; Boubacar N'Diaye "Guinea" in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, 
eds. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye, and `Funmi Olonisakin (Geneva Centre for Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces, 2008): 143. 
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existing studies are much less useful in attempting to understand when and how 
soldiers in West and Central Africa mutiny. The few case studies of African 
mutinies are simply too limited to provide a broader assessment and non -African 
studies are actually misleading when applied to an African context. Below I will 
examine several of the key differences between observations I have made about 
African mutinies and those made in other studies of non -African cases. By doing so 
the need for studies specifically pertaining to African mutinies becomes clear, as the 
existing mutiny literature is often limited in its applicability to an African context. 
One difference is that much of the analysis of Western mutinies is specific to 
combat scenarios, particularly when soldiers refuse orders during a combat situation. 
Parsons explains "most cases of collective indiscipline in Western national armies 
occurred when danger of active combat broke down institutional prohibitions on 
insubordination and mutiny. "69 Hamby shares this belief and created a "mutiny 
wagon wheel" which details what he feels are the eight reasons for mutinies. 
However his analysis is specific to "troops who are about to enter or actually 
engaged in fighting. "70 The vast majority of mutinies in my dataset do not occur 
within a combat setting. It is possible that combat mutinies occur in the region, 
however the types of records available from Western conventional warfare are 
typically not available for modern African combat scenarios. 
The focus on combat mutinies within other scholarship could give the 
impression that mutinies are largely confined to times of war. It is important to point 
out that in Africa this is not the case. Mutinies are a relevant topic in West and 
Central Africa regardless of whether the country is at war or peace. Some of the 
logic between causes of mutinies in combat settings can be applied to mutinies in 
non -combat. However, explanations that mutinies are largely a result of the 
battlefield conditions (such as fear, mental fatigue, sleep deprivation, etc.) are not as 
convincing in the mutinies examined in this thesis. Lawrence James links the 
prevalence of mutinies in world wars to the frequent use of conscripts who often had 
low morale due to the feelings of being "dragooned into service. "71 This explanation 
G9 Parsons, The 1961 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa, 8. 
70 Joel Hamby, "The Mutiny Wagon Wheel: A Leadership Model for Mutiny in Combat," Armed 
Forces and Society 28, no. 4 (Summer 2002): 576. 
71 Lawrence James, Mutiny in the British and Commonwealth Forces, 1797 -1956 (London: Buchan & 
Enright Publishers: 1987): 12. 
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in a modern African context does not hold weight as most countries in the region do 
not have a shortage of military recruits and do not rely on conscription. 
The focus on mutinies in times of war also portrays mutinies as spontaneous 
actions directly linked to immediate life -threatening combat scenarios. For example, 
in studies of Western historical mutinies by Geoffrey Parker and Guy Pedroncini, 
they each conclude that there were "few premeditated or purposeful acts of 
indiscipline. Instead most mutineers acted out of despair, fatigue, or momentary 
anger. "72 Conversely, in the mutinies that I analyzed, the acts were often 
premeditated with soldiers regularly warning leadership ahead of time of the 
possibility of mutiny. Chapter Two will demonstrate that the tactics used by 
mutineers indicate that they are not spur of the moment decisions, but rather planned 
actions with specific goals. This point will be furthered in Chapter Four, which 
shows that while mutinies correlate with peacekeeping missions, the mutineers most 
often revolt when they return home from the deployment, not while on the 
battlefront. 
Additionally, studies of mutinies in a Western context are often associated 
with navies.73 Naval mutinies are a particularly dramatic type of mutiny since the 
confined space and sea location put added pressure on commanders. The dataset in 
this thesis does include mutinies among navy personnel but none onboard ship. The 
prevalence of studies of mutinies onboard ships and combat mutinies show the image 
of mutinies generally contained within a military environment, usually not affecting 
civilians. However, this is another significant difference with modern African 
mutinies as they regularly occur in populated city centres and many have resulted in 
high civilian casualties. While mutinies have traditionally been seen as an internal 
military matter, my research argues that studying mutinies can further our 
understanding of the way internal military divisions can affect civilian populations. 
Additionally, Chapter Three will show that mutinies do not just affect civilian 
society but civilian society often influences soldiers' decision to mutiny. Therefore, 
civilian society will play a larger role in my study of African mutinies than in many 
other studies of mutinies in a non -African context. 
72 Parker, "Forward" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective, viii. 
73 Hamby, "The Mutiny Wagon Wheel: A Leadership Model for Mutiny in Combat," 596, Hathaway, 
"Introduction" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective, XII, 
Cornelis J. Lammers, "Strikes and Mutinies: A Comparative Study of Organizational Conflicts 
between Rulers and the Ruled," Administrative Science Quarterly 14, no. 4 (Dec. 1969): 570. 
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1.7 Scope of the Research 
The geographic scope of my research will be limited to West and Central 
African countries. Studies by McGowan and Johnson have shown West Africa to 
have the highest Total Military Intervention Scores, making it the region par 
excellence of the military coup d'état.74 While mutinies are not necessarily included 
in these scores, coups indicate a level of military indiscipline and dissatisfaction, 
which are qualities also associated with mutinies. When doing preliminary data 
collection I noticed that Central Africa had a very high prevalence of mutinies, with 
several significant cases. For example, Democratic Republic of Congo had the first 
post- independence mutiny and Central African Republic holds the record for the 
longest mutiny in the region. Combining West and Central Africa allows for a wider 
dataset with a variety of colonial backgrounds. While I cannot quantify the number 
of mutinies in the other regions in Africa, from my data collection I am confident 
that West and Central Africa have the highest rate of mutinies on the continent. 
Lastly, many of the most recent military incursions in African politics have occurred 
in West and Central Africa (Guinea coup in 2008, Niger coup in 2010, Côte d'Ivoire 
election standoff in 2010, Burkina Faso mutinies in 2011, Mali coup in 2012, Guinea 
Bissau coup in 2012, Central African Republic coup in 2013), showing that military 
indiscipline is a timely topic for this region. 
My dataset for this thesis includes the West African countries that are part of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Therefore I include 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea -Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. In terms of Central Africa I 
include Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, and Sao Tome and Principe. 
My research covers all branches of the armed forces including the 
gendarmerie. The role of the gendarmerie varies by country but in general they are 
74 McGowan, "African Military coups d'etat, 1956 -2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution," 356; 
Pat McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, "African Military Coups d'etat and Underdevelopment: A 
Quantitative Historical Analysis," The Journal of Modern African Studies 22, no. 4 (Dec. 1984): 649. 
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considered the policing force of the military. They are typically considered part of 
the armed forces, use a military rank structure and often fall under the control of the 
defence sector. I will not include police or paramilitary forces in my study, however 
police forces will be referred to throughout the research, particularly when they are 
assigned to counter a mutiny or when they conduct mutinies at the same time as the 
military. 
1.8 Research Design 
My research design takes two distinct but complementary approaches to 
examining mutinies. The first approach is a dataset that documents the occurrence of 
mutinies in West and Central Africa since independence. It uses mixed methodology 
to present both quantitative and qualitative data on mutinies. The second approach 
involves case studies of mutinies in three countries. The two -part research design 
allows for identification of broader patterns of mutinies across time while not 
neglecting the ground level perspective. Each approach on its own has potential 
weaknesses. The dataset identifies broad patterns but is less valuable for looking at 
the context of the mutiny, whereas the case studies are rich in context but alone 
difficult to make generalizations from. However, combining the two approaches 
allows for mutinies to be viewed as incidents that both follow general patterns but 
are also subject to nuance. 
Since my research design takes two distinct approaches to the topic, this 
methodology section will address each approach individually. It will start with an 
explanation of how I developed the mutiny dataset and discuss complications with 
the data. I will present my basic quantitative findings and more detailed analysis of 
the trends will be expanded on in later chapters. The latter part of this section will 
address my reasons for choosing the case study mutinies and explain how the data 
was collected to build these case studies. 
1.9 Mutiny Dataset 
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One of the largest challenges I encountered in analyzing patterns of mutinies 
is a lack of any numerical data on the incidents of mutiny. Despite the popularity 
within military studies for counting and calculating (whether it be number of troops, 
number of casualties, number of enemy tanks /missiles /planes, number of coups 
conducted), there are no existing counts, or even estimates, for mutinies. Therefore, I 
began my research by building such a dataset. This dataset is significant because it is 
the first attempt to document how many mutinies have occurred in an African region. 
However, it is more than a quantitative dataset, as each recorded incident of mutiny 
includes a corresponding qualitative description. This dataset will drive much of the 
analysis of how mutinies are typically conducted (Chapter Two) as well as when 
West and Central African soldiers most often mutiny (Chapters Three and Four). It 
will also help explain actions taken by mutineers in the case studies (Chapters Five to 
Seven) and show when those actions follow the pattern or veer from it. 
1.9.1 Building the Dataset 
The first step in building a dataset of mutinies is determining what criteria 
must be met to be considered a mutiny. In order for an event to be included in my 
dataset it must include the following traits: 1) a group of soldiers who remain within 
the state's military structure and 2) use mass insubordination to express stated 
grievances and goals beyond the desire for political power to higher political and 
military authorities. These two criteria are closely linked to the definition of mutiny 
presented earlier. A key trait of all the mutinies in my dataset is that soldiers 
expressed grievances to the government or military hierarchy with hopes that the 
government would respond in their favour. In other words, the first action was not to 
occupy State House. 
The best source for incidents of mutinies would likely be a state's internal 
military records. However, those are typically not available to researchers nor would 
I have been able to access the records for all the countries in my dataset. Therefore, 
the next best option was to look for incidents of mutiny documented in the media. I 
did a systematic review of every issue of Africa South of the Sahara, Africa 
Confidential, Africa Research Bulletin, and West Africa to identify cases of mutinies 
from independence to present day. These sources were chosen as my primary 
starting point due to their consistent and quality reporting on the region. I also 
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utilized the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project dataset, 
which documents and maps acts of political violence in Africa from 1997 onwards. 
Once I had identified an incident of mutiny I was able to do a more targeted search 
for additional information about the event. Additional information about the 
mutinies came from academic writing, memoirs, other news outlets, declassified and 
leaked intelligence reports, and interviews conducted during field research. 
Another important source of information was McGowan's dataset of coups, 
attempted coups, and coup plots. McGowan provided me with the extended 
unpublished version of his dataset, which documents coup -related events across the 
continent from 1957 -2003. His dataset serves as the basis for many other studies of 
coups. Access to this dataset allowed me to compare the incidents of coups to 
mutinies, as described earlier. Additionally, McGowan's dataset inspired the way in 
which I built and organized my dataset. His documentation also relies on media 
reporting and for each incident he includes a summary of the event. 
1.9.2 Analysis of the dataset 
Like McGowan, I have gathered qualitative data on each incident in my 
dataset. This amounted to hundreds of pages of data about the mutinies. In order to 
organize this data and observe patterns I used the qualitative data analysis computer 
software, NVivo. Within NVivo I created labels for the aspects of mutinies I was 
interested in. For example, some of my codes include location, leadership, tactics, 
examples of violence, government response, and stated grievances. I then uploaded 
all the data I had collected and coded the documents with the labels I created. This is 
a time - intensive method as it requires the user to manually code all the material that 
is related to a specific label. However, it is valuable because it allowed me to focus 
on one particular aspect of mutinies across the dataset. For example, I can retrieve 
all information for `tactics' across all incidents of mutinies and observe reoccurring 
tactics used by mutineers, or alternatively, observe unique tactics that were not 
common within other mutinies. 
Using NVivo also allowed me to easily add and label new incidents of 
mutinies to the dataset and see how the new case compares with previously observed 
patterns. I can therefore continue to build the dataset as more mutinies occur or add 
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new labels if I identify different aspects that are worth examining. NVivo is largely 
a way to organize data and is limited by the data in the dataset and the labels 
assigned by the user. It is unlikely to uncover trends that were not labelled by the 
user and will not assist with missing data. 
1.9.3 Dataset Limitations 
There are several challenges to building a dataset of mutinies based on media 
reporting. The first involves the incentive for both governments and militaries to not 
publicize a mutiny. Mutinies often challenge the legitimacy of individual officers or 
the military command structure. There is also a common belief within the military 
that a mutiny is always the fault of the officer in charge of the particular unit.'' This 
gives officers a motive to not announce when a mutiny occurs, particularly when 
mutineers are calling attention to misdeeds by their officers, such as accusations of 
corruption. Additionally, mutinies are a threat to public order and there are often 
fears that they could spread to other units, giving government officials incentive to 
not announce mutinies. 
Unreported mutinies are especially likely when the government controls the 
media, the case for many African states at some point since independence. 
Additionally, the level of international reporting is not consistent across the large 
number of countries in this dataset. In particular, the sources used are largely 
Anglophone and likely to focus more attention and have more access to countries 
which are former British colonies. With the increase in internet reporting and social 
media, it is has become easier to identify mutinies, particularly when conducted in a 
public location. Additionally, mutineers over the last two decades have increasingly 
used media as a `weapon.' This issue will be discussed further in Chapters Two and 
Three. 
Given the methodological issues presented above, my dataset of mutinies 
almost certainly does not include every incident of mutiny within West and Central 
Africa. Rather it can only account for those that are publicly documented, which is 
75 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 572; Hamby, "The Mutiny Wagon Wheel: A Leadership Model 
for Mutiny in Combat," 593. 
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likely an underestimate of the real number of occurrences. This is the opposite 
problem to that faced by those attempting to document coup attempts or plots. There 
is often speculation that governments will announce false coup attempts or coup 
plots as a justification for arresting opposition figures or those deemed a threat to 
political leadership. I did not come across what appeared to be false reporting on 
mutinies. This is related to the various differences in coups and mutinies discussed 
earlier. Mutinies are generally not seen as immediate threats to political control and 
usually include many participants. Therefore there would be less incentive to frame 
individuals for mutinies and the size of mutinies would make doing so difficult. 
Datasets of coup attempts and plots are challenged by false reporting whereas my 
mutiny dataset is affected by a lack of reporting. 
One other complication with creating a dataset of mutinies is determining 
how to count the mutinies. As will be described in the following chapter, mutinies 
often spread between units and geographic areas. Therefore it is common to see 
multiple units mutinying in different locations within the same country. I was in a 
dilemma over whether to count this as one mutiny or multiple mutinies. In this 
scenario I counted multiple units mutinying at the same time as a single incident, 
largely because reporting usually does not identify all of the various participating 
units. However, when there was a clear end to a mutiny or pause for negotiations 
followed by another revolt (usually from a new unit), this was counted as a separate 
mutiny. There are two sets of mutinies (Central African Republic in 1996 -1997 and 
Burkina Faso in 2011) in which a series of mutinies lasted several months. In these 
cases I decided to break the mutinies into phases, based on when negotiations or 
concessions occurred. The way in which I counted mutinies led to a conservative 
estimate. If I had counted each individual unit as a separate mutiny, the numbers 
would have been much higher. The large variation in the ways in which incidents of 
mutinies could be calculated as well as the earlier addressed issue of underreporting, 
has led me to focus much more on the qualitative aspects of the dataset instead of 
attempting more quantitative analysis. 
1.9.4 Dataset Summary 
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My dataset accounts for sixty -six mutinies in West and Central Africa 
between 1960 -2012. Figure 1.1 shows a chronological list of the mutinies, organized 
by the country they occurred in and the year. 
Figure 1.1 
List of Mutinies in West and Central Africa from 1960 -2012 
Country Year Country Year 
Democratic Republic of Congo 1960 Guinea 1996 
Ghana 1961 Republic of Congo 1997 
Democratic Republic of Congo 1961 Republic of Congo 1997 
Togo 1963 Burkina Faso 1997 
Liberia 1963 Guinea Bissau 1998 
Niger 1963 Niger 1998 
Republic of Congo 1966 Côte d'Ivoire 1999 
Democratic Republic of Congo 1966 Niger 1999 
Nigeria 1966 Burkina Faso 1999 
Democratic Republic of Congo 1967 Côte d'Ivoire 2000 
Nigeria 1970 Côte d'Ivoire 2000 
Benin 1972 Nigeria 2000 
Sierra Leone 1982 Benin 2000 
Burkina Faso 1983 Central African Republic 2001 
Côte d'Ivoire 1990 Côte d'Ivoire 2002 
Côte d'Ivoire 1990 Niger 2002 
Chad 1991 Burkina Faso 2003 
Gambia 1991 Côte d'Ivoire 2003 
Democratic Republic of Congo 1991 Guinea Bissau 2004 
Democratic Republic of Congo 1991 Burkina Faso 2006 
Benin 1992 Burkina Faso 2007 
Republic of Congo 1992 Guinea 2007 
Gambia 1992 Guinea 2007 
Niger 1992 Guinea 2008 
Central African Republic 1993 Côte d'Ivoire 2008 
Central African Republic 1993 Nigeria 2008 
Democratic Republic of Congo 1993 Guinea 2009 
Côte d'Ivoire 1993 Guinea 2011 
Niger 1993 Burkina Faso 2011 
Central African Republic 1996 Burkina Faso 2011 
Central African Republic 1996 Burkina Faso 2011 
Central African Republic 1996 Guinea Bissau 2011 
Republic of Congo 1996 Mali 2012 
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The above information is easier to comprehend when presented in a graphic. 
Therefore Figure 1.2 divides the mutinies into decades. This chart clearly shows that 
mutinies have not occurred at an even pace across time. Chapter Three will propose 
reasons for why soldiers have been prone to mutiny during certain decades more than 
others. For comparative purposes this chart does not include the years 2010 -2012, as 
it does not account for a full decade. However, it is important to note that mutinies 
have not ceased in the most recent years. The qualitative data that accompanies the 
above listed mutinies will be analyzed in depth in Chapter Two. 
Figure 1.2 
Incidents of Mutiny in West and Central Africa 








1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Decade 
Figure 1.3 shows the occurrence of mutinies compared to coups, and returns 
to the discussion of the difference between the two events. In a direct comparison 
between my mutiny dataset and McGowan's coup and coup attempt dataset, there are 
eight incidents that are included in both his dataset and mine, which accounts for 
twelve percent of my dataset. In these eight individual cases, he classifies the event 
as failed coup attempts whereas I classify them as mutiny. In other words, he 
assesses that the soldiers were attempting to take the state while I believe their 
primary motive was to express grievances. This variation in interpretation of 
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motives occurs on the ground as well, with political and military leaders often 
assuming a mutiny is a coup attempt or less often, calling a coup attempt a mutiny. 
As the following chapter will further describe, large groups of soldiers can have 
different individual goals within a single group and thus in some cases it is possible 
to classify an incident as both a failed coup attempt and a mutiny. Comparing the 
two datasets also reveals that eighty -eight percent of the incidents in my dataset have 
not been included in coup datasets and strengthens the argument that mutinies are 
often a distinct type of rebellion that have been overlooked in other research. 
In Figure 1.3 we can see that coups and mutinies follow a similar trajectory 
from the 1960s to the 1980s. The occurrence of coups and mutinies decrease from 
the 1960s to the 1970s and stay fairly stable between the 1970s and 1980s. The 
biggest difference in the use of the two tactics occurs in the 1990s when the numbers 
of coups decreases while the number of mutinies dramatically rises. Both then 
decrease into the twenty -first century. Additionally, in this chart we can see that from 
the 1990s onwards mutinies have been more common than coups. The trends seen in 
this chart will be further explained in Chapter Three. 








Number of Coups and Mutinies in West and 
Central Africa from 1960 -2009 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Decade 
Coups 
- - Mutinies 
76 In this figure, the mutiny data is from my dataset (presented in Figure 1) and the coup data is from 
Patrick McGowan's dataset. His dataset end in the year 2006 and I supplemented the years 2007- 
2009 with my own count of successful coups in the region. 
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1.10 Case Studies 
The mutiny case studies will provide the in -depth details that the dataset 
lacks. As previously mentioned, reporting on mutinies typically simplifies what are 
complex events. The case studies will put the mutiny into historic and political 
context, which is key to a full understanding of how and why mutinies form. The 
case studies will also allow for post- mutiny analysis and help show that mutinies 
often have long lasting effects on a military and state. 
In addition to providing a more detailed look at mutinies, the case studies 
provide a different and important perspective, that of the mutineers. In media 
reporting of mutinies, government representatives are typically the main source of 
information. When mutineers express their grievances it is usually through a 
spokesperson. Neither of these outlets allow for the perspective of individuals. 
Through interviews with former mutineers, the motivations and justification of 
individuals participating in mutinies will be given attention. While mutiny is an 
action that requires some group cohesion, conversations with former mutineers show 
that there is often variation in motives and beliefs amongst the individuals involved. 
1.10.1 Choice of Case Studies 
My case study countries are Sierra Leone, The Gambia, and Burkina Faso. 
These countries were chosen partially by a process of elimination. The internal 
workings of militaries are often shrouded in secrecy and exclusivity, making 
researching military misbehaviour a difficult task, even in stable countries. Most 
military records are not open to the public and military hierarchies often require 
numerous levels of authorization. West Africa has the added disadvantage of 
recurring instability, often caused by or involving a response from the military. 
Therefore, many of the countries most prone to mutinies, such as Central African 
Republic, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire, are the least desirable for field research. 
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Attempting field research in the midst of conflict or tensions within the state would 
put my informants and myself at a greater risk. Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, and The 
Gambia have all had a series of mutinies throughout their history but are also 
currently stable enough to effectively conduct field research on their militaries. 
In addition to the accessibility of these cases, they also serve to show 
different `types' of mutinies, which occurred under different styles of political 
leadership. The mutinies in The Gambia in 1991 and 1992 are what I term contained 
mutinies whereas the mutinies in Burkina Faso in 2011 are an example of violent 
mass mutinies. The case of Sierra Leone in 1992 represents the overlap between 
mutinies and coups and will show how one may lead to the other. At the time of the 
examined mutinies, Sierra Leone was under military leadership, The Gambia was led 
by a civilian who had been in office for twenty -four years, and Burkina Faso was 
(and still is) controlled by a long- standing military turned civilian leader. Lastly, the 
case studies show varying outcomes, often beyond the goals of the mutineers. 
Despite many of the clear differences between the case studies, when looked 
at in detail, they also show similarities, particularly in the causes of the mutiny and 
the tactics used by the mutineers. These three case studies show that even when 
mutinies occur in very different settings with varied participants, there are common 
trends within the conduct of the event. 
1.10.2 Conducting Field Research on Mutinies 
My primary goal for field research was to conduct interviews with former 
mutineers and others with close involvement in the mutinies. Secondly, I wanted to 
collect more details about the mutinies through local reporting and government 
documents. My first round of field research was in Sierra Leone in April and May of 
2011. This trip served to test the feasibility of conducting interviews with former 
mutineers. It was a successful research trip and I returned to West Africa for more 
extensive research from January to June of 2012. During this time I travelled to each 
of the three case study countries. I travelled by road, using public transport from 
Sierra Leone to Burkina Faso (and back), transiting through Guinea and Mali. The 
already arduous trip was made especially challenging by a coup in Mali in March 
2012, preceded by a mutiny. The uncertainty of the situation caused the Malian 
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borders to be closed on several occasions (first by Mali and later by neighbouring 
countries). The situation also led to heightened security in Mali and surrounding 
countries, with visibly more troops near the border crossings and additional road 
checkpoints. I was likely one of the few individuals who did not mind the added 
inconveniences of these procedures as it allowed for more engagement with military 
personnel and discussions about their opinions on the Malian coup. I have included 
details from these conversations throughout the thesis. 
The varied political and security situations in Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and 
The Gambia led to great variety in the way in which I conducted research in these 
three countries. Below I will provide a brief summary of the differences, particularly 
to point out how it led to variations in the type of information I gathered. Additional 
information will be presented within the case study chapters. All of the interviews I 
conducted were in an unstructured style in which I had key questions but the 
respondent largely drove the conversation. All interviewees were made aware of my 
status as a researcher. I digitally recorded roughly one -third of my interviews, all 
with permission from the respondent. For the interviews in which I did not record 
the conversation I took hand written notes during the interview. Whether or not I 
asked an interviewee peimission to record the discussion was based on my sense of 
the individual's comfort level as well as the permissiveness of the environment. For 
example, whereas recording on a base in Sierra Leone was generally permitted, I 
knew better than to even carry a recording devise on a military base in The Gambia 
due to their heightened security sensitivities. 
1.10.3 Sierra Leone 
Of the three case study countries, I had the best access in Sierra Leone. This 
was partially because I worked closely with a young officer who I was introduced to 
through a friend. While he was not involved in the mutiny, he was able to assist in 
identifying and locating those who were. He comes from a military family- his 
father was a retired enlisted soldier and his brother currently serves in the 
presidential guards. Due to his status as an officer, I was granted permission to visit 
bases that would have been difficult had I been alone. In total, I visited nine military 
bases, which are spread throughout nearly all regions of the country. At most of 
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these bases I stayed on base, in the military accommodations for between two and six 
days. This was advantageous because it allowed for casual conversations in addition 
to the formal interviews. It appeared that having a foreign female civilian visiting, 
let alone staying overnight on base was quite unusual, especially at the remote bases 
and thus a stay of only a few days seemed to make a difference in the matter of 
information I was given. Numerous soldiers commented that I would be able to 
understand their complaints (which for soldiers today are mostly about living 
conditions) because I also endured them (temporarily). However this also had a 
downside as soldiers often wanted my opinion if they were being treated poorly and 
in one case they directly requested help in voicing their complaints to seniors (which 
I declined). 
When I was not travelling between bases or researching at the archives I 
stayed in the town of Tintafor in the house of a friend. This house is a few hundred 
feet away from an army base and I would walk through the base daily to go to the 
community well and the market. I attended social events at the base and my 
presence appeared to be accepted by most and I was generally free to wander around 
the base without much hassle. These details help explain why I was able to gather 
more sensitive information in Sierra Leone than the other case studies where my 
interactions with most people were one -time encounters. In Sierra Leone most of the 
information that I received about plans for a future mutiny was only told to me after I 
had been around the soldiers for a while, or in some cases after I returned for a 
second round of research a year after the first trip. 
Another reason why Sierra Leone was a good place to conduct interviews 
was that there appeared to be little sensitivity about the events in 1992 for which I 
was researching. This is likely because the incident occurred twenty years prior, was 
not violent, and most of the population responded positively to it at the time. There 
were individuals from the unit who did not want to be interviewed, especially those 
currently involved in politics, but most of the individuals I contacted agreed to 
discuss their involvement. In total I interviewed twenty soldiers who were closely 
involved in the mutiny plan and had at least a dozen casual conversations with others 
who were in the military at the time and familiar with the events. 
In addition to the interviews, I also visited the National Archives at Fourah 
Bay College. While I was unable to find any official documents about the event, 
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there were many records of the incident in the local papers. There was an increase in 
press freedom in the early 1990s in Sierra Leone and therefore numerous daily and 
weekly papers reported the story. This reporting was generally more detailed, 
particularly in the use of individual names, than international reporting and followed 
the aftermath of the event longer than the international press. 
1.10.4 Burkina Faso 
The second country I conducted field research in was Burkina Faso and my 
experience was much different than in Sierra Leone largely because the mutinies I 
was most interested in occurred less than a year prior. The positive side to 
researching such a recent event is that it was fresh in peoples' minds and the public 
nature of the mutinies meant many people witnessed it first hand. However, the level 
of violence made it a sensitive topic for civilian and military alike. For example, one 
interviewee stated "it is very difficult to talk about, what they did no one could 
imagine, even during war that should not happen, attacking your own people, raping 
your own women, it was a very bad time for our country. "77 Additionally, state 
investigations into who was involved within the military were still ongoing, making 
military personnel very reluctant to discuss the events. Still, I was able to interview 
seven military sources, some of who were surprisingly candid given the tense 
environment. Military sources also informed me of other mutinies that have 
occurred in Burkina Faso over the last decade. 
The Burkina Faso mutinies were unique compared to the other case studies 
because they occurred alongside large civilian protests, which together with the 
mutinies triggered major government responses. I therefore interviewed a wide 
variety of civilians within Burkina Faso in order to get a better understanding of the 
interplay between civilians and military personnel during these mutual actions of 
dissatisfaction. The civilian interviewees included labour union leaders, members of 
student organizations, civil servants, academics, an opposition politician, and the 
leader of the country's most prominent human rights organization. I also 
interviewed journalists from both private and government news organizations. In 
77 Author interview with civilian civil servant (Member of Ministère Chargé des Relations avec le 
Parlement et des Réformes Politiques), March 2012. 
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addition to the seven military sources I interviewed ten civilians and ran a focus 
group with university students that included eight individuals. 
The Norbert Zongo National Press Centre in Ouagadougou was an especially 
valuable resource. This organization collects newspaper reporting from throughout 
the country, creating its own independent library and archive. Many of the units 
mutinying were located in remote locations and details of the event were best 
documented in local reporting which I was able to access at their office. 
Burkina Faso was the only country in which the majority of the interviews 
were not conducted in English. I used a translator to assist me with the interviews 
and he helped me locate and contact sources. This individual was a student at 
University of Ouagadougou and referred to me by the American Embassy for his 
involvement in the language exchange programs that they host. He attended all of 
the interviews with me, expect for those with military sources. All of my interviews 
were conducted in Ouagadougou, however I travelled to several other locations that 
were key to the mutinies including Bobo -Dioulasso and Po and will include casual 
conversations from those locations. 
1.10.5 The Gambia 
The Gambia was the last country where I conducted field research and in 
many ways the most difficult. The mutinies in The Gambia had the smallest number 
of participants of the case study mutinies, and thus there are only a small number of 
people who were present for the events. Additionally, unlike most West African 
militaries, many Gambian soldiers only stay in the military for one term of service, 
and it is difficult to track these individuals after they leave the military. There has 
been much emigration, particularly since 1994 when President Jammeh came to 
power, meaning many of those involved in the events are likely no longer living in 
The Gambia. 
The political environment in The Gambia is currently tense and it was clear 
that even the mention of my research topic made many uncomfortable because the 
military and especially intelligence services are viewed with fear and suspicion. I 
visited the military headquarters in Banjul and was granted several interviews. 
However it was the only location in which I was told beforehand what questions I 
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could not ask. Any topics pertaining to events that have happened since Jammeh's 
time in office were off limits. Even questions of a historic nature seemed to be 
answered with reluctance, especially by the junior ranked military personnel. 
Following my interviews at the military headquarters I was questioned by the 
National Intelligence Agency (NIA). Between this experience and the lack of 
detailed information from the military sources, I decided it was better to not attempt 
to visit other military facilities in The Gambia. Instead, I interviewed several civilian 
sources that had worked in the government at the time of the mutinies as well as 
academics who had a strong understanding of Gambian political and military history. 
Although The Gambia was not an ideal interview environment, the country 
has a well- organized and easily accessible archive where I was able to find news 
reporting on the mutinies. Several newspapers at the time wrote extensive reporting 
on the events and attended the court martial hearing for the mutineers. I also visited 
these news offices in an attempt to speak to the individuals who reported on the 
stories. The office of the newspaper Foroyaa was particularly generous in spending 
time searching through their archives to look for any additional notes on the story; 
however no additional information could be found. 
As previously mentioned many Gambians (including former military) live 
abroad. The Gambian Diaspora community is very active with numerous blogs, 
radio stations, email lists, and social media groups, which I used to help locate 
sources. Additionally, The Gambia is the only country in my case studies in which 
there are several memoirs written by former military personnel that detail the 
mutinies. Therefore I was able to supplement the interviews I conducted in The 
Gambia with phone interviews with members of the Diaspora. Still, even in the 
Diaspora more requests for interviews were declined than accepted, indicating the 
sensitivity surrounding both political and military topics amongst the Gambian 
community. In total I interviewed eleven Gambians who were knowledgeable about 
the mutinies in 1991 and 1992. 
1.11 Thesis Structure 
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This thesis begins with broad patterns that span the dataset and becomes 
narrower as it progresses. Chapter Two uses the mutiny dataset to examine the 
common grievances stated by mutineers and patterns in how they physically carry 
out a mutiny. This chapter examines the position of the rank and file in comparison 
to the officer corps, in which there is a particularly severe divide in terms of wealth 
and prestige due to the role of militaries in post -colonial Africa. I show that 
mutineers in West and Central Africa use a fairly limited number of tactics, thus 
making it possible to anticipate courses of action of mutineers. However, the 
predictability of a mutinies' outcome is limited, partially due to the tendency of 
mutinies to spread, altering the number and specific participants as well as the goals. 
I demonstrate how the common tactics used by mutineers serve common strategic 
goals. 
Chapters Three and Four uses the mutiny dataset to address patterns of when 
mutinies have occurred in West and Central Africa. The clearest spike in mutinies 
occurred in the 1990s, as visualized in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3. Chapter Three will 
focus on this trend and examine the political and economic conditions in Africa in 
the 1990s, which may have made the region particularly mutiny -prone, and 
conversely why mutiny was not a popular tactic in the preceding decades. This 
chapter will argue that soldiers' decision to mutiny is often linked to particular 
political systems. 
Chapter Four addresses a more nuanced trend of when soldiers mutiny, which 
is less apparent in the charts but becomes clear with an examination of the qualitative 
aspects of the mutiny dataset. This chapter shows that mutinies often follow 
deployments, and particularly deployments on multinational missions. I explain how 
deployments alter both the conditions in which soldiers find grievances as well as 
their view of their entitlements. This chapter brings to light the potential heightened 
risk that deployed units have to mutiny and shows the common grievances that 
soldiers find amongst these deployments. 
The next three chapters consist of the case studies presented in a 
chronological order. Therefore Chapter Five is Sierra Leone, Chapter Six is The 
Gambia, and Chapter Seven is Burkina Faso. The case studies will provide both 
detailed analysis of the mutinies as well as situate the event within the political and 
military context of the state at the time that it occurred. Additionally, a summary of 
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relevant and related events that followed after the mutiny will serve to show potential 
long -term impacts of the incident. The case studies will refer back to the other 
chapters in order to show places in which the cases support the earlier identified 
patterns as well as where they contradict. 
The thesis concludes with Chapter Eight, which summarizes the key findings 
and provides an assessment of the future of mutinies in this region. 
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Chapter Two- The Typical Mutiny: Patterns in Participants, Tactics, 
and Outcomes 
2.1 Introduction 
Within the global research on mutinies there is debate over whether mutinies 
follow a standard pattern. American military historian, Fletcher Platt, claims, "there is 
no such thing as a typical mutiny. "' Rose counters that Platt's statement is "only partial 
true, since mutinies, like men, have attributes that permit at least some generalizations. "2 
I agree with Rose that generalizations can be made about mutinies; however the 
generalizations I reach in this chapter often contradict his. This is partially due to 
variations in our dataset: Rose focuses on early 20`" century Western cases while my 
focus in limited to modern African mutinies. 
It should not come as a surprise that there are typical behaviours within mutinies 
considering they are conducted by a group of individuals with shared training 
experiences and a lifestyle that places emphasis on conformity. While mutinies show an 
obvious break from the discipline instilled in a military environment, mutineers often 
utilize military manoeuvres and strategy to their advantage during a mutiny. What is 
perhaps surprising though is that we know very little about what a typical mutiny looks 
like in West and Central Africa. This chapter aims to begin to fill this gap by looking at 
common traits within the demands made by mutineers as well as the way mutinies are 
carried out. Attempting to document what is typical within the actions of mutineers has 
practical value in terms of attempting predictive analysis. However, perhaps more 
importantly, it helps identify recurring dissatisfaction within the ranks in the region. 
This chapter first briefly discusses the role of the military in African states in 
order to show the historic roots in many of the mutineers' grievances, particularly those 
in which they object to the advantages given to the officer corps. The findings show that 
As quoted in Elihu Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 565. 
2 Ibid. 
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most mutineers' grievances involve conditions of service, in particular aspects of pay or 
other material benefits such as housing. However, underlying these grievances are 
perceptions of injustice at their own conditions compared to those of the senior ranks. 
Although rank and file mutineers do not make claims that they deserve equivalent pay or 
benefits to senior officers, there is a common feeling that the level of differentiation is 
extreme. This analysis builds on works of scholars such as Robin Luckham, Michael 
Lofchie, and Jimmy Kandeh, who have emphasized the significance of class differences 
within African military structures.3 While these authors place emphasis on the position 
of junior officers, my analysis will expand on the discussion by showing the way the 
class differences are often interpreted by the rank and file soldiers. 
Following the discussion of common mutineer grievances, the chapter will then 
focus on the act of mutiny. Using the mutiny dataset, I will show that there are a limited 
number of tactics used by soldiers when they conduct a mutiny, indicating that soldiers 
are not reinventing strategies with each mutiny but rather learning from what has worked 
in previous attempts and adapting. Furthermore, these common tactics all serve to draw 
attention to the cause of the mutineers and open a dialogue with senior leadership. I will 
argue that mutineers are often not acting simply on impulse but rather have a particular 
strategy in their actions. Still, even mutinies with plans are limited in their predictability 
due to shifts in participants and goals as well as the various ways in which a government 
can respond. Lastly, this chapter will discuss the success rates of mutinies. I assess that 
mutinies have a short-term success rate but are limited in creating long -term changes. 
2.2 The Uncomfortable Place of Rank and File Soldiers in Africa 
Before delving into the specifics of mutineers' grievances and how they 
generally conduct mutinies, it is worthwhile to briefly situate the military, and 
3 Robin Luckham, "The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature 
and Issues," African Studies Review 37, no.2 (Sep. 1994): 13 -75; Michael F. Lofchie, "The Uganda Coup - 
Class Action by the Military," The Journal of Modern African Studies 10, no. 1 (May 1972): 19 -35; 
Jimmy Kandeh, Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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particularly the rank and file soldiers, within African states. As will be further 
elaborated on in the next section, mutineers are typically enlisted soldiers and their 
grievances, even those of a material nature, regularly involve accusations against their 
superiors. This section will help set the stage to demonstrate that West and Central 
African mutineers' complaints are often grounded in a history in which the divisions 
between the ranks have increased as the military has become involved in politics. 
The role of the military has changed in many states throughout the decades since 
independence but generally the military has been one of the most powerful organizations 
in any given state. This is not simply based on its manpower or access to weapons but 
due to its history of participating in, influencing, and often dominating politics. In the 
early years of independence the military was often viewed as the most capable and 
disciplined organization in most African states, largely due to its position and training 
during the colonial era. When militaries throughout the region began to conduct coups 
in the 1960s they marketed themselves as selfless saviours who would `modernize' the 
state .4 For many their presence in politics was welcomed as the military was viewed as 
the only "group with the necessary skills to uplift newly independent nations. "5 
However, soon coups became endemic, with few countries spared and many coup 
organizers became victims of coups themselves. The military's performance in the 
political realm did not live up to its promises and in many cases military regimes were 
particularly repressive. By the 1980s the image of African militaries as saviours was 
long out of fashion and focus turned to ways to `demilitarize' or 're-civilianize' politics. 
However, it was (and still is) difficult to relegate the military back to the barracks once 
they became involved in politics. 
One of the main ways political leaders (both civilians and leaders from a military 
background) tried to insure themselves against a coup was to make certain the military, 
especially the officer corps, was satisfied. Samuel Decalo explains that there has been a 
4 A.H.M. Kirk -Greene, "'Stay by your radios: ' Documentation for a Study of Military Government in 
Tropical Africa," (Cambridge: African Studies Centre, 1981): 12 -13. 
5 Mathurin Houngnikpo, Guarding the Guardians: Civil -military relations and democratic governance in 
Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010): 20. 
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"very visible trade -off of material benefits, both to the military as a corporate body and 
to officers as individuals, in exchange for political fealty. "6 He goes on to state 
The quest for alliance with the armed forces is not unlike the patron - 
client networks that political leaders establish with influential civilians in 
both the traditional and modern sectors. Stability thus becomes a direct 
function of the satisfaction of group and individual needs in the armed 
forces, and they become yet another important constituency that has to be 
`taken care of' through spoils of office. 
Corporate trade -offs may include the provision of often unnecessarily 
sophisticated equipment and firepower that enhances the prestige of the 
military, and an ever increasingly large army at that, inter alia, raises the 
status of its leaders, as well as the number of officers needed, all with 
prestige and remunerative repercussions, etcetera. Individual perks 
include not only rank and pay promotions, duty -free cars and other luxury 
imports, but also appointments overseas as military attaches, as well as 
places on refresher training -courses in prized foreign staff -colleges.' 
In addition to these immediate benefits for senior officers were often more long- 
term opportunities including positions within the government and access to land or other 
entrepreneurial prospects. As a result, in "most African states, civil or military, army 
officers play a major economic role in the commercial sector. "8 These economic 
advantages are often highly profitable for a select number of individuals. For example, 
Herbert Howe shows that the expensive and generally unnecessary weapons systems are 
often desired not just for issues of prestige, as described by Decalo, but for the 
commissions they can earn senior officers.9 Additionally, the officer corps in many 
states has come to enjoy a high degree of impunity due to their political links. 
As a result of the history of the military in Africa, their role in politics, and the 
privileges awarded by governments (as well as foreign governments), senior military 
officers are often considered elites within society. However these "spoils 
enticements...have mostly benefitted senior officers" and created a sharp division 
6 Samuel Decalo, "Modalities of Civil- Military Stability in Africa," The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 27, No. 4 (Dec. 1989): 573. 
Ibid., 573 -574. 
8 Ibid., 567. 
9 Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, 41; For example, his research provides 
numerous examples of senior officers in Nigeria receiving commissions as high as twenty percent from 
sales of equipment with price tags in the tens and hundreds of millions (USD). 
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between the ranks in the military.10 Although the military is often referred to as a 
homogenous organization with particular privilege, in reality vast differences occur 
within the organization. 
The prestige awarded to the military as an organization, as described above, 
often has limited tangible benefit to rank and file soldiers. While soldiers may be in an 
enviable position compared to some civilians because they have a (supposedly) regular 
salary, the pay for rank and file soldiers is typically low. Additionally, in some states it 
is common for rank and file soldiers to only receive their salary erratically, as various 
examples throughout this thesis will demonstrate. It is also common for enlisted ranks 
to supplement their salaries through other means, both legal and illegal. Housing for the 
lowest ranks is often limited and it is common for junior soldiers to live off base. The 
advantage of joining the military is likely not the initial pay but the ability to advance up 
the ranks. However, a lack of promotion opportunities is a common complaint amongst 
junior soldiers. Of course, there is a challenge in making generalization across many 
states and not all rank and file soldiers live in poor conditions while not all senior 
officers have become wealthy from their position. However the persistent claims of the 
gap between the lifestyles of the senior officers and those below them indicate that it is a 
common trend in the region. 
Rank and file soldiers in Africa are in an uncomfortable position because they 
are the least influential members of the most powerful and elite organization in the 
country. The military institution may project an image of prestige but this has limited 
value in the daily life of junior soldiers. Still, the limited economic opportunities in 
most states in the region, especially for individuals without higher education, create an 
incentive for soldiers to maintain their position in the military. As this thesis 
demonstrates, instead of relinquishing their position due to dissatisfaction, they attempt 
to work within the system to have their conditions improved. 
In terms of their socio- economic status, rank and file soldiers likely have more in 
common with lower classes of the civilian sector than they do with senior officers. 
While there is often overlap between junior soldiers and the civilian sector, there is also 
Kandeh, Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa, 208. 
43 
an intentional divide. This divide goes beyond the standard division created in most 
militaries where soldiers separate themselves from civilians through uniforms, grooming 
standards, etc. The divide in West and Central Africa between rank and file soldiers and 
civilians also has to do with the history of using militaries for internal policing. Soldiers 
were often tasked (and in many cases still are) with regime protection and in particular 
shielding political leaders from internal opposition. In this role the military was often in 
direct contact with the civilian sector but in an antagonistic way, particularly when 
ordered to curb civilian protests. Ethnic military recruitment in some states has further 
exacerbated tensions between the military and civilian populations when the military is 
seen as aligned with a particular ethnic group or region. 
In many ways the rank and file soldiers as caught between the lower classes of 
the civilian world, in which they likely have a lot in common with but with whom they 
are disconnected from, and their military superiors whom they have little in common 
with but are connected with via military membership. When rank and file soldiers 
mutiny it often appears influenced by both actions in the civilian sector and their 
military superiors. For example, demands for improvements in their work conditions 
often sound very similar to strikes by trade unions or student organizations, as the next 
chapter will further expand on. However mutineers also utilize their position in the 
military by using intimidation and threats of violence and instability. Much as coup 
leaders present an image of policing the civilian politicians, mutineers often present 
themselves as policing the officer corps. 
2.3 Private Problems 
This section will use the mutiny dataset to look in more detail at who typically 
mutinies and what they commonly demand. As previously stated, one consistent feature 
of mutineers, which applies to both African and non -African settings, is that they tend to 
be made up of a majority rank and file soldiers. Occasionally non -commissioned 
officers (NCOs) take part and more rarely junior officers but for the most part mutinies 
involve the lowest level of the military hierarchy. Within research on mutinies from a 
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non -African perspective and coups in an African context, there has been speculation that 
internal military tensions and revolts often centre on divisions created by the 
development of elite units within the military." These elite units often have heightened 
expectations alongside their special status and responsibilities, which when under threat 
can lead to a revolt. Additionally, the added equipment, training, and pay for these units 
often leads to resentment by `regular' units. Within an African context the most elite 
units are usually those that work directly for the Head of State, such as the Presidential 
Guards, or units with specialized (often foreign) training, such as the parachutists or 
counter -terrorism units. Based on the sixty -six incidents of mutiny in the dataset, there 
is insufficient evidence to suggest that elite units disproportionately contribute to 
mutinies. There is no significant difference in the type of units that mutiny. Nearly 
every type of military unit can be accounted for in the dataset: army, navy, air force, 
gendarmerie, parachutists, commandos, presidential guards, foreign trained units, and 
units with foreign advisors. 
Additionally, there is no significant difference in the mutiny rates for rural or 
urban -based units. The majority of mutinies occur in the capital city. This is expected 
considering soldiers are typically bringing their complaints to the government or military 
headquarters, both of which are usually located in the capital. Furthermore, most 
capitals host a sizeable number of military personnel and units. Large cities, which are 
not capitals, have also seen mutinies. Roughly eighteen percent of the mutinies 
examined in this dataset occurred in rural regions, away from major cities. 
As explained in the previous chapter, when soldiers mutiny they request that 
leadership address specific grievances. Based on the stated demands in the mutiny 
dataset, it is clear that the vast majority of mutineers' grievances revolve around their 
daily life or terms of service. Therefore, this thesis will view mutinies as a way for 
junior soldiers to negotiate with their superiors over their conditions of service. This is 
slightly different from mutinies in other contexts, such as mutinies in the Vietnam War 
over objections to the mission for political reasons. 
Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, 44 -45; Bernd Horn, "A Law 
Unto Themselves? - Elitism as a Catalyst for Disobedience," in The Unwilling and the Reluctant: 
Theoretical Perspectives on Disobedience in the Military, ed. Craig Leslie Mantle, 127 -138 (Ontario: 
Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006). 
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First, it is valuable to take a closer look at where soldiers find fault in their 
conditions of service. Mutineers in West and Central Africa most commonly make 
demands for payments or material items. These account for roughly seventy percent of 
the stated grievances examined. Payment grievances typically consist of accusations of 
delays in receiving pay or claims that their pay is inadequate. These two complaints are 
not mutually exclusive and some mutineers have claimed that their inadequate salaries 
are late. A more specific payment criticism involves special payments for deployments. 
These particular demands will be addressed in more detail in Chapter Four. Closely 
linked to salary complaints are grievances over material issues such as housing, food, 
and uniforms. These material issues are closely tied to, and often inclusive of, salaries. 
For example, in some states it is common for monthly salaries to include both cash and a 
supply of rice. Similarly, if soldiers reside on base and if the base provides meals, a 
portion of their salary goes to cover those expenses. Mutinying soldiers often claim that 
the food, housing, or uniforms provided by the military are insufficient or of less value 
than the money subtracted from their salaries. They demand larger cash payments of 
which they can then buy their own food or pay for their own housing. 
The second most common grievance involves specific complaints about 
leadership. These demands are closely linked to the material complaints above as the 
officers are usually accused of having a role in missing pay or lack of other material 
items. The spokesperson for mutineers in Guinea in 2008 demonstrated this type of 
grievance by stating that the generals "do not care about the needs of the soldiers" and 
accused them of "hiding" the soldiers' back pay.'2 
In some cases the soldiers appear to have had personal negative interactions with 
the particular officers they accuse. For example, in Republic of Congo in 1997 
mutineers demanded the removal of the commander of a particular training centre, 
which is likely an individual that the soldiers would have had contact with.13 However, 
often mutineers seem unsure of whom to blame and call for dismissals at the most senior 
levels. This occurred in Guinea in 2008 when soldiers asked that the Defence Minister 
be dismissed and in The Gambia in 1991 when soldiers called for the most senior officer 
12 AFP, "Guinea Mutiny Reveals Rift Between Top Brass and Ordinary Soldiers," June 5, 2008. 
13 Africa Research Bulletin, February 1997, 12578. 
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in the military to be relieved of service.14 In these two cases it is unlikely that junior 
soldiers had personal interactions with these senior officers and thus their calls are more 
symbolic of a distrust of the hierarchy in general. In both cases the demands of the 
mutineers were met and these senior officers lost their positions. Although just as these 
demands by the mutineers appear symbolic, the firing of senior officers also has a 
similar feel. For example, the Gambian Colonel removed from his position following 
calls from mutineers in 1991 was "punished" with an Ambassadorial position in 
Europe.15 
The third common type of grievance has to do with procedures within the 
military system. In these cases the soldiers complain about decisions or specific 
processes that they deem to be unjust or not advantageous. Examples include objections 
to decisions to downsize the military or transfer units to different bases. It is also 
common for grievances to include the promotion process or more general accusations of 
favouritism within the military. 
An overview of the common grievances shows that mutineers are self -interested 
and fairly pragmatic. Mutineers rarely push for changes beyond their own conditions of 
service nor do they make radical requests for changes to the military structure. When 
asking for promotions it is almost always within a reasonable scale. For example, rank 
and file soldiers may ask to be promoted up one rank but not to be promoted to an 
officer rank. Similarly, mutineers may demand better housing but do not expect their 
housing to be on par with officers or even NCOs. Through their demands mutineers 
show a general respect or at least acceptance of the military hierarchy. 
Another example of the pragmatic side of mutineers is their heavy emphasis on 
numbers and facts. This was apparent in my interviews with former mutineers. They 
would often go to great lengths to explain their salary in precise numbers (including how 
often they were paid) as well as listing other various costs such as rice, a pound of meat, 
transportation to visit family, uniforms, and boots. This is apparent in media 
announcements by mutineers as well. For example, soldiers in Central African Republic 
announced, "We pay for our uniforms which cost CFA 25,000; a pair of boots costs 
14 Africa Research Bulletin, May 2008, 17526- 17527; West Africa, August 12, 1991, 1336. 
15 Samsundeen Surr, Coup d'etat by the Gambian National Army (Xlibris, 2007). 
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CFA 25,000, and we get 29,041- and we have families and children. "16 The same group 
later explained on the radio "We have continued to receive the salary of a second class 
private, CFA 29,041 for 15 to 16 years. "17 Similarly, soldiers in Guinea in 2008 
explained their pay grievances in relation to the cost of rice in order to show that a bag 
of rice costs roughly half of their monthly pay.'8 In these cases there seemed to be a 
strong desire to demonstrate in detail how their salaries could not cover the basic costs 
of living and in doing so soldiers were making the point that their actions were driven by 
necessity. By providing the exact details of their salaries and expenses soldiers also 
distinguished themselves from the officers whom they often accuse of economic 
irresponsibility. However, perpetuating themselves as sensible negotiators is likely to 
some degree a strategy in itself and there are plenty of examples of behaviour within 
mutinies, such as looting, which could not be justified by claims of necessity. 
2.4 "The problems are between the generals and us "19 
Mutineers' demands for payment, improved housing, or removal of an officer, as 
described above, are often linked to perceptions of injustice. The sense of injustice 
regularly develops around large discrepancies in the privileges and economic advantages 
between the ranks. While all hierarchies have divisions between the rank and file 
soldiers and their senior officers, the divisions in West and Central Africa are often 
particularly severe given the unique role of the military in the region, as examined 
earlier. In interviews with former mutineers they regularly addressed their own 
conditions in comparison to what they saw as excessive lifestyles of officers. For 
example, a rank and file soldier involved in the 1992 revolt in Sierra Leone described 
the cause of the incident in the following way: "We are at the warfront, we are not being 
paid on time, we are not well catered for, we need better medical facilities. And 
16 West Africa, May 5, 1996, 667. 
17 West Africa, May 5, 1996, 667. 
18 AFP, "Guinea Mutiny Reveals Rift Between Top Brass and Ordinary Soldiers," June 5, 2008. 
19 Quote from spokesperson of Guinea mutiny in 2008; AFP, "Guinea Mutiny Reveals Rift Between Top 
Brass and Ordinary Soldiers," June 5, 2008. 
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authorities are sitting in Freetown, driving luxurious cars. "20 In conversations with 
Sierra Leonean soldiers about their present conditions, their complaints sound similar to 
those of decades earlier. One soldier commented on the lifestyle of officers by 
questioning "if you have 10,000 and you are driving a car that costs 60,000- 70,000, 
where did you get the money? They are building homes, mansions in Freetown. And 
we are grumbling, soldiers are grumbling. "2 ' The soldier's answer to his own question 
was that he believed the money came from peacekeeping pay, a topic that will be further 
examined in Chapter Four. Here we see that it is not necessarily the inequality that 
soldiers object to, as any hierarchy has inequality, but rather what they view as 
excessive, which they represent using words like "luxurious" and "mansions." 
This perceived lavish lifestyle of senior officers is a direct contradiction to 
traditional military ethos, which puts emphasis on austerity. While austerity is rarely a 
term used to describe senior officers in Africa, there still appears to be a disdain for 
officers whom the rank and file soldiers deem to be living too extravagantly. The 
actions of soldiers in Burkina Faso in 2011 represent this belief. Mutineers vandalized 
and set fire to the homes of several of senior officers, including the Army Chief of 
Staff.22 Similar targeted attacks occurred on the residences of senior officers in Guinea 
in 2008.23 
It is difficult to quantify the salary differentiation between the ranks as official 
pay scales in Africa are usually not made publicly available and it is likely that rank and 
file soldiers are not aware of the particular salary of their senior officers.Z4 No 
interviewee in my research ever gave a specific number for an officer's salary and in fact 
salary was rarely mentioned. This is consistent with public statements by mutineers as 
well. Instead, complaints seemed to circulate around the idea that officers were making 
20 Author interview with military source S (current enlisted soldier), April 2012. 
2! Author interview with military source L (current enlisted soldier), May 2011. 
22 "Burkina Faso President Leaves Capital Amid Mutiny," AFP, April 15, 2011. 
2' "Guinea Meets Soldiers' Demands to End 2 -Day Mutiny," Reuters, May 27, 2008. 
24 
There has been some attempt by scholars to make comparisons between the pay scales of various 
countries. For example, Lofchie showed comparisons of pay by rank between East African states 
following the 1964 mutinies and more recently Dr. Mobolaji Aluko has attempted to compare Nigerian 
pay scale to American military pay scale on his blog. Aluko's analysis is interesting as it shows a Colonel 
in Nigeria makes roughly ten times that of a private whereas in the U.S. it is only four times. However, 
these comparisons serve limited value in terms of mutinies as mutineers are not attempting making claims 
that their pay structure is unjust in comparison with Western states. 
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money through other means due to their position. Mutineers are not alone in their 
observations. For example a report written by the Strategic Studies Institute in the late 
1990s clearly supports the grievances made by soldiers. It stated that Nigerian "senior 
officers all become immensely rich through theft, while junior officers and enlisted men 
live in poverty" and the researchers went as far as to call for a "wholesale replacement 
of the officer corps."25 
The perceived injustice becomes especially apparent when soldiers believe that 
their efforts are responsible for officers' success. A Burkinabé rank and file soldier very 
blatantly expressed this opinion by stating 
if he is a high officer, say a Colonel, he gets to that position through the 
help of those below him. He is taken care of by his juniors, but then he 
has no respect for them...There is much selfishness with the officers.26 
While this individual is speaking in more of a hypothetical sense, Chapter Four will 
show this perception in a direct manner by describing the perception of mutineers who 
claims officers have personally benefitted from rank and file deployments. 
This issue of class differentiation and perceptions of corruption among officers 
by the ranks as detailed above is also is a key argument in Kandeh's work on junior 
ranks that conduct coups. He explains 
Ordinary soldiers observe and take exception to the sudden 
embourgeoisment of their officers, which many have come to rightly 
believe occurs at their expense. Resentment based upon perceptions that 
officers are `stiffing' the ranks, `chopping them small,' and siphoning 
their supplies has often been the center of the grievance narratives of 
subaltern mutineers and insurgents.27 
However, the feelings of resentment by the rank and file go beyond the material 
advantages and include other privileges. For example, Burkinabé military interviewees 
consistently complained of a system in which senior officers were able to bring their 
sons into the military, regardless of whether or not they met the qualifications. 
Perceived impunity among the officer corps was also a key concern of mutineers in 
25 Kent Hughes Butts and Steven Metz, "Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria 
and South Africa," Strategic Studies Institute, 1996. 
26 Author interview with military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
27 Kandeh, Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa, 7. 
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Burkina Faso in 2011. Rank and file soldiers felt that they were singled out for 
punishment due to their rank, while officers went uncharged for similar or worse 
offenses 2s 
Many of the accusations made by mutineers are not of criminal offenses but 
rather frustrations that their leadership does not abide by the required military 
procedures. These perceived double standards amongst the ranks lower troop morale and 
undercuts the ethos of discipline, which is key to military functionality. In an interview 
with a Burkinabé soldier I asked the basic question "what caused the [2011 ] mutinies." 
He responded, "the main main main cause is no respect for authority, no discipline, even 
the superiors do not respect military rules. "29 This individual expresses the idea that 
discipline must start at the top of the hierarchy and seems to suggest that if superiors do 
not respect rules, neither will their subordinates. 
When soldiers discussed their general complaints about the officer corps they 
usually made a point to explain that there were exceptions, individuals who did not fit 
the pattern. A quick look at an exception also reveals values of the soldiers. There was 
one particular officer in Sierra Leone who was described in a heroic manner among 
numerous interviewees. During one interview with a soldier I remarked "Every time I 
talk to people they bring up Saj Musa, why is he so popular ?" The soldier's response 
was very extensive but he summed up the reason nicely by stating "He demonstrated by 
example." The interviewee then elaborates this with statements such as "He is the only 
person who wakes up at 6:00 in the morning, 8:00 in the morning everybody is supposed 
to be in the office... He participated in the cleaning every last Saturday of the month, he 
started it. "30 This soldier shows that the respect for Lt. Musa was a result of his 
willingness to follow the same rules that were applied to the rank and file soldiers.3 
Z8 Author interviews in Burkina Faso, 2012. More details will be provided in Chapter Seven. 
29 Author interview with military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012 
so Author interview with military source S (current enlisted soldier) April 2012; The 'cleaning' he is 
referring to is a program enacted by the military regime which came into power in 1992. It required all 
citizens to assist in cleaning the city one day a month. 
31 Solomon "Saj" Musa was killed during the civil war and it is possible that his death on the 'battlefield' 
attributes to his heroic status today. However, a review of newspapers at the time shows he had a popular 
following well before his death. He appears in the press often and was nicknamed in the papers "The 
Action Man." 
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This discussion of leadership shows many similarities to research on mutinies 
from other region: however significant differences are also present. There is a dominant 
theme among mutiny scholars and military personnel, that mutinies are the fault of 
individual officers. Rose explains that the "view of command responsibility is a 
leitmotif throughout military history, as prevalent today [as it was] almost 200 years 
ago. "32 Hamby's work titled "A Leadership Model for Mutiny in Combat" specifically 
addresses how individual leaders can avoid causing mutinies or handle mutinies if they 
occur. He leaves the reader with no doubt of his opinions for the causes and solutions of 
mutinies by stating "There is no magical silver bullet that will prevent mutiny; only 
leaders who lead effectively can forestall the phenomenon. "33 
The examples from West and Central Africa, as presented above, vary from the 
dominant view, which blames mutinies on individual leaders. In the cases I presented 
soldiers present grievances about leadership but it is expressed as a much more systemic 
problem. The African examples represent divisions between the rank and file soldiers 
and their officers that go beyond the normal hierarchical divisions that develop from 
differences in education, training, or experience. The soldiers raise objections about a 
system in which the gaps between rank and file and senior officers are often enormous in 
terms of economic advantages. Added to these economic differences are other concerns 
such as the unequal treatment under the law. 
By viewing the gap between the ranks as a more systemic problem with 
historical roots it becomes clearer why mutinies have become a recurring regional 
problem, not just single exceptional incidents. Hamby argues that in mutinies "the 
passions involved burn out quickly" and this makes sense in his analysis that mutinies 
result from weak leaders and can be resolved with changes to leadership.34 However, 
my research does not suggest that passions die easily and in fact we very often see 
mutinies reignite in the same countries. This is largely because although authorities may 
address the surface complaints (salary, food, housing), they rarely acknowledge the 
j2 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 572. 
33 Hamby, "The Mutiny Wagon Wheel: A Leadership Model for Mutiny in Combat," 595. 
34 Ibid., 576. 
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systemic issues, a topic that will be further addressed in section 2.9 and will be 
highlighted again through the case studies. 
2.5 Mutineers' Playbook 
Discussions of common tactics used by mutineers are oddly absent from nearly 
all writings on mutinies. The opposite can be said for coup analysis in which there has 
been detailed and extensive work done on tactics.35 This is a major gap in the mutiny 
literature because it means that it is very difficult to know what to expect once a mutiny 
begins. The analysis of tactics is valuable beyond its practicality and is also useful in 
determining goals. This section will first detail how a mutiny is typically conducted and 
then demonstrate how these various tactics are used to achieve similar goals. 
The image in most peoples' minds of an African mutiny is likely one of soldiers 
gathered in streets firing weapons into the air. This is a fairly accurate starting point for 
a mutiny. Discharging firearms and mass gathering in a strategic location (military 
headquarters, State House, Parliament building, etc.) are among the most common 
tactics used by mutineers. The firing of weapons is closely linked to another common 
tactic, breaking into the armoury. In most parts of West and Central Africa junior 
soldiers do not readily have access to firearms and therefore the first step for many 
mutineers is to seize weapons and ammunition from the armoury. Brandishing weapons 
or firing weapons can serve as both a symbol of power and a threat to those not involved 
in the mutiny. 
While the media portrayal of mutineers as gun wielding soldiers creating a 
chaotic atmosphere for their own benefit is partially true, it is also an incomplete picture. 
Mutineers are often quite strategic and creative in their tactics, gaining inspiration from 
their own military training as well as from successful actions used by other armed 
groups and civilian organizations. 
35 Examples include Edward Luttwak, Coup d'etat: A Practical Handbook (London: Penguin Press, 1968) 
and Harvey G. Kebschull, "Operation `Just Missed': Lessons from Failed Coup Attempts," Armed Forces 
and Society 20, no. 4 (1994): 565 -579. 
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One common tactic by mutineers is hostage- taking. Of the sixty -six mutinies 
examined in this dataset, at least fifteen incidents involved the taking of hostages. This 
tactic is not specific to a particular time period. It was used in the Republic of Congo in 
1966 when mutineers captured the head of the army and gendarmerie.36 Similarly this 
occurred in the Central African Republic mutinies in 1996 when mutineers took hostage 
the Army Chief of Staff, Energy Minister, and National Assembly Speaker.37 Nigerien 
soldiers appear to be the most keen on using hostages as a mutiny strategy and have 
done so during revolts in 1992, 1993, 1998, 1999, and 2002. Their abductees include 
the head of the parliament, ministers, military commanders, and local authorities. 
Hostage taking is a common strategy among armed groups in Africa. For 
example it has been used by bandits in the Niger Delta, Al -Qaida in the Islamic 
Maghreb, and Somali pirates. However, it is not a strategy that would commonly be 
used in a military context. In hostage- taking by both armed groups and mutineers the 
value of the hostage is in the ability to pressure an exchange. For example, armed 
groups are usually attempting to exchange hostages for the release of prisoners or 
money, while mutineers exchange hostages for meetings with senior leadership or 
promises that their demands will be met. One important aspect that makes hostage - 
taking by mutineers different from other armed groups is that they are often abducting 
individuals from their own organization, whereas armed groups regularly go for 
international targets. Furthermore, mutineers are usually not attempting to hide their 
identity or location (as are terrorists or pirates). Lastly, mutineers are usually not overtly 
threatening the lives of their hostages. In the cases of hostages taken by mutineers 
examined here, there were no incidents in which the hostages were killed. Mutineers 
want to make changes to the military system or desire material gains; they do not want 
to be excluded and removed from the system. Therefore they must use caution when 
dealing with hostages, as an injured or dead hostage would not help their cause. 
It is more common for mutineers to take civilian political representatives hostage 
than to abduct military officers. In some ways this may seem counterintuitive. One 
could assume that rank and file soldiers would take hostage those that they blame for 
36 West Africa, July 2, 1966, 757. 
37 West Africa, May 27, 1996, 812. 
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their problems, which tends to be military officers. However rank and file soldiers 
abducting officers and expecting the military hierarchy to respond keeps the act as an 
internal military matter and generally speaking the mutineers do not trust the military 
hierarchy. By involving political representatives mutineers work around their chain of 
command and bring their complaints into the political realm. Additionally, they draw 
wider attention to the perceived wrongdoings of their seniors. 
Mutineers also often take over strategic locations as a way to assert their power 
and threaten authority. The tactical value of the locations utilized by mutineers range 
from relatively minimal to highly important. For example, mutineers in Nigeria in 2008 
blocked traffic for several hours on a major road in order to draw attention to claims that 
they had not been paid their allowances.38 While the mutiny did bring attention to their 
complaints and likely inconvenienced many local people, it did not threaten the stability 
of the nation. Other mutineers have captured more valuable targets. For example, Air 
Force mutineers took over the control tower and terminals at the Abidjan Airport in 
1990.39 Similar incidents of mutineers holding airports have occurred in Democratic 
Republic of Congo (1966, 1991) and Niger (1992).4° Mutineers in Republic of Congo in 
1997 held both the rail station and the power station, disrupting rail service and leaving 
local towns without electricity for several days 41 
Controlling public or strategically important locations is similar to hostage taking 
in that it brings the grievances of the mutineers into a more public forum. Unlike 
hostage taking, controlling locations affects not just key political or military personnel, 
but the general civilian population as well. Targeting transit infrastructure, especially 
airports, also has international implications when air traffic is diverted. The longer 
mutineers hold strategically important locations, the more fragile a government appears, 
which could affect international trade and investments. Furthermore, when actions taken 
by mutineers affect civilians there is the threat that civilians will react, further 
destabilizing the situation. There is the possibility for civilians to criticize the way the 
38 This Day, "Mutiny -27 Soldiers Get Life Sentence ", April 28, 2009. 
39 West Africa, May 28, 1990, 877 -878. 
4° West Africa, July 30, 1966, 869; West Africa, October 7, 1991, 1674 -1675; Africa Research Bulletin, 
February 1992, 10471. 
41 Africa Research Bulletin, February 1997, 12578. 
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government handles the situation or perhaps even worse for a government is if the 
civilians side with the mutineers. Both scenarios have occurred in Burkina Faso, the 
former in 2011 and the latter in 1983. 
In addition to its strategic value, the choice of capturing largely transportation 
infrastructure can also be seen as mutineers working within a domain they are familiar 
with. While militaries worldwide are often thought to have an external focus, in West 
and Central Africa the military regularly take on an internal function, similar to policing. 
The protection of key infrastructure is often part of their responsibility and it is 
particularly common for the military to be active in transportation infrastructure as 
evidenced with military manned road checkpoints or military personnel as airport 
security. 
Public gathering, firing weapons into the air, taking hostages, and holding key 
infrastructure all serve the purpose of drawing attention to the cause of the mutineers. 
These tactics are not meant to be discreet; mutineers want people to know their mission. 
This is an important difference between coups and mutinies, as explained in the 
introduction chapter. Whereas coups are meant to be a definitive action, mutinies are a 
step in a process of negotiations. The tactics aim to gain attention and open a dialogue 
with leadership in an environment in which the hierarchy does not easily allow 
individuals to express their opinions. Channelling concerns up the chain of command, 
which would be the required procedure within a military hierarchy, has several 
complications. One is that the direct chain of command is often the problem, 
particularly when soldiers make accusations that their superiors have a hand in their 
missing salaries. Secondly, the demands of mutineers are often larger than could be 
addressed by their immediate superiors. For example, a junior officer or NCO would 
not be able to raise solders' salaries. 
There is often ambiguity in whether mutineers are attempting to gain the 
attention of senior military leadership or senior political leadership. This is likely due to 
the lowly position of the mutineers within the hierarchy. As junior soldiers, most 
without advanced education, they may be unaware of how decisions, especially 
regarding funding, are made, and at times seem willing to negotiate with either military 
or political leadership. Most often it appears they would prefer to deal with political 
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leadership, a trend that represents their general distrust of their senior military officers. 
This preference can be seen in the way they often physically approach State House or 
demand meetings with the President. 
2.6 Mutineers' Public Relations Campaign 
The desire for mutineers to grab the attention of government officials, and often 
a wider audience, commonly leads them to utilize the media. Media also allows 
mutineers to circumvent their chain of command and address their concerns to political 
authorities. Additionally, by engaging directly with the media mutineers can create their 
own public relations image. As the examples below will show, soldiers often 
intentionally try counter the image portrayed by government sources, which is almost 
always negative. For example, descriptors of mutineers by government sources include 
"ruthless," "uncontrolled individuals," "diehards," "criminals," and "dangerous." 
Mutineers use media to provide an alternative narrative and often one in which they are 
the victims of an unjust system, rather than aggressors. The attempt to change the 
narrative was especially clear in mutinies in Central African Republic in 1997 when 
soldiers publicly demanded "a monument to the memory of the civilian and military 
victims of the three mutinies be erected in Bangui. "42 
Radio is the preferred media outlet for African mutineers. There are several 
ways mutineers use the radio waves; the less common manner is to speak to each other. 
For example, mutineers in Central African Republic in 1993 first explained over the 
radio that they were revolting because they had not been paid for eight months and then 
they called on other soldiers to return to the barracks and take up arms in case of attack 
by other troops.43 In this instance mutineers saw a radio broadcast as the fastest way to 
get a message across to both the government and their fellow soldiers. However, most 
mutineers do not use the public radio to send instructions to each other, but rather to 
justify their actions and lay out demands, sometimes in very specific detail. For 
a' West Africa, February 1997. 
a' Africa Research Bulletin, May 1993 11012. 
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example, in 1996 mutineers in Central African Republic made the following 
announcement 
First, we demand the payment of overdue salaries for 1992, 1993, and 
1994. Second, the unfreezing of salaries. Third, the restoration and 
improvement of the Central African armed forces....Fourth, we demand 
that no legal proceedings should take place after the mutiny since we will 
stop today.44 
In a separate message the same group stated 
Our living conditions are mediocre; we are treated badly and we are 
exposed to disease. This is why we have left the barracks. We made 
these demands from our barracks, but call to no avail. We have been 
forced to take to the streets. We have no intention of destabilizing the 
regime; President Patassé was democratically elected.' 
This announcement serves to personalize the mutineers. They aim to portray themselves 
not as soldiers who are committing a military crime but rather as individuals who simply 
cannot provide for themselves or their families under their current salary. These soldiers 
also express that the mutiny was an action of last resort. In doing so they suggest that 
the blame is on their leadership for not responding to earlier complaints. 
While the above examples used media during a mutiny, Nigerian soldiers in 2012 
contacted the media in order to threaten the government about a potential mutiny. 
Nigerian soldiers, serving as part of the United Nations /African Union mission in 
Darfur, told Radio France International Hausa Service that they would mutiny if they 
were not paid their owed allowances and airlifted back to Nigeria. In a related petition 
they sent to the government the soldiers stated 
Nobody seems to listen to us or the plight of our families back home. 
Even though it is against the ethics of the military to go to the press, we 
are pushed to the wall because nobody listens to our cries apart from the 
media.46 
44 West Africa, May 5, 1996, 667. 
4' Ibid. 
46 Kadir Badsha Mukhtar and Misbahu Bashir, "Nigeria: Darfur Operations- Nigerian Soldiers Threaten 
Mutiny- Ask to be Airlifted Home," Daily Trust, June 26 2012. 
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In this case the soldiers stress the desire to be listened to by their superiors and their 
willingness to take extreme measures to get attention for their concerns. Much like the 
example from Central African Republic above, these soldiers also acknowledge that 
their actions go against a military code of conduct but express that it was a measure of 
last resort. 
The rapid increase in internet use and particularly social media potentially allows 
the messages of mutineers to reach much farther than radio announcements. Whereas 
the Nigerian soldiers' threat was announced on the radio, the story was also posted 
online and picked up by bloggers and reposted via Twitter, thus reaching an incalculable 
number of people throughout the world. The use of the internet in spreading information 
about mutinies came into play unintentionally in an interview with soldiers in Burkina 
Faso when I asked about a very specific incident within the 2011 mutinies. The soldier 
interviewee immediately got suspicious and questioned how I knew that particular 
information. I explained that it was reported in the media and I read about it on the 
internet from the UK. This individual was surprised to find out that the mutineers' story 
was broadcast around the world and the interviewer /interviewee roles were quickly 
swapped as he questioned me on exactly what these reports said. When the conversation 
was over it was clear that the soldier was excited to hear how far their story had 
travelled. 
Other soldiers and former soldiers are already hard at work spreading their 
message via social media. For example, a fast way to track down former Gambian 
soldiers is to visit the Facebook page "Arrest Yahya Jammeh. "47 Those familiar with 
recent Gambian military affairs will recognize many of the names of the members. As 
the group name suggests, they are pushing for a coup but members also post pictures of 
current Gambian military officers and express their general disdain for them. 
Considering mutinies often involve junior rank and file soldiers, many of whom will 
likely be of a more technology savvy generation than their older peers, it is reasonable to 
47 While this Facebook group was active while I was conducting research, when attempting to access the 
page 9 months later the group page had been removed. However, there exists others that are similar, such 
a group titled "Uproot Jammeh" and another called "Jammeh Step Down." 
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assume that the use of technology and media will be used even more pervasively in 
future mutinies. 
All of the commonly utilized tactics such as discharging firearms, gathering in 
mass, taking control of strategic locations, holding hostages, and making media 
announcements, are designed to grab attention, open a dialogue, and pressure 
negotiations. While these tactics would be extreme if conducted by civilians, in a 
military perspective they can be considered measured and controlled. There are 
certainly cases in which mutineers turn to violence and destruction and these incidents 
will be discussed later, but as this section demonstrated most tactics at least in the initial 
stages of a mutiny are calculated decisions. This analysis of tactics is in opposition to 
many other writings on mutinies, which describe the act as `spontaneous.' While there 
may be incidents within mutinies that are unplanned, mutinies in West and Central 
Africa are usually not reckless reactions. Taking control of an airport, breaking into an 
armoury, capturing hostages, and making media announcements all require a degree of 
planning and coordination in the execution phase. However, even if we view mutinies 
as largely planned actions, rather than impulsive decisions, they still have a high degree 
of unpredictability, which will be the focus of the next two sections. 
2.7 Violence as an Ace or a Bluff 
An important part of mutineers' strategy is the ability to create and control 
instability. Unlike those in an industrial or agricultural industry, soldiers do not have 
any tangible goods to demonstrate or measure their worth. Instead, the value of the 
military rests in their ability to manage violence.48 Within this context it is perhaps not 
surprising that violence is a key tool for mutineers. 
It is important to note that the threat of violence is an integral part of a mutiny, 
however the use of violence is not. Of the sixty -six mutinies addressed in this dataset, 
slightly less than half involved direct acts of violence. This data contradicts writings by 
48 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 13. 
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Kandeh who argues, "mutinies are by definition violent acts of defiance. "49 However, 
the trend in my dataset is consistent with other studies using non -African datasets, which 
have also shown that mutinies tend to be nonviolent.50 Mutineers utilize their position in 
the military to threaten to create a situation of instability or escalate the instability they 
have already created. Their main bargaining chip is their ability to also control the 
situation and return to the desired state of stability. Yet this is often an overly ambitious 
claim, especially when the group lacks cohesion. Anger, aggression, and indiscipline can 
dominate over strategy and individuals often act on their own accord. Involving large 
numbers of participants is often both the strength and the downfall of mutinies. A large 
group quickly gathers the desired attention but is also difficult to control. 
Whereas it could be considered good news that the (slight) majority of mutinies 
in the region are not violent, the bad news is that when mutinies become violent the 
number of casualties can be very high. In the mutinies in Central African Republic in 
1996 estimates of fatalities range from 200 -500.51 In mutinies in Democratic Republic 
of Congo in 1967 there were an estimated 80 killed and 100 wounded and revolts in the 
same country in 1991 resulted in 100 fatalities.52 The Côte d'Ivoire mutinies in 2002 led 
to 270 deaths and mutinies in Guinea in 1996 resulted in 50 deaths and 300 wounded.53 
Significantly, many, if not most, of these casualties are civilians. Therefore, although 
mutinies are usually seen as internal military matters, in West and Central Africa they 
have had severe consequences on civilian populations. Understanding mutinies and in 
particular ways to avoid or resolve mutinies is important not just from a political 
stability standpoint, but also from a humanitarian perspective. 
The variation in levels of violence within mutinies leads to the question of 
whether there are different types of mutinies. Other mutiny scholars have stated that 
attempts to create a mutiny typology has proven more difficult than anticipated and my 
49 Kandeh, Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa, 42. 
50 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 568; Hathaway, "Introduction" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: 
Mutiny in Comparative Perspective, XVI. 
51 Andreas Mehler, "The production of insecurity by African security forces: Insights from Liberia and the 
Central African Republic," GIGA working papers, No. 114, 2009. 
52 Edgar O'Balance, The Congo -Zaire Experience, 1960 -98 (London: Macmillan Press,Ltd, 2000): 101- 
103; West Africa, October 7, 1674 -1 675. 
53 West Africa, September 30, 2002, 25; Africa Research Bulletin, February 1998, 13014 
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own experience mirrors this.54 The fluid nature of mutinies makes it challenging to 
categorize them in the way that coups are at times described as a "palace coup" or a 
"coup from below." Mutinies often start out in one fashion and change drastically as 
time goes on. Instead, I find it more valuable to view mutinies along a continuum. 
On one end of this spectrum are mutinies that involve a generally cohesive unit 
with demands that are often specific to their particular group. I will refer to these as 
self -contained mutinies. In many cases these units have recently deployed together and 
share common grievances about their deployment experience. Since these units have a 
history together they often appear to respect a hierarchy within the group and mutineers 
in this scenario are less likely to use violence. Mutinies in The Gambia in 1991 and 
1992, as described in Chapter 6, fall into this category. Another example of a self - 
contained style of mutiny occurred in Republic of Congo in 1997. In this case sailors 
locked themselves in their base in an attempt to demand better pay, living conditions and 
the removal of their base commander who they accused of fostering tribalism within the 
unit." 
On the opposite end of the continuum to these self -contained mutinies, is a more 
chaotic style, which I will refer to as violent mass mutinies. These mutinies often appear 
to be self -destructive in nature. Although the mutinies may start with a single unit their 
complaints are regularly broad in scope, which gives their campaign mass appeal. As 
more soldiers and units from throughout the country join in they add their own 
personalized goals and complaints. These soldiers are unified in anger and frustration, 
not necessarily shared experiences or specific demands. 
Rose notes that as a mutiny spreads the individual motivations of mutineers 
becomes widely varied. He explains that during a mass mutiny 
the full gamut of the human condition is revealed. Some troops join 
because of intimidation, some because of opportunism. Some are true 
believers; some are only swimmers with the tide. Some would face the 
severest penalties for their principles; some would denounce their fellows 
at the first opportunity.'6 
54 Hathaway, "Introduction" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective, 
XV. 
'5 West Africa, May 4, 1997, 665; Africa Research Bulletin, March 1997, 12664. 
56 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 569. 
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With these wide variations in motivation and goals within the group it then becomes 
especially difficult to organize cohesive demands or negotiations. When mutineers in 
these situations use violence it seems to quickly spread and often also involves property 
destruction, looting, and rape. As a result, this type of mutiny has the highest probability 
of negatively affecting the civilian population. Mutinies in Burkina Faso in 2011, which 
will be addressed in Chapter Seven, can be considered violent mass mutinies, as can 
mutinies in Democratic Republic of Congo in 1961, Central African Republic in 1996, 
and Guinea in 1996. 
In some ways a mutiny feels like a high -risk game of poker. As a mutiny 
progresses the mutineers are raising the stakes, often with hostages or strategic locations, 
and always with the threat of violence, hoping for the government to fold. When the 
mutineers resort to violence they have put all their chips on the table and force the 
government to respond. However, the chaotic environment created by a violent mass 
mutiny makes negotiations difficult and the government often responds with force. 
Therefore the use of violence is often counterproductive to the goals of mutineers. 
The use of violence can also isolate the mutineers from those who might 
otherwise sympathize with their cause. In an interview with the Editorial Chief of the 
radio station Ouaga FM in Ouagadougou, he explained that his station had initially been 
conducting interviews with the Burkinabé mutineers in 2011 and essentially giving them 
a voice to air their grievances. He says "we talked [to the mutineers] before the big 
unrest but then there were rapes and lootings and shootings and we do not want to 
interact with them anymore. "57 He explained that the station did not want to appear 
supportive of the more extreme behaviour of the mutineers. Other media sources 
followed suit. The Burkinabé government also had initially negotiated with the 
mutineers but drew the line when the series of mutinies grew increasingly violent. The 
government eventually countered them with force, killing at least six mutineers. 
When a mutiny reaches a mass level it also attracts opportunists who take 
advantage of the weak security situation. It becomes difficult to determine if the 
perpetrators are civilians or soldiers, as both can wear civilian attire. When mutineers 
57 Author interview with Editorial Chief for Ouaga FM, March 2012 
63 
engage in hostage taking, holding strategic locations, or gathering in public locations 
they are committing the acts in public and generally unconcerned about hiding their 
identity. However, looting and randomized violence are more anonymous acts, likely 
because it is very blatantly criminal in nature. It is common for mutineers to claim some 
of the more criminal aspects associated with a mutiny are not the responsibility of their 
group. In interviews in Burkina Faso numerous respondents (both civilian and military) 
described "gangsters" that "joined with the soldiers to steal. "58 
In some cases mutineers seem to acknowledge the negative effect that violence 
could have on their efforts and intentionally show they are unarmed. This is likely 
meant to deter a counter attack as well as avoid accusations of a coup attempt. A 
Burkinabé soldier described this tactic in a 1997 mutiny he was involved in. He 
explained 
Soldiers were given strict orders [by NCOs] to not go near the armoury, 
that anyone attempting to break into the armoury will be shot. We were 
told what to wear, basically the most simple of uniforms, no belts, no 
extra clothing, they wanted to give the signal that there was nothing to 
hide, everyone was unarmed.59 
However even when soldiers indicate that they are unarmed, their position in an 
in the region, still 
gives an implicit threat of violence or instability. As a result governments usually act 
with more expediency towards a mutiny than they would if members of the civil service 
or a trade organization were taking the same action (as is often the case when mutinies 
coincide with civilian demonstrations). 
2.8 The Predictably Unpredictable Nature of Mutinies 
A common characteristic of mutinies in West and Central Africa is their fluid 
nature. As mentioned in Chapter 1, mutinies are generally drawn out events, lasting 
58 Author interviews in Burkina Faso, March 2012 
59 Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in defense 
industry), March 2012 
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days, weeks or even months. Therefore, mutineers must be flexible and adaptable. 
They have to anticipate how the government will respond and plan their counter moves. 
Linked to the issue of fluidity within mutinies is their contagious nature. The 
potential for a contagion has also been discussed in coup literature. The term `coup 
contagion' describes a trend in which successful coups can trigger coups in 
neighbouring countries. There are some incidents of where this could be the case with 
mutinies. Mutinies in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda in 1964 serve as the strongest 
example. However, a more convincing argument can be made that mutinies are 
internally contagious. Mutinies appear much more likely to spread within the borders of 
a country than to neighbouring countries. It is very common to see one unit start a 
mutiny and others either join in immediately or within a short period of time. Examples 
of incidents of an internal contagion include mutinies in Côte d'Ivoire (1990, 2000), 
Democratic Republic of Congo (1991), Republic of Congo (1997), Niger (2002), and 
Burkina Faso (2011). 
Often times the mutiny does not spread immediately but instead after non - 
mutinying soldiers have observed the outcome of the mutiny. After a unit has 
successfully received their demands with minimal repercussions it is common to see 
other units copy the tactic. This trend can be seen in mutinies in Central African 
Republic in 1993. The initial mutiny involved the Presidential Guards but five days 
after this mutiny was resolved the Régiment de Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire 
(RDOT) mutinied. They made similar demands and sealed off the treasury in protest at 
their late payments.60 This pattern will be demonstrated with the case of Burkina Faso 
in 2011 in Chapter Seven. 
An explanation for the contagious nature of mutinies is that the grievances 
expressed by one unit often resonate with other units or individuals. Most of the earlier 
mentioned demands, in particular pay and housing, are issues affecting large sectors of 
the military. Concerns over promotion opportunities and corruption are also likely to be 
grievances seen in a wide sector of the military and thus likely to trigger a contagious 
effect. When a complaint is specific to a particular unit, it is less likely to become 
G0 Africa Research Bulletin May 1993 11012; West Africa May 31, 1993, 922; Africa Confidential August 
13, 1996, 6 
65 
contagious. The mutinies in The Gambia in 1991 and 1992, as will be highlighted in 
Chapter 6, were particular to the special pay promised from their deployment on a 
peacekeeping mission. The vast majority of their fellow Gambian soldiers did not go on 
the deployment and did not share in their grievances and the mutiny did not spread to 
other units. A similar case involved a mutiny in Liberia in 1963 over specific 
complaints about the way money contributed to a communal fund was handled by the 
officers. The complaints by these junior soldiers were specific to a particular process, 
quickly addressed by the headquarters (ultimately leading to the arrest of four officers 
and the base commander) and did not lead to similar incidents with other units.61 It is 
important to note though, that this dichotomy of broad grievances leading to contagions 
and specific grievances generally remaining contained is not always an easy separation. 
It is common for mutineers to list numerous complaints, some of which others can relate 
to. For example, soldiers may have grievances about lack of payments for a deployment 
that is specific to their unit but then blame the delay on corruption among higher ranks, 
which many others can relate to. 
Another trend in mutinies, related to the issue of fluidity, is the diversion of a 
mutiny into a coup or a rebellion against the state. While soldiers may start their 
mission with a goal of having their specific corporatist claims met, there are examples of 
incidents in which they have ultimately overthrown political leadership. One 
explanation for why mutinies often change course is because they create opportunities 
that would not otherwise exist. The mutiny gives junior soldiers a level of control and 
power that the normal structure of the organization has intentionally kept from them. 
Ambitious individuals, often junior officers, can see this as a prime opportunity to make 
a move to capture more power. This type of scenario is consistent with Decalo's 
theories about the importance of personal elements in relations to the causes of coups. 
He argues 
the main weakness of attempts to explain military interventions by 
pinpointing areas of systemic stress is in not placing sufficient weight on 
personal idiosyncratic elements in military hierarchies, which have 
61 West Africa April 20, 1963, 444. 
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greater freedom and scope of action within a context of fragmented and 
unstructured political systems.62 
Mutinies create additional divides in the already fractured systems and provide 
the ideal opportunity for the personalize power -grabs that Decalo describes. 
Additionally, individual officers do not have to mobilize soldiers as they already have a 
disgruntled audience to work with. 
The case of Sierra Leone in 1992, as detailed in Chapter Five, is one example of 
where the rank and file soldiers wanted to mutiny over their pay and conditions but 
officers escalated the plan to a coup. In Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire in 1999 soldiers took to 
the streets in a mutiny over unpaid salaries and poor living conditions.63 Negotiations 
between the mutineers and the government were reportedly called off when Robert Guei, 
a former General who had been fired two years earlier, announced that President Bedie 
had been removed and a ruling council was formed with himself as the leader. 64 The 
recent coup in Mali in 2012 also fits this pattern. Soldiers began to mutiny over 
deployment conditions and shortly after Captain Sanogo led a coup to overthrow 
President Touré. Additionally in all of these scenarios internal instability increased after 
the coup and the military remained unsatisfied. When a mutiny escalates into a coup, 
the original complaints of the soldiers are often sidelined in the need to focus on the 
large task of developing a new political structure. This scenario will be described in the 
case study of Sierra Leone where soldiers explain why a mutiny is a better option to 
address their current complaints than a coup. 
It is not only military personnel who see opportunity in mutiny; politicians are 
also guilty of utilizing a mutiny to advance their cause. Even if mutineers are not calling 
for political changes, they are drawing attention publicly to perceived problems in the 
military or political system. In doing so they may expose a power vacuum that others 
can seek to fill. Similarly, it is common to see opposition leaders or parties use it as an 
62 Decalo, "Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa," 113. 
63 Africa Research Bulletin, December 1999, 13783 -13786. 
64 Tom Kamara, Cöte d'Ivoire: Implications of the December 1999 Coup d'Etat, 1 April 2000, Writnet 
Paper 01/2000, available at: http:// www. unhcr. org /refworld /docid /3ae6a6c74.html [accessed 4 December 
2012]; Guei, initially popular with the mutineers quickly fell out of favor and he was killed during 
subsequent mutinies in 2002. 
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opportunity to call for political changes. Variations of this pattern occurred in Central 
African Republic in 1996 and Burkina Faso in 2011.65 
This section has shown that mutinies are often fluid and become increasingly 
unpredictable as they progress. It is not just a matter of mutineers attempting to make 
moves that are unpredictable to the government. Instead it appears that the outcomes 
become unpredictable to even those involved. Earlier sections of this chapter identified 
patterns that could help observers anticipate what tactics mutineers are most likely to use 
but the actions of the mutineers are only one piece of the puzzle. It is common to see 
other units and individuals, both military and civilian, become involved and their roles 
and actions add to the volatility of a mutiny. 
2.9 Determining Success in a Mutiny 
A final issue to address is whether mutinies work. Are the demands of mutineers 
usually met? This is not an easy question to answer as mutinies often involve numerous 
participants making a variety of demands. The dataset indicates that most mutinies are 
at least partially successful. The government or military hierarchy typically provides 
some concession, although often not the full demands. Both Hamby and Rose argue that 
mutinies pay out in the long run for the majority of participants.66 They believe that 
while a few may be punished, the conditions protested are usually improved and the 
state reconsiders issues brought up by the mutineers. However, the data for West and 
Central Africa does not support this theory. Mutinies in this region appear to follow the 
opposite pattern; they pay out in the short term, not necessarily the long term. Short- 
term fixes such as payments to mutineers are common but many of the complaints about 
ingrained problems such as corruption, promotion procedures, or favouritism persist 
after the mutiny. This pattern was seen in mutinies in Guinea in 2007 and 2008. In 
several mutinies in these two years, which spread throughout the country, soldiers were 
paid off with bonuses, salary increases, increased transportation allowances, and reduced 
65 
West Africa June 16, 1996; West Africa June 23, 1996. 
66 Hamby, "The Mutiny Wagon Wheel: A Leadership Model for Mutiny in Combat," 592; Rose, "The 
Anatomy of Mutiny," 572. 
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cost of rice.67 Yet, requests to investigate senor officers for fraud were denied and 
soldiers continued to make claims that their superiors were living "in opulence. "68 The 
reluctance to address the underlying issues of mutinies is likely linked back to the earlier 
discussion of the privileged place of senior officers in many African states. Taking 
action against this sector of the military could threaten political leadership or state 
stability. 
Support for the argument that mutinies are often not a long -term fix can also be 
found in the list of mutinies in the previous chapter (Figure 1.1). In the list there are 
numerous examples of countries that experience mutinies over and over again with 
soldiers usually expressing similar grievances in each mutiny. For example, Burkina 
Faso experienced six mutinies in a matter of eleven years, Niger had five in ten years, 
and soldiers in Central African Republic rebelled six times in eight years. The persistent 
problems within the Burkinabé military, despite numerous mutinies, will be addressed in 
more detail in Chapter Seven. 
Another way to analyze whether mutinies are successful is to examine if and how 
mutineers are punished. Mutinies would likely not be considered successful for those 
involved if the action resulted in the mutineers being dismissed from the military or 
jailed. Like many aspects of the military, punishments are often not a matter shared with 
the public and trials are often done through court martials (internal military court 
system). However, there are also times in which governments highlight the 
punishments, likely in hopes that it will serve as a deterrent for other soldiers. Based on 
the dataset, the most conclusive thing that can be said about the punishment of African 
mutineers is that there appears to be no clear pattern. African governments are not 
necessarily lenient on mutineers, as Hamby and Rose claim when discussing mutinies 
from a Western perspective.69 It is also not the case that only ringleaders and punished, 
as they also suggest. There are numerous examples of harsh punishments that go 
beyond just the mutinying unit to others in the military and officers. For example, one of 
the first post -colonial West African mutinies occurred among a Ghanaian unit deployed 
67 Africa Research Bulletin, March 1st -315`, 2007; Africa Research Bulletin, February I, 2008. 
68 Africa Research Bulletin, March 1st-31st, 2007, 17015. 
69 Hamby, "The Mutiny Wagon Wheel: A Leadership Model for Mutiny in Combat," 592; Rose, "The 
Anatomy of Mutiny," 571. 
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to Congo. Following the mutiny, which involved a single unit, 125 soldiers were 
dismissed, 6 given jail terms, and the ringleader was sentenced to death (the sentence 
was later commuted to life in prison).70 Following a mutiny in Niger is 2002, 268 
soldiers were arrested, a number of whom spent eighteen months in prison. Similarly, 
the mutinies in Burkina Faso in 2011 resulted in the dismissal of 566 soldiers, 217 of 
which were brought up on criminal charges.71 However, there are also plenty of 
examples, also across time, of where mutineers received minimal or no punishment. 
As this section has shown, measuring success in mutinies based on short or long 
term gains and punishments is rather inconclusive on the question of whether mutinies 
generally work in favour of those who take the risk to become involved. Perhaps this 
data about success is less important than the perceptions of soldiers who indicate their 
belief that mutinies work by continuing to carry out mutinies across the region. Soldiers 
are trained in calculating risks, which is an important part of combat. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that mutinies would continue to be a tactic that soldiers use if they did not 
believe they had a good chance of success. 
The following chapter will enforce the point that soldiers calculate their chances 
of success before engaging in a mutiny by demonstrating that mutinies occur more often 
in regimes with some respect of democratic principles. Part of the explanation for this 
trend is that soldiers have deemed that these governments are more likely to be receptive 
to their grievances and thus their probability of success is heightened. 
2.10 Conclusion 
In returning to the debate of whether there is such thing as a typical mutiny, this 
chapter has demonstrated that although each mutiny is to some degree unique, there are 
also particular aspects of mutinies that are common across states and time. Mutineers' 
grievances in the region generally concern issues of their conditions of services, which 
can include both material aspects (salary, housing, etc.) and military procedures 
70 West Africa, March 18, 1961, 298. 
7' Lila Chouli, "Peoples' Revolt in Burkina Faso," in Africa Awakening: The Emerging Revolutions, eds. 
Firoze Manji and Sokari Ekine (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2012): 143. 
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(promotions, relocations, etc.). Underlying the desire for improved conditions is often a 
sense of injustice over perceptions that their conditions are at extreme odds with the 
conditions of senior officers. This exceptional gap between the ranks has developed as a 
result of the unique role of the military in African politics, both in colonial times and 
particularly post- independence. 
The perceptions of injustice that go along with a decision to mutiny are just as 
important to understanding a mutiny as are the publicly declared grievances but they are 
difficult to observe through media reporting. The less tangible aspects of mutinies will 
be addressed further through case studies using interviews with former mutineers. The 
publicly declared grievances generally have a clear solution, although the time it would 
take to implement the solution varies. For example, soldiers can be paid, unacceptable 
leaders can be fired, and issues such as promotion criteria can be adapted. Yet the 
grievances have often been long brewing and become accompanied with feelings of 
distrust, disrespect, and contempt, which are harder to remedy. This is an important 
trend observed in non -African mutinies as well. Lawrence James, studying British 
mutinies, writes, "although the genesis of a mutiny could be attributed to trivial matters, 
the form and level of the resultant collective action could be completely disproportionate 
to the original case. "72 Even if mutinies from the surface appear to be pay disputes, it is 
often more accurate to view them as a sign of severe issues within an armed force. 
The dataset has shown that mutineers typically use a rather limited number of 
tactics, which include public gathering (often in proximity to decision makers), firing 
weapons in the air, taking hostages, and holding strategic locations. These tactics serve 
the purpose of publicly expressing dissatisfaction and forcing a dialogue with leadership 
about demands. This desire for attention to their cause is further achieved through the 
relatively new trend of mutineers directly engaging with the media. Despite a recurring 
pattern of tactics, mutinies in practice are not predictable. In many cases the cohesion 
needed for a mutiny proves to be very tenuous and dissolves as the mutiny spreads and 
gains more participants. 
72 James, Mutiny: In the British Commonwealth Forces, 1797 -1956, 13 -15 as summarized in Howard G. 
Coombs, ed. The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and 
Disobedience, 1920 to Present, 16. 
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The threat of violence is the most valuable tool used by mutineers. Even when 
mutineers do not directly involve violent actions, their position within an organization 
that has the ability to cause widespread instability as well as a history of doing so, causes 
alarm among both political and military leadership. Although the threat of violence is 
the strength of mutinies, the use of violence is often their downfall. Violent acts, 
especially against civilians, are likely to isolate the mutineers and potentially trigger a 
counter attack. 
One aspect of a typical mutiny in West and Central Africa that has been absent 
from this chapter is when they typically happen. This topic will be discussed in the 
following two chapters, which will identify particular contexts in which soldiers often 
decide that their conditions of service are unacceptable. 
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Chapter Three- The Unlikely Democrats 
3.1 Introduction 
When mutinies in West and Central Africa are charted chronologically, the most 
eye- catching trend is the dramatic increase in the 1990s (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter One). 
There were twenty -eight mutinies in this decade, accounting for forty -two percent of all 
mutinies in the dataset, which spans a fifty -two year time period. This chapter serves to 
explain this unequal distribution by linking the increase in mutinies in the 1990s to the 
political and economic context of the time. 
The spike in mutinies in the 1990s corresponded with what is often referred to as 
the democratization period in Africa. It was a time of both turbulence and hope with 
quick collapses of authoritarian regimes, increases in competitive elections, and more 
political rights for the average citizen. However, debates continue about whether the 
political reforms seen during the 1990s were successful and lasting.' The political 
changes during this period were a result of both international pressures as well as local 
involvement, in which many Africans across the continent became actively engaged in 
demanding reform. Richard Joseph refers to these events as the "awakening process. "2 
Similarly, the rank and file soldiers in the region also seemed to be reawakened after 
decades of limited incidents of mutiny. 
Eboe Hutchful argues that the democracy movement "won the battle for civil 
society but lost the battle for the military. "3 He laments the "failure of the democracy 
I Several examples of volumes dedicated to the topic include Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds. 
Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
2010); Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Lindsay Whitfield, eds. Turning Points in African Democracy 
(Suffolk: James Currey, 2009); E. Gyimah -Boadi, ed. Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of 
Progress (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). 
'` Richard Joseph, "Challenges of a `Frontier' Region," in Democratization in Africa: Progress and 
Retreat, 2nd ed. Eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 
2010): 4. 
3 Eboe Hutchful, "Military Issues in the Transition to Democracy," in The Military and Militarism in 
Africa, Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, eds. (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1998), 608. 
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movement to capture' key sectors of the military. "4 I agree with Hutchful that 
militaries in the region overall were not active participants in progressing the movement; 
however I will argue that in many ways they were `captured' by the themes of the 
movement. Just as civil society rediscovered their popular voice, so did the military, 
although the junior soldiers expressed theirs through mutinies.' 
Part of the explanation for the overlap between civilian and military demands in 
the 1990s is that both were negatively affected by international economic changes at the 
time. The chapter will begin by addressing these changes and will demonstrate the 
effects of shifts in Cold War relations on 'militaries in the region. The similarities 
between the civilian and military movements go beyond shared economic hardships and 
I will show ways in which mutineers appeared inspired by the themes of the 
democratization movement. They displayed awareness of political themes of the time 
by using popular discourse from the democratization movement within their public 
statements. While this chapter will focus mostly on the 1990s, its lessons are not 
restricted to this time period. The last section of the chapter will look beyond the 1990s 
and use Freedom House data to demonstrate that mutinies most often occur in countries 
that display respect for civil liberties and political freedoms. Mutineers likely view 
democratic leaders as more responsive and they often utilize the political freedoms and 
civil liberties that are associated with democracies to their advantage during mutinies. 
There is also possibly a methodological explanation to the trend of limited 
mutinies- in the 1970s and 1980s followed by a spike of mutinies in the early 1990s. 
Many states in this region lacked press freedoms during the 1970s and 1980s and 
regimes maintained tight control over the domestic sources of information and banned 
independent news outlets.6 Mutinies are generally considered a threat and 
embarrassment to the state and state media outlets are less likely to publicize a mutiny. 
Therefore, there may have been mutinies in the 1970s and 1980s, which were put down 
quickly and never reported. "Missing mutinies" is a possibility for all eras covered in 
d Hutchful, "Military Issues in the Transition to Democracy," 608. 
' "Rediscovery of a popular voice" borrowed from Paul Nugent, Africa Since Independence, 2 "d Ed., 377. 
6 Adebayo Olukoshi "State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa: The Complex Process of Renewal," in 
State Conflict and Democracy in Africa, ed. Richard Joseph (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1999): 454. 
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the dataset but most likely when independent reporting is absent. Still, I do not believe 
the methodological explanation discounts the pattern and I will show throughout this 
chapter that there are numerous reasons for both the lack of mutinies in the 1980s and 
prevalence of mutinies in the 1990s. 
3.2 Global Trends Lead to Ground Level Complaints 
As the previous chapter explained, most mutinies involve concerns over the 
terms of service of rank and file soldiers and specifically aspects of their pay. This 
section will show that increased soldier dissatisfaction in the 1990s can be partially 
attributed to international economic factors at the time. It will also demonstrate how the 
end of the Cold War affected the soldiers' conditions as well as their willingness to 
make demands to the government. 
The 1980s were a financially difficult time for African states. By the beginning 
of the decade "virtually every African country was manifesting signs of acute economic 
distress, reflected in a mounting and unsustainable debt burden, a permanent trade 
deficit and an acute fiscal crisis which meant that the state was unable to maintain basic 
infrastructure or fund essential social services. "' International financial institutions and 
Western governments deemed that uncontrolled state expenditures were a primary cause 
of the economic crisis across the continent and African states were pressured to accept 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). SAPs required states to pursue economic 
reforms as stipulated by international institutions in order to receive loans from them.8 
A key aspect to the required reforms was a reduction in state expenditures in general and 
the number of public sector employees specifically.9 These programs therefore 
threatened the interests of the military, which had grown substantially throughout the 
1970s and into the 1980s. In particular, 
Nugent, Africa Since Independence, 330 -331. 
8 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Press, 1996): 170. 
9 Ibid., 172. 
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donors attempted to impose a predetermined ceiling (or `acceptable 
level') on the military expenditures of the states. These attempts were 
directed especially at those states deemed to be engaged in `excessive' or 
`unproductive' expenditures on the military at the expense of the social 
sector and economic development.10 
Although most states formally accepted SAPs, there were various ways in which 
they attempted to manoeuvre around full implementation of the required changes.11 
Wuyi Omitoogun explains that disagreements between African states and donors over 
what constituted appropriate military spending "led to two unintended consequences: (a) 
the deliberate manipulation of military expenditure figures; and (b) the resort to off - 
budget spending, which further compounded the problem of public expenditure 
management. "12 The general lack of transparency in military spending that occurs in 
many states combined with the intentional manipulation in relation to SAPs makes it 
difficult to assess military spending in the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
Despite questions about the reliability of state figures, there have been some 
attempts to examine trends in military spending across decades. For example, Nadir A. 
L. Mohammed analyzed the "average levels of military expenditures, military burden, 
arms imports, relative size of the armed forces to total population, and the ratio of capital 
costs of total military spending" for 13 African countries between 1963 -1987. While 
acknowledging that there were variations between countries he concludes that the 
previous mentioned indicators "increased gradually in the 1960s, escalated sharply 
during the 1970s, reached a peak in the late 1970s, and displayed a significant reduction 
in the 1980s. "13 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) can be used to 
extend Mohammed's analysis into the 1990s and beyond. Its database of military 
10 Wuyi Omitoogun, "Introduction," in Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and 
Mechanism of Control, eds. Wuyi Omitoogun and Eboe Hutchful (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006): 1. 
Nicolas Van De Walle, African Economies an the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979 -1999 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 64 -1 12. 
12 Omitoogun, "Introduction" in Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and 
Mechanism of Control, 1 -2. 
1' Nadir A. L. Mohammed, "Trends, Determinants and the Economic Effects of Military Expenditures in 
Sub -Saharan Africa," in The Military and Militarism in Africa, eds., Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye 
Bathily (Darak: CODESRIA, 1998), 93 -94; Mohammed's dataset draws his conclusions from analysis of 
13 African countries. 
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expenditures starts in 1988 and continues into the present year.14 The figures show a 
steady decline in military expenditures from the late 1980s through the late 1990s across 
sub - Saharan Africa. During this period military expenditure was the highest in 1989 
when total military expenditure was $13.9 billion and reached its lowest in 1996 with 
$9.1 billion.15 The figures also decreased when examined as a proportion of GDP (from 
3.0 percent in 1990 to 2.6 percent in 1998) and as a proportion of central government 
spending (from 11.8 percent to 8.5 percent).16 
However, as Geoff Harris points out, these reductions were disproportionate 
across Sub -Saharan Africa with South Africa, Angola and Ethiopia accounting for the 
largest decreases in expenditures.17 The decreases in these cases relates to settlements 
that were reached following periods in which states (and their international allies) 
deemed it necessary to maintain high military spending. Analysis of specific countries 
within West and Central Africa using the SIPRI dataset shows a varied picture but the 
pattern of declining military spending from the late 1980s to late 1990s is still a general 
trend in many states. For example, military spending in Burkina Faso was nearly halved 
between 1990 and 1996, while Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire also saw decreases in military 
spending between 20 and 35 percent. There were exceptions to the trend, which can be 
explained through an examination of the specific political context of the time. For 
example, Sierra Leone's substantial increase in military spending throughout the 1990s 
can be attributed to its civil war. Unfortunately, many of the countries that are most 
mutiny prone (Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Central African 
Republic, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Benin) have multiple years of missing data or no data at 
all, which makes it unfeasible to assess changes in their military spending. 
In relation to decreased defence funding, the number of military personnel was 
reduced from the 1980s into the 1990s. The size of sub -Saharan African militaries had 
quadrupled between 1963 and 1979 but then fell by a third by the mid 1990s.18 The data 
14 Dataset can be accessed at http: / /www.sipri.org/ 
15 All figures are set to USD 2011 exchange rate. 
16 Geoff Harris, "The Case for Demilitarisation in sub -Saharan Africa," in Achieving Security in Sub - 
Saharan Africa, ed. Geoff Harris (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004): 3. 
17 Ibid., 4. 
18 Jeffrey Herbst, "African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and Combat 
Research," Journal of Peace Research, 41 (2004): 359. 
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above shows that African militaries were at their prime, in terms of size and funding, 
during the 1970s but were downsized into the late 1980s. For many militaries the cuts 
continued and spending reached its lowest level in the 1990s. Spending across the 
continent then increased again in the 2000s and beyond. 
In order to understand the increase in mutinies in the 1990s it is necessary to 
view how the economic conditions presented above affected the average soldier. 
Military spending alone is not a strong indicator of whether a military is content, 
especially at the lower levels, as military spending does not necessarily equate to better 
conditions for soldiers.19 However, we are not left guessing about how the economic 
conditions affected the daily lives of rank and file soldiers because they vocalized their 
discontent. By the mid 1990s soldiers in at least Central African Republic, Chad, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Guinea, Niger, Republic of Congo, 
and Sierra Leone had all publicly claimed that they had not been paid their salaries or 
other monetary dues. A lack of salary payments was paralleled in the civil service in 
many countries as we11.20 Many soldiers also made complaints about decreased 
standards of living within the military. 
Decreases in internal military spending is only one factor that contributed to 
declining military satisfaction in Africa in the late 1980s and into the 1990s; another 
important factor was changes to Cold War relationships. Throughout the Cold War the 
international superpowers vied for African state loyalty and offered military assistance 
as a key incentive. However by 1985 the Soviet Union began to disengage with Africa 
and the Western allies soon followed suit. By the end of the 1980s both "had abandoned 
Africa as a geostrategic outpost. "21 The end of the Cold War also brought an end to 
much of the foreign military assistance and other perks that the military had become 
accustomed to, such as foreign military training. William Thom explains that training 
19 Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 244. 
29 Chris Allen, "Understanding African Politics," Review of African Political Economy 22, 65 (Sep. 1995): 
312. 
21 Michael Bratton, "International versus Domestic Pressures for Democratisation in Africa," in After the 
Cold War: Security and Democracy in Africa and Asia, eds. William Hale and Eberhard Kienle (London: 
Tauris Academic Studies, 1997): 160. 
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following the Cold War was "almost nonexistent" for most African states.22 This was 
due to both decreases in foreign military training and reduced funds available for 
internal training. 
African states had also benefitted from military equipment as a result of Cold 
War partnerships; however this largely declined along with the end of the Cold War. 
For example, Howe describes the dramatic decrease in terms of equipment by noting, 
"between 1988 and 1995 official transfers in sub- Saharan Africa declined from $4.27 
billion to $270 million. "23 This figure largely symbolizes the shift from official state -to- 
state transfers of expensive equipment (aircrafts, tanks, etc.) to a more gray market of 
small arms sales. Although many of the more expensive weapons were unnecessary for 
the type of conflicts most countries endured, the downgrade likely symbolized a loss of 
prestige to many in the military. 
With pressure to cut military spending and reduced assistance from abroad, 
equipment and maintenance in the late 1980s was neglected.24 The equipment and 
maintenance deficiencies as well as training shortfalls were not of immediate importance 
to most states in West and Central Africa at the time because most were not involved in 
conflict. However, this changed in the early 1990s when most Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) members became involved in the wars in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone and began contributing troops to other regional peacekeeping operations. 
The reduced manpower and inadequate training and equipment had a particularly 
negative effect on rank and file solders as they bore the brunt in regional conflicts, both 
within their own countries and as regional peacekeepers. Chapter Four will further 
expand on the trend of mutinies linked to combat deployments. 
One may question why soldiers began to mutiny only in the 1990s if their 
conditions were decreasing by the mid to late 1980s. Scholars have raised similar 
questions about why the civilian democratization movement gained ground when it 
22 William G. Thom, "An Assessment of Prospects for Ending Domestic Military Conflict in Sub -Saharan 
Africa," CS1S Africa Notes, No. 177, 1995, 3. 
23 Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, 80. 
24 Robin Luckham, "Taming the Monster: Democratisation and Demilitarisation" in The Military and 
Militarism in Africa, eds., Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1998): 589. 
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did.25 Just as there is no singular reason to explain the civilian timing, there are also 
likely several reasons why soldiers were reluctant to mutiny in the 1980s. It could be the 
case that conditions were not quite bad enough in the 1980s to trigger a mutiny. 
Although defence spending had decreased in the late 1980s, widespread accusations of 
non -payment did not begin until the early 1990s. Additionally, there was little 
indication that the largely authoritarian leaders who ruled in the 1970s and 1980s would 
make concessions to mutineers, which could have served as a disincentive. The reduced 
likelihood of mutinies under authoritarian regimes extends beyond this time period and 
will be further examined in section 3.6. 
It is also likely that the Cold War relationships that were strong in the 1970s and 
present, although weakening, in the 1980s served as a deterrent for mutinies. During the 
Cold War many African states relied on direct military support from their non -African 
allies. For example, France deployed troops at least seven times in the 1970s and 1980s 
to assist African leaders.26 Howe explains that consistent willingness of foreign nations 
to intervene on the behalf of African leaders "undoubtedly dampened the aspirations of 
some potential insurgents or invaders. "27 It also likely caused potential mutineers to 
rethink plans to revolt. Junior soldiers would have been aware that they would stand no 
chance against an attack by better- equipped and trained foreign soldiers. 
The end of. the Cold War also reduced the willingness of non -African states to 
intervene in African conflicts. France, who had once been quick to deploy its 
paratroopers to assist its former colonies, ended many of its mutual defence agreements 
with African countries. For example, "the French government informed Felix 
Houphouet -Boigny, its key African ally, that he could not longer count on French 
military reinforcements to contain domestic unrest. "28 Interestingly, Houphouet -Boigny 
tested this threat during mutinies in the spring of 1990. France stood by its word and 
refused Houphouet -Boigny's request for military assistance in putting down the 
mutinies.29 As a result, Houphouet -Boigny gave in to many of the mutineers' demands. 
25 Bratton, "International versus Domestic Pressures for Democratisation in Africa, "179. 
26 
Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, 78. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Bratton, "International versus Domestic Pressures for Democratisation in Africa," 165. 
29 West Africa, 28 May -3 June, 1990, 877. 
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While the high likelihood of foreign intervention throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
may have been a deterrence of mutinies, the lack of foreign intervention in the 1990s 
may have had the opposite effect. Without the possibility of foreign assistance, leaders 
in the early 1990s were quick to acquiesce to soldiers' demands in order to avoid further 
instability, which was already growing with popular protests at the time. 
3.3 Mutual Mobilization 
While the previous section examined how economic trends and shifts in 
international relations led to more grievances among the military, this section will show 
that the political mood of the time also likely played a part in the increased mutinies. 
The swift regime changes that took place in the 1990s, following decades of 
authoritarian leadership can be attributed to both international and domestic factors. 
Structural adjustment programs did not turn out to be a quick cure for the ailing 
economies and as the Cold War came to an end international institutions and Western 
governments decided that the "absence of democratic government and political 
accountability in Africa was a significant contributory factor in economic malaise." 30 
External donors began to introduce political conditionality to aid allocations in which 
recipient countries had to demonstrate respect for human rights and progress towards 
democracy. Under the deteriorating economic conditions most states had little choice 
but to concede to political conditionality, at least to some degree. While the political 
conditionality served as warnings for leaders who had grown accustom to neglecting 
democratic principles and human rights, in practice it was often selectively enforced.31 
This assessment will focus more attention on the domestic pressures for change as those 
likely had more of an influence on mutineers. 
By the late 1980s the credibility of single -party systems was challenged not only 
internationally but also internally. The decreasing per capita income levels for the 
average African caused people to further question the existing authoritarian and military- 
30 John Wiseman, "Introduction" in Democracy and Political Change in Sub -Saharan Africa, ed. John 
Wiseman (New York: Routledge, 1995): 3. 
31 Bratton, "International versus Domestic Pressures for Democratisation in Africa, "184; Allen, 
"Understanding African Politics," 313. 
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led political systems. Shared economic hardships led to a "coalescence of political 
participation by all levels of society from elite to mass level. "32 One of the main ways 
in which this coalescence transpired was through mass protests.33 
The mass protests, which initially involved economic demands, widened to 
include political reforms. 34 However, they often lacked a cohesive political agenda, 
with protestors demonstrating more clearly what they were against ( "the repressions and 
predations of big -man rule ") than what they were for.35 Chris Allen et. al. note that 
while the popular calls for "good governance" were often undefined, the movement can 
generally "be seen to include such elements as the rule of law, the safeguarding of basic 
human rights- including the right to organize, freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press- and the presence of honest and efficient government. "36 While mutineers in the 
1990s did not directly demand government improvements in these same areas, examples 
in the following section will show that issues such as rule of law and human rights were 
themes also expressed in mutinies. Closely linked to the calls for "good governance" 
were demands for multiparty elections and much emphasis in the civilian sector was 
placed on building the democratic "hardware ", such as electoral institutions and political 
parties.37 However, for this assessment, more attention will be paid to the broader 
themes of the movement than on the implementation of democracy through elections. 
Mutineers did not champion the need for multi -party elections and in some cases such as 
Senegal, soldiers were not even allowed to participate in elections (until 2007). 
However, the next section will show that mutineers did occasionally comment about 
their respect for elections. 
32 Wiseman, Democracy and Political Change in Sub -Saharan Africa, 5. 
ss Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle show that throughout the 1980s there were around twenty 
incidents of political protests annually in sub -Saharan Africa but in 1991 alone there were 86 major 
political protests within the thirty countries they studied.; Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, 
Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, 3. 
34 Wiseman, Democracy and Political Change in Sub -Saharan Africa, 5. 
35 Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Lindsay Whitfield, "African Democratisation: The Journey So Far," in 
Turning Points in African Democracy, eds. Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Lindsay Whitfield (Suffolk: James 
Currey, 2009): 1; Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, "Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or 
Instrumental ?" Afrobarometer Paper No. 1, 2000, 2. 
36 Chris Allen, Carolyn Baylies, and Morris Szeftel, "Editorial: Surviving Democracy ?" Review of African 
Political Economy, 54 (July 1992): 8. 
37 Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Lindsay Whitfield, "The Politics of African States in the Era of 
Democratisation," in Turning Points in African Democracy, Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Lindsay 
Whitfield, eds. (Suffolk: James Currey, 2009), 225. 
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Additionally, during the 1990s there were "soundly based popular perceptions 
that those closely associated with government did not personally share the effects of 
economic decline and, through massive corruption of public office, actually prospered 
whilst the majority suffered. "38 Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes note a similar 
observation by stating, "Judging by the issues raised in the streets, people seemed to 
want accountability of leaders and to eliminate inequalities arising from official 
corruption. "39 Similar to the complaints made by the civilian sector, mutineers also 
highlighted the large gap between wealth and lifestyle within a military context and 
attributed the large differences to corruption. As later examples will show, mutineers 
also made demands for accountability for their leadership. Lastly, like the civilian 
sector, mutinying soldiers saw that one way to rectify the situation was to pressure 
change through a shared voice and both groups mobilized, although in a different 
fashion. 
Both the civilian democratization movement and the military mutinies also 
represent the desire for a reconfiguration of power dynamics. This is consistent with 
Robert Dahl explanation of democratic theory which he states at a minimum involves 
"the processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over 
leaders."4° Although the civilian democratization movement was often unclear in its 
specific political goals, there was a general sense of empowerment which Bratton and 
Mates explain involved "citizens attaining a new measure of self -confidence and a wider 
scope of taking control of their own lives."'" Mutinies can also be seen to represent a 
high degree of empowerment from the lower ranks and a desire for more control of their 
situations, neither of which are traits normally inherent in military hierarchies. The 
similarities in the themes of the democratization movement and the military mutinies 
should not be seen as a coincidence, but instead it is more likely that junior soldiers 
gained inspiration and ideas from the movement. 
38 Wiseman, "Introduction" in Democracy and Political Change in Sub- Saharan Africa, 5. 
39 Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, "Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental ?" 
Afrobarometer Paper No. 1, 2000, 2. 
ao Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory: Expanded Edition (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2006): 3. 
41 Bratton and Mattes, "Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental ?" 3. 
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Several examples will help illustrate this overlap between themes in the 
democracy movement and mutinies in the 1990s. First is the case of Côte d'Ivoire in 
which "the economic crises of the 1980s that affected most African countries, created 
peculiar kinds of problems" for President Houphouët- Boigny.42 "The government had 
long paid farmers a higher proportion of the world price of the country's agricultural 
commodities, especially coffee and cocoa, than had most African governments. "43 
When world prices for coffee and cocoa dropped and international donor community 
demanded austerity measures, President Houphouët -Boigny decreased subsidies, 
imposed new taxes, and eliminated many government jobs. However, the economic 
crisis did not stop lavish state expenditures such as a basilica in Yamoussoukro for the 
price of $300 million.44 In February of 1990 the government announced a general cut of 
public wages by up to 40 percent and an 11 percent rise in income taxes45 This caused a 
massive reaction and students, utility workers, educational and professional associations, 
taxi -drivers, hospital staff, and factory workers orchestrated strikes and street protests 
throughout the following months.46 They called for both economic and political 
reforms. 
In May of 1990 it was the military's turn to express their discontent. On May 14, 
around one hundred rank and file soldiers attempted to take over the state -run radio 
station. The radio staff resisted the attempt and helped arrange a delegation of the 
soldiers to meet with the president. The president promised the mutineers increased 
salaries, better living conditions, and reenlistment.47 His willingness to quickly give in 
to the soldiers' demands was likely due to an increased dependency on the military in 
the face of a growing civilian movement. As previously mentioned, Houphouët -Boigny 
requested French military assistance but was denied the help. Air force members took 
42 Jennifer Widner, "The 1990 Elections in Côte d'Ivoire," Issue: A Journal of Opinion 20, no. 1 (Winter, 
1991): 31 -41. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 32. 
4' Richard Crook, "Côte d'Ivoire: Multi -party democracy and political change: surviving the crisis," in 
Democracy and Political Change in Sub -Saharan Africa, John Wiseman, ed. (London: Routledge, 1995): 
16. 
46 Crook, "Côte d'Ivoire: Multi -party democracy and political change: surviving the crisis," 16; West 
Africa, June 18 -24, 1022. 
47 West Africa, May 28, 1990, 877 -878; Africa Research Bulletin, June 1990, 9693. 
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note of the army success and two days after the army mutiny they staged their own 
revolt using more severe tactics. The fifty air force members armed with semi- 
automatic weapons seized the control tower and a terminal building of Abidjan 
International Airport. Similar to the army recruits, they were angry over low pay and 
poor living conditions. However, they also added grievances over corruption amongst 
the officer corps, claiming that their superiors docked their pay on a regular basis for 
little reason.48 When the government agreed to meet with the airmen to discuss their 
complaints the mutineers initially refused because one of the mediators was the Defence 
Minister. The mutineers called him a `corrupt billionaire' and demanded his removal 
from the mediation process 49 
The mutineers in Côte d'Ivoire were likely inspired by the actions of local 
civilian protestors who had been expressing their discontent for months prior to the 
mutiny. The civilian and military personnel shared both economic grievances and the 
idea that corruption or general government economic mismanagement was a cause of 
their hardship. 
The Gambia provides another good example of the overlap between civilian 
movements and mutinies, which Chapter 6 will expand more on. In the early 1990s The 
Gambia shared the burden of economic crisis seen throughout the continent, and 
growing dissatisfaction was expressed through public protests. Soldiers mutinied in 
1991 after failing to receive their deployment pay. They accused their officers of being 
behind late payment and expressed objections to corruption in the officer corps. The 
issue of corruption was also mirrored in the civilian realm as several corruption scandals 
had recently been revealed in the press. John Wiseman and Elizabeth Vidler explain that 
public awareness and resentment over corruption in The Gambia was undoubtedly at an 
all time high around the same time that Gambia soldiers mutinied in 1991 and 1992.5° 
The mutineers took their complaints directly to President Jawara at State House. They 
specifically called for the removal of the highest- ranking officer in the country, Colonel 
48 West Africa, May 28, 1990, 877 -878; West Africa, June 25, 1990, 1090; Africa Research Bulletin, June 
1990, 9693. 
49 West Africa, 28 May -3 June, 877. 
5o John Wiseman and Elizabeth Vidler, "The July 1994 coup d'état in the Gambia: The end of an era," 
Round Table 333, no.1 (Jan 1995): 57. 
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Ndow Njie and the government conceded. For these 60 junior soldiers it was not 
enough to just receive their salary arrears, they also wanted someone to be held 
accountable for the delay. 
The cases of the Ivoirian mutiny in 1990 and the Gambian mutiny in 1991 show 
a remarkable reconfiguration of power. In both incidents the mutineers were rank and 
file soldiers and were able to engage directly with the Head of State. In many states in 
previous decades it would have been inconceivable that junior ranks would take their 
issues directly to the president and even more shocking that the president would `obey' 
these junior ranks. However, leading into the 1990s there were increasing expectations 
that governments would be responsive. Growing domestic opposition and changes to 
foreign relationships also put political leadership in a more vulnerable position and one 
in which they were more likely to grant concessions to the military. The power shift can 
also be seen in the way that both groups of mutineers made accusations against the top 
individual in the military structure. They show the belief that even an individual in a 
high position should not be above the standard regulations, signalling a major shift from 
previous decades when `big men' were clearly above the law. 
It is significant to note that the mutinies in Côte d'Ivoire in 1990 and Gambia in 
1991 were the first time either country had experienced a mutiny. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that these soldiers had 'learned' to mutiny from other soldiers in their proximity 
but more likely that they picked up on common ideas expressed in the civilian sector, 
which in both cases had publicly protested just prior to the mutinies. 
3.4 Borrowed Scripts 
It was not only the general concepts that overlap between the democratization 
movement and mutinies; there were also similarities in the rhetoric used by mutineers 
and civilians. Soldiers in the 1990s seemed aware that military rule had lost its 
popularity and in public statements made during mutinies they attempted to distance 
86 
themselves from authoritarian regimes. For example, the spokesman for mutineers in 
Guinea Bissau in 1998 stated 
We have already had the opportunity of stating on several occasions that 
we are soldiers, we do not want to become involved in politics... We do 
not claim the right to propose someone to be president of the Republic.51 
Similarly, soldiers in Central African Republic in 1996 said that their mutiny was 
"corporatist" and "apolitical ". The mutineers' spokesman, a Sergeant, explained to 
Radio France International 
We made these demands from the barracks, but call to no avail. We have 
been forced to take to the streets. We have no intention of destabilizing 
the regime; President Patassé was democratically elected.52 
In a separate statement he urged the president "to take measures and prove he is a 
politician worthy of his office. "53 He implied that to be `worthy' of the position, the 
president must be responsive to their demands. Although the issues were not resolved 
and the mutinies continued for months, the soldiers continued to insist that their goals 
were not political. In an interview with RFI, Captain Saulet of Central African 
Republic, said 
It is not our intention to stage a coup d'état, I think that is a problem that 
(could have been) solved within a matter of hours. It was not for nothing 
that the army took to the streets three times in the space of eight months. 
It means that there is a problem and we want this problem solved. "54 
Here the mutineers suggested that had they wanted to conduct a coup they could have 
done so easily, but instead they claim to be interested in working with political and 
military leadership to resolve the problem. 
In some ways these statements may appear to be part of a history of African 
military personnel publicly commenting on politics. For example, coup leaders almost 
always justify their actions in relation to claims of failure amongst politicians." 
However, in the above statements mutineers appear to want to signal a break from coup 
51 Africa Research Bulletin, August 1998, 13226. 
52 West Africa, April 29 -May 5, 1996; 667. 
53 West Africa, April 29 -May 5, 1996; 667. 
54 West Africa, January 1997, 89. 
5' Numerous examples can be found in A.H.M. Kirk- Greene, 'Stay by your radios': Documentation for a 
study in military government in Tropical Africa. 
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leaders and show their support for democratic leadership and the process that brought 
them to power or at least express their neutrality. Still, due to the mutineers' 
membership in an organization that has caused many problems for politicians in the 
region, their actions can be interpreted as a veiled threat. In other words, the mutineers 
may be implying that they are supportive of political leadership at that moment but the 
loyalty could be dependent on how their demands are handled. 
The rhetoric of mutineers in the 1990s also showed signs of other traits 
commonly associated with democracy such as justice and human rights. The spokesman 
for the 1996 Central African Republic mutiny stated, "We appeal to Amnesty 
International, and we agree to stop [the mutiny] this Friday evening. "56 In this case the 
soldiers attempted to gain sympathy from a prominent international organization by 
implying that their three -month salary delay was a human rights violation. While 
Amnesty International did not take on their cause, the soldiers' call for their assistance 
showed an awareness of the growing international dialogue surrounding human rights 
and a creativity in how they could use the trend to their advantage. 
In 1997 mutineers in Central African Republic included in their demands "an end 
to any hampering of collective and individual liberties, in particular body searches, 
arrests and house searches." This is an especially unusual request from soldiers as 
`individual liberties' are to some degree forfeited when soldiers join the military. In 
particular, living spaces are often subject to inspection within a military context. These 
demands; which are somewhat contradictory to military procedures, reflect the growing 
attention towards civil liberties at the time. The comments also hint at the objection to 
arbitrary arrests and demonstrate ideas of the importance of following due legal 
processes. 
Mutineers in Guinea Bissau in 1998 also addressed issues of rule of law. The 
spokesman for the mutiny commented about an ongoing arms trafficking scandal in 
which military members were accused of trafficking weapons to Casamance rebels by 
stating 
We want those who stand accused in the report to be brought to trial. 
Even if Brigadier Ansumane Mane himself is accused, he must be 
56 West Africa, April 29 -May 5, 1996; 667. 
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brought to justice. We are for justice because the law must take its 
course. The law is above everything else, everyone, whoever they may 
be, must obey the law.57 
The soldiers in this case sound very similar to calls heard around the continent for justice 
and accountability for all levels of society, regardless of the paradox of having mutineers 
explain the need for obedience to the law. 
Despite their increased rhetoric about justice and calls for accountability, 
mutineers did not want those standards to apply to their own actions. Mutineers in the 
1990s appeared nervous about their post- mutiny prospects. This makes sense 
considering the lack of mutinies in the 1970s and 1980s meant that soldiers had few 
precedents for how mutineers would be treated by the law. To rectify this uncertainty 
about their status following the mutiny, mutineers began to add to their demands 
stipulations that they would not be held accountable for their actions when the mutiny 
ended. Soldiers in Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea all made deals 
with the government that gave them amnesty. 
In addition to borrowing rhetoric from the democratization movement, in some 
cases mutineers also imitated the movement through their tactics. For example, 
Gambian soldiers in 1991 held a procession to State House while soldiers in Burkina 
Faso in 1997 marched to the Defence Ministry to make their complaints heard, both in 
very similar fashions to civilian protestors at the time. Mutineers in Burkina Faso in 
1999 were reported to have chanted their demands, as is common during political 
protests.58 In this particular case soldiers would have had regular exposure to civilian 
political protests because the mutiny occurred during a series of intense civilian protests 
against the Compaoré regime. Additionally, in the 1990s it became common for 
mutineers to assign a spokesperson for the group who would represent their cause to 
higher authorities and the media. This pattern is similar to political, student, and trade 
organizations that also regularly used spokespersons to articulate the goals of the group. 
During the series of mutinies in the 1990s, politicians appeared growingly 
frustrated by mutinying soldiers who were increasingly acting and sounding like civilian 
57 Africa Research Bulletin, August 1998, 13226. 
58 Associated Press, "Soldiers End Burkina Faso Mutiny," July 16, 1999. 
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organizations. In many cases the public responses made by political leaders to the 
mutineers also expressed popular political themes. For example, in 1993 President 
Ousmane of Niger seemed exasperated by the mutineers and publicly reminded them 
that the army is not a political trade union and that they were obligated to obey the 
constitution.59 Similarly, President Patassé of the Central African Republic expressed 
his frustration after months of ongoing mutinies by stating 
The current rebellion is condemned by the country's entire population, 
respectful of the constitution, and through it, of the Republic's 
institutions. In my position as Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, I 
could indeed have ordered military operations to bring this rebellion to an 
end, but it would have brought harm to the civilian population. Thus, I 
was patient. I issue two demands (to the mutineers): lay down your arms 
immediately and unconditionally.6° 
He went on to state "I was not elected to shed the blood of Central Africans, whether 
they be from the north, south, east or west. I ask you to do nothing during these difficult 
times that might jeopardize national unity. "61 In both of these examples the presidents, 
much like the mutineers, drew on wider political themes of the time. President Ousmane 
did not personally order the mutineers to end their campaign but rather highlighted the 
importance of the constitution as a governing document. President Patassé used more of 
an authoritative voice but still couched his authority within the context of having been 
popularly elected. He also drew on the need for the mutineers to respect the constitution 
and state institutions. 
The importance of international organizations in the 1990s is revealed through 
statements made by both President Patassé and mutineers in Central African Republic in 
1996 and 1997. In March, following the first set of mutinies Patassé commented 
The army knows that in my negotiations with the IMF and World Bank I 
refused to reduce the number of soldiers in the army. However, I do 
understand them and that is why I am ready to go meet with them when 
calm returns, and calm is returning.62 
59 West Africa, August 1, 1993, 1313. 
60 West Africa, December 1996, 1909. 
61 Ibid. 
62 West Africa, May 5, 1996, 667. 
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While in this statement Patassé sided with the military over the international monetary 
organizations, seven months later his attitude changed. In November of 1996 he stated 
I have been watching things. I have been patient, lenient, and at times 
sympathetic. But from now on, things will be different. Certain 
compatriots still feel the need to try to scuttle the forthcoming 
negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions by brandishing the 
specter of a third mutiny. There will be no third mutiny and no one had 
better take such a risk.63 
President Patassé emphasized the importance of international organizations by 
expressing his concern that the mutinies could impact upon negotiations with 
international organizations. He also implied that the soldiers were aware of the 
significance by suggesting that they were intentionally attempting to derail the process. 
Despite the president's hardened rhetoric, the mutinies did not end with this speech. 
After a year of ongoing mutinies, they were eventually brought to an end with the 
assistance of foreign troops and international negotiators. Among the final demands of 
the mutineers was the "continued existence of the international follow -up committee. "64 
In August of 2002 Nigerien mutineers recited a claim that is popular amongst 
mutineers by stating, "we are not politicians, we are soldiers." On the surface this 
assertion is true; however the use of political rhetoric, which often drew on popular 
concepts, themes, and tactics of the democratization movement, politicized the mutinies 
even when their stated goals were not for political power. Similarly, political leaders 
often countered the mutineers with political language as presented above. In this 
dialogue, the actors (both mutineers and politicians or military superiors) seemed to be 
speaking above the problem. Layers of references to constitutions, good governance, 
democracy, human rights, international organizations, etc. have to be unveiled to get to 
the specific demands of the soldiers, which are generally similar to grievances from 
other eras. The political manner in which mutineers discussed their grievances during 
the 1990s appeared to be a product of the time period and the dominance of similar 
rhetoric in the civilian sector. 
63 West Africa, November 1996, 1705. 
64 West Africa, February 1997. 
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3.5 The Loose Boundaries Between Junior Ranks and Civilians 
The above examples and the general argument that mutineers were inspired by 
popular political themes of the time raises the question of why the military did not join 
forces with the civilian movement. Given the earlier explanation of the military 
conditions in the 1980s and 1990s it would be fair to assume the military would be 
sympathetic towards the democratization movement. The military, especially its junior 
members, were suffering many of the same hardships as ordinary civilians and many of 
the calls for greater political liberties and respect for human rights would also benefit 
military members. However, instead the military often put down mass protests, with 
only a few notable exceptions such as Mali in 1991. 
One explanation for why the military in most states did not become actively 
engaged in the democratization movement is that there had been a "virtual 
`privatization' of key military units by incumbent dictators. "65 These militaries or units 
were directly loyal to the individual leaders. Bratton and Van de Walle expand on why 
this would be the case by stating 
the armed forces often came to occupy a privileged position within the 
ancien régime. To keep the soldiers content and under some semblance 
of civilian control, rulers granted to individual officers and the military 
units a generous array of perks, privileges, and rewards, including access 
to rents and commercial ventures. Transitions from authoritarian rule 
threaten these benefits, not only because the greater transparency of a 
democratic regime may lead to pressures for the suspension of privileges, 
but also because the military must negotiate with a new and usually less 
sympathetic political elite.66 
For the elite members of the military a switch to new, democratic leadership could have 
meant an end to a good deal and for the rest of the military the uncertainty of the role of 
the military under civilian democratic leadership appeared to make them reluctant to 
jump on board with the movement. 
as Hutchful, "Military Issues in the Transition to Democracy," 608. 
66 Bratton and Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative 
Perspective, 244. 
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Hutchful argues that part of the blame for the reluctance of the military to join in 
must be placed on the democratization movement for failing to have a "clearly thought - 
out and articulated military policy. "67 He states "this strategy needed to separate the 
military institution clearly from the military regime and to avoid lumping the two 
together, as the democracy movement tended to do. "68 By "making wholesale attacks 
against the military" those that may have been sympathetic to the movement were driven 
"into the arms of the regime. "69 Although there were large elements of the military that 
were not satisfied under the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s they also did 
not have trust or confidence that their lot would be improved with the movement 
towards democracy. Instead the junior soldiers seemed to instrumentalize many of the 
themes of the democratization movement for their own campaigns. More examples of 
this will be given in the following section. 
Popular input in political decision -making and expectations for accountable 
leadership are widely internationally accepted concepts within a civilian realm. 
However, these same concepts can be considered radical within a military context. 
Military hierarchies intentionally prohibit junior members from having a say in the 
decision making process. In the military, junior members are responsive to the orders of 
senior members; very rarely would it ever be the opposite pattern. For junior soldiers to 
demand that their seniors respond to their requests is what Rose calls "an unnatural and 
unsettling state for troops. "70 
This raises questions as to why the popular civilian ideas, which are "unnatural" 
in a military context would permeate the military sector. Militaries usually implement 
policies to separate its members from wider civilian society. For example, soldiers are 
typically housed on bases and required to wear uniforms and adhere to grooming 
standards which help unify the individuals but also separate them from civilians. In 
many militaries worldwide, the duties of a soldier would often not require day -to -day 
interaction with civilians. However, as the previous chapter described, the role of 
African militaries often put soldiers in direct contact with civilians on a daily basis, 
67 Hutchful, "Military Issues in the Transition to Democracy," 609. 
G8 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," 568. 
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through tasks such as manning checkpoints. African militaries were often closely linked 
to the head of state and his protection and therefore militaries often have a heavy 
presence in urban areas, particular capital cities. Urban areas and capital cities were also 
the forefront of civilian political protests and many soldiers would have been exposed to 
their grievances and actions. Lastly, it is very common for junior soldiers to live off 
base due to military housing shortages, which would mean these soldiers spend a lot of 
their time with civilians. 
It is not only the employment duties and lifestyles that likely exposed soldiers to 
themes of the democratization movement; the avenues in which the messages were 
being spread also played a part. The ideas were spread through mediums in which 
soldiers would likely be exposed to. For example, religious organizations played an 
important counterweight to authoritarian regimes with `political sermons' popular 
throughout the I990s.71 Increases in shortwave radios, private radio stations, and private 
newspapers allowed civilians and military alike greater access to political messages than 
in previous decades and led to an easier transfer of information across state borders.72 
Sections of the youth, both student organizations and unemployed urban youth, also 
served as important instigators for political reform. Paul Nugent explains that in the 
1990s "nothing symbolized the erosion of government support more than the open 
contempt displayed by youth towards figures and symbols of authority. "73 
While soldiers often have a contentious relationship with urban youth, we also 
must view junior soldiers as part of the same peer group who likely maintain personal 
links with students or urban youth. Although militaries often attempt to separate 
soldiers from the civilian population, the reality is that a large number of soldiers are 
youths, living in urban areas, listening to radios, and attending religious services in the 
same manner as much of the civilian population. It is therefore not surprising that many 
of the popular sentiments regarding democracy that were being expressed in the civilian 
population would also be picked up by soldiers. 
71 Wiseman, Democracy and Political Change in Sub -Saharan Africa, 5; Nugent, Africa Since 
Independence, 2nd ed. 382. 
72 Nugent, Africa Since Independence, 2nd ed. 389 -392. 
73 Ibid., 389. 
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The often loosely defined boundaries between junior ranks and the civilian 
population was particularly clear to me when I spent weeks travelling with a young 
Sierra Leonean soldier (who helped facilitate my interviews). Whether or not to take on 
the role of a soldier or civilian was nearly a daily decision for this individual. We would 
discuss the daily plan and then he would decide whether or not to wear his uniform. If 
the plan involved travelling long distances the uniform was desirable so as to move 
through any checkpoints easier and to obtain the coveted front seat of the shared 
transport (which was usually offered to him when in uniform). However, for days in 
which there would be a lot of downtime away from base and no travel he seemed to 
prefer to wear civilian attire, presumably because his actions would be less scrutinized. 
This example demonstrates the way in which soldiers in the region can maintain a foot 
in both the civilian and military world and helps explain why messages may be easily 
spread between the two. 
Hutchful observed a similar pattern of links between the junior ranks and civilian 
society within his research on junior ranks in Ghana. He notes "the further down the 
ladder of hierarchy one goes...the more likely that organizational boundaries will be 
breached. "74 One reason is that junior ranks are less likely to have a substantial 
investment in the military status quo.75 While Hutchful describes this pattern in the 
context of direct alliances between junior ranks (junior officers specifically) and political 
organizations, the same pattern applies more broadly to the popular political themes, 
which were spread from the civilian realm to junior military ranks during the 1990s. As 
the previous chapter explained, the junior ranks often attempt to balance a relationship 
with the civilian sector and the military hierarchy. Their behaviour during 
democratization demonstrates this; they borrowed themes, rhetoric, and tactics from 
civilians but for the most part never fully joined the democratization movement. 
3.6 Freedom to Mutiny 
74 Hutchful, "Institutional Decomposition and Junior Ranks' Political Action in Ghana," 249. 
75 Ibid., 250. 
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So far this chapter has proposed that many of the popular themes and concerns 
that inspired civilians to take to the streets the 1990s also inspired soldiers to mutiny. 
While the economic situation and political climate of the 1990s may have created the 
perfect condition for mutinies, the link between civilian movements and mutinies is not 
limited to this period. Just as the pressure for democratic reform did not end in the 
1990s, neither did mutinies. This section will demonstrate that the increased number of 
mutinies in the 1990s was not merely a result of a particular historic period, but rather 
part of a larger pattern of links between mutinies and democratic political systems. To 
examine this link I have used Freedom House's "Freedoms of the World index ". This 
index, which has been produced annually since 1973, calculates scores for political 
rights and civil liberties and classifies countries into one of three categories: Free, 
Partially Free, or Not Free. While there is room to criticize how accurately democracy 
and freedoms can be calculated on a numeric scale, I have chosen this index to provide a 
general understanding of the level of political rights in a country at the time of the 
mutiny, rather than to calculate numeric correlations. This scale was chosen over similar 
indexes, such as the Mo Ibrahim index, due to the length of its existence, which allows 
for a more consistent comparison over time. 
Of the fifty -three mutinies in the dataset that occurred between 1973 and 2012, 
thirty-eight took place in states that were ranked as either Free or Partially Free at the 
time of the mutiny and fifteen were ranked as Not Free. In other words, seventy -two 
percent of the mutinies took place in states that have some degree of respect for political 
rights and civil liberties. A closer look at specific country examples will help 
demonstrate the pattern. 
Just as there were few mutinies during the authoritarian regimes that dominated 
the continent in the 1970s and 1980s, there still remain few mutinies in the authoritarian 
regimes that exist in the region today. For example, long- standing authoritarian regimes 
such as Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon have been free from mutinies. The Gambia 
serves as a particularly interesting example of how authoritarian political systems may 
deter mutinies. The Gambia has had a unique political trajectory with a reverse pattern 
of most states in the region. During the 1980s when authoritarian regimes were 
common, The Gambia was one of the few considered to be democratic. Yet, as many 
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states in the region have increased civil liberties and democratic political practices, The 
Gambia has done the opposite. It is currently one of the few countries in West Africa, 
which is labelled by Freedom House as "Not Free" consistently over the last couple 
years. While The Gambia had a series of mutinies in the 1990s, as the government has 
become increasingly repressive mutinies have ceased. Nearly everyone I interviewed 
about the potential for a near future mutiny in The Gambia felt that it was very unlikely, 
as President Jammeh would surely have any mutineers severely disciplined. Recent 
political executions in 2012 (the first officially in twenty -seven years), which included 
military members accused of plotting against Jammeh, served as a particular warning for 
the consequences of threatening state stability.76 The current repressive nature of the 
state is not the sole reason for the lack of mutinies and the case study of The Gambia 
(Chapter Six) will further expand on this example. 
The most recent mutinies on the continent also support the trend of mutinies 
occurring more often in states with democratic political systems. For example, mutinies 
took place in 2011 in Burkina Faso, which is ranked by Freedom House as "Partially 
Free," and in 2012 in Mali, which at the time was ranked as "Free." Sierra Leone has 
made considerable gains in political rights and civil liberties since the official end of its 
civil war in 2002. In 2013, for the first time, the country was listed as "Free" (elevated 
from previous years in which it was listed as "Partially free"). The increased political 
freedoms have not necessarily erased soldiers' grievances and some soldiers interviewed 
in 2011 and 2012 warned that a future mutiny may be on the horizon. The interviewees 
explained how their confidence in the political and justice system increased their 
confidence in conducting a future successful mutiny. For example, one soldier 
explained that he felt a mutiny would be successful under the current political leadership 
because "There are accessible leaders who want to know, who have an interest, who will 
listen. They (senior officers) will be arrested and they will be jailed. "77 This individual 
clearly believes the government will be responsive to their concerns, a shift from 
attitudes about the government in the 1990s, as will be elaborated in Chapter Five. 
76 "Gambia executions: Senegal Angry After Nationals Killed," BBC, August 29, 2012. 
77 Author interview with Sierra Leonean junior soldier, May 2012. 
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The occurrence of mutinies across time as presented in Figure 1.2 (Chapter One) 
is similar to patterns of increased levels of democracy at global and regional levels, as 
observed by various scholars. Samuel Huntington described the worldwide pattern as 
waves with the second wave occurring from the end of World War II until the early 
1960s and the third wave arriving in the 19905.78 Nugent, focusing on Africa 
specifically, uses the image of a swinging pendulum, which moved in the direction of 
nationalism and popular political participation in the 1960s, the opposite direction in the 
1970s and 1980s and back with even more force towards popular political participation 
in the I990s.79 Mutinies also rose at the same times as the waves or pendulum reach 
their peak, and subsided as the momentum declined. 
The pattern of mutinies occurring most often in states that have at least some 
respect for democratic principles is somewhat counterintuitive. It may seem logical that 
soldiers would revolt under a repressive system, however it is that system which would 
prohibit a successful mutiny. Mutinies require leadership that is willing to listen and 
respond, which is more likely under a democratic regime than an authoritarian one. 
Although it may be hard to convince leaders that they should be flattered by mutinying 
soldiers, mutinies do in some ways represent a level of faith in leadership to adequately 
address grievances. When soldiers have no faith that a leader will respond or the 
political system is so fragmented that there is no one to hear the complaints (such as in 
the midst of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia) mutinies become a pointless 
endeavour. 
However it is not only the perceptions that democratic leaders are more 
responsive that may make soldiers in democratic countries more prone to mutinies; the 
civil liberties often associated with democratic political systems work to the advantage 
of mutineers. Increased freedoms of media in particular provide soldiers, as well as 
civilians, with new tools to express their grievances. As previously mentioned, media in 
Africa in the 1970s and into the 1980s was often state -controlled. 80 During this time 
78 Samuel Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 12 -34. 
79 Nugent, Africa Since Independence, 2nd ed., 376. 
8o Adebayo Olukoshi "State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa: The Complex Process of Renewal," in 
State Conflict and Democracy in Africa, ed. Richard Joseph (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1999): 454. 
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the media was typically a "one -way operation" with "people being spoken to, not 
listened to. "81 However, this began to change in the 1990s as one country after another 
introduced legislation that gave local press the freedoms it lacked in previous decades.82 
The increased media freedoms were partially a result of the democratization movement 
but were also used to further pressure political reform. The new freedoms of media 
allowed reporters (however not without risk) to "reveal what [was] going on behind the 
well draped windows of public institutions. "83 There was increased public scrutiny of 
political figures and government procedures, with growing attention towards 
corruption.84 
While not all states have progressed in an equal fashion towards increased media 
freedoms, generally speaking there have been more privatized media and more access to 
international media from the 1990s onward than in previous decades. The increased 
privatization of media sources as well as introduction of new forms of media has 
resulted in more interactive media, allowing messages to move "downwards, upwards, 
and sideways."85 
Mutineers began to utilize this more interactive media to work around their chain 
of command and in some cases to connect with the international community and the 
civilian population. Prior to the 1990s there were few examples of mutineers making 
radio announcements (one of the only cases was in Democratic Republic of Congo in 
1966 when solders attempted to overtake the radio station). However, as media 
freedoms increased in the 1990s, soldiers turned more and more to the media during 
mutinies, a trend which continues into the present time. There are also times in which 
mutineers did not seek out media attention but the reverse pattern occurred, with media 
outlets approaching mutineers. During mutinies in Burkina Faso in 2011 news outlets 
81 Goran Hyden and Michael Leslie, "Communications and Democratization in Africa," in Media and 
Democracy in Africa, eds., Goran Hyden, Michael Leslie and Folu F. Ogundimu (New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002): 4. 
82 Ibid., 11. 
83 Ibid., 12. 
84 Hyden and Leslie, "Communications and Democratization in Africa," 12; Goran Hyden and Charles 
Okigbo, "The Media and the Two Waves of Democracy," in Media and Democracy in Africa, eds., Goran 
Hyden, Michael Leslie and Folu F. Ogundimu (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2002): 48. 
85 Hyden and Leslie, "Communications and Democratization in Africa," 5. 
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sought out mutineers for statements, a trend that will likely continue as international and 
local media organizations compete for new angles to stories. 
In the past several years there is a trend of disgruntled soldiers providing their 
story to the media in hopes that a threat to mutiny will be enough to resolve their 
complaints. The previous chapter described a scenario in which Nigerian soldiers in 
2012 contacted the media to threaten their leaders with a pending mutiny. A similar 
tactic was used by Sierra Leonean soldiers deployed to Somalia in 2013, as Chapter Five 
will detail. Additionally, in March 2013, the Malian newspaper, Le Républicain, 
published an open letter claiming to represent the "other soldiers" (meaning the ones not 
involved in the 2012 coup) to the president. In the letter they questioned whether one 
needs to commit a coup to be compensated and recognized as a good soldier. They 
provided a two -week deadline to annul the salary of Captain Sanogo (leader of the 2012 
coup) or they would cease to fight (in the North) and were prepared to suffer the 
consequences.86 
In reporting of mutinies in the 1960s through the 1980s the opinions of civilians 
in relation to mutinies is absent. There is no indication of how they viewed the actions 
of soldiers. However, this began to change in the 1990s with privatized media that 
published more opinion pieces and letters to the editor. It has changed even more 
drastically in recent years with increasing interne access allowing nearly anyone to 
publicly comment on events. 
Likely to the chagrin of political and military leadership, the opinions in the 
media often took the side of the mutineers. For example, following a mutiny in Niger in 
2002 a local newspaper published the following 
When the mutiny first occurred, it is crucial to ask Mr. President why 
salaries of soldiers have not been paid for a good five months. What does 
the government expect mutineers to live on and survive? True, mutiny is 
an offense everywhere. But why is mutiny an offense for soldiers and 
government officials' remissness and irresponsibility not an offense? 
This is the root of the problem.87 
86 Le Républicain published the letter on their website http: / /www.lerepublicain- mali.com / ?q= node /225. 
Translation and analysis by Bruce Whitehouse from his blog entry on March 6, 2013 titled "The north, the 
army, and the junta," http://bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/03/06/north-army-junt/ 
87 Africa Research Bulletin, July 2002, 14972 -14975. 
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There was additional criticism within the media, civil society, and opposition when 
President Tandja declared a state of emergency following the mutinies which restricted 
civil liberties, particularly press freedoms.88 Journalists who reported on the story were 
arrested, leading to international attention.89 The Constitutional Court ruled against 
Tandja and declared that he did not have the authority to make the decree.90 Civilians 
stayed engaged with the mutineers' cause and staged a sit -in in front of the Congress 
Palace in Niamey where the African Commission of Human and People's Rights was 
being held to protest that over 200 mutineers had been held in jail for nearly a year 
without tria1.91 In this case the media was actively involved in publicizing the event, as 
well as critiquing the government's response. The mutiny concerned pay and living 
conditions, as well as complaints over particular officers; however it took on larger 
proportions when civilian organizations used the government response to question the 
powers of the president and state of civil liberties. While the media attention may not 
have earned the soldiers the lower meal prices in the army dining halls that they had 
initially demanded, their plight was given international attention. For example, Amnesty 
International wrote about their concern for the 230 mutineers who had been jailed 
without trial.92 
The case of media coverage of the mutiny in The Gambia in 1992 reveals the 
differences between government run media and private media coverage for the same 
event. Following the 1992 mutiny the private newspapers, The Point and Foroyaa, 
reported extensively on the event, including editorials, which criticized both the 
government and the soldiers. The Point claimed to represent the voice of the local 
population when it wrote 
Without in any way seeking to prejudice the proceedings of the court- 
martial, it is to be said, as the public is already saying, that while the 
actions of the 35 privates is to be condemned, having regard to the kind 
of discipline expected from the army, it must also be pointed out that they 
88 Ibid. 
89 Committee to Protect Journalists, "CJP Concerned about climate for independent journalism," 
September 4, 2002; IRIN, "Niger: Second journalist arrested over mutiny reports," August 28, 2002. 
90 Africa Research Bulletin, September 2002, 14999. 
91 Africa Research Bulletin, May 2003, 15317. 
92 Amnesty International Report 2004- Niger, http: / /www.refworld.org /docid /40b5a1 fd8.html 
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should not have been given the chance for this repeat performance 
through nonpayment of any part of their allowance, however sma11.93 
Foroyaa took the mutiny as an opportunity to criticize the Peoples' Progressive Party 
(PPP) government. Below the story of the mutiny they included the following under a 
title "Foroyaa's Comment:" "PPP does not respond to the rights and entitlements of its 
people. Urge citizens to vote them out of office in upcoming election. "94 Like the 
example in Niger, the mutiny became an example of government mismanagement in the 
eyes of civilian opposition. The Gambia had a government run newspaper at the time, 
alongside the private news sources. The government newspaper, The Gambia Weekly, 
did not report on the mutiny or mention any military indiscipline. Instead the week 
following the mutiny, as if to counter the potentially negative media, the paper reported 
on plans for a military parade in which the President would provide medals to soldiers 
for "long and dedicated service to the nation."95 The parade story was too mundane for 
any other news outlets to report. This contrast of public versus private media reporting 
of the same event helps show that without private media it is unlikely that mutinies 
would gain the attention they desire. However, it is difficult to tell if the mutineers 
benefitted from this press coverage, although they were eventually paid their dues. 
example of mutineers likely benefitted from media attention is the case 
of a mutiny in Nigeria in 2008. In this case, which will be further described in the next 
chapter, mutineers were given harsh sentences while their officers, who were determined 
to have `misappropriated' rank and file salary funds, received no punishment. 
Following numerous letters to the editors, and online postings, the military announced 
revisions to the mutineers' sentences.96 
This section has shown that mutinies most often occur within states that show 
some respect for political freedoms and civil liberties. Increased press freedoms and 
access to media in the 1990s and onward in many ways assisted mutineers. They began 
93 The Point, February 10, 1992. 
94 Foroyaa, February 15, 1992. 
9' The Gambia Weekly, February 21, 1992. 
96 Examples of forums discussing the topic include Nairaland Forum and Nigerian Village Square. 
Additionally the following article discusses public opinion on the issue: Senator Iroegbu, "Nigerian Army 
Pardons Akure 27," This Day, December 3, 2010; Juliana Taiwo, "Mutiny: Army retired indicted senior 
officers," Nigeria World, October 21, 2009. 
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to use media outlets as a way to express their grievances around their chain of command 
and gain wider attention for their cause. The increased attention also highlighted due 
legal processes for mutineers, as the examples from Niger and Nigeria demonstrate. 
However, with increased presence and types of media rarely does one actor (for 
example the government or mutineers) fully control the flow of information. Instead the 
more interactive style of media, which in some ways gives the mutineers a voice, also 
limits the ability of the mutineers to control their message. As the examples of Niger, 
Gambia, and Nigeria demonstrate, civilians have become increasingly involved in 
reporting on mutinies and providing their opinions about the event. While this can have 
advantages for the mutineers, it also makes it easier for their cause to be used by 
opposition political groups or others wishing to discredit the government or military 
leadership. The case study of Burkina Faso, Chapter Seven, will show ways in which 
media aimed at popular culture has also become engaged in telling the mutineers' story. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that mutinies in the 1990s can be seen as a way to gauge 
the impact international economic and political changes had on rank and file soldiers and 
also demonstrates a way they responded to the effects. I have proposed that soldiers in 
the 1990s were not immune to the political currents of the time, even if they were 
regularly seen as suppressing the movement. Issues that were prominent in the civilian 
sector, such as awareness of corruption and demands for accountability, were also key 
themes in mutinies. Just as "ordinary citizens" in the 1990s began to "exert a high 
degree of control over leaders," so did rank and file soldiers through increased 
mutinies.97 Mutineers in the 1990s also used similar rhetoric and tactics as those in the 
civilian sector who were pushing for democratic reform. The attitude of the military 
towards the democratization movement is not one of complete support or disregard, but 
rather a more nuanced relationship. Hutchful may be correct in his assessment that the 
97 Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory: Expanded Edition, 3. 
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democracy movement "lost the battle for the military;" however I have suggested in this 
chapter that the movement was not lost on the rank and file soldiers.98 
This chapter has shown that mutinies most often occur in states with some 
respect for political freedoms and civil liberties, a pattern that extends beyond the 1990s, 
Mutineers do not just desire responsive leadership; they require it for success. Thus 
democratic leaders, who are typically more responsive than authoritarian leaders make 
better negotiating partners for mutineers. Additionally, mutineers benefitted from the 
democratization movements in the 1990s and the democratic reforms that have persisted 
in some states today. While mutineers in the 1990s were usually not outright demanding 
civil liberties, such as press freedoms, they quickly utilized these liberties once they 
came into existence. 
98 Hutchful, "Military Issues in the Transition to Democracy," 608. 
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Chapter Four- Peacekeeping Abroad, Trouble Making at Home 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed how the end of the Cold War marked a change in 
international strategic relationships and foreign military assistance; it also coincided 
with a rapid increase in peacekeeping missions. The United Nations (UN) established 
twenty missions between 1989 and 1994, which accounted for more than the previous 
forty years of missions combined.' In addition to the UN, regional organizations 
became involved in peacekeeping. West and Central African states increasingly 
contributed troops to peacekeeping missions and most states remain committed to 
various missions today. This chapter will demonstrate how the increase in mutinies 
from the 1990s onward can partially be attributed to increases in deployments 
throughout the region, particularly deployments on multinational missions. There have 
been a range of studies that demonstrate unintended consequences of peacekeeping 
missions, on the local civilian population, the peacekeepers, and the conflict in general; 
yet, mutinies following deployments are a trend that has not yet received attention.2 
Of the sixty -six mutinies examined in the dataset, twenty percent involved 
grievances related to deployments. However, not all deployments appear to spark 
mutinies at an equal rate. Of the thirteen incidents of mutinies related to deployments, 
ten cases (or seventy -seven percent) involved deployments on multinational peace 
operations and three involved internal deployments. This chapter first discusses why 
recently deployed troops may be especially prone to mutiny. Afterwards, I show that 
there are traits unique to multinational peace operations, which may contribute to 
grievances among soldiers who participate in the missions and ultimately lead to 
mutinies. 
The United Nations Peacekeeping, Post Cold War Surge, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml 
2 One example is Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. Unintended Consequences of 
Peacekeeping Operations, (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007). 
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Various mutiny scholars have described "implicit contracts" or "social contracts" 
between soldiers and their superiors where "in exchange for obedience, the chain of 
command will see to the needs of its personnel and ensure that they are well cared for. "3 
Being a soldier is often viewed as more than just a job since it potentially involves high 
risks, includes lifestyle restrictions, and is legally binding. In return, soldiers expect 
more than just pay. They often expect housing, subsidized food, uniforms, and training. 
If soldiers feel that their superiors are not fulfilling these expectations, they are more 
likely to renege on their obligation to obey orders and follow the chain of command. 
While this pattern can apply to mutinies in general, this chapter will show why 
deployments in particular often alter the contract between soldiers and their superiors. 
Like most contracts, the ones between soldiers and their chain of command shift 
depending on the workload. When stationed at home both sides may be more lax about 
the agreement or find alternative ways to meet the demands. For example, it is common 
for West and Central African soldiers to take on small side jobs that their bosses 
overlook or soldiers may be assigned to positions that could supplement their salaries 
(such as working check points where bribes are frequently given). When soldiers are 
deployed, the contract shifts because a deployment is where soldiers are seen to be most 
earning their dues. As this chapter will demonstrate, soldiers' expectations of what they 
are owed by the command increase on a deployment along with the risks of the job. 
Deployment on multinational missions often further heightens soldiers' expectations as 
they are able to compare their conditions to those of soldiers from other states in the 
region. However, it is more difficult for superiors to `take care of soldiers on a 
deployment due in part to increased needs (equipment, logistics, etc.) that do not 
necessarily coincide with increased funds. As this chapter will show, the hierarchy often 
fails to meet the heightened expectations of deployed soldiers, thus breaking the 
understood contract. 
s Quote from Christopher Ankersen, "Beyond Mutiny? - Instrumental and Expressive Understandings of 
Contemporary 'Collective Indiscipline "' in The Unwilling and the Reluctant: Theoretical Perspectives on 
Disobedience in the Military, ed. Craig Leslie Mantle (Ontario, Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006): 
121; topic also discussed in Rachel Lea Heide, "After the Emergency: Demobilization Strikes, Political 
Statements, and the Moral Economy in Canada's Air Forces, 1919 -1946," in The Insubordinate and the 
Noncompliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to Present, ed. Howard G. 
Coombs (Ontario, Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2007): 178 -179. 
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4.2 Value -Added Deployments 
Although militaries are trained to engage in combat, in West and Central Africa 
deployment to a combat zone is infrequent for most soldiers. With interstate conflict a 
rarity in the region, most combat deployments will not involve traditional military to 
military engagement but instead require "non- traditional" missions such as counter 
insurgency, counterterrorism, etc. These types of missions are difficult for even the best 
trained and equipped forces. West and Central African militaries are often further 
disadvantaged in these missions by outdated equipment, lack of basic supplies, and 
logistical shortfalls, as the examples below will demonstrate. 
Old complaints take on a new level of importance when they occur in a 
deployment setting. Soldiers commonly grumble about not having equipment or 
uniforms while in the barracks but these concerns become more significant when a 
soldier is deployed. Outdated equipment is of little relevance in the day -to -day lives of 
soldiers who do not need it to survive. Yet, when in combat outdated equipment or lack 
of supplies such as ammunition can be the difference between life and death. The case 
study of a planned mutiny in Sierra Leone, as detailed in the next chapter, will 
demonstrate this point. The mutiny was planned while the soldiers were deployed to 
counter rebel forces and their complaints included lack of equipment, uniforms, boots, 
food, medical care, and inconsistent pay. These were not necessarily new complaints; 
the government had long been neglecting the military. However, these issues had more 
severe consequences for the soldiers who were deployed. One soldier from the deployed 
unit explained that the group was "demoralized every time we go to battle" due to the 
lack of supplies and support.4 The old complaints led to new complications on the 
ground for deployed soldiers (including casualties within the unit) and severely altered 
their attitudes towards the mission and their chain of command, which ultimately led the 
soldiers to make a decision to mutiny to rectify the situation. 
Author interview with military source I (current officer), May 2011. 
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The heightened risks associated with deployments also leads to a heightened 
sense of entitlement. Soldiers on deployment or returned from deployment believe they 
are due more from the government or military hierarchy as a result of their experience. 
Soldiers with combat experience revise their criteria of what is acceptable pay based on 
the risks involved. For example, a Sierra Leonean soldier involved in the mutiny plan in 
1992 commented, "the pay was very much low. That is the reason we decided to take 
over the government. Soldiers just get 10,000 [leones] a month and you sacrifice your 
life for the nation. "5 Similarly a Gambian former soldier discussing the 1991 and 1992 
mutinies stated "soldiers felt that they were in Liberia risking their lives and still the 
amount of money they were expecting was not reaching them...they were exposed to 
danger and...they don't get the money they expected. "6 In these quotes the soldiers 
explain that the problem was not only an issue of pay, rather the pay issues combined 
with the risks of the mission made the situation unacceptable. Lastly, in an interview 
with a current Sierra Leonean soldier about ongoing deployments to the Darfur missions 
he commented, "If I go to Sudan, I risk my life and only get $400, my life is worth more 
than that. "7 He shows that there is a recalculation of what a soldier is entitled to 
depending on the conditions. To this individual the bonus deployment pay was still not 
enough to justify the potential danger. He was not saying that he was refusing to go to 
Sudan, just did not want to go for the current pay. His language sounds much more like 
an individual negotiating terms of a contract than that of a soldier fulfilling duties of the 
job. As these examples show, danger is considered a chargeable experience and the 
soldiers expect to be compensated for it. 
Increased expectations following deployments is not unique to West or Central 
African militaries and parallels can be drawn in the civilian sector. Most military 
personnel that deploy, especially to a combat zone, expect supplemental pay (often 
called hazard pay). Similarly, even non -military personnel expect that added 
responsibilities in their employment would also come with added pay or benefits. 
' Author interview with military source L (current enlisted soldier) May 2011; In 1992 the conversion rate 
for leones to U.S. dollars averaged 499 to 1. Therefore, 10,000 leones a month would be roughly $20. 
ó Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier) October 2012. 
7 Author interview with military source S (current rank and file soldier) May 2011; The "$400" is not 
converted, the interviewee spoke about the pay in U.S. dollars. 
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Soldiers in nearly any professional military count on appropriate provisions when 
deployed. The demands made by deployed or post -deployed soldiers in this region are 
not necessarily unusual; what seems to cause the trend of mutinies in this region is the 
inability of governments to meet common expectations of deployed soldiers. States are 
often unable to fund the military missions or there is misappropriation of the funds (or 
both). This trend will be discussed more specifically in relation to multinational 
missions below. 
The hardships and sacrifices of a deployment also lead to a sense of entitlement 
in a more abstract way. There seems to be an expectation that in addition to added pay, 
soldiers that have deployed deserve increased respect for having endured the mission. 
This was a subtler trend that I noticed during field research. In addition to formal 
interviews, I engaged with a wide variety (in terms of both ranks and nationalities) of 
soldiers in a more casual setting and noted that soldiers were very quick to tell me about 
any deployment they had been on. Guinean soldiers talked extensively about their 
experiences on the ECOMOG missions to Liberia and Sierra Leone and similarly Malian 
soldiers openly discussed their time deployed against the rebellion in the northern part of 
their country. On several occasions during interviews in Sierra Leone, soldiers made a 
point to show me physical scars from their deployments. One officer took his uniform 
shirt off to show me a particularly severe scar from a bullet to the chest and a subsequent 
surgery. It demonstrated a pride not only in the deployment but in the combat and 
physical danger associated with the experience. He also directly used this experience to 
justify his involvement in overthrowing President Momoh in 1992 by explaining that the 
government did not take care of the wounded. To him, the government had not fulfilled 
its responsibility to veterans, thus breaking the implicit contract. 
A heightened level of respect for veterans was also apparent in the language used 
by interviewees. When soldiers would tell me about their military colleagues, friends, or 
relatives they would often add descriptors about the person's deployment experiences. 
For example, in Sierra Leone young soldiers would commonly describe someone as 
"battle- tested" or "battle- hardened." It was always said with admiration. As previously 
stated, traditional military combat is infrequent in the region and thus having combat 
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experience is something that makes soldiers stand out among their comrades in many 
states. 
Additionally, my conversations with soldiers indicated that there is solidarity 
among soldiers from various countries that those engaged in combat deserve better 
treatment. While I was conducting field research in West Africa in 2012 there were two 
coups in the region (Mali and Guinea Bissau). In casual conversations with soldiers in 
Guinea and Sierra Leone, there was overwhelming support for the actions of the Malian 
soldiers. They commented that the Malian soldiers were justified because the 
government was not taking care of them in their fight against rebels in the northern part 
of the country. Interestingly, Sierra Leonean soldiers did not have the same sympathy 
for the soldiers in Guinea Bissau and made dismissive comments about how they are 
always acting up.8 The fact that the Malian solders' initial complaints were over 
deployment conditions seemed to win them sympathy among other West African 
soldiers. 
Olonisakin's interviews with Nigerian peacekeepers following the ECOMOG 
mission to Liberia reveal similar findings to my own. She explains that when the 
peacekeepers returned home there was a strain between them and their comrades at 
home. She notes 
[the peacekeepers'] views were influenced largely by their experience 
during [peace] enforcement. Believing themselves to have been `battle - 
tested' by the Liberian mission, many of them considered their 
contemporaries at home `inexperienced.' Indeed, some considered 
themselves to be not only better soldiers than their own contemporaries, 
but also superior to many officers at home who had no experience in 
battle.9 
This universality of heightened respect for combat veterans can be linked to 
issues of honour, as described by Iliffe. He uses Frank Hendersen Stewart's definition 
of honour as a `right to respect.' 10 Iliffe explains that groups determine the criteria for 
honour. Stratified groups typically experience vertical honour, in which special respect 
8 I do not have the perspective of Guinea soldiers on the coup in Guinea Bissau because it occurred after I 
had left Guinea. 
9 `Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG 
Operations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000): 205. 
1D Iliffe, Honour in African History, 4. 
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is awarded to those of superior rank." Within a military context, the `group' seems to 
largely agree that endurance of combat deployments is honourable and deserves 
heightened respect. Additionally, combat experiences often appear to give soldiers a 
heightened spot within the vertical honour structure, even if they hold a seemingly junior 
rank. This observation will be furthered in the case study of Sierra Leone. 
When the hierarchy treats combat veterans poorly, it is viewed as a particular 
insult. Soldiers implied that there was a level of tolerance when soldiers in the barracks 
are paid late, but it was not acceptable for combat veterans to be treated that way. Post - 
deployment mutinies can serve as a way to defend the honour soldiers feel they deserve. 
Thus far I have described how deployments create new conditions in which 
soldiers can find grievances and a new sense of their own entitlement within the military 
structure due to the increased sacrifices that come with a deployment. The link between 
deployments and mutinies may also be partially understood by examining how a 
deployment alters the dynamics of the unit. In the most basic sense, deployed soldiers 
are physically separated from the military hierarchy. Units may feel freer to discuss or 
plan a mutiny away from the watchful eyes of their senior hierarchy. Soldiers from 
Ghana (1961), Sierra Leone (1992), and Nigeria (2000, 2012), planned or carried out a 
mutiny while away on deployment. 
Beyond the issue of distance from their home bases, deployment on combat 
missions often leads to strong group cohesion. Although definitions vary, generally 
strong cohesion involves trust among group members and the capacity for teamwork.12 
During combat deployments "members are immediately known to each other and their 
actions are interdependent, mutually supporting, and reciprocal. "13 Soldiers deployed 
together are in constant contact with each other, not only during intense combat 
situations, but also during the long mundane downtime, which inevitably occurs on 
deployments. In more recent years with the increase in peacekeeping deployments, units 
Ibid. 
12 Guy L. Siebold, "The Essence of Military Group Cohesion," Armed Forces & Society 33, No. 2 (Jan. 
2007): 288. 
'' Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty -First 
Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 18. 
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will often spend months together prior to the deployment in preparatory training.'` 
These shared experiences of hardships as well as the consistent close proximity often 
create close interpersonal bonds between members of the unit which may be absent 
when stationed at home. 
Military scholars regularly discuss cohesion in relation to its ability to create 
more efficient and motivated units. Anthony King explains that there is a common 
presumption that the close personal relationships formed within cohesive units "generate 
good performances because it motivates the individual members to fight. "'5 However he 
draws on various studies that also show another side of cohesion, one that can motivate 
individuals into deviant behaviour together. The close bonds can cause the group to 
subvert or ignore their authorities as well as their obligation to the organization. Guy 
Siebold explains that highly cohesive units may be particularly likely to disobey orders 
when "peer bonding is strong and bonding with leaders is poor.i16 This pattern is likely 
to be the case in West and Central African militaries as there are often large divisions 
between the rank and file soldiers and their superiors, particularly senior officers (as 
explained in Chapter Two). The deployment experience can increase the peer bonding 
as well as the divisions between the ranks, increasing the likelihood of disobedience. 
King cites cases of Western mutinies (French and Australian troops during WWI and 
American troops during the Vietnam War) among his various examples of deviant 
military behaviour among combat units." African combat related mutinies can also be 
added to this list of deviant behaviour, which is likely affected by increased group 
cohesion. 
Mutinies embody a unique dynamic in that they require both a strong bond 
within the group as well as a level of detachment from the larger organization. Mutineers 
put a high degree of trust into their fellow mutineers as they must have faith that the 
groups will stick together during negotiations or a potential counter attack. As Chapter 
Two explained, this cohesion is often difficult to maintain and the group regularly 
14 In earlier iterations of peacekeeping deployments specific training for the mission was less common. 
1' King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty -First Centuries, 
31. 
16 Siebold, "The Essence of Military Group Cohesion," 293. 
17 King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty -First Centuries, 
32. 
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experiences internal divisions, which can quickly result in mass violence. However, 
deployment related mutinies are often among the most organized and contained mutinies 
in the dataset. Their complaints are generally specific to the unit and their own 
experiences on the deployment and therefore they do not as easily allow for a contagion 
effect. Deployment related mutinies are also among the most successful mutinies in the 
dataset. This is likely due to the cohesion formed during the deployment. These units 
have presumably planned and conducted missions together and this shared skill set 
comes in useful in mutinies. The case study of Sierra Leone will show an example of a 
unit that clearly utilized their experiences together on the battlefield to plan and 
orchestrate a revolt against senior leadership. 
Shared deployment experiences often create the necessary group cohesion as 
well as feelings of division, isolation, and dissatisfaction from the larger military 
hierarchy. They can also create divisions between those in the military that have 
experienced the hardships versus those that have not. This division was highlighted with 
earlier examples of soldiers identifying others as "battle- tested." The division between 
those that have deployed and those that have not also largely follows the rank structure 
as combat deployment consists mostly of rank and file soldiers, led by junior officers. 
Senior officers are much less likely to engaged in combat. This division builds on the 
economic divisions between the junior ranks and senior officers described in Chapter 
Two. 
The case of Sierra Leone in 1992 exemplifies the trend of deployments creating 
both cohesion and division. When soldiers overthrew the government after battling 
rebels in eastern Sierra Leone they regularly brought up the lack of experience of their 
senior officers (and government officials). In Captain Strasser's first speech as president 
he stated "our soldiers continue to sacrifice their lives on the war front in spite of very 
poor logistic support provided by the government, whose leadership sit in Freetown 
enriching themselves by gross misappropriation of war funds." Another speech explains 
that "while our men were dying at the war front to liberate our country" their superiors 
were "plundering" in Freetown.18 In these accounts the soldiers want to not only 
is Wes( Africa, May 11. 1992. 
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discredit their seniors but to do so in comparison to their own self -proclaimed 
meritorious actions. 
This section has shown that combat deployments alter solders' perceptions of 
their conditions and their value within the military. With the increased hardship and 
sacrifice, soldiers often expect the government to reciprocate with increased pay or 
provisions. The deployment experience may also create new bonds within the unit while 
intensifying feelings of divisions from the larger hierarchy, a dynamic which is 
conducive to mutiny. 
4.3 Increased Complications of Multinational Missions 
As earlier noted, the vast majority of mutinies related to deployments occur 
following multinational missions. This section will examine why this type of 
deployment is particularly prone to spark mutinies. Most of the missions discussed in 
this section are a type of Peace Support Operation (PSO) and thus the individuals 
involved will be referred to as peacekeepers. 19 However, this analysis will place more 
emphasis on the multinational aspect of the mission than the particular type of peace 
operation. It is likely that even missions that are more interventionist but multinational 
would be susceptible to many of the patterns outlined in this chapter. 
There is a wide spectrum of peace support operations, some of which occur in 
the midst of conflict (peace enforcement missions), while others occur after a cease -fire 
has been reached (peacekeeping missions).20 However, as the UN doctrine points out, 
the line between the various types of operations is often blurred and mission mandates 
can change.21 Nearly all the multinational missions described in this chapter involve 
operations to regions in which conflict was ongoing or where there was a high 
probability that the unit encountered combat. This is part of a trend that has emerged in 
recent decades in which regional peacekeepers are the first to deploy to a conflict zone 
19 For various categories. of UN peace operations and details on their overlap see "United Nations 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines ", 2008, 17 -20. 
20 "United Nations Operations: Principles and Guidelines ", 2008, 17 -20. 
21 Ibid. 
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and later often "rehatted" into a more multi -national and better resourced (usually) UN 
mission.22 This pattern has occurred in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and most 
recently, Mali.23 Regional organization are often first to arrive in a conflict because they 
can deploy more rapidly and have a better understanding of the operational environment. 
However, as `Funmi Olonisakin points out, this trend has led to some criticism that 
"Africans give the blood and the UN takes the glory. "24 The combat aspect of these 
missions is significant to understanding the reasons for the mutiny. The combat 
situation alters the dynamic of the group and the way they view their own worth to the 
organization, as described in the previous section. Additionally, the logistical and 
material shortfalls, which this section will describe, were more than just frustrations; 
they became life- threatening for the peacekeepers on the ground. The areas in which the 
soldiers found fault were often at least partially caused by the complexity of the 
multinational aspect of the mission, as will be elaborated on below. 
This section will pay particular attention to the multinational missions to Liberia, 
which began as an ECOWAS mission in 1990 and continues as a UN mission today.25 
At least seven mutinies from soldiers in five different countries have occurred following 
involvement in the Liberia missions (see Figure 4.1 below).26 However, the Liberia 
missions were not the only multinational missions related to mutinies. Others include 
Ghanaian troops during the United Nations led mission to Congo (ONUC) in 1961 and 
soldiers from Burkina Faso (1999) and Côte d'Ivoire (1999) following the UN led 
mission to Central African Republic ( MINURCA). The mutinies following the 
MINURCA mission were rather ironic considering the mission was developed to assist 
in the instability following military mutinies by Central African Republic forces. 
Although outside the dataset time frame, Chadian soldiers in 2013 mutinied due to the 
22 Funmi Olonisakin, "Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peacekeeping and Peace Support 
Operations in West Africa," Kofi Arman International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2008, 17. 
23 
The case of Mali is slightly different from the others because French troops were deployed alongside 
regional troops from the beginning of the mission. 
24 
Olonisakin, "Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations in 
West Africa," 17. 
25 
There was a break in the mission between 1998 and 2003, which coincides with when the first civil war 
ended and the second began. 
26 
ECOWAS deployed troops to Liberia on two occasions. The first was from 1990 -1998. During the 
second Liberian civil war ECOWAS deployed troops again but this mission was soon converted into a UN 
mission. 
115 
conditions of the UN mission to Mali (MINUSMA). This trend can also been seen in 
other regions of Africa as evidenced by a mutiny in 2009 among Burundian soldiers 
involved in the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM).27 
Figure 4.1 Multinational mission related mutinies in West and Central Africa 
Mutineers' country Year of 
Mutiny 
Multinational Mission 
Ghana 1961 ONUC (Congo) 
Gambia 1991 ECOMOG (Liberia) 
Gambia 1992 ECOMOG (Liberia) 
Guinea 1996 ECOMOG (Liberia) 
Burkina Faso 1999 MINURCA (CAR) 
Côte d'Ivoire 1999 MINURCA (CAR) 
Benin 2000 ECOMOG (Liberia/Guinea 
Bissau) 
Nigeria 2000 ECOMOG (Liberia /Sierra Leone) 
Guinea Bissau 2004 ECOMOG /UNMIL (Liberia) 
Nigeria 2008 UNMIL (Liberia) 
Of the numerous multinational missions that have involved West and Central 
African troops, one must question why the initial ECOWAS mission (1990 -1998) to 
Liberia has led to such a disproportionate number of post- deployment mutinies. In some 
ways the problems can be attributed to the fact that the mission was unprecedented in 
many ways. It was the first time a regional organization in Africa had undertaken a 
major peacekeeping initiative and it was the first time for a regional organization 
mission to take place alongside a UN mission.28 Simply put, this mission was 
particularly difficult and disorganized and the brunt of the problems fell on the soldiers 
on the ground (and of course the civilians they were meant to protect). A brief summary 
of the mission will help illustrate some of the problems. This section will focus mostly 
BBC, "Burundi Peacekeepers on Trial Over Somalia Mutiny," February 5, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/8499975.stm 
28 Olonisakin, "Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations in 
West Africa," 46. 
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on the ground conditions of the mission and will be followed in the next section by pay 
concerns. Part of the complication during the Liberia operations, which contributed to 
mutinies, was the overlap between ECOWAS and UN missions on the ground. The 
below chart serves to briefly differentiate the various multinational missions to Liberia. 
Figure 4.2 ECOWAS and UN Peace Support Operations to Liberia, 1990- Present29 
Organization Mission Title Years 
ECOWAS ECOMOG 1990 -1998 
UN UNOMIL 1993 -1997 
ECOWAS ECOMIL* 2003 
UN UNMIL 2003 -present 
* ECOWAS soldiers were 'rehatted' to UNMIL mission 
Although international peace operations increased dramatically following the end 
of the Cold War, the international community was not initially interested in becoming 
involved in the deteriorating security situation in Liberia. By 1989 the National Patriotic 
Liberation Front (NPFL) rebellion against Liberian President Doe had created a 
humanitarian crisis, threatening not only Liberia but also the region as a whole as 
Liberians refugees began fleeing to neighbouring countries. In 1990 ECOWAS made a 
controversial decision to send troops to Liberia. The troops, under the title ECOWAS 
Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), were given a broad mandate that included 
both peacekeeping and peace enforcement.30 This was an unprecedented decision in an 
organization that was established for regional economic cooperation. It was also 
contested by several of the sixteen ECOWAS member states. Only six countries 
initially contributed troops to the mission and of those six countries, five were 
29 This chart is specific to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, information from 'Funmi 
Olonisakin, "Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations in 
West Africa." 
30 Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping," International Security, 21, 
no. 3 (Winter 1996 -1997): 151. 
117 
Anglophone.31 Nigeria was clearly taking the lead, supplying the bulk of the funding, 
equipment, leadership, and roughly seventy percent of the troops.32 There were 
questions from the start about the political motives, legality of the mission and 
mandate.33 However, for this assessment it is more important to focus on the ground 
conditions of the mission, as that is where mutineers developed grievances. 
The ECOMOG forces were initially meant to serve as peacekeepers; however 
this was highly problematic because there was no established peace to keep.34 
" ECOMOG intervened in the Liberian crisis before any ceasefire agreement, and indeed, 
against the expressed wishes of the country's most important warring faction, Charles 
Taylor's NPFL."35 Taylor threatened to attack the ECOMOG troops if they intervened 
and carried through on the threat the very first day of their arrival to Monrovia.36 The 
inexperience among the ECOMOG troops and complications of operating with 
multinational troops was quickly exposed and the rebels advanced despite the ECOMOG 
presence. The utility of the ECOMOG troops in the conflict became especially 
questioned when rebel forces "murdered seventy Doe bodyguards- at ECOMOG's 
headquarters - and then murdered [President] Doe himself nearby. "37 After months of 
direct attacks on ECOMOG troops by rebel groups and a growing number of troop 
casualties, the Commanding General, Ghanaian General Quainoo, reportedly 
recommended withdrawing the force from Liberia. Instead, command was switched to 
Nigerian General Dogonyaro, 3,000 additional troops were added to the initial 2,700, 
and the troops took on the more assertive role of peace enforcers.38 
31 The Anglophone countries contributing troops included Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Nigeria, 
and Ghana. The only Francophone country to contribute troops at the initial stage was Guinea. 
32 Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping, ", 152. 
33 Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping," 152; Eboe Hutchful, "The 
ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in Africa," in Whither Peacekeeping in Africa ?, Monograph No 
36, Institute for Security Studies, April 1999. 
34 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG 
Operations, 103. 
35 Lansana Gberie, "Liberia's War and Peace Process: A Historical Overview," in Tortuous Road to 
Peace: The Dynamics of Regional, UN and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia, eds. 
Festus Aboagye and Alhaji M. S. Bah (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 2005): 56. 
36 Lansana Gberie, "Liberia's War and Peace Process: A Historical Overview," 56.; Olonisakin, 
Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations, 102. 
37 Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping," 154. 
38lbid., 155. 
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Command and control tensions were a problem from the top levels down to the 
lower ranks. Command at the top levels were chosen by ECOWAS leadership based on 
political reasons rather than competence or experience, which led those below them in 
the chain of command to doubt their abilities and decisions.39 It was common for unit 
commanders to put the interest of their home nation ahead of the mission overall, which 
often endangered troops and created an environment of distrust.40 The official hierarchy 
was regularly undermined "by the tendency for troop contributing countries to give 
direct orders to their troops," even when outside their chain of command.4 These 
internal divisions within the mission were likely of particular frustration to the rank and 
file who had to navigate the divisions while under stressful combat conditions. 
In addition to the complications of a vague and changing mandate, the troops 
wére underprepared for the task. From the start the mission was plagued with numerous 
practical complications including inadequate equipment, intelligence, and logistics.42 
The training level of the troops, who came from different countries, varied greatly. 
After Action Reports (AARs) from the mission reveal that there was no standardized 
training across the contingents, which reduced their effectiveness as a force.43 
Interoperability between the troops was further challenged by the variety of equipment, 
training, and shared languages.44 Additionally there was a lack of even basic supplies 
such as uniforms, boots, and food.45 
Hutchful observes that this lack of readiness could have been anticipated since 
most of the contributing countries had not maintained their militaries for a deployment 
scenario. A review commissioned by the government of Ghana in 1987 showed the 
operational state of readiness was so low that the army would not be capable of 
launching even a single company within the infantry brigade into action. Less than ten 
39 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues 
Operations, 165. 
40 Ibid., 166. 
41 Olonisakin, "Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peacekeeping and Peace 
West Africa," 29 
42 Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping." 167. 
43 Olonisakin, "Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peacekeeping and Peace 
West Africa," 29 
44 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues 
Operations, 163, 172 -175. 
4' Hutchful, "The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in Africa." 
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percent of the transport fleet was operable, only five of the forty -three aircraft were 
serviceable, and much of the other equipment was obsolete or unserviceable. Records 
on Nigeria from the same time show similar issues.46 Ghana and Nigeria were the most 
capable militaries of the contributing countries and their internal lack of readiness likely 
contributed to the larger problems of the ECOMOG mission. The state of affairs of the 
contributing militaries may have come as a surprise to many considering five of the six 
contributing countries were headed by a current or former military leader (the only 
exception being The Gambia). However, it corresponds with the continental trends 
identified in the last chapter in which most states were downsizing their armed forces 
due to the economic constraints of the time and changes in Cold War relationships. 
There were other factors, such as Liberia's jungle terrain that made the mission 
particularly difficult.47 ECOMOG planners also underestimated the NPFL; initial 
ECOWAS estimates assumed the troops would only be in Liberia for six months, 
whereas the first mission lasted eight years.48 Taylor's rebel troops were strengthened 
with help from (ECOWAS members) Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire and the sale of 
gold, diamonds, and wood from rebel -controlled regions 49 The rebels were often better 
armed than the ECOMOG troops and had a better understanding of the region and 
terrain. 
The equipment shortfalls, training inadequacies, interoperability challenges, 
chain of command confusion, and bold enemy led to high fatality rates and severely 
damaged troop morale.5° There were an estimated 500 ECOMOG troop fatalities during 
the initial mission to Liberia, 400 of which were Nigerians.' I The harsh conditions and 
high casualties would have been enough to demoralize the troops but they were pushed 
to their limit when they often went unpaid, both during the deployment and when they 
46 Hutchful, "The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in Africa." 
47 Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, "The Evolution and Conduct of the ECOMOG Operations in West Africa," 
in International Security Studies Monograph No. 44: Boundaries of Peace Operations, February 2000. 
48 Christopher Tuck, "'Every Car or Moving Object Gone:' The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia,' Africa 
Studies Quarterly 4 no. 1 (2000) http: / /web.africa .ufl.edu /asq /v4 /v4i I al .htm; Hutchful, "The ECOMOG 
Experience with Peacekeeping in Africa." 
49 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations 
91; Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping," 149, 155 -156 
50 Tuck, "'Every Car or Moving Object Gone:' The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia.' 
51 Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002): 251. 
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returned home. As previously mentioned, soldiers believe dangerous missions should be 
compensated with added respect and pay. The ECOMOG mission was particularly 
difficult and dangerous and the soldiers were often receiving less than they would be at 
their home bases, which set the stage for mutinies upon their return. 
Some analysts attribute this lack of payment as the motivation for the widespread 
looting and theft by ECOMOG soldiers and have argued that "more frequent payment of 
allowances would reduce the number of soldiers who loot little items. "52 However, 
much of the looting went far beyond the need to survive and the payment delays should 
only be seen as a partial explanation for this behaviour. Even if only a fraction of the 
ECOMOG soldiers were involved in looting, the organization as a whole gained a poor 
reputation among locals who claimed that ECOMOG really stood for "Every Car Or 
Moving Object Gone. ' 53 Some also speculate that the lack of financial and material 
support for the peacekeepers on the ground led some peacekeepers to actually work with 
the rebels.54 The common perception that ECOMOG soldiers were collaborating with 
rebels or acting worse than the rebels increased the difficulty of the mission and likely 
further demoralized many of the participants. 
Some of the problems related to the ECOMOG mission can linked to the fact that 
the mission was unprecedented in several aspects. However, the mutinies spanned a 
seventeen -year period, indicating that the complications were not simply a matter of new 
mission growing pains. Instead the complaints of soldiers on the ECOMOG mission to 
Liberia are common in other multinational missions. including the recently established 
mission to Mali, as Chapter Eight will demonstrate. 
4.4 The Problem of Transparent Pay 
52 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG 
Operations, 170. 
53 Tuck, "'Every Car or Moving Object Gone:' The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia.' 
54 Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping." 157, 169; W. Ofuatey -Kodjoe, 
"The Impact of Peacekeeping on Target States: Lessons from the Liberian Experience," in The Causes of 
War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa, ed. Ricardo Rene Laremont (Heinemann: 
Portsmouth, NH, 2002): 136. 
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In addition to the numerous mission complications described above, the key 
complaint among ECOMOG soldiers was about remuneration." The pay grievances 
from soldiers on the ECOMOG Liberia mission were particularly widespread, however 
it was a problem not unique to ECOMOG. Mutinies over deployment pay have occurred 
following missions run by ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN. The different ways that the 
missions are funded leads to slightly different accusations by soldiers who claim they 
have not been paid. The ECOMOG funding issue will be discussed first, following by a 
discussion of UN funded missions. 
The ECOMOG mission in Liberia occurred at a time when many states were 
experiencing major internal economic constraints, as described in the previous chapter. 
Therefore, it was not a mission in which many West African countries could afford 
without assistance. The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee agreed "that troops 
from participating countries were to be self -sufficient for the first thirty days, after 
which ECOWAS was to pick up the funding, but it was unable to do so. "56 ECOWAS's 
goal of collecting fifty million dollars in donations from African states and other 
international donors was not met.57 The "parlous state of most ECOMOG members 
resulted in incomplete funding for the new force. "58 This may explain why countries, 
like The Gambia, struggled to provide the extra deployment pay to the initial two groups 
that deployed on the ECOMOG mission and reduced their troop contributions when it 
became clear that ECOWAS would not provide the expected funds. However, as The 
Gambia case study will further show, it is difficult to determine where the fault lies in 
the lack of payment to soldiers (ECOWAS, national government, individual military 
leaders). 
Several years into the ECOMOG mission, the conflict gained more attention 
worldwide and more international contributions (both in terms of money and troops).59 
In 1993 the UN set up the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to 
" Olonisakin, "Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations in 
West Africa," 30 
56 Hutchful, "The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in Africa." 
'7 Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, 138. 
'8 Ibid. 
59 Michelle Pitts, "Sub- regional Solutions for African Conflict: The ECOMOG Experiment," Journal of 
Conflict Studies XIX No. 1 (Spring 1999); http: / /journals.hil.unb.ca /index.php /jcs /article /view/4379/5057 
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work in tandem with ECOMOG in Liberia.60 However, this often only further 
complicated the situation. Rather than work together as allies, the ECOMOG soldiers 
often viewed the UNOMIL mission as a rival. The UNOMIL mission was better funded 
and "ECOMOG soldiers complained that they were poorly paid when compared to 
UNOMIL and yet they performed the more rigorous task. "61 Additionally, some 
ECOMOG soldiers resented the idea of being monitored by the UN, especially since the 
organization had been late to intervene.62 
Even in later stages of the mission, funding remained a problem, often due to the 
complexity of the multinational, multi -organizational mission. For example, problems 
arose when ECOMOG soldiers were "rehatted" into the UNMIL mission in 2003. In 
2004 soldiers from Guinea Bissau staged a mutiny demanding unpaid wages from their 
involvement in the ECOMIL /UNMIL mission. They accused their army chiefs of 
pocketing their peacekeeping payments while the army chiefs accused the UN of not 
paying the salaries from the transition from ECOMIL to UNMIL.63 ECOWAS stepped 
in and provided the government of Guinea Bissau with approximately $500,000 to pay 
the mutineers arrears.64 
It may be understandable that the involvement of numerous nations and several 
international organizations would complicate the issue of funding; yet soldiers are 
generally not sympathetic to the funding difficulties at the organizational level. When 
they are not paid on time they do not seem to question if the organization is at fault but 
rather blame their officers or others above them. This makes particular sense within a 
military chain of command because officers are seen as being responsible for taking care 
of those who work under them. This is significant because it means delays in payments 
for multinational missions, regardless of who is at fault, has the potential to cause 
divisions and suspicions between the ranks of the contributor's military. 
G0 Pitts, "Sub- regional Solutions for African Conflict: The ECOMOG Experiment." 
61 Olonisakin, "Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations in 
West Africa," 30. 
62 Tuck, "'Every Car or Moving Object Gone:' The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia." 
63 Mark Malan, "Transition with Minimal Assistance: Lessons from Guinea- Bissau ?" KAIPTC Paper No. 
5, March 2005, 14 -15; Mario de Queiroz, "Guinea- Bissau- Fragile Democracy Jeopardised by Military 
Revolt," Inter Press Service, October 7, 2004 http: / /www.ipsnews. net /2004/10 /guinea -bissau -fragile- 
democracyjeopardised -by- military- revolt 
64 Malan, "Transition with Minimal Assistance: Lessons from Guinea -Bissau ?" 
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ECOWAS funding for the Liberia mission was uncertain from the start and the 
organization had no prior experience with multinational military missions. However, 
UN missions have much more funding and a long history of conducting operations 
around the world. Yet, African mutineers have expressed pay grievances with these 
missions as well. As will be described below, these mutinies (or threats of mutinies) are 
often related to the transparency of UN payments compared to the lack of transparency 
of the payments within the contributing country. 
There is no shortage of soldiers volunteering to go on UN missions in West or 
Central Africa. This is largely because soldiers make significantly more money per 
month deployed on a UN mission than they would earn stationed at home. Additionally, 
the missions provide experience that could be valuable for promotions or future job 
opportunities. For some, the appeal of travelling or simply breaking the routine of life in 
the barracks may be appealing. 
During discussions with Sierra Leonean and Guinean troops, just days and weeks 
after the Malian coup in 2012, they continually brought up the potential for a 
multinational mission to Mali for which they could become involved. It became clear 
that a multinational mission to Mali (at this early stage) was more of a rumour than a 
plan but still I was struck by how eager soldiers throughout the region were to take part. 
Similarly, when a Sierra Leonean military contact of mine posted on social media that he 
was given a spot on the Somalia mission congratulatory messages from his colleagues 
poured in, despite the high fatality rates among peacekeepers on this particular mission. 
My personal observations about the strong desire of soldiers to participate in 
multinational mission are consistent with other writings on the topic. Kwesi Aning 
explains that in Ghana there is a "perception among the troops that participating in peace 
operations is an irrefutable way to improve one's financial situation. Thus being 
selected to participate in such a force has become a major raison d'être for members of 
the GAF to stay in the forces." 6' A report by the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training 
Center (KAIPTC) argues that Ghanaian soldiers are so keen for the opportunity to go on 
Kwesi Aning, "Unintended consequences of peace operations for troop- contributing countries from 
West Africa: The case of Ghana," in Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations, ed. Chiyuki 
Aoil, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur (The United National University Press, Tokoyo, 2007): 140. 
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a multinational mission that even the possibility is enough to keep the military more 
self -disciplined. The report states "soldiers who are found HIV positive miss out on the 
extra income from peacekeeping missions and therefore make active efforts to prevent 
themselves from being infected. "66 The report credits peacekeeping missions (and 
particularly the pay incentive) as a reason for the low HIV rate in the military.67 
The income from peacekeeping missions has the potential to create long -term 
opportunities for the peacekeepers and their families. Aning explains that in Ghana 
soldiers on deployments are able to ship goods back home duty free. Therefore, it is 
common for peacekeepers to send bulk goods to their families who can make a profit 
selling them in Ghana. Additionally, "those who have managed to invest their 
peacekeeping funds profitably have subsequently purchased plots of land, built houses, 
purchased household goods and generally sent their children to better schools. "68 
It is not only soldiers who benefit financially from involvement in multinational 
missions; the military as a whole also stands to gain. The previously mentioned 
KAIPTC report explains how this is the case for Ghanaian participation in UN 
operations 
The Government...is reimbursed for the ordinary contingent member 
with an amount of $1096 per month while for the specialist an amount of 
$1399 per month is reimbursed. Considering that the ordinary contingent 
member is paid $20 a day (making $600 a month for 30 days), while 
provision is made for catering and some of the other provisions under 
self -sustainment (not readily quantifiable), the country makes significant 
profits on each ordinary contingent member and specialist that it deploys 
on a UN mission.69 
There are other benefits for a national armed forces besides the financial profits. 
The U.S., U.K., France, and Canada (among others) offer training programs to African 
66 Emma Birikorang, "Ghana's Regional Security Policy: Costs, Benefits, and Consistency." Kofi Annan 
International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra Ghana, KAIPTC Paper No. 20, September 2007, 10. 
67 It is Ghanaian policy that all troops must test negative for HIV before being able to deploy on a 
peacekeeping mission. 
68 Aning, "Unintended consequences of peace operations for troop -contributing countries from West 
Africa: The case of Ghana," 140. 
69 Birikorang, "Ghana's Regional Security Policy: Costs, Benefits, and Consistency," 8; emphasis in 
original text. 
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militaries contributing troops to multinational missions.70 Additionally, there are lease 
reimbursement programs, which enable African militaries to upgrade their equipment.71 
For states with a bloated military, the missions can serve as a "release valve" by 
stationing a portion of the military outside the country for a period of time.72 
On the one hand this may seem like a win for all, as both individuals and the 
country benefit, but the discrepancy between what the UN pays the country and what the 
individual soldiers receive is commonly a cause for grievances among the peacekeepers. 
The UN is very transparent about what it pays a country for peacekeepers and the 
$1096/$1399 figures are publicly available.73 Soldiers in Sierra Leone who expressed 
grievances about the pay for peacekeeping missions were fairly close in what they stated 
the UN was paying Sierra Leone for involvement in various missions (quotes from 
interviewees ranged from $1,000 to $1,500). If these soldiers who were located at 
remote bases in Sierra Leone could have relatively accurate understanding of the pay, 
surely soldiers in countries with a better technology infrastructure, such as Nigeria and 
Ghana, could easily find the information if they wanted. This transparency contrasts 
with the lack of transparency usually found in the defence industry where contracts, 
spending, and individual pay is often not publicly available information. 
Countries contributing troops to multinational missions justify paying 
peacekeepers less than the pay allotted by the UN because there are some internal 
expenses involved in the deployment. For example, peacekeepers often attend special 
training or screening in their home country before deploying. Additionally, it leaves the 
contributing country without those troops. In terms of mutinies it is less important to 
determine if the pay difference is justified and more important to understand how 
soldiers view the discrepancy. 
70 Ibid., 6. 
71 Aning, "Unintended consequences of peace operations for troop- contributing countries from West 
Africa: The case of Ghana," 135 -137; Birikorang, "Ghana's Regional Security Policy: Costs, Benefits, and 
Consistency," 8. 
72 Elizabeth Dickinson, "For tiny Burundi, big returns in sending peacekeepers to Somalia," The Christian 
Science Monitor, December 22, 2011, http: / /www.csmonitor.com /World /Africa/20l 1 /1222 /For -tiny- 
B urundi -b ig- returns -in- sending- peacekeepers -to- Somalia 
73 For example, see "Financing Peacekeepers" page of the UN website. 
https: / /www.un.org /en /peacekeeping /operations /financing.shtm I 
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When soldiers are unclear what the additional money from multinational 
missions is being used for, they often assume corruption is involved. Interviews with 
current soldiers in Sierra Leone illustrate this point. One soldier explained "these people 
[peacekeepers] are not happy, they are grumbling. 1,225 to country but we only get 400. 
We do not know what the government is using the money for. "74 In a separate interview 
a soldier stated 
if you think, they [the Sierra Leone government] are making something 
like one million, two million dollars over six months and they are not 
doing anything, not buying uniforms, not buying medicine for soldiers. 
They are not helping those that are representing us in Darfur. They are 
managing it poorly. If they don't change the system it will happen.75 
The "it" is referring to a mutiny. Another Sierra Leonean soldier speculated that the 
officers were benefitting from the missions by noting their lifestyles which he felt could 
not be maintained on a regular salary.76 Similarly, in an interview with a Gambian 
soldier about the 1991 and 1992 post -deployment mutinies, he said the unit mutinied 
because they "have seen senior officers robbing them. "77 
Nigerian soldiers have also been known to express dissatisfaction about late 
payments for UN peacekeeping missions or angrily speculate about how the remainder 
of the UN pay is being used by the military. Nigerian soldiers (and police officers) have 
consistently complained about unpaid salaries from peacekeeping missions and their 
grievances typically place the blame on their officers.78 The Nigerian case that has 
received the most media attention is a mutiny among returned peacekeepers that 
occurred in 2008 in Akure. In this incident twenty -seven soldiers recently returned from 
the UN mission in Liberia blocked a highway by setting up bonfires and chanted slogans 
74 Author interview with Sierra Leonean rank and file soldier, May 2011; for cases in which soldiers 
provided information about current grievances I have chosen to not provide source identification letters to 
help further their confidentiality. 
75 Author interview with Sierra Leonean rank and file soldier, May 2011. 
76 Author interview with Sierra Leonean rank and file soldier, May 2011. 
77 Author interview with military source F (former officer), August 2012. 
78 Adelowo Oladipo, "600 Nigerian police peacekeepers protest in Lagos over unpaid allowances," 
Tribune, May 21, 2011, http: / /www. tribune. com.ng /sat/index.php /news /4199- 600 -nigeria- police- 
peacekeepers- protest -in- lagos- over -unpaid- allowances.htm 1; "Nigeria police UN peacekeepers grumble 
over unpaid allowances," Nigeria Police Watch, May 21, 2011, 
http : / /www.nigeriapolicewatch.com/2011/05/nigeria-pol ice-un-peacekeepers-grumb le-over-unpaid- 
allowances/ 
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and songs condemning their officers.79 All mutineers were arrested and jailed. The 
mutineers' lawyer explained that `this money was paid to them by the UN and stolen by 
some military officers. The officers were not detained for one day." In 2009 the 
mutineers were sentenced to life in jail. The officers were court martialed, found guilty 
and only demoted and ordered to return the money.80 There were numerous editorials 
and online postings expressing anger at the severe sentences of the enlisted soldiers 
compared to the lenient punishments for the officers.8 t A statement by the Nigerian 
Army public relations officer six months after the trials noted that although they did not 
believe the officers intentionally stole the money (rather misappropriated it) the situation 
continued to have "negative implications on the morale and disposition" of the military 
ranks "towards one another. "82 Therefore they decided to retire the accused officers. In 
2010 the rank and file soldiers appealed their case, the sentence was overturned and the 
soldiers were discharged from the military.83 This case highlights that mutinies often 
result from suspicions among the rank and file towards their superior but also shows that 
these divisions can be intensified with the way that mutinies are dealt with by the 
hierarchy. 
It is not always a simple matter of peacekeepers claiming their salaries go 
directly into the pockets of officers. Soldiers have also argued that the process of 
selection for peacekeeping missions has been corrupted. In an interview with a soldier 
in Sierra Leone he explained that there is a group of rank and file soldiers who want to 
"incite the whole military against higher authorities." When I asked why, he responded 
that the soldiers who are selected to go on peacekeeping missions are expected to pay 
the assigning officers "something like ten percent...It is a mission, if you are fortunate to 
go they want you to give ten percent. If you don't do it they hold up your rank, they 
make you relinquish your appointment. "84 Similar accusations were made in the Sierra 
79 AP, "Ex -U.N. peacekeepers get life in mutiny case," April 28, 2009 
80 Ibid. 
81 Examples of forums discussing the topic include Nairaland Forum and Nigerian Village Square. 
Additionally the following article discusses public opinion on the issue: Senator Iroegbu, "Nigerian Army 
Pardons Akure 27," This Day, December 3, 2010 
$2 Juliana Taiwo, "Mutiny: Army retired indicted senior officers," NigeriaWorld, October 21, 2009 
8' Iroegbu, "Nigerian Army Pardons Akure 27." 
84 Author interview with Sierra Leonean rank and file soldier, May 2011 
128 
Leone media in 2013 and which the government strongly denied.85 Aning observed a 
similar trend in Ghana. He explains "different types of ̀ protocol' facilities are extended 
by junior officers to their senior officers, either to get their duty tours extended or to be 
selected to participate in a peacekeeping operation as a whole. "86 He notes a variety of 
different ways that the protocols work but the general trend is that those in the position 
to select who deploys often require compensation from those they choose. This practice 
extends far up the chain of command and also includes corruption over which units or 
branches of the military will be involved in the mission, not only the selection of 
individual peacekeepers.87 During interviews with soldiers in Burkina Faso, none 
mentioned being required to pay to go on a mission but they were adamant that the 
selection was based on personal relationships, not necessarily merit. Even an individual 
who was in an authoritative position within the military admitted "if you do not know 
someone you will never get assigned to an important mission. "88 
The perceived corruption within the selection process and placing the blame on 
officers for late pay is significant because it indicates a more systemic problem. The 
roots of the grievances over peacekeeping pay go deeper than just issues of money. The 
perceived corruption threatens to delegitimize the officer corps and their orders in the 
minds of the enlisted soldiers, which weakens the hierarchy.89 The resentment and 
suspicion of the soldiers towards their superiors does not necessarily vanish if /when the 
soldiers receive their due pay. The case study of The Gambia (Chapter Six) will show 
how the late payments for peacekeepers was seen as evidence of corruption among the 
officer corps. Even after the soldiers received their pay, doubts and suspicions persisted 
in the minds of enlisted soldiers against their officers, resulting in further instability 
within the armed forces. 
85 "Pay scandal rocks Sierra Leone's troops in Somalia," Africa Review. October 17, 2013. 
86 Aning, "Unintended consequences of peace operations for troop- contributing countries from West 
Africa: The case of Ghana," 144. 
871bid., 144 -148. 
88 Author interview with military source AA (former officer, currently working in the security sector), 
March 2012. 
89 Similar argument to corruption delegitimizing organizations and impeding the peacebuilding efforts, as 
explained by Philippe Le Billon "Corrupting Peace? Peacebuilding and Post -Conflict Corruption," 
International Peacekeeping 15 3 (2008): 344 -361. 
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4.5 Revealing the Greener Grass 
Another important aspect of multinational missions is that they bring together 
soldiers from a variety of African (and in some cases non -African) countries. The 
soldiers live and work together with their foreign comrades usually for extended periods 
of time. The individual soldiers perform the same job as their fellow peacekeepers, 
under the same conditions but each is paid by their home government. The various 
countries contributing troops do not pay the same amount to the soldiers they deploy. 
The economic conditions and cost of living between countries in the region vary widely 
and thus it could be expected that salaries would also vary. However, from the 
perspective of the soldiers, those that were on the lower end seemed to view the pay 
difference with contempt. For example, soldiers interviewed in Sierra Leone made 
vague references to soldiers from other countries making more than them (however no 
one named a particular country). A Gambian officer explained that a key aspect to the 
1991 and 1992 mutinies following the multinational mission in Liberia was that the 
soldiers "believed they were being paid less than their counterparts from other 
countries. "90 Another Gambian interviewee said the mutineers thought that the 
Nigerians specifically were being paid more than them.91 
The variations in pay among the ECOMOG soldiers were a consistent source of 
tension during (and after) the mission. ECOWAS had agreed on an operational 
allowance of five U.S. dollars per day per deployed soldier and that each contributing 
country would be responsible for paying their troops. However, there were "noticeable 
differences both in the amount and pattern in which some contingents were paid. "92 
Soldiers from Sierra Leone claimed that even when paid regularly they were not 
90 Author interview with military source F (former military officer), May 2012. 
91 Author interview with member of Gambian diaspora community, currently in U.S. defense sector, 
November 2013. 
92 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG 
Operations, 179. 
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receiving the agreed upon amount. Soldiers from Nigeria were known to go months on 
end with no pay, whereas other contingents received regular and full pay.93 
Soldiers compare more than just pay when on multinational missions. 
Contributing countries on the ECOMOG mission were expected to supply their own 
soldiers with uniforms and equipment. The difference in uniforms was "one of the most 
glaring aspects" of differentiation between the troops. Olonisakin's interviews with 
ECOMOG soldiers reveal expressions of frustration at the state of their uniforms 
compared to their comrades from other countries. The Nigerian soldiers in particular 
were so undersupplied and outfitted compared to the other soldiers that they often 
purchased uniforms from other contingents. One Nigerian officer states 
some of the countries are unable to re- supply their people. Nigeria, for 
example, you need to see some of our soldiers in the bush. Their 
condition, uniforms, and so on, is appalling... Some have resorted to 
buying from other contingents. There is now a sale point on premise.94 
Another officer explains that it was "disheartening to note that of all the 
contingents in Ops. Liberty the Nigerian contingent is the most badly turned out."95 A 
rank and file Nigerian soldier states, "When I arrived here [Liberia], a Guinean soldier 
was kind enough to give me one of his uniforms. Although it was a bigger size, it was 
better than what I had. Other countries do not have this problem of uniform. "96 In all 
these examples, the respondents note the condition of the Nigerians in comparison to the 
other contingents. The ability to see themselves next to better -outfitted soldiers seemed 
to add shame and anger to the situation. This was likely especially the case for 
Nigerians because Nigeria was funding the majority of the mission and thus one would 
expect its soldiers to be the best equipped, not the worst. 
In a military context, uniforms are much more than assigned clothing. Generally 
military uniforms are seen as being earned, with individuals not allowed to wear the full 
uniform until passing a certain level of training and tests. They help unite a group of 
individuals and separate them from the civilian population. There are strict protocols on 
93 Ibid., 179-180. 
94 Ibid., 180. 
95 Ibid., 180. 
96 Ibid., 181. 
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how to wear uniforms and discipline for those who wear it incorrectly. There is usually 
a high level of pride associated with military uniforms and to be denied uniforms or have 
uniforms in poor shape is likely to be demoralizing. 
There were other areas where ECOMOG soldiers expressed dissatisfaction after 
comparing themselves to soldiers from other countries. A former Gambian soldier 
argues that the Gambian contingent was undertrained compared to other West African 
soldiers and other West African countries were more prepared to deal with casualties.97 
Additionally. during the ECOMOG mission, Nigerian troops frequently complained that 
the Ghanaian troops were eating better than them.98 
Many peace operations in Africa not only include soldiers from various countries 
but these soldiers then belong to different organizational structures. For example, during 
the peace operation in Liberia there were ECOMOG troops and UN troops deployed in 
the same region, conducting similar missions, but under different command structures 
with different pay, provisions, etc. As previously mentioned, ECOMOG soldiers in 
Liberia grew resentful of the better funding of the UN mission. Olonisakin notes that 
"the arrival of UNOMIL on the scene made ECOMOG's office accommodation appear 
substandard" and she goes on to describe how this caused tensions between the two 
groups.99 The situation became even more complex when the UN and US funded troops 
from Tanzania and Uganda to join an "expanded" ECOMOG. However, these East 
African troops were not funded by ECOWAS and were paid three times what the 
original ECOMOG troops were making. Additionally they were believed to be 
receiving better food than the West African troops and the disparity "further lowered the 
morale within the original force. "1 °0 
Academics in the 1960s and 1970s also identified that resentment was common 
when soldiers were exposed to foreign soldiers who had better conditions or pay. They 
noted that military officers who trained together in European military schools carried out 
the first coups in Africa. For example, the officers who conducted the first coups in 
97 Samsudeen Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army (Xlibris: 2007): 120. 
98 Hutchful, "The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in Africa." 
99 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG 
Operations, 160 -161. 
ioo Ibid., 194. 
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Ghana and Nigeria trained together in Sandhurst in Britain.101 J.M. Lee explains that 
when officers first trained at foreign schools with other African officers they were 
exposed to the variation in salary and work conditions between African militaries.102 
Those who realized their conditions were on the low end became resentful and more 
demanding of their government. The foreign training alongside African officers from 
other countries changed the way that the officers thought about their own role in the 
military and the role of the military in society.'°3 
Multinational foreign missions for enlisted soldiers can be viewed in a similar 
light as international training opportunities for officers. The majority of those deployed 
on multinational foreign missions are junior enlisted soldiers and it is likely that for 
many it would be their first time to extensively engage with colleagues from other 
countries. The new experience also brings new insights and often makes soldiers 
question their conditions, particularly in comparison to others. 
4.6 False Advertising 
Lastly, the soldiers participating in peacekeeping missions often have false 
expectations of the missions, which lead to feelings of resentment and suspicion towards 
their hierarchy. The previous sections detailed the hardship conditions and pay issues 
common in deployments in the region, but it is also important to view this in relation to 
how the missions are `sold' to the soldiers. West and Central African governments 
regularly treat appointment on a multinational mission as a reward, giving the 
impression that the mission will be an easy way to make money. However, as this 
chapter has shown, these missions are often very difficult and dangerous, which can 
cause a disconnect between the expectations and reality of the mission. 
1 °' Guttenridge, Military Regimes in Africa, 28 -29; First, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa 
and the Coup d'Etat, 23. 
102 J.M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (London: Chatto and Windus, Ltd., 1969): 92 -93. 
103 There are some who believe the foreign military schools took a more direct role in orchestrating a coup 
plan, however that argument will not be discussed here as it is not applicable to mutinies. 
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Hutchful observes this approach towards multinational missions within Ghana 
during the ECOMOG mission by noting that "troop earnings from peacekeeping 
operations abroad have become a major factor in stabilizing relations between the army 
and the Rawlings government, with participation in peacekeeping operations carefully 
regulated so that all soldiers feel that they have fair access to opportunities to augment 
their income. "104 He also explains that this became problematic because "of course 
Liberia and Sierra Leone were far from being well -heeled peacekeeping missions," 
especially in comparison to other UN missions. 
A similar situation occurred in The Gambia. A former Gambia soldier explained 
that most of those chosen for the initial ECOMOG mission were individuals who had 
not been part of the Confederal Army.105 The Confederal Army will be explained in 
more detail in Chapter Six, but participation in this joint unit with the Senegalese also 
allowed for increased pay. The ECOMOG mission was used to compensate those that 
did not economically benefit from involvement in the Confederal Army. Former 
Gambian soldiers explained to me that when the ECOMOG mission was announced 
most soldiers wanted to be a part of it. When I asked why one former soldiers 
responded "the truth is that people were saying this is one of the best paid forces in the 
world and people were saying if you go when you come home you have [thousands of] 
dollars in your bank account. "106 A former Gambian officer confirms this common 
belief by explaining 
it was widely believed in the GNA [Gambian National Army] that all 
participating armies in the mission were to be paid hard foreign 
currencies- dollars -from cash pledged by the international community. 
The exact amount was said to be over a hundred a day.1 °7 
For the Gambian contingent that participated in the ECOMOG mission, their 
pay expectations were not realistic considering the $5 a day ECOMOG pay rate. Lt Col 
(ret.) Sarr notes that the Gambian government could only afford three dollars a day per 
1 °4 Hutchful, "The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in Africa." 
I05 Author interview military source C (former enlisted soldier) October 2012. 
lob Ibid. 
1°7 Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 209. 
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soldier and even this amount was often not paid, leading to great "disappointment and 
frustration" among the troops.1 °8 
Olonisakin also observes the issue of unrealistic expectations of the ECOMOG 
mission among Nigerian soldiers. She quotes a Nigerian General who stated that in his 
country "the planners did not heed warnings at the planning stage, to prepare the troops 
for possible combat in Liberia. "109 Rank and file soldiers backed up the General's 
observation by stating that they were never given an accurate picture of the situation in 
Liberia. Olonisakin goes on to explain that 
The troops were not mentally prepared for what to expect in Liberia. 
Nigerian troops for example were told that they were going on a 
peacekeeping assignment in Liberia, not war, and that they were going to 
earn some U.S. dollars. This affected the disposition of the troops to the 
operation. Indeed, morale was seriously weakened when the troops 
arrived in Liberia only to face heavy artillery fire from the NPFL11° 
While the ECOMOG mission was in some ways exceptional in the level of 
combat endured by the peacekeepers, it is not the only peacekeeping mission that has 
resulted in high casualties. The ongoing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 
which consists of all African troops, has also resulted in high troop fatalities. The 
official figures show that there have been 500 deaths among AMISOM troops (as of 
October 2012) but many security analysts and journalists claim that the real number is 
three times as high.l l l The UN recently estimated that the number could be as high as 
3,000 peacekeeper fatalities in Somalia.112 AMISOM troops have consistently been 
targeted by Al- Shabaab, putting the soldiers in combat positions rather than 
peacekeeping roles. Media coverage of the mutiny of Burundian troops following their 
AMISOM deployment noted that the contingent was located in one of the most 
dangerous regions and troops "face almost daily attacks. "113 
108 Ibid. 
logy Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG 
Operations, 147. 
11 Ibid. 
111 Greg Mills, "AMISOM: An African success story?" Brethurst Foundation, October 14, 2012; Charles 
Onyango -Obbo, "Okay, can we now send AMISOM to Afghanistan?" Africa Review, October 8, 2012. 
112 "Up to 3,000 African peacekeepers killed in Somalia since 2007," Reuters, May 9, 2013. 
11' "Six months of Unpaid wages for Burundian soldier in Somalia," November 11, 2010, 
Burundiintwari.com; http: // burundiintwari .com /english.php ?id =17 
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It is an unfortunate reality that when African countries contribute troops to 
peacekeeping operations they are likely to be involved in the most dangerous missions. 
The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) showed 
evidence that "the current era of `complex' peacekeeping in civil -war -torn states has 
seen a drastic shift away from developed -country blue helmets- the standard practice 
during the Cold War- towards blue helmets supplied by third world states. "1'4 While 
this trend has been criticized for having '`an unpleasant mercenary flavor, whereby rich 
countries appear to pay soldiers from very poor countries to undertake dangerous 
peacekeeping jobs" the pattern does not appear to have shifted since the Brahimi report 
was issued over a decade ago."' Therefore, the commonly held perception of viewing 
peacekeeping operations as separate (and easier) from combat operations is often not 
applicable to the types of missions that African soldiers partake in. 
In addition to false expectations about pay and the intensity of the conflict, 
soldiers have also claimed they were misled about the length of the tour. On the 
ECOMOG mission, states agreed to rotate troops every six months. While some 
countries, such as Ghana and The Gambia, followed this procedure, others did not. For 
Nigeria, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, the average tour of duty ended up being between 
eighteen and twenty -four months.16 However, research shows that Nigerian troops 
were at times deployed as part of ECOMOG for three years.' 7 These deployments were 
an exceptionally long time to be stationed in a combat zone. Troops' morale and 
productivity was diminished as a result of the extensions beyond their expected end 
date. "8 This was not a problem unique to ECOMOG. In 2012 Nigerian soldiers on the 
UN /AU mission in Darfur threatened to mutiny because they had been in Sudan for a 
114 James D. Fearon and David Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," International 
Security 28 no. 4 (Spring 2004): 25; William J Durch, et. al. The Brahimi Report and the Future of United 
Nations Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003): 71. 
115 James D. Fearon, "International Institutions and Collective Authorization of the Use of Force," in Can 
the World be Governed? Possibilities for Effective Multilateralism, ed. A. Alexandroff (Waterloo, 
Ontario: W. Laurier University Press, 2008): 20. 
116 `Funmi Olonisakin, "African Peacekeeping and the Impact on African Military Personnel," in The 
Psychology of the Peacekeeper, eds. Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler (Praeger: Westport, CT, 2003): 
303. 
117 Aning, "Unintended consequences of peace operations for troop- contributing countries from West 
Africa: The case of Ghana," 142. 
11S Olonisakin, "African Peacekeeping and the Impact on African Military Personnel," 303. 
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month beyond their expected tour completion date.19 Chadian troops deployed to Mali 
have recently mutinied over a similar grievance. Studies on the psychology of 
peacekeepers have shown that uncertainty in the length of deployment is one of the 
critical issues impacting stress levels among peacekeepers. The research suggests that 
standard deployment lengths or better communication about the deployment specifics 
can significantly reduce stress, and similarly could prevent situations such as the 
Nigerian peacekeepers mutiny threats.120 
The framing of a mission affects the mindset of the troops involved. For many 
multinational missions involving African soldiers, the deployments are treated as 
rewards rather than a sacrifice. Yet, many of these missions are much more difficult and 
dangerous than anticipated, leading to a discrepancy between the expectations and the 
reality for the soldiers on the ground. Soldiers then feel that they have been misled or 
that they deserve more for the increased hardships. 
4.7 The Nigerian Puzzle 
This chapter has placed heavy emphasis on the ECOWAS missions, due to the 
number of mutinies following participation in these missions. However, one puzzle that 
remains is why there were not more Nigerian mutinies during or following the 
ECOMOG mission. Although a multinational mission, Nigeria contributed the vast 
majority of the troops, with over 12,000 Nigerian soldiers in Liberia in 1993.121 The 
Nigerian troops were often the most poorly cared for, despite the large amount of money 
that Nigeria invested in the mission. Therefore, one could assume they would have 
mutinied more than they did. Howe offers a similar observation about Nigeria by stating 
the "lack of pretorianism is somewhat surprising, given both the anger of many officers 
towards the decision by their government not to conduct offensive operations and 
119 Kadir Badsha Mukhtar and Misbahu Bashir, "Nigeria: Darfur Operations -Nigerian Soldiers Threaten 
Mutiny- Ask to be Airlifted Home," Daily Trust, June 26 2012. 
120 Amy B. Adler, Brett T. Litz, and Paul T. Bartone, 'The Nature of Peacekeeping Stressors," in The 
Psychology of The Peacekeeper eds. Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003): 
152 -153. 
121 Adebajo, Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa, 121. 
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frustrations felt by the soldiers about substandard living conditions. "122 However, he 
does not propose an explanation for why the Nigerian officers did not take political 
action about their grievances. 
The answer to why there were not more mutinies likely lies in both the ground 
deployment conditions and the political climate in Nigeria. As Chapters Two and Three 
have explained, mutineers generally revolt when they believe their actions will be 
successful. Olonisakin notes that the tensions between officers and other ranks were 
especially pronounced among the Nigerian troops. She observes that this was apparent 
"with increase in cases of insubordination, where soldiers sometimes reacted badly to 
officers at checkpoints. "123 Yet, she does not note any cases of organized mutiny. For 
Nigerian soldiers, they likely felt that a mutiny would not be successful at home or on 
the deployment. The complex and often chaotic environment of the Liberian civil war 
did not allow for an ideal situation for Nigerian soldiers (or other contingents) to open a 
dialogue about their conditions. The Nigerian peacekeepers were deployed the longest, 
at times for two to three years. They often integrated themselves into the local 
communities and developed relationships with local women, and in some ways seemed 
to accept that they would be in Liberia for longer than a standard temporary 
deployment.124 They made up for their irregular payment by "doing business" with the 
local community.125 This involved many variations including commercializing 
ECOMOG transport and pilfering ECOMOG equipment and supplies (especially 
petroleum).126 At times soldiers were directly engaged in other areas such as mineral 
extraction.127 Soldiers were also accused of looting and taxing local communities. 
In Olonisakin's interviews with Nigerian rank and file solders she explains that 
they often felt that their government was intentionally keeping them on deployment 
longer for fear that the return of so many disgruntled soldiers "under an unstable 
122 Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, 152. 
123 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG 
Operations, 210. 
124 Ibid., 197 -199. 
125 Festus B. Aboagye, ECOMOG: A Sub -regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and 




political climate could lead to insurrection in the army. "128 She notes that based on her 
conversations with these soldiers, "it is easy to believe this claim. "129 However, of 
course soldiers did return but for those that harboured resentment about their 
experiences, the "unstable political climate" in Nigeria may have deterred them from 
mutinying. During the initial ECOMOG mission to Liberia (1990- 1998), Nigeria was 
ruled by two different military leaders, each who came to power in a coup.13° General 
Abacha took power in 1993 and had a particularly poor human rights record. Under his 
regime there were "rumours of growing unrest and deep divisions in the middle and 
lower ranks of the army. "131 In 1995, thirty-nine military personnel were arrested and 
charged with coup -plotting, fourteen of which were given death sentences.132 This 
incident and the generally repressive environment under Abacha likely discouraged 
Nigerian soldiers from mutinying. It was not until after Nigeria transitioned to civilian 
democratic rule that Nigerian peacekeepers began to mutiny. The case of Nigerian 
peacekeepers can be used to support the point made in Chapter Three that mutinies are 
most likely to occur in states that adhere to more democratic principles. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the grievances of soldiers following deployments are 
similar to the grievances expressed in other mutinies in the dataset. Both involve 
complaints over conditions of service as well as feelings of perceived injustice. 
However, the deployment setting brings a heightened importance to the grievances. 
Many of the more vague complaints about neglect for the military take on a practical 
importance during deployments. For example, inadequate equipment or logistics on a 
deployment can put soldiers in life- threatening danger. Additionally, soldiers expect 
more pay due to the increased hardships and risk involved in deployments. They also 
128 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG 
Operations, 182. 
129 [bid, 183. 
130 There was also a brief 3 -month period in 1993 in which a civilian interim government was established. 
131 Adebajo, Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa, 171 -172. 
132 [bid, 172. 
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seem to find particular offense in delayed payments for veterans. While hierarchies may 
be able to fulfil the expectations of soldiers when based at home, the heightened 
expectations and complications that come with deployments often prove to be too much 
for the chain of command. The basic expectations of soldiers that they will be taken 
care of as well as the heightened expectations of increased pay are often unfulfilled and 
thus symbolize a break in the implicit contract between soldiers and their superiors. 
Disobedience through mutiny becomes easier to justify in light of the unfulfilled 
obligations of the superiors. 
Deployments on multinational missions in particular create new avenues for 
perceptions of injustice. Soldiers are able to compare their situations directly with those 
from other countries. When they compare living conditions, pay, uniforms, equipment, 
etc. with their foreign colleagues there are bound to be discrepancies. Soldiers often 
alter their views of their own conditions and treatment in comparison to others. 
Involvement in multinational missions is profitable for the contributing state and can 
lead to new opportunities for corruption or new opportunities to perceive corruption, 
especially when there is not transparency in how the added income is used. 
This thesis has addressed how mutinies are often used as a form of 
communication between junior soldiers and their superiors. However, this chapter has 
also shown that miscommunication can contribute to mutinies. Mutinies that follow 
deployments, particularly multinational mission, often express resentment that they were 
misled about aspects of the deployment. Soldiers commonly complain that their pay is 
less than they anticipated or that their deployment tour was longer than expected. In 
these cases clearer communication down the chain of command could likely lessen the 
tensions as many of the expectations (particularly in relation to pay) appear to be based 
on rumour rather than military guidance. 
The trend of mutinies following deployments is particularly valuable in 
identifying potential future scenarios that may trigger mutinies. Whereas the previous 
chapter linked mutinies to global trends, which were in many ways unique to the time 
period, the increase in multinational peace operations is an ongoing issue and one which 
does not appear to have a near term conclusion. The majority of UN missions and UN 
peacekeepers are located on the African continent and added to these are missions by the 
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African Union and regional organizations (ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD).133 Therefore, 
there are numerous opportunities in the near future for African soldiers to be involved in 
multinational operations. However, this also provides numerous possibilities for 
soldiers to find grievances that could escalate into mutinies, if lessons learned from 
previous incidents are not addressed. 
133 Cedric de Coning, "The Evolution of Peace Operations in Africa: Trajectories and Trends, "Journal of 
International Peacekeeping 14 (2010): 26. 
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Chapter Five- A Coup Hidden in a Mutiny: Case Study of Sierra Leone 
5.1 Introduction 
On the morning of April 29, 1992 roughly fifty soldiers entered Freetown and 
staged a revolt against President Momoh. By mid -afternoon the president had fled the 
city and Siena Leoneans found out they were being led by a twenty -seven year old 
military captain. Academic literature and media reporting vary on whether they call the 
action a coup or a mutiny. This chapter will provide new details on the events that day 
as well as how the plan to revolt developed. The case will show that the confusion 
between what to label the incident is understandable as even the soldiers involved had 
divergent ideas of the goals of their actions. The rank and file soldiers believed they 
were headed to the capital to ask for payment arrears while the officers had a more 
ambitious plan to overthrow the government. In many aspects the situation in Sierra 
Leone was specific to the context of the country's emerging civil war, yet the pattern of 
a planned mutiny leading directly to a coup has happened elsewhere in the region, 
notably in Togo in 1963 and in Côte d'Ivoire in 1999. 
This chapter provides a brief history of the role of the military in Sierra Leone 
leading up to the events in 1992. The ceremonial role of the Sierra Leone military and a 
culture of political and familial recruitment had disastrous effects when the military was 
tasked with countering rebel forces. The chapter will focus primarily on the Tiger unit, 
who were responsible for overthrowing President Momoh. The hardship conditions both 
bonded this combat unit together and caused them to resent the government, a feeling 
shared with much of the civilian population at the time. The chapter will then show 
how the complaints crystallized into a plan for a mutiny and ultimately resulted in a 
coup. Analysis will be presented to show that the 1992 revolt created further divisions 
within the military, which contributed to two more coups within five years. 
It has been over twenty years since the 1992 revolt and much has changed, 
however according to military interviewees some sectors of the Sierra Leonean military 
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still see a mutiny in their future. The last part of the chapter will describe the current 
grievances and show that soldiers in recent years have attempted various tactics to open 
a dialogue with political and military leadership about their conditions. Some of the key 
complaints among current soldiers involve peacekeeping pay. Compared to most of its 
neighbours, Sierra Leone is a newcomer to peacekeeping operations. However, only six 
months into the AMISOM mission its soldiers have already expressed many of the 
common grievances among peacekeepers, as described in the previous chapter. A 
failure to address these concerns can also lead to another common trend, deployment 
related mutinies. 
5.2 The Shifting Role of the Military 
By 1992 the Sierra Leone military was no stranger to political interventions. 
Between independence in 1961 and the events in 1992 the military had carried out two 
coups, a counter -coup and several other unsuccessful attempts or plots.' This section 
will briefly explain the role of the military in Sierra Leone leading up to 1992, with 
particular emphasis on the relationship between the military and politicians. This 
relationship shaped the development of the officer corps and affected general military 
recruitment. 
There has been a long tradition of close interaction between civilian political 
elites and the officer corps in Sierra Leone. In early independence years it was common 
for political elites to serve as patrons for individual army officers.2 Furthermore, "in 
order for the client, the army officer, to rise in the hierarchy of his own organization, it 
was necessary for him to acquire the benevolent support of a civilian mentor. "3 Thomas 
Cox relates this patron- client relationship to the prevalence of coups, counter -coups, and 
There was a coup in 1967, followed several days later with an internal counter -coup. Details on this 
event can be found in Humphrey J. Fisher, "Elections and Coups in Sierra Leone, 1967," The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 7, no. 4 (Dec. 1969): 611 -636. A second coup was conducted in 1968. 
Additionally, Patrick McGowan's dataset shows 3 coup attempts and 2 coup plots between 1961 -1992. 
2 Thomas S. Cox, Civil - Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976): 220 -223. 
Ibid., 223. 
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coup attempts because military personnel had a vested interest in having their patrons 
stay in power or come to power. The importance of these personalized links within the 
officer ranks undermined the integrity of the officer corps. Individual officers were seen 
as receiving promotions, appointments, or material gains based on personal ties, rather 
than merit. The highly personal way in which benefits were received within the military 
also led to highly personalized rivalries within the officer corps.` Thus the officer corps 
in Sierra Leone did not have a strong professional code or apolitical identity. It was not 
a cohesive group and "remained a `corps' in name only. "5 
The mixed loyalties within the military were especially apparent during President 
Siaka Stevens' time in office. Stevens' tumultuous relationship with the military started 
as soon as he was elected in 1967 and immediately ousted by the military just hours after 
he was sworn to office. However, he was reinstated the following year when junior 
military members overthrew their seniors in what is popularly called the `Sergeants 
Revolt.' The junior soldiers announced that they ousted their military superiors because 
"the rank and file of the army and police have been ignored. "6 Stevens seemed to take 
note of this complaint and initially treated the junior ranks of the military as heroes and 
the military budget increased by roughly one -third within two years of the 1968 
Sergeants Revolt. Even when the military handed control back to Stevens, the rank and 
file soldiers demanded that the officers remain in jail. Stevens acceded and most of the 
officers remained locked away for nine month to a year after the coup, at which point 
only a fraction were reinstated.8 The junior ranks' insistence on keeping the officers 
jailed symbolized a major distrust between the rank and file soldiers and officer corps at 
the time. This same distrust among ranks would fuel the 1992 and 1997 coups. 
While Stevens was initially grateful for the support from the junior ranks, the 
positive relationship was not long lasting and the honeymoon period had ended by 1971 
when soldiers attacked Stevens' house in a coup attempt. Several of the perpetrators 
4 John Cartwright, Political Leadership in Sierra Leone (London: Croom Helm, Ltd., 1978): 80 -81. 
Cox, Civil - Military Relations in Sierra Leone, 90. 
G Jimmy Kandeh, Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa, 146. 
7 E.D.A. Turay and A. Abraham. The Sierra Leone Army, (London, Macmillan, 1987): 137. 
8 Ibid. 
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were the same individuals who helped bring him to power just three years earlier.9 A 
second attempt occurred three years later. Thirteen soldiers were executed for their 
involvement in these attacks and dozens more were arrested, establishing a strong 
warning for future soldiers thinking of attempting a coup.10 
As a result of these direct threats against Stevens by members of the military he 
began to turn away from the organization in favour of the police and foreign military 
assistance. Stevens signed a defence agreement with Guinea that sent troops to 
Freetown to essentially guard Stevens against his own military. Additionally he 
negotiated with Cuba to train a paramilitary force called the Internal Security Unit 
(ISU).11 The ISU became the most cared for, as well as most feared, part of the state's 
security apparatus and took on many of the missions previously given to the military.12 
From this point the Sierra Leone military took on a largely ceremonial role.13 The size 
of the military was intentionally kept small and little funding was available for updating 
equipment or training. As will soon be shown, this marginalization of the military 
severely affected the ability of the Sierra Leone army to counter rebel forces when they 
attacked in 1991. 
At the same time that the vast majority of the military was cast aside, the top 
ranks had become more embedded in the political system. This culminated in Stevens' 
appointment of General Momoh to parliament in 1974.14 While Stevens saw the 
military as a potential risk to his rule, he was also strategic enough to know complete 
isolation of the military would increase this threat. 
After seventeen years in power Stevens stepped down in 1985 and left General 
Momoh to lead the All Peoples' Congress (APC).'5 That same year General Momoh 
won the general election, for which he was the only candidate.16 Momoh inherited a 
9 Ibid., 147. 
1° David Fasholé Luke, "Continuity in Sierra Leone: from Stevens to Momoh," Third Word Quarterly 10, 
1 (Jan 1988): 71. 
I Later renamed the Special Security Division (SSD). 
12 Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa (London: Hurst and Company, 2005): 29. 
l' David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, (New York: Palgrave, 2005): 17. 
14 Turay and Abraham, The Sierra Leone Army, 161. 
1' Luke, "Continuity in Sierra Leone: from Stevens to Momoh," 75 -76. 
16 
William Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995): 153. 
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one -party state with a bankrupt treasury. Although once seen as a successful military 
leader, as a politician Momoh was largely viewed as an inept leader with a blind loyalty 
for Stevens." Momoh did little to change his reputation or the inherent corruption that 
riddled the state institutions. By 1990 Sierra Leone was ranked the poorest country in 
the world, despite the state's significant wealth of natural resources. 1 8 
By the late 1980s Sierra Leone, like other states throughout the continent, was 
under pressure to reduce government spending and as part of the austerity measures 
subsidies were cut.19 This had a widespread effect on the average citizen as the price of 
fuel increased by 300 percent and the cost of rice 180 percent between 1989 and 1990.20 
Additionally civil servants and teacher salaries often went unpaid and by the early 1990s 
much of the professional class had left the country.2 ' Around this same time Momoh 
encountered growing internal and external pressures to end the one -party political 
system.22 Student activists groups had become increasingly vocal in opposing Stevens 
and then Momoh. At least two of the officers (Lt. Tom Nyuma and Lt. Komba Mondeh) 
involved in the revolt in 1992 had been members of the activist group Pan African 
Union (PANAFU) and participated in rallies prior to joining the army.23 Additionally, 
nearly every newspaper edition from roughly 1989 to 1991 featured details of corruption 
and government incompetence, which further eroded the confidence of citizens in the 
government.24 The frustrations of the civilian population were not lost on the soldiers 
involved in the 1992 coup and they addressed many of these issues in their speeches 
explaining the reasons they took power.25 
17 John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamond and Struggle for Democracy, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001. ): 
30. 
18 A. Zack- Williams and Stephen Riley, "Sierra Leone: The Coups and its Consequences," Review of 
African Political Economy, vol. 56 (1993): 92. 
19 Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 26. 
20 Earl Conteh- Morgan and Mac Dixon -Fyle, Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century (New 
York: Lang Publishing, Inc., 1999): 125 -126. 
21 
Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamond and Struggle for Democracy, 30. 
"`Jimmy D. Kandeh, "In Search of Legitimacy: The 1996 Election," in Between Democracy and Terror: 
The Sierra Leone Civil War, ed. Ibrahim Abdullah (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004): 125. 
23 Ismail Rashid, "Student Radicals, Lumpen Youth and Origins of Revolutionary Groups in Sierra Leone 
1977 -1996," in Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War ed. Ibrahim Abdullah 
(Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004): 84. 
24 
Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa, 37 -38 
25 
Transcripts of the speeches can be found in West Africa, May 11, 1992. 
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It was against this backdrop of economic failure and deep- seated anger at 
government inefficiency and corruption that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
began their attack on Sierra Leone in 1991. The RUF was a rebel group headed by 
Foday Sankoh, a former corporal in the Sierra Leone army who had been arrested and 
discharged from the military for his alleged involvement in the coup attempt against 
Stevens in 1971.26 When the RUF first attacked eastern Sierra Leone in March of 1991, 
President Momoh sent Sierra Leonean military units to the east to counter the attacks. 
Few of the soldiers had any combat experience and the majority of the unit was expected 
to switch from a largely ceremonial force to a combat capable unit almost overnight. 
5.3 The Tigers are Tested 
Among the units tasked with countering the RUF were the Tiger and Cobra units. 
The experiences of these units proved to be demoralizing and within a year of the 
beginning of the mission the units led a revolt against the government. This section will 
highlight the internal dynamics of the Tiger unit specifically, as the majority of the 
individuals involved in the revolt were from this unit (although there were also a smaller 
number of Cobras). Interviews with members of the unit will demonstrate their 
experiences on the battlefront and show where these soldiers found fault in the 
conditions of the mission. 
By 1992, the army continued to "serve as a major instrument of patrimonial 
favour. "27 The officers of the Tiger unit were not immune to this system. For example, 
Captain Strasser, a leader in the Tiger unit, was brought into the military by a former 
APC minister, Thaimu Bangura.28 However, not all clients in a patronage system are 
equal and the leaders of the Tiger unit found themselves with much less political clout 
26 Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 37; The RUF was closely linked to and supported by the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, which began attacking Liberian 
President Doe's regime in 1989 and ultimately began the Liberian Civil War. 
27 Paul Richards, Fighting For the Rain Forest: War Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James 
Currey, 1996): 23. 
28 Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa, 70. 
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than their senior officers who had stronger ties to the ruling APC. The Tiger officers' 
assignment to the war front sharply contrasted with the comfortable postings and fringe 
benefits that the more senior officers stationed in Freetown received. Furthermore, the 
government kept the military intentionally small (estimated at 3,000- 4,000) and 
therefore there was limited room for advancement.29 
The small size of the military combined with limited employment opportunities 
also made joining as an enlisted soldier a coveted opportunity. Individuals who were 
enlisted in the military in the late 1980s explained that they were able to join because a 
family member or friend gave them a card.30 In other words, individuals needed to 
know someone in the system or with ties to the system to be accepted. This furthered 
the trend of loyalties to individuals rather than the military institution or state. There 
was weak adherence to the formalized military hierarchy amongst both the enlisted and 
officer ranks. 
Prior to 1991, most soldiers, both officers and rank and file soldiers, had some 
type of connection, which earned them a place in the military. However this changed 
after the initial attacks by the RUF in 1991 when the government decided to quickly 
increase the size of the armed forces. By the end of 1991 the military had grown to an 
estimated 7,000 personnel.3 ' However in their haste to boost personnel the recruits were 
quickly processed and minimally trained before given their assignments, some of whom 
were sent to join the Tiger unit. Many of the rank and file Tiger interviewees explained 
being right out of basic training at the time of the revolt. One individual explained that 
he was still in his initial training when news broke of a rebel attack. He recalled, "So 
that day they gather us, distributed weapons to us, and that very day we deploy to Sanga. 
At that time, I [did not know much] about the army. "32 Another soldier highlighted the 
lack of proper training by stating, "at the time I never knew my role. In 1991 to 1998 I 
never knew the roles of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces. It is only now that 
I know our roles and responsibilities. "33 It is likely that for many of these young soldiers 
29 Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 83. 
30 Based on author interviews with soldiers in Sierra Leone, 2011 and 2012. 
31 Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 87. 
j2 Author interview with military source N (current enlisted soldier), April 2012. 
32 Author interview with military source Q (current officer, enlisted rank in 1992), May 2011. 
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their military experience was limited to this one unit. Their officers in the Tiger unit 
were the only military leadership they had worked under. 
In many ways this was a unit with few ties to the larger military structure, 
operating in a location and under conditions isolated from the rest of the military. The 
rank and file soldiers had a strong loyalty to their unit leadership, which seemed to 
develop around the hardship conditions. When asked about Captain Strasser's traits as a 
leader of the Tiger unit one of his subordinates explained that he was a good commander 
"because he had foresight, he used to encourage us in terms of difficulty, when we have 
casualty he sit around and sympathize with us. He used to take money from his pocket 
to buy marijuana, to motivate you." 34 Another rank and file member of the unit recalled 
Strasser "was a good military leader because he always take care of us, always try to 
order equipment for us, have our rations on time. "35 The enlisted soldiers described 
Lieutenant Musa, another leader of the unit, similarly with statements such as "He cared 
about everybody, how they are doing. "36 These quotes show that the enlisted soldiers' 
high esteem for their immediate supervisors was personal; they viewed them as being 
responsible for their basic needs and in many ways their lives. No interviewee ever 
mentioned any particular military skills as a reason for their respect for their leaders. 
The emphasis on the personal bonds with their officers was in contrast to how many saw 
the senior hierarchy in Freetown, whom they had no contact with, no commonalities, 
and no reason to trust. For example, one rank and file soldier discussing senior 
leadership exclaimed "In those days we are having leaders who just do things on their 
own...they never come down and see the ordinary soldier. You never see a 
commander. "37 When the officers of the Tiger unit proposed a mutiny it is likely that 
the rank and file soldiers saw the action less as an attack on the larger chain of command 
and more as a act of loyalty and solidarity to the only chain of command that they really 
knew. 
' Author interview with military source Q (current officer, enlisted rank in 1992), May 2011. 
35 Author interview with military source H (current enlisted soldier). May 2011. 
36 Author interview with military source S (current enlisted soldier), April 2012. 
37 Author interview with military source Q (current officer, enlisted rank in 1992), May 2011. The soldier 
made this statement in the context that the enlisted ranks now have much more regular contact with 
officers of all levels. 
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Additionally, there was little difference in background or qualifications between 
many of the junior officers and the enlisted soldiers serving under them. None of the 
officers or enlisted soldiers I spoke to had higher education at the time they joined the 
military. Several of the rank and file soldiers spoke of their personal relationships with 
the officers in the unit, whom they knew prior to joining the military. One rank and file 
soldier from the Tiger unit explained that an officer in the unit was, and still is, his "very 
best friend. "38 They were raised in the same region, joined the military together, and 
have both served ever since. He explained that despite their similar backgrounds, the 
officer had a brother in the military and thus received an officer commission. These 
types of stories show that in many cases the distinctions between junior officers and 
enlisted were minimal in terms of background, education, age or experience. 
The Tigers were not an elite unit per se but had a honourable reputation within 
the military as one of the few "battle- tested" units in Sierra Leone. In addition to 
distinguishing themselves by their combat experiences, the unit wore different scarves 
from the rest of the military as an expression of their unit identity. One soldier fondly 
told me that after the coup all the civilian youth "wanted to be a Tiger, everyone was 
wearing our muffler. "39 However, the current military leadership may have realized that 
creating a separate identity within the military had negative effects and has since stopped 
using titles such as "Tigers" and "Cobras." While on various bases in Sierra Leone I 
was at times reprimanded by soldiers when asking if they had been a part of those units. 
For example, one soldier told me "we don't use those names anymore, they are 
divisive." 40 
Members of the unit were from all parts of the country although Freetown was 
the area most highly represented in the unit, a trait that made the soldiers especially 
popular among Freetown youth when they came to power. Their bond was thus not one 
based on shared ethnicity or regional background but rather formed through shared 
experiences on deployment. Like most units deployed together, the Tigers spent large 
amounts of time together, both downtime and moments of danger, in an environment 
38 Author interview with military source S (current enlisted soldier). April 2012. 
39 Author interview with military source S (current enlisted soldier), May 2011. 
10 Author casual conversation with soldier, April 2012. 
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isolated from much of the hierarchy. Their group provides a strong example of the 
potential for increased unit cohesion as a result of deployments, as described in Chapter 
Four. 
The strong group cohesion that formed within the Tigers was necessary for 
survival as the decades of intentional neglect in updating the military quickly took its 
toll on the mission. The units on the eastern border did not have the weapons, 
equipment, or training to adequately engage with the RUF. Even the Commander of the 
Sierra Leone military at the time admitted years later that the military and political 
leadership did not adequately prepare for the RUF rebellion. He states 
I will confess that at the time the rebels started in March 1991, we were 
really caught with our pants down. The strength of the army was small -a 
little above the colonial legacy- and arms and logistics inadequate, all a 
result of the economic difficulties the country had been enduring through 
over the years.41 
Similarly, in a testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2003 
Brigadier (Ret.) Conteh explained that at the time, the army was operating with 
less than thirty percent of its transportation needs, less than twenty percent of its 
support equipment and that much essential equipment was non- existent.42 
It had long been the government's policy to limit soldiers' access to ammunition, 
out of fear that they would use it in a coup attempt.43 While this policy is 
understandable in times of peace, it was life threatening in war. Soldiers recall 
constantly being short on ammunition while battling the rebels. One soldier explained, 
"When we were fighting we were only given 20 rounds, rebels were using hundreds a 
day. "44 Another member of the unit had a similar complaint stating, "Before 1992 we 
were not well catered for, you have 20 rounds, they only give you 20 rounds of 
ammunition to challenge a whole enemy who will come with everything they have."45 
41 West Africa April 3, 1995, 498 -499. 
42 Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, testimony before TRC hearing held in Freetown, June 2003, 
quoted in Mohamed Sesay, "Military Reform and Post -Conflict Peace Building in Sierra Leone," 2009 
MPhil, Fourah Bay College. 
43 New African, June 1992, 18. 
as Author interview with military source L (current enlisted soldier), May 2011. 
;' Author interview with military source S (current enlisted soldier), April 2012. 
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Furthermore, the weapons issued were not conducive to the fight. For example, 
Strasser explained that the unit was using mortars from 1962, many of which did not 
fire.46 Media reports at the time note that the Sierra Leone soldiers, with bolt- action, 
breech -loading rifles, had no chance against the rebels with automatic weapons.47 An 
officer in the unit explained, "In 1991 when the war broke out, at that time the military 
was nothing to talk about. When we started with the RUF, soldiers are just using rifle, 
no AK47, no RPG, no mortar." 8 Additionally, there was a limited supply of vehicles 
and soldiers lacked basics such as socks and boots.49 As the conflict dragged on there 
was irregular and inadequate resupply. Soldiers explained that their food rations were 
limited, some stating that at times they had no food. The units experienced several 
casualties and for those that survived little medical attention was available. This 
concern was particularly personal to Strasser who was injured by shrapnel from rebel - 
fired mortars.'° Strasser explained, "the worst part was there were no paramedics, no 
drugs, no blood. "51 
Soldiers were clearly disgruntled about being inadequately trained, underfed, 
poorly equipped, and having no medical attention while tasked at fighting rebels in a 
jungle environment. These grievances were compounded by the fact that the unit was 
not paid for months on end. Every soldier interviewed commented on the pay issue. 
Even when they were paid, the soldiers found the salary to be offensively low for the 
risks they were taking. These complaints demonstrate the altered expectations that often 
form on deployments, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
The pay issue became especially suspicious when President Momoh publicly 
announced that his government was spending 1.2 billion leones a month (US $2 million) 
on rations and logistics for the war.52 The stark contrast between Momoh's statement 
and the reality for the soldiers on the ground led many soldiers to believe that the money 
46 West Africa, June 15, 1992, 1002. 
47 New African, June 1992, 18. 
'18 Author interview with military source I (current officer), May 2011. 
4° Author interview with Valentine Strasser, May 2011. 
5° West Africa, June 15, 1992, 1002. 
51 Author interview with Valentine Strasser, May 2011. 
52 West Africa, May II, 1992, 788: A. Zack -Williams and S. Riley, -Sierra Leone: The Coups and its 
Consequences," 94. 
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meant for them was actually being diverted into the pockets of the politicians and 
military leaders at the top. In their minds, not only were they suffering the hardships of 
war, but others were profiting from it, which created a strong sense of injustice. This 
issue of perceived corruption was mirrored in the civilian population who were also 
expressing anger at government corruption. 
5.4 From Objections to Actions 
The tough conditions on the eastern front are largely uncontested in media and 
academic writing and the bitterness of the soldiers towards their situation was 
understandable. However, nearly all published accounts fail to explain how the unit 
decided to take their complaints to the capital and how they executed their plan. These 
are details worth examining more closely as they can help explain how a mutiny forms 
at a tactical level. 
Many media and academic reports on the events of April 29, 1992 describe it as 
a mutiny or a protest.53 The popularly told story is that the soldiers fighting on the 
eastern front were fed up with the conditions, as listed above, and decided to voice their 
complaints to the government in the form of a protest at State House.54 Some accounts 
describe how the unit sat down with President Momoh but when the negotiations did not 
go in the soldiers favour, they rebelled. Media within Sierra Leone took the stance that 
it was because the government refused to meet with the soldiers that they became 
angrier and escalated their plan from a strike to a coup.55 
The account I received while interviewing the soldiers is a more nuanced story. 
The officers leading the supposed mutiny assert they never planned to negotiate with 
53 Several of these publications include Arthur Abraham "State Complicity as a Factor in Perpetuating the 
Sierra Leone Civil War," in Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War, ed. Ibrahim 
Abdullah (Dakar: Codesria, 2004): 105; Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamond and Struggle for Democracy, 32; 
Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa, 68; Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth & Resources 
in Sierra Leone, 9. 
'a Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamond and Struggle for Democracy, 32. 
" Several of these accounts include Daily Mail, May 4, 1992, Rural Post, June 1992, and Progress, May 
9, 1992. 
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political leaders; their goal from the start was to overthrow the government. However 
the enlisted soldiers explained that they firmly believed they were going to the capital to 
protest their payments and conditions. They were told by the officers at the last minute 
that rather than strike, the order was to attack. 
The Tiger unit was based in Kailahun while the Cobras were in Kenema but the 
officers occasionally met at a bar near the Daru headquarters to discuss the war situation. 
It was over drinks at this local establishment that the officers hatched their plans.' In an 
interview with Strasser he explained that he and the other officers had been planning the 
coup for a year. I commented that a year was a long time to keep the plan a secret and 
asked how he knew whom to trust. He replied "Yes, it was a problem, if it got out we 
would end in death. The ones that saw the problems first hand, that were deployed 
together, they could be trusted. "57 Strasser's quote confirms the close relationship that 
these soldiers shared as a result of their time together in combat. Despite Strasser's 
statement about trusting those he deployed with, the officers were cautious about letting 
too many in on the plan, in particular the rank and file soldiers. Instead, the officers 
proposed to the soldiers a mutiny. They laid out the common grievances and suggested 
they all go together to Freetown to protest their conditions and demand their overdue 
salaries. 
When recounting the discussion that proposed the idea to mutiny, the rank and 
file soldiers seemed unsure as to whether it was a personal decision by each soldier or an 
order by officers. One soldier said, "it was not an order, just a conversation between 
everybody. And they say who wants to go and most of us say we are going. "58 
However, others explained that they were told to get in a truck (by Lt. Tom Nyuma 
specifically) and only found out later where they were going.59 Considering soldiers 
came from different units (Tigers and Cobras), it is possible that both stories are 
56 This narrative was told by several different interviewees. Additionally there appears to be a local story 
which claims that after the officers came to power they paid the bar owner to close the establishment. 
Some said it was because it was a sacred place for the soldiers. others said it was so that other soldiers in 
the region could not meet there and develop similar plans. 
57 Author interview with Valentine Strasser, May 201 1. 
'K Author interview with military source T (current enlisted soldier). May 2011. 
59 Author interview with military source N (current enlisted soldier), April 2012. 
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accurate. Several soldiers note that the only person to say no, a fellow officer, was 
arrested on the spot. A Corporal from the unit recounted that 
only one Major... in Kenema, refused to join. So he was arrested by the 
officers. He refused to join, he said soldiers don't strike, when soldiers 
strike is becomes coup. And that is why he refused to join, so he was 
arrested and loaded into the truck and came with us.6o 
Considering the circumstances of the arrested Major, it is unlikely that any of the rank 
and file soldiers would have refused to take part. Still, the soldiers that were interviewed 
all seemed to support the idea of a mutiny. The fact that the arrested soldier was a Major 
is significant, as it means he outranked the other officers present. His arrest by his 
subordinates is the first act of mutiny in the unit. It illustrates the bond between the 
enlisted soldiers and the junior officers (Captains and below). The rank and file soldiers 
appear to support the junior officers rather than the senior officer present. 
When asked if they knew the mission to Freetown was designed to overthrow the 
government the enlisted soldiers all gave similar variations of "no." 
Ration was low on the war front, salary was so small so this is 
why they say let's go to Freetown and arrest the officers. But we 
don't know it was a coup, later the mission changed. 
Well initially we never knew what was going to happen. When 
we reached Freetown we were told "gentlemen this is a life or 
death mission, be prepared to fight." We did our best and we 
succeeded. 
No, we did not know it was going to be a coup, we thought it 
would be a strike action. 
We did not know any motive. 
No, they don't tell us that. They don't inform anybody about a 
coup. 
I was surprised! Because that was not the mission I heard about. 
I heard about the rations. 
G0 Author interview with military source T (current enlisted soldier), May 2011; This story was verified by 
numerous sources although there were variations in the name of the Major. 
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We were fighting, no proper medication, not enough rations, 
because of that the commanders organized that we would go to 
Freetown to ask for those. 
At that time our wives and relatives are staying down in Freetown 
and are not getting our rations, like rice. Salaries we are not 
getting in time. We decided we should come down and ask for 
those things. Not knowing that it was a coup to topple APC. 
The officers confirm that they used deceptive tactics to convince the enlisted 
soldiers to participate. An officer explained 
When we left Daru nobody knew what was the intention... it was a hidden 
agenda to overthrow the APC government. They say they are going to 
demand salaries but actually the hidden intent behind the whole issue was 
to overthrow the government.61 
The disconnect between the account of the officers and those of the rank and file raises 
questions as to whether the mission was an `accidental' coup or whether the officers 
simply did not want to tell the rank and file the real intention. The officers insist that the 
latter is the case. Successful coups rely on secrecy and it is possible that they were 
attempting to limit the number of people who knew the plan. 62 Additionally, if the 
overthrow failed they could claim their actions were just a mutiny, which is a lesser 
crime than a coup within a military court martial. 
Despite the officers' misleading tactics towards their subordinates, the proposed 
mutiny shows trust between the ranks of this particular unit. Organizing a mutiny could 
have meant arrests or worse for the officers if any soldier had informed the senior 
military hierarchy. Three days passed between when the enlisted soldiers were informed 
of the plan to mutiny and when the revolt actually occurred, giving ample time for any 
of them to inform others. Furthermore, those that stayed in the east were also aware that 
their colleagues went to Freetown for the stated goal of making demands to the top 
military hierarchy.ó3 Despite all these soldiers knowing the plan and knowing it was 
illegal under military law, it appears no one leaked the secret as the soldiers stationed in 
Freetown admit to being completely surprised. It is also possible that the lack of 
61 Author interview with military source P (current officer), May 2011. 
62 First, Barrel of a Gun, 19; Kandeh, Coups From Below, 43. 
63 Based on author interviews and casual conversations, Sierra Leone 2011 and 2012. 
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operational information leaks had to do with a lack of cell phones and radios at the time. 
This type of secret would likely be harder to keep with today's technology. 
5.5 Operation Mutiny Turns Operation Coup 
Academic and media reporting tends to downplay the logistics involved in this 
operation, often stating the soldiers marched to the capital.64 The image of soldiers 
marching to Freetown to demand their wages portrays the soldiers in the fashion of 
union members or civilian groups who similarly held processions in the capital for their 
causes. However, this detail is not accurate nor would it have been possible for the 
soldiers to march the 250 -mile distance. The top logistical concern was how to get from 
their location in eastern Sierra Leone to the capital, a long route made especially time 
consuming given the poor road infrastructure. The soldiers were aware that their plan 
might not be supported by all of the military and were especially concerned about the 
checkpoints. A group of fifty soldiers arriving at any checkpoint would cause suspicion. 
They explained that some members of the unit travelled together in military vehicles and 
attire with a ready story that they were travelling to Freetown to report on the logistics 
concerns on the warfront. Another version of the story was that they were travelling 
with their weapons to have them repaired in Freetown. The majority wore civilian 
clothes and travelled in stolen civilian vehicles in order to not raise alarm.65 
The unit met up on the outskirts of Freetown on roughly April 26th. While they 
initially had planned to conduct the revolt the next day, plans were changed when they 
realized there were festivities planned in the capital. April 27th is Sierra Leone's 
Independence Day and the soldiers did not want to involve civilians. The officers 
rescheduled the mission for April 291h. This was one of the several points in which the 
soldiers seemed aware and concerned about how civilians would perceive their actions. 
Another example is that they conducted the attack early in the morning when less people 
would be on the streets. However this had a strategic aspect as well since less people 
va Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, 174. 
6' Based on author interviews, Sierra Leone 2011 and 2012. 
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meant less vehicle or foot traffic to obscure the routes and fewer people to notice 
irregular military movements. 
The responsibilities for securing vehicles and ammunition were divided between 
various officers. Their plan involved capturing six key locations throughout the city. 
An officer from the unit explained, 
The first step was State House, the first attack was State House. The 
second Upgun Roundabout, the third site was the Pademba Road prison. 
The fourth site was the radio station, the fifth was the military head 
quarters, and the sixth was FBC (Fourah Bay College).66 
The soldiers never had to enact the full six steps as the government toppled almost 
immediately at State House. However, the plan suggests that the officers were never 
intending to mutiny; they were geared for a full attack. True to their war experiences, 
the officers concocted a military plan that covered major strategic locations as well as a 
primary entry and exit point of the city. 
Even upon entering Freetown on the morning of April 29th, the rank and file 
soldiers still thought they were going to hold a protest. They found out the real plan as 
they approached State House. A rank and file soldier in the unit explained 
To our surprise they tell us we are to attack State House. We start asking 
ourselves what are we here for. They tell us we are to ask for our rations 
and now they say we are to attack State House. But we are young 
soldiers and we work for our commanders.67 
Several other soldiers provided similar accounts. The enlisted soldiers explained their 
surprise and fear at the sudden escalation in plans. When asked what he thought about 
the order to attack State House one enlisted soldier animatedly said 
I wanted to run away but there was no way...I was a young soldier and it 
is a big thing, a coup. When someone says `coup' I think `AHHHH' 
(exclaiming surprise and fear), you see? But it was a command, if I ran 
away I would be arrested. It was do or die, you see ?68 
G6 Author interview with military source P (current officer), May 2011. 
67 Author interview with military source Y (current enlisted soldier), May 2011. 
68 Ibid. 
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This individual felt little concern over the plan to mutiny but found the coup idea much 
more serious and stressful, suggesting that there is a clear distinction between the two 
events in the eyes of soldiers. 
Despite the shock of the order, the soldiers obeyed and fired on State House and 
into the air. Additionally, they used rocket- propelled grenades. Media reports noted the 
weapons used during the attack and questioned whether the soldiers were really as ill 
equipped as they claimed. However, soldiers interviewed alleged they acquired the 
better weapons upon arriving in Freetown. Everyone interviewed, including soldiers 
stationed in Freetown during the time, agreed that the attack came as a complete 
surprise. A soldier involved in the attack recounts 
We crawled right up to the main gate at State House. We fired, the town 
soldiers were not used to that sound, it was their first time to hear that 
weapon, so they started running. We chased them and seized them and 
distributed their ammunition. That is how we are able to capture State 
House that day.69 
Another soldier puts it more bluntly by saying "The Freetown soldiers are cowards, that 
is how we are able to win. "70 The language used by these soldiers demonstrates the way 
in which the Tigers differentiated themselves from soldiers who had not deployed, a trait 
common in deployed units and a trend discussed in relation to honour in the previous 
chapter. Although all in the same organization, the members of the Tiger unit called the 
other soldiers "town soldiers" and discussed their inexperience with weapons and 
perceived lack of bravery. 
There were small pockets of resistance but the majority of the soldiers guarding 
State House did not stick around to fight. Even the revered SSD (formerly known as 
ISU) did not counter the attack.71 By mid afternoon on April 29, 1992 Captain Strasser 
came on the national radio and announced the overthrow of President Momoh. This was 
the first time the majority of Sierra Leoneans had heard of Strasser. Although initially 
part of the Tigers, he had been moved to Freetown due to his injury on the warfront. 
G9 Ibid. 
70 Author interview with military source L (current enlisted soldier), May 2011. 
71 Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 94. 
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Therefore, he did not travel with the troops from the east. Strasser was however 
involved in the early planning and possibly coordination on the day of the attack. 
In many ways Strasser was not the likely candidate for leading the coup or junta 
that followed. First, he was not the brains behind the plan, as explained by the officers 
involved. That title went to Lt. "Saj" Musa who one soldier explained was "the whole 
machine behind it" and another soldier called "the mastermind." Furthermore, Strasser 
did not have a distinctive educational background or any international experience (short 
of his time with ECOMOG in Liberia). He is never described as charismatic or well 
spoken. Strasser was not from a prominent family and at twenty -seven years old he 
certainly did not have age on his side. Every individual, including Strasser, explained 
that the reason he was chosen as leader was due to his rank, which was the highest 
among the junior officers involved. Had they chosen a leader based on charisma, 
popularity, or leadership skills their choice would probably have been Musa (who 
became Vice President under the military junta).72 The adherence to military hierarchy 
in selecting the junta leader, as well as the obedience of the rank and file towards their 
immediate supervisors during the revolt, are an examples of what Robin Luckham calls 
the "remarkable power of military norms in the midst of revolt. "73 The soldiers were 
breaking many norms within military doctrine but did not seem comfortable acting 
outside of the chain of command within their own group. 
In contrast to the media reports at the time, the soldiers never sat down with 
President Momoh to discuss their complaints, nor does it appear that the officers wanted 
to. One of the officers explained 
President Momoh, wanted to prey on the weak. We are from the 
warfront, we are battle -tested officers, we have tasted the bitterness of 
war. This is not a tribal mark (showing a large scar on his chest), this is a 
gun mark. For anything we do we will have to pay the price and the price 
72 Musa was a figure that the rank and file rallied around until his death in battle in 1998 and was by far 
the individual that the interviewees, regardless of rank, spoke the most about and the most highly about. 
He appeared in the post -coup newspaper reporting more often than Strasser and was nicknamed the 
"Action Man" in the press due to the many initiatives he led under the National Provisional Ruling 
Council (NPRC). 
73 Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960 -1967, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971): 83. 
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will be life. So we don't have to compromise. When we enter the city 
we do not have to compromise on anything again.74 
His statement shows a heightened sense of entitlement based on the hardships endured in 
the combat mission against the RUF. There is a clear sense of superiority due to the 
dangers undergone. 
The plan as explained by the officers above as well as Strasser's admission that 
the idea had been in the works for a year, counters popular media and academic accounts 
that claimed the revolt was accidental, spontaneous and disorganized.75 It is possible to 
take a more cynical look at the officers' accounts and argue that out of pride they would 
be unlikely to admit if the coup was an accident. However, if the officers are recreating 
the narrative, they have at least been consistent with doing so as the story Strasser told 
me in 2011 is the same he told the media days after the event.76 
5.6 "A Change that Changed Little "77 
The coup was widely supported by the civilian population in Sierra Leone. The 
soldiers showed they were aware of the widespread civilian complaints and claimed 
their actions were largely in response to the call for change, rather than a response to 
their own poor conditions. This made them widely popular and gave Strasser the 
nickname "The Redeemer." The one -party state had long fallen out of favour and the 
young military officers were expected to bring new life to the system through their 
creation of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Strasser's first speech to 
the public, made over the radio a day after the coup, used strong populist rhetoric and 
caused many to compare him to other regional revolutionaries such as Lieutenant 
74 Author interview with military source I (current officer), May 2011. 
7' Several such accounts include West Africa, June 29 1992, Robert Edgerton, African Armies: From 
Honor to Infamy, (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002): 164; A. Zack -Williams and S. Riley, "Sierra 
Leone: The Coups and its Consequences," 92. 
76 The one year time frame for the coup plan is consistent with descriptions given by Strasser to the media 
immediately after the coup, as quoted in West Africa June 11, 1992. 
77 First, Barrel of a Gun, 22. 
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Rawlings of Ghana or Captain Sankara of Burkina Faso. 78 However, these were 
comparisons he was never able to live up to and "the NPRC did not represent a 
significant divergence from the regime it replaced. "79 
Initially after the coup, Strasser and other top members of the junta were treated 
as heroes. Their style was imitated by youth throughout the country and portraits of 
them were painted in the form of street art throughout the capital.80 Although the 
enlisted soldiers were deceived about the goal of the mission, none interviewed appeared 
bitter about it and several commented on feeling fortunate to be a part of overthrowing 
Momoh. Several of the rank and file soldiers from the Tiger unit noted that they 
received immediate rewards for their involvement in the form of larger salaries and new 
postings in the capital. However, this caused further divides in the military as the 
majority of the top jobs and associated benefits went to the Tiger rank and file soldiers.81 
Thus, a similar pattern that the Tigers had objected to was recreated when the NPRC 
came to power, only they were now the resented Freetown privileged. 
Most members of the Tigers felt that their leadership failed to make lasting 
changes for the military. One member of the unit explained, "Some issues got better, 
some did not. Like one of the promises that was made by the NPRC was that they 
would provide accommodations for the soldiers, they were not able to. "ß2 When asked 
what the benefits were for the military after the NPRC came to power a rank and file 
soldier responded 
No benefits. Because they never succeeded. When they took office they 
said the number one priority is to end the war and that was not done. The 
second one was to alleviate poverty, that was not done. The third is to 
bring the Sierra Leone army to standard welfare, in terms of training, 
logistics, and that was not achieved. So by this way, nothing was 
achieved.83 
78 West Africa, May 11 1992. 
79 Rashid, "Student Radicals, Lumpen Youth and Origins of Revolutionary Groups in Sierra Leone 1977- 
1996," 85. 
80 Joseph A. Opala, "'Ecstatic Renovation!': Street Art Celebrating Sierra Leone's 1992 Revolution," 
African Affairs 93, 371 (Apr., 1994): 195-218. 
81 Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 108. 
82 Author interview with military source P (current officer), May 2011. 
83 Author interview with military source Q (current officer but enlisted soldier in 1992), May 2011. 
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Although most soldiers agreed that in the long run they were disappointed with 
the lack of military changes made by the NPRC, they seemed conflicted on whom to 
blame for the unfulfilled promises.84 When soldiers talked about their grievances while 
in the east, they were unified in pointing the finger at Momoh. Yet, when similar 
grievances were expressed under the NPRC they were often reluctant to blame their 
former unit leaders. Some were clear in stating that the decisions rested with Strasser 
yet others continued to blame civilian politicians, stating that "Strasser was used by 
politicians."85 Another excused the junta's behaviour by stating "it is because they are 
inexperienced. They are just junior military officers, none of them are graduates and 
they took some old politicians to advise them and they were given bad advice. "86 Many 
of the soldiers noted their personal sacrifice during the mission to bring the NPRC to 
power and took the lack of continued benefits as an insult. Yet, still they seemed 
hesitant to criticize one of their own. An interview with a rank and file member of the 
unit exemplifies this point. 
Author: What were the benefits for your unit after the coup? 
Soldier: There were no benefits. In fact, Strasser deserted those that 
came to Freetown. Yes, he sidelined us. He sidelined us. Those that 
sacrificed their lives. We laid down our lives! But actually he was a 
good leader. 
Author: That seems contradictory to the statement about him sidelining 
you. 
Soldier: Well yes but it was the other officers that were the problem. 
They failed to come down to our level and check. If he had come down 
and check he would notice what was going on.87 
With the politicians out of the picture the unit no longer had a common 
antagonist to rally against. When the revolt began the unit was a cohesive group with 
communal complaints. When the coup was successful some of the unit were among the 
most powerful in the country while the majority were left with little to show for their 
84 Strasser was one of the only interviewees who had a long list of achievements by the NPRC. 
8' Author interview with military source L (current enlisted soldier), May 2011. 
86 Author interview with military source Q (current officer but enlisted soldier in 1992), May 2011. 
87 Author interview with military source Y (current enlisted soldier), May 2011. 
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efforts. These divisions took root and festered and as the years of NRPC rule carried on, 
the officers began to turn on one another. 
In 1996 Strasser's junta arrested him, and forced him out of the country. This 
internal coup was led by Lieutenant Madaa Bio one of the officers involved in carrying 
out the 1992 coup alongside Strasser. Bio gave in to popular demands for democratic 
elections, which brought an end to the NPRC after four years in power.88 
Ahmed Kabbah won the 1996 election, although it was contested by the fact that 
many areas were too unstable to carry out voting. President Kabbah placed greater 
importance on civilian militias, called kamajors, to fight the rebels when it became clear 
that the military was failing at the job.89 Kabbah expressed a clear distrust of the 
military, an extension of previous civilian attitudes towards the military as well as a 
result of the behaviour of soldiers during the NPRC. The 1992 coup served as further 
evidence in the mind of politicians, such as Kabbah, that the military could not be 
trusted and thus created an additional divide and rivalry between the civilian government 
and the military. The military went from being the centre of power under the NPRC to 
fearing that the military as an institution would be disbanded and replaced with the 
kamajors.90 Furthermore, the kamajors and military were often in direct combat against 
each other. 
It did not take long for the military to reassert their power and just fourteen 
months after the elections, the military was back in control, this time through a coup led 
by a military football team. One soldier explained that directly prior to the 1997 coup 
soldiers "were so angry that a single person could incite the entire military. "91 The 
anger and frustrations of the military was unleashed when the soldiers released the 
prisoners from Pademba Road prison who then ran rampant through the streets of 
Freetown alongside disgruntled military members.92 Whereas the soldiers interviewed 
were generally comfortable, and in some ways even proud, when talking about the 1992 
88 Kandeh, "In Search of Legitimacy: The 1996 Election," 129. 
89 Abraham "State Complicity as a Factor in Perpetuating the Sierra Leone Civil War," 119. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Author interview with military source S (current enlisted soldier). May 2011. 
92 Kandeh, Coups from Below, 169 -174; Lansana Gberie, "The 25 May Coup d'etat in Sierra Leone: A 
Lumpen Revolt ?" in Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War, ed. Ibrahim Abdullah 
(Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), 147. 
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incident, the entire tone changed with the mention of 1997. No one wanted to admit to 
having any role in that event and no one attempted to justify it. One officer passionately 
stated "If I want to be sincere within myself, I will pray to the almighty that that event 
would not be repeated. It was the worst we have ever seen. What we struggled for for 
the last 10 -15 years was lost...everything was lost. "93 
Whereas in 1992 there was a level of discipline and structure within the Tiger 
unit's revolt, the military hierarchy by 1997 had completely broken down. It is possible 
to see the 1992 events as setting the stage for 1997. The coup in 1992 created further 
division in the already fractured military and further complicated the role of the military 
in the state. Not only did the NPRC not address the problems that initially brought them 
to the capital, but they also allowed the problems to escalate. The breakdown of 
hierarchy, roles, and order within the military, which began with the 1992 revolt reached 
its climax in the 1997 coup. 
5.7 A New Military with New Problems 
In many ways the revolt in 1992 was largely linked to the context of the unit, the 
political situation at the time, and a military history in which official structures and 
procedures were often undermined by personal patronage systems. This section will 
show that while much has changed in Sierra Leone since 1992, soldiers today still see 
mutiny as a potential option for addressing their grievances.94 Furthermore, the move 
towards democracy may actually have heighten the risk of mutiny in Sierra Leone. 
Following the end of the civil war in 2002 much internal and international 
attention was placed on restructuring and professionalizing the military.95 An important 
part of the restructuring of the armed forces was integrating various elements of the 
military and rebels forces into one organization. The program has been considered a 
9' Author interview with military source P (current officer), May 2011. 
94 Identification of the sources of interviewees who provided details on a potential future mutiny will be 
kept confidential due to the sensitivity of the topic. Information about future mutinies was provided to me 
in both 2011 and 2012. 
9' The largest contribution to this effort was the UK International Military Training and Advisory Team 
(IMATT), which provided training and assistance to the Sierra Leone Armed Forces for nearly twelve 
years (2002- 2013). 
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success story and the soldiers themselves seemed proud of it. For example an officer 
involved in the events in 1992 explained 
Today if you are asking you don't know who is RUF in the army. You 
don't know who is West Side in this army.96 Today you don't know who 
is kamajor in this army. You don't know who is old soldier. What they 
did was take the RUF and train them, they restructure, they say you are 
no longer RUF, you are a soldier. Anyone call you a kamajor you may 
complain. West Side boys you are no longer West Side, you are soldiers. 
So today all of us are in this national army, there is no problem. We are 
all soldiers now so let bygones be bygones. We are all brothers.97 
Nearly every soldier commented that the conditions in the military today were 
much better than those in 1992. However the officer's statement above may have been 
overly optimistic when claiming there are no problems today. With some time, soldiers 
began to open up and express that below the surface tensions were building. The most 
resounding complaint was over accommodations, which was not particular to one 
specific base or region. Those living in base accommodations generally found them to 
be below par; however the bigger problem was the housing shortage. One officer 
explained that seventy -five percent of the soldiers, mostly rank and file, live outside the 
bases due to the shortage.98 Several junior soldiers living off base commented that they 
endure added expenses and time to get between home and work each day. Whereas the 
accommodation complaint on its own may not be enough to trigger a revolt, such 
widespread dissatisfaction could be used to further recent claims of military 
mismanagement or neglect for the lower ranks. 
In addition to these general complaints about accommodation, there were more 
specific grievances from rank and file soldiers about peacekeeping pay. The soldiers 
explained what the UN pays the government of Sierra Leone per soldier is much less 
than what the individual soldiers receive. They further explained their outrage at an 
informal system in which they claim soldiers are expected to pay roughly ten percent of 
their deployment salary from the mission up the chain of command as gratitude for 
96 West Side boys was a notorious gang /rebel group 
97 Author interview with military source I (current officer), May 2011. 
98 Author interview with military source M (current officer), April 2012. 
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assigning them to the mission. They claimed that if they refused to pay they would be 
passed over for promotions or other opportunities in the future. 
The primary complaint amongst these soldiers is pay -related; however the 
concerns quickly took on the larger issue of corruption. The interviewees had calculated 
what they believed the government was making from the UN missions and explained 
that they did not know where that money was going. The soldiers accused the senior 
officers of "not doing anything, not buying uniforms, not buying medicine for soldiers. 
They are not helping those that are representing us in Darfur." They went on to explain 
that the top officers were driving cars that would cost three quarters of their salary and 
proposed the question "where did they get the money ?" The implied answer was at the 
expense of the soldiers participating in the UN missions. Another soldier was more 
frank by saying "They are taking the money and doing what they want with the money. 
They are enriching themselves." 
Two soldiers interviewed together explained that if the problems are not resolved 
they could "sense something like a mutiny in the near future." When asked who they 
felt was to blame for the payment problem one soldier stated, "It is just the seniors 
(officers). But the young ones will copy, maybe even they get worse. But if we set an 
example, we make them (junior officers) afraid that we will do the same to them." Their 
plan involved arresting senior officers and bringing their complaints to the government. 
In the below interview excerpt a rank and file soldier explains the goal: 
Soldier: There will be no violence. We just want to arrest 
those we suppose and hand them over. We want to expose 
them. 
Author: Expose them for what? 
Soldier: For embezzlement of government money. They 
are just eating this money. We want to expose them, to 
expose them so others do not do the same. If we do not do 
this in the future we will go back to where we came from. 
We will go back to war, back to revolutions. We do not go 
again to where we came from. But if you expose them, you 
bring them to justice, they punish them for that. 
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To these enlisted soldiers, there was more to gain in a mutiny than just pay. 
They believed a mutiny would discipline the officers and have a long -term impact. 
These soldiers never spoke of changing the system or promoting themselves. They 
actually seemed to have faith in the concept of military hierarchy and had a clear idea of 
how an officer "should" behave. They were upset that the accused officers were not 
upholding the responsibilities of that position. Their statements support the idea 
proposed in past chapters that mutineers often see themselves as policing the officer 
corps. 
Soldiers explained they have already brought their concerns to the government. 
One rank and file interviewee noted that a group of soldiers "wrote a letter secretly with 
no names," informing the government of their accusations of corruption within the 
officer corps. This letter is confirmed in a leaked U.S. Embassy report which states that 
the soldiers accused the Minister of Defence and other senior officers of making 
promotions based on favouritism, theft of government resources, and embezzlement of 
funds meant for the welfare of soldiers. The letter claimed to represent 850 officers and 
rank and file soldiers and ended by stating, "when all fails, please do not be surprised to 
see us seeking justice in our own way." According to the embassy report, the Minister 
of Defence dismissed the letter as "just a bit of mischief' but it created an uncomfortable 
atmosphere within the Ministry due to the allegations.99 A rank and file interviewee also 
noted that a delegation of soldiers met with the Ministry of Defence about the problems 
but he insisted that the problems have persisted and soldiers are losing patience. 
The pending mutiny that soldiers discussed in interviews in 2011 and 2012 
appeared to come closer to fruition in 2013. In August of 2013 the government 
announced the arrest of a group of soldiers at the barracks in Makeni for plotting a 
mutiny.100 Reports indicate that the soldiers were planning to protest during the 
president's visit but his trip was cancelled when intelligence discovered the plan. Of the 
soldiers arrested for conspiracy of intended mutiny, the vast majority were rank and file 
solders with some reports claiming either an officer or an NCO was also involved. 
99 American Embassy Freetown, "Sierra Leone Army `Dream Team' Airs Grievances," February 4, 2009. 
100 Reports of the story vary in their statements of the size of the group. Some put it at six soldiers with 
others as high as fourteen. Umar Fofana, "Bring on the Alleged Mutineers," Politico, January 28, 2014. 
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Reports have not stated precisely what it was that the soldiers were planning to protest 
over. In December of 2013 Sierra Leonean media ran a story about the soldiers accused 
of planning a mutiny and alleged that they have been incommunicado since their arrest. 
The story questions why no trial has been held and interviewed military sources and the 
Attorney General about the status of the case. In the article the soldiers' families 
appealed to the "international community, humanitarian organizations, civil society, and 
the media" to help advocate for a fair trial.101 Similar reports followed in the 
international media and human rights organizations also put out press releases detailing 
their concerns.102 Although it is too early to tell the fate of these soldiers, the general 
freedom of press in Sierra Leone has allowed for attention to be drawn to the case, 
which may have ultimately placed pressure on the government to handle the case more 
transparently. In April of 2014, nearly eight months after their arrest, the trial began for 
the alleged mutineers. The Sierra Leone government allowed media to attend the trial 
and local reporters live Tweeted details of the trial from the courtroom.103 This is a 
sharp contrast from the secrecy of most mutiny trials and the first case I have seen of 
social media being used during a mutineer trial. 
Ongoing soldier grievances were further made public in October of 2013 when a 
weekend radio show interviewed a soldier deployed on the AMISOM mission in 
Somalia. This individual accused the government of "fraudulently" reducing the 
peacekeepers pay and claimed that soldiers have to bribe officers to go on the mission. 
This individual's account was very similar to the stories I heard during field research, as 
described above. He alleged that Sierra Leonean soldiers are living "precariously" on 
deployment, without adequate supplies and food. He also added that the soldiers are 
upset that they receive their pay in Kenyan shillings when they were expecting U.S. 
dollars. While the Defence Minister responded that the claims were "unfounded" and 
"unprofessional" and questioned whether the caller was even a soldier, he still provided 
1 °1 Mohamed Massaquoi, "Africa Almost 14 Weeks Incommunicado," Concord Times (Freetown), 
December 6, 2013, http: / /allafrica.com /stories /201312061592.html. 
102 Kemo Cham, "Sierra Leone Mutiny Trial Hit by Cash Crunch," Africa Review, February 11, 2014; 
Press Release by Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law (CARL), April 7, 2014. 
103 At the time of writing this the trial was still ongoing, it is excepted to conclude in June or July of 2014. 
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a detailed response to each of the claims.104 As the previous chapter explained, much of 
the grievances of peacekeepers appear to revolve around false expectations and 
uncertainty. It is therefore a positive step that the Ministry of Defence attempted to 
bring clarity to the complex issues of funding for peacekeeping operations. It is too early 
to tell if the peacekeepers will be satisfied with his response. 
The growingly vocal grievances by soldiers is concerning, particularly as it 
threatens to create divisions within the newly restructured force. However in 
discussions with the soldiers it was also clear that they had faith in the government to 
address the issues and a level of confidence in the justice system. For example, one 
soldier explained that if they were to conduct a mutiny "you must explain why you do 
this thing, and people will listen. There are accessible leaders who want to know, who 
have an interest, who will listen. They (senior officers) will be arrested and they will be 
jailed." This attitude is a significant change from the events in 1992 and 1997 when 
soldiers had little faith that the government would respond to their requests. In those 
years the government was the main target of military dissatisfaction, whereas with the 
soldiers interviewed above the government could provide the solution. This is a 
noteworthy shift as it indicates that the military views the government as responsive and 
having legitimate authority over the military. 
Another rank and file soldier also expressed a sense of faith in the government, 
and justice system particularly by explaining 
if you kick the government out you are not going to address the problems 
appropriately, you are talking to the international community. But if you 
arrest the (military) leadership they (the government) will look at the 
problem and bring some of them to justice. 
He believes that the government is capable of handling the problem. He also suggests 
that when a coup occurs attention turns to international matters and the demands of the 
rank and file soldiers are ignored. These soldiers felt it was better to work within the 
1 °4 For example, he explained that it is up to each country what they will pay their peacekeepers and Sierra 
Leone has decided on $828 per month per soldier, with the balance of the UN pay going towards 
"operational costs." He emphasized that it is not the responsibility of the Sierra Leone government or the 
Ministry of Defense to provide food for the peacekeepers and commented that he knew nothing about the 
allegations of bribery. 
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system through mutinying. rather than create a new one through a coup. This soldier 
confirms assessments made throughout this thesis that there are key differences between 
coups and mutinies. Soldiers see the two as different tactics to be used in different 
situations with different outcomes. 
S8 Conclusion 
The grievances of the Tiger unit in 1992 are specific to their own situation but 
also consistent with the larger pattern of mutinies described throughout this thesis. Like 
most mutinies in the region, their primary complaints were over material conditions but 
these grievances were closely linked to perceptions of injustice. The injustice involved 
the discrepancy of their own situation compared to the conditions of the senior 
leadership in Freetown, which had its roots in a long pattern of benefits awarded by 
personal relationships rather than merit. 
As is common with deployed units, the Tigers felt that they were entitled more 
from the hierarchy due to their hardship conditions and risks of the mission. The 
decision to revolt, as well as their success in doing so is likely partially due to increased 
group cohesion, which developed on deployment. Rank and file soldiers from the unit 
expressed loyalty to their unit commanders, which appeared to be based on their 
personal contact with them during the difficult combat situations. They demonstrated 
this loyalty as well as a level of discipline when they obeyed the order to attack State 
House, despite their expectations that the mission would be a protest. The case of the 
Tiger unit also demonstrates that internal revolts usually involve interplay of cohesion 
and division. The Tigers showed feelings of division from the larger hierarchy, based in 
Freetown. While they acted cohesively as a group, their divergent understandings of the 
mission showed that the cohesion was limited. 
Interviews with members of the Tiger unit, as well as with current soldiers, 
demonstrate that they view mutinies and coups are distinct actions. However, the 
distinction between the two events was clearer in discussions than during the event. 
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This case shows the way the two actions can be intertwined. Even though the rank and 
file soldiers unanimously believed they were going to conduct a mutiny, they very 
quickly shifted their action to a coup. 
Even though current Sierra Leonean soldiers acknowledge that life in the military 
is much better than in previous decades, there is growing dissatisfaction with aspects of 
their conditions. The main complaints concern accommodation, peacekeeping missions, 
and perceptions of corruption. Rank and file soldiers appear to be frustrated with the 
lack of action taken on their complaints by the military hierarchy and in recent years 
have attempted tactics to work around their chain of command. Through letters to the 
government, radio interviews, and even discussions with myself, they have attempted to 
bring wider attention to their cause. Soldiers have also considered mutinies as another 
way to communicate their message. The 2013 mutiny plan was likely linked to the 
perception that previous attempts to pressure change have not been successful. 
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Chapter Six - Mutinies with Unintended Consequences: Case Study of 
The Gambia 
6.1 Introduction 
On the exact same day as Sierra Leonean soldiers and civilians were dancing in 
the streets in celebration of Momoh's downfall through the coup by the Tiger unit, 
Gambians were also engaged in political statements, by voting in the country's 5th 
General Election. Despite these states being on opposite ends of the democratic 
spectrum in 1992, two years later both were under the control of a military council 
headed by a twenty -nine year old junior officer. Whereas Sierra Leone's history of past 
military involvement in politics and emerging civil war made a mutiny or coup 
unsurprising, military revolts in The Gambia were unprecedented until 1991. The 
Gambian military wasted no time in going from a seemingly well- disciplined and 
apolitical force to conducting two mutinies and a coup in a matter of three years. 
This chapter will begin with a history of the Gambian military, which remains 
the youngest force in the region. Aspects of its unique development, often in 
collaboration with foreign military contingents, contributed to the complaints expressed 
by mutineers in 1991 and 1992. Both of the mutinies involved primary complaints over 
peacekeeping pay and the grievances are part of the trend of post- deployment mutinies 
described in Chapter Four. Like many mutinies, the ones in The Gambia in 1991 and 
1992 also involved accusations of corruption, particularly against the officer corps. 
These complaints resonated with many in the military, beyond just those that had 
deployed together. While the government addressed the pay issue, they failed to deal 
with the issue of corruption, which had created divisions between the junior ranks 
(including junior officers) and the senior officers. Rather than tackle these internal 
tensions, the government invited a Nigerian military contingent to take over the top 
leadership aspects of the military, which furthered the military dissatisfaction and 
ultimately contributed to a coup in 1994. The leader of the 1994 coup, Yahya Jammeh, 
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is still in power today. Civil liberties and human rights under his rule have been 
neglected and the regime is considered authoritarian by most measures. The last part of 
the chapter will show how this `undemocratization' in The Gambia in recent years may 
make the country less likely to experience mutinies. 
6.2 The Reluctant Creation of the Gambian Armed Forces 
By 1981 The Gambia remained one of only three West African states, which had 
not experienced a coup attempt (alongside Cape Verde and Côte d'Ivoire).1 President 
Jawara had ruled The Gambia since its independence from Britain in 1965. Despite his 
long tenure, The Gambia had held a series of multi-party elections considered free and 
fair. Jawara's Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) had always won a majority of seats but 
opposition parties were also represented in the parliament. More radical political 
organizations espousing varied combinations of Marxism, Socialism, and Pan -Africanist 
beliefs (such as the Movement for Justice in Africa -MOJA and Gambia Revolutionary 
Socialist Party -GRSP) were present in The Gambia but never considered a serious threat 
to the ruling party or existing democratic system.2 There had been no cases of deaths by 
political violence, leading John Wiseman at the time to describe The Gambia as "a 
sometimes lonely, outpost of political tranquility in a troubled area. "3 Jawara had little 
reason to suspect his position was in danger when he travelled to Britain to attend the 
royal wedding of Prince Charles in 1981. It was while he was abroad on this trip that the 
country suffered its first coup attempt. While the occurrence of coups had become 
I Patrick McGowan, "African Military coups d'etat, 1956 -2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution," The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 41 3 (Sep. 2003): 363 -364. 
2 Arnold Hughes, "The attempted Gambian coup d'etat of 30 July 1981" in The Gambia: Studies in 
Society and Politics, ed. Arnold Hughes. Birmingham University African Studies Series 3, 96 -97. 
3 John Wiseman. "Revolt in the Gambia: A pointless tragedy," The Round Table: The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs 71, no.284 (1981): 374; There was one incident in October of 1980 in 
which the Deputy Commander of the Field Force, Eku Mahoney, was killed by a junior member of the 
unit. Investigations were conducted to determine if the perpetrator, Mustapha Danso, was linked to radical 
political groups but no link was ever determined. Furthermore, there was no indication that the murder 
had anything to do with complaints within the Field Force, but rather was assessed to be an individual act 
of aggression. For more information on this topic see The Voice of the People: The Story of the PPP, 
1959 -1989, (Banjul: Baroueli Publications, 1992): 98; Dawda K. Jawara, Kairaba (West Sussex: Alhaji 
Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, 2009): 315 -317. 
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common on the continent by 1981, the Gambian coup attempt was unique for at least 
three reasons. 
The first unique aspect of the coup attempt was that it was not carried out by the 
military. In fact the Gambia had no military at the time. Since independence from 
Britain in 1965, law and order in The Gambia was the responsibility of the police and 
the Field Force. The Field Force was formed out of the Royal West African Frontier 
Force (RWAFF), set up during colonialism by the British. At independence the 
Gambian regiment of the RWAFF was converted to a paramilitary force called the Field 
Force. The Field Force and police combined constituted less than 600 personnel and 
both performed policing duties .4 
Kukoi Samba Sanyang, a civilian who had been unsuccessful in previous 
attempts to run for political office, led the coup attempt. Of the fifteen individuals 
initially involved in carrying out the attempt, only four were in the Field Force. The 
remaining individuals varied in their educational background and professions. However, 
a number were taxi drivers, giving the event the nickname "the taxi driver coup. "5 
The other two unique factors of the 1981 coup attempt are the length of the event 
and the level of violence and death it caused. After breaking into the Field Force 
armoury, the rebel elements released all prisoners from Mile Two prison and distributed 
rifles and ammunition to anyone they felt was on their side. Instead of supporting the 
rebels, many who had acquired weapons carried out personal vendettas, further 
undermining the efforts of the rebels who already lacked widespread support.' The coup 
plotters took other extreme measures that surely led to a loss of credibility such as 
holding Jawara's wife and eight children hostage and threatening them live over the 
radio.8 Kukoi and his co- conspirators soon lost control of the situation and the plan to 
a Zaya Yeebo, State of Fear in Paradise: The Military Coup in the Gambia and its Implications for 
Democracy, (London: Africa Research and Information Bureau, 1995): 46; Abdoulaye Saine, The 
Paradox of Third -Wave Democratization in Africa (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009): 26. 
Arnold Hughes and David Perfect, A Political History of The Gambia: 1816 -1994, (Rochester, NY: 
University of Rochester Press, 2006): 212: Jimmy Kandeh, Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and 
State Power in West Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 180. 
G Hughes, "The attempted Gambian coup d'etat of 30 July 1981," 99. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Hughes, "The attempted Gambian coup d'etat of 30 July 1981," 103; Jawara, Kairaba, 311 -312. 
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take Banjul was sidetracked by widespread looting, robbery, and killing.9 The majority 
of the Field Force was not quick to counter the rebels; instead they remained neutral and 
waited for the dust to clear before choosing a side. 
Within the first day of the coup attempt Jawara requested the assistance of 
Senegal under a Defence Agreement that had been in place since 1965.10 Senegal 
responded quickly and generously, sending in hundreds if not thousands of soldiers 
including airborne and sea assault units." The response was likely spurred by a fear of 
the movement spreading across the borders to Senegal. Within four days the coup was 
aborted but cost the lives of 33 Senegalese soldiers and 500 Gambians, many of whom 
were civilians uninvolved in the fighting. This coup attempt contrasts with general 
patterns that show that coups in Africa are usually short and cause little immediate loss 
of life.12 The severity of the situation, especially in contrast to The Gambia's history of 
stability, can help explain the major changes enacted by the government following the 
attempt. 
The exact reasoning behind the 1981 coup attempt remains contested but most 
accounts link it to the Marxist beliefs of Sanyang.13 For the purposes of this assessment, 
the causes of the coup attempt are less important than the effects. A direct effect of the 
coup attempt was the creation of the Gambian Armed Forces. Only a few months after 
the coup attempt, President Jawara and President Diouf of Senegal signed the Kaur 
Declaration leading to the creation of the Senegambia Confederation. This 
confederation aimed to integrate the security forces of Senegal and The Gambia as well 
as create an economic and monetary union and would serve to coordinate issues of 
9Hughes and Perfect, A Political History of The Gambia, 211 -214; Hughes, "The attempted Gambian coup 
d'etat of 30 July 1981," 99. 
19 Nicodemus Fru Awasom, "The Senegambia in Historical and Contemporary Perspective," in Nation - 
States and the Challenges of Regional Integration in West Africa: The Case of the Gambia, ed. Siga 
Fatima Jagne (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2010): 52. 
11 Hughes and Perfect, A Political History of The Gambia, 215; Jawara, Kairaba, 311; The estimates of 
the number of Senegalese troops sent in the respond to the coup attempt vary widely. Jawara, in his 
autobiography, states that 300 airborne troops were initially dropped with more arriving later. Hughes 
gives an estimate as high as 3,000 total; British Special Air Service (SAS) were also utilized specifically 
to deal with the hostage situation. 
12 Patrick McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, "African Military Coups d'Etat and Underdevelopment: A 
Quantitative Historical Analysis" The Journal of Modern African Studies 22 4 (Dec. 1984): 635; Harvey 
G. Kebschull "Operation "Just Missed ": Lessons from Failed Coup Attempts." Armed Forces and Society 
20, no. 4 (1994): 570. 
13 Hughes and Perfect, A Political History of The Gambia, 210 -220. 
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foreign policy.'` In order to integrate the two countries' armed forces, Gambia had to 
first create a military. 
It is important to note that Jawara had been in power for 17 years before 
establishing a military. Prior to the coup attempt he believed an armed forces was not 
necessary for The Gambia. Although he appeared supportive of the Senegambia 
Confederation, he never seemed fully comfortable with the idea of the Gambian Armed 
Forces. Several interviewees felt that Jawara was pressured by Senegal to create a 
military because they did not want to take responsibility for Gambian security, as they 
had in 1981 (and which resulted in Senegalese casualties).'' In an interview with the 
official state newspaper Jawara acknowledges that he wanted to keep the military "as 
small as possible. "16 Throughout his time in office he appeared reluctant to invest in the 
military and naïve to military matters. His actions following the mutinies in 1991 and 
1992 and the coup of 1994, as presented later, back up this observation as do interviews 
with former soldiers and academics, many of whom noted Jawara's lack of interest in 
the military. 
6.3 The Divisive Effects of the Confederal Army 
The Gambian National Army (GNA) was created in 1983 -84 by merging the 
existing loyal members of the Field Force with new recruits. The new unit was set up 
and trained by a small British training team. Around the same time, the Gambian 
National Gendarmerie (GNG), a force separate from the GNA, was established based on 
a French military model and trained by the Senegalese.17 Within five years of the coup 
attempt. Gambia went from having little more than a police force to an armed forces 
comprising an army and gendarmerie alongside the police. 
There was a hybrid of British and French military structures used to create the 
Gambian Armed Forces, which led to confused roles and an often -contentious 
14 Jawara, Kairaba, 341. 
15 Author interview with military source C (former rank and file soldier), October 2012. 
16 The Gambia Times, February 14, 1990. 
17 Hughes and Perfect, A Political History of The Gambia, 220. 
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relationship between the army and gendarmerie. Officers from each branch attended 
different foreign training, which further intensified the divide between the GNA and 
GNG. Army officers, under the British styled system, trained in the United Kingdom, 
the United States, or occasionally Pakistan, while gendarmerie officers were sent for 
training in France, Morocco, Turkey or Senegal.18 Therefore the branches operated on 
different military doctrine, although all were part of the Gambian Armed Forces. This 
separateness intensified into a rivalry over the years and will be addressed later in its 
relation to the 1994 coup.19 
The Senegambia Confederal Agreement merged elements of the new Gambian 
Armed Forces with the Senegalese Armed Forces to create the Confederal Army. The 
Confederal Army was made up of two -thirds Senegalese soldiers and one -third Gambian 
soldiers with the ability to deploy anywhere within the confederation.20 Gambian 
soldiers chosen for the Confederal Army were given the same pay grade as the 
Senegalese soldiers. Due to the higher cost of living in Senegal than Gambia, the 
amount was significantly more than the normal pay rate for the Gambian military. This 
"financial advantage made it the dream assignment of every Gambian soldier. "21 
However, it caused disparities in pay within the new Gambian army and soldiers 
"complained of gross differences in income and privileges" as a result of the Confederal 
Army.22 Furthermore, it was a pay scale that the Gambian military could not sustain 
after the Senegambia Confederation disbanded. 
One former Confederal Army member explained that there was a level of 
prestige involved with being in the unit. The Senegalese military at the time had a 
longer history and higher standards for recruitment and Gambian soldiers selected for 
the Confederal Army were supposed to match the standard. 23 However, former soldiers 
noted that in reality the way to get chosen for the Confederal Army was to know one of 
18 Samsudeen Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army (Xlibris: 2007): 120. 
19 Binneh Minteh, Rethinking the Military and Democratization (Saarbrucken, Germany: Lambert 
Publishing, 2010): 7. 
20 
It took time for The Gambia to recruit and train its army and therefore The Gambia did not begin 
contributing troops to the joint unit until 1985 even though the Confederal Army was established years 
earlier. 
2! Ebrima Chongan, The Price of Duty (Lulu: 2010): 26. 
22 Yeebo, State of Fear in Paradise, 47. 
23 Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier), October 2012. 
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the Gambian selecting officers. In an interview with a former Confederal Army soldier 
he laughingly said, "if it was not for corruption, I would not have been in the 
[Confederal] army." He explained that he did not meet the standard criteria but he knew 
someone that assigned him a spot.24 This favouritism, which began from the very start 
of the Gambian Armed Force's existence, likely undermined the integrity of the officer 
corps who were viewed by their subordinates as corrupted. Furthermore it weakened the 
hierarchical structures by providing privileges based on personal links rather than on 
rank or merit. 
Even when the Gambian soldiers joined the Senegambia Confederation, they 
were junior to their Senegalese colleagues due to their newly appointed ranks. Due to 
the vastly different size of the Gambian and Senegalese populations, Senegal also 
contributed more resources and troops.25 Therefore, the Gambian military was always 
second fiddle in the defence aspects of the Senegambia Confederation. Furthermore, the 
key tasks of guarding the airport, port, and Gambian president were given to Senegalese 
troops.26 Gambian soldiers said that at the time they saw potential personal benefits to 
the Confederal Army, but some also saw it as an insult to their national pride to not have 
full responsibility of protecting the nation.27 Political opposition parties claimed the 
confederation was a threat to national sovereignty and economically disadvantageous to 
the Gambian citizens.28 
Individuals with doubt about the agreement did not have to wait long for the 
Condeferation to come to an end, which is did suddenly in 1989, over a dispute 
regarding the rotation of the Confederal presidency.29 In August of 1989 Senegal 
removed all 300 troops from the Gambia without prior warning.30 President Jawara 
explained that he only found out about the withdrawal of troops when he arrived at work 
24 
Author confidential interview, 2012. 
25 John Wiseman and Elizabeth Vidler, "The July 1994 Coup d'etat in The Gambia: The End of an Era ?" 
Round Table 333, no. 1 (Jan 1995): 55. 
26 Wiseman and Vidler, "The July 1994 Coup d'etat in The Gambia: The End of an Era ?" 55. 
27 Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier), October 2012. 
28 Hughes and Perfect, A Political History of The Gambia, 265. 
29 Awasom, "The Senegambia in Historical and Contemporary Perspective," 55. 
30 Awasom, "The Senegambia in Historical and Contemporary Perspective," 55; Wiseman and Vidler, 
"The July 1994 Coup d'etat in The Gambia: The End of an Era ?" 55. 
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and found that there were no Presidential Guards present.3 ! The Senegalese Minister of 
Defence justified the withdrawal by reasoning that the Senegalese soldiers were needed 
to deal with an emerging issue on the border with Mauritania.32 Gambia responded by 
initiating the legal measures to dissolve the confederation.33 Thus the Senegambia 
Confederation ended less than seven years after it was formed. 
Most of the grand plans for the confederation were never enacted (in particular 
the monetary union) and therefore its demise did not have major repercussions in terms 
of the political or economic stability of The Gambia. However, the withdrawal of the 
Senegalese troops meant Jawara was finally dependent on his armed forces for both 
internal and external protection. This was the first time since the army's creation that it 
had not been alongside foreign leadership. 
Gambia's involvement in the Confederal Army, especially in the early stages of 
the military's existence may have sowed the initial seeds of discontent within the 
military. It created divisions within the armed forces by giving some soldiers more pay 
and prestige. One former soldier explained, "We were seeing that some of us are treated 
better than others and that is very dangerous in the army." 34 Additionally, junior 
soldiers alleged corrupt practices within the officer corps during the selection of 
Confederal Army members. Unfortunately, these accusations did not end with the 
termination of the Senegambia confederation. 
6.4 Dissatisfaction Amongst the Peacekeepers 
At the same time that the Senegambia Confederation was winding down, the 
rebel situation in Liberia was intensifying. As Chapter Four described, ECOWAS, of 
which Gambia is a member, decided to send a peacekeeping force to Liberia, under the 
title ECOMOG. In August of 1990, 105 Gambian soldiers were deployed to Monrovia, 
31 Jawara, Kairaba, 354. 
'' Wiseman and Vidler, "The July 1994 Coup d'etat in The Gambia: The End of an Era ?" 55. 
33 Hughes and Perfect, A Political History of The Gambia, 265. 
'; Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier), October 2012. 
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alongside Ghanaian, Nigerian, Guinean, and Sierra Leonean troops.35 This was the 
Gambian military's first involvement in a peacekeeping mission. The ECOMOG 
deployment was a controversial issue within The Gambia. Newspapers questioned the 
goal of the mission and some military members expressed doubt as to whether the 
military was adequately prepared.36 However, similar to earning a spot in the 
Confederal Army, soldiers viewed an appointment to the ECOMOG mission as a 
potential way to earn money since peacekeepers were paid a higher deployment salary. 
One former soldier explained that those that had not had an opportunity to be a part of 
the Confederal army were compensated with appointments on the ECOMOG mission. 37 
This is similar to the trend identified in Chapter Four, in which military hierarchies often 
treat peacekeeping deployments as a reward or compensation, which creates false 
expectations of the mission. Although involvement in both the Confederal army and 
ECOMOG resulted in additional pay, the ECOMOG mission involved direct combat and 
related hardships, whereas the Confederal army did not. Those expecting easy 
additional pay from the ECOMOG mission were quickly disappointed. 
The Gambian soldiers were involved in the first rounds of deployments on the 
ECOMOG Liberia mission and thus the soldiers would have experienced the problems 
described in Chapter Four, which were particularly severe at the beginning of the 
mission. The Liberia mission was difficult and dangerous for even the experienced 
militaries in the region and the Gambian military was further disadvantaged by its 
infancy. A former Commander of the GNA explained that the Gambian peacekeeping 
unit was inexperienced and underprepared. He states at the time of the deployment the 
army had 
never trained on its own, let alone participated in real armed conflict with 
its officers in charge. The British...did everything for us... So when C 
35 The Gambia Weekly, August 10, 1990; The exact number of Gambian troops involved in the first 
ECOMOG mission vary depending on the source, although all cite that over 100 troops were deployed. 
The Gambia Weekly (government sponsored newspaper) and Jawara's Autobiography quote 105 troops, 
where as other media sources and academic writing puts the number at 150. 
36 Foroyaa published numerous and regular criticism of the mission from 1989 into the early 1990s; 
Author interview with military source D (former officer) September 2012. 
37 Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier), October 2012. 
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Company of 150 men including six of the best GNA officers were sent to 
Liberia, the timid command immediately collapsed... 38 
A former Gambian officer explained in an interview that the unit stood no chance 
against rebels who were trained and motivate to fight.39 Funmi Olonisakin also notes the 
inexperience of the Gambians during her research of the ECOMOG mission by 
commenting that their most senior officer was a Captain, whereas the other contingents 
all had much more experienced officers present.4° 
During the initial deployment two Gambian soldiers, Corporal Modou Bojang 
and Private Sama Jawo, were killed.41 As this was the first combat mission that the 
Gambian Armed Forces had been involved in, these casualties were also the first for the 
country's military. The deaths likely had an effect on the unit; however their direct 
relation to the 1991 and 1992 mutinies is a point of contention within the narrative of the 
mutinies. In 1995, five years after the death of these two soldiers and after the Jawara 
regime was ousted, President Jammeh approved a mission to retrieve the bodies of these 
Gambian soldiers in Liberia.42 When the bodies were exhumed they held a ceremony 
and burial for the soldiers in Banjul. The government claimed that The Gambia was the 
only country to leave their dead in Liberia and argued that this was a key cause of the 
previous mutinies. Lt. Col. (ret.) San explained that the return of the fallen soldiers was 
meant to bring closure to the tragic event experienced by the ECOMOG soldiers.43 
However, this appears to be a rewriting of history. There is no mention of 
soldiers being angry about the bodies of their colleagues in the press at the time and all 
interviewees were adamant that this had nothing to do with the mutinies. One former 
soldier explained that bringing home the bodies in 1995 was a "psychological game to 
make the former regime look bad. "44 Another stated, "[Jammeh] was in the army, he 
knows how to play with the emotions of the soldiers.i45 Other soldiers said that military 
'$ Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 126 -127. 
39 Author interview with military source D (former officer) September 2012. 
40 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, 166. 
41 Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 40. 
42 Ibid.,147. 
;' Ibid., 147. 
44 Author interview with military source D (former officer) September 2012. 
'b Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier), October 2012. 
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members are aware that if they are killed on the battlefield their bodies will be left there. 
They explained that this is not a practice unique to Gambia but that great militaries 
throughout history have done the same during war.46 Rather than rectify an unresolved 
problem, the military junta attempted to utilize the mutinies from past years to remind 
the soldiers of their dissatisfaction during the Jawara regimes and make a public show of 
how they would treat the military with more respect. However, as the interviewees' 
statements demonstrate, many soldiers saw through this instrumentalization of the 
mutinies for political gains. 
The first Gambian ECOMOG contingent returned home on April 13, 1991. The 
soldiers were honoured with a ceremony and another contingent of a similar size was 
sent to Liberia to replace the returned soldiers. Media coverage of the ceremony noted 
"it was clear that Liberia was not a dinner party for them. Those known by our reporters 
had lost a lot of weight. "47 Former soldiers noted the same, one remarked that the 
returned soldiers looked like "typical pictures of people from the third world ", meaning 
they looked malnourished.48 Less than a month after their return, media in The Gambia 
started to report on pay issues within the unit. Newspapers reported that soldiers were 
only paid part of their allowances for the later months they were deployed and received 
no compensation for the last month they were on the mission. The newspaper Foroyaa 
also questioned why soldiers must come to the media to have their complaints reach 
official channels. They suggested the government or military should have mechanism in 
place to communicate with the soldiers over these issues.49 These soldiers were at the 
forefront of the trend, described in Chapters Two and Three, of soldiers taking their 
complaints to the media. Whereas many countries in the region were struggling to gain 
media freedoms in the early 1990s, The Gambia already had these rights, and soldiers 
utilized them. Additionally, the media appeared to take the side of the soldiers. Thus 
the mutineers benefitted from media freedoms both by having an outlet to communicate 
their frustrations and from the support expressed by the civilian media. 
46 Author interview with military 
May 2012. 
47 Foroyaa, May 15, 1991. 
48 Author interview with military 
49 Foroyaa, May 15, 1991. 
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The military leadership and government did not pay heed to the grievances 
expressed by soldiers in the media. A month after the press identified the pay issue, the 
soldiers had still not received their pay and the complaints escalated to a mutiny. On 
June 13th, two months after their return, the ECOMOG soldiers gathered in Yundum 
barracks to request a meeting with the Commander of the Armed Forces, Colonel Ndow 
Njie.50 Njie reportedly refused to meet the soldiers due to security concerns.' The next 
day a small contingent of officers and NCOs, led by the British military advisor, Lt. Col. 
Jim Shaw, attempted to arrest the soldiers at Yundum barracks for organizing a mutiny 
but they were unsuccessful.52 The ECOMOG soldiers took to the streets, arriving at 
State House in Banjul to express their dissatisfaction. There were approximately 60 
soldiers involved in the mutiny, all Sergeants or below." President Jawara agreed to 
meet with the soldiers about their complaints.' 
The mutineers did not use any force or violence; still many at the time described 
their shock at the junior soldiers' bold behaviour. An individual who worked for the 
Jawara government at the time states. 
I remember seeing soldiers marching to State House, we watched from 
our windows in Banjul. It was the first time in my life that I had seen 
soldiers in uniform demonstrating. It was the first time I knew something 
was seriously wrong, it was the first writing on the wall." 
The government did take the mutineers seriously, and made significant changes, 
although not necessarily ones designed to address the root causes of the mutiny. The 
mutineers were first and foremost asking for their back pay from the peacekeeping 
mission.56 The soldiers also made requests for improvements in accommodations, 
equipment, and welfare.' However, as Dr. Abdoulaye Saine speculates "the motivation 
to mutiny ran deeper than just pay, there was widespread disapproval with the regime, in 
5D Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 127 -128; Foroyaa, June 30, 1991. 
1 Foroyaa, June 30, 1991. 
52 Author interview with military source A (current officer), May 2012; Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia 
National Army, p127-128. 
53 West Africa, February 10, 1992; Author interview with military source D (former officer), September 
2012. 
54 West Africa, October 10 -16, 1994. 
55 Author confidential interview, May 2012. 
56 Author interview with military source F (former officer), August 2012. 
57 West Africa, October 10 -16, 1994. 
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part due to increased corruption. "58 Saine's speculation is consistent with interviews 
with former soldiers, all of whom claimed that corruption was behind the non -payment. 
Soldiers did not believe the government's claim that they did not have the money, but 
rather thought that "the senior officers were robbing them." One former soldier 
explained "the top brass got the [deployment] money and sliced it, only gave some to the 
soldiers." He further elaborated that the soldiers spoke to Nigerian soldiers while on the 
ECOMOG mission and found out that they were getting paid more than the Gambians.'9 
The soldiers believed that the discrepancy between the Gambian pay and Nigerian pay 
proved that senior Gambian officers were taking part of their salary. He added 
"ECOMOG was not a Gambian contingent alone, it was ECOWAS...how can a sub 
regional force that is supposed to be recognized as an international organization not have 
money to be paid ?" While Chapter Four explained that there were funding issues at the 
organization level, this quote supports the idea that soldiers are often unsympathetic 
towards these high level funding issues and instead interpret the cause as corruption 
(which it may have been). One soldier explained that the perceived corruption 
demoralized the troops. He states "a military should be proud, but there was too much 
corruption, too much nepotism. "60 
President Jawara promised to pay the mutineers' owed allowances and look into 
the other requests.61 However, one former soldier says that paying the soldiers only 
justified the corruption accusations in the eyes of many in the military. He explained "if 
there was no money really, even if [the mutineers] were able to bring the sky down [the 
government] would not be able to get money but as soon as that happened they were 
paid the money. So where did that money come from ? "62 People believed that the 
immediate payment showed the salary dues had been available the whole time and 
officers were simply not distributing it to the soldiers. Thus paying the soldiers so 
quickly only furthered junior soldiers' allegations of top -level corruption and 
incompetence. It appears the government was aware of the resentment building within 
58 Author interview with Dr. Abdoulaye 
59 Author interview with military source 
G0 Author interview with military source 
61 West Africa, October 10 -16, 1994. 
62 Author interview with military source 
Saine, June, 2012. 
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the ranks because one month after the mutiny the Minister of Finance announced a pay 
increase for all the Armed Forces. The news outlet reporting the story expressed hope 
that the move "may temper down the feelings that are running high. "63 However, as will 
be presented below, tempers continued to rise and dissatisfaction soon spread to the 
junior officers. 
Initially the soldiers that mutinied were asked to go on leave but a later press 
release stated that they were suspended on half pay until a full enquiry could be 
conducted.64 It remains unclear if or how the mutineers were punished; however it 
seems likely that the mutineers were not dismissed from the military. The media had 
been covering the story of the mutiny and never mentioned a mass dismissal of soldiers. 
Had there been a large number of soldiers fired or detained, it would have been fairly big 
news in a country as small as The Gambia and the media would likely have reported the 
story. Furthermore, years after the event Lt. Col. Shaw (the British advisor who had 
pushed for the mutineers to be arrested) commented that he believed the 1994 coup 
stemmed from the fact that the government "failed to take effective actions against the 
`dissenters' from ECOMOG."65 This indicates that the mutineers were either not 
punished or only mildly punished. 
Whereas the fate of the mutineers was vague, the same cannot be said about the 
Commanding Officer (CO) of the Gambian National Army, Colonel Njie. He was 
retired over the event and there remains speculation over whether he chose to retire or 
was fired. Regardless of whose decision it was, it was likely intended to show that the 
government and military took the mutiny seriously. Colonel Njie was not only the CO 
of the Gambian National Army but he was the only CO that the GNA had ever had, 
assuming the position when the force first came into existence. However, Njie did not 
appear to suffer much from his `punishment' as he was immediately given an 
ambassadorial position abroad. 
6' The Nation, July 20, 1991. 
64 West Africa, July 8 -14, 1991. 
6' Comment by LtCol Rtd Jim Shaw on blog titled "Mutiny in Gambia. Former Army Lieutenant Kejau 
Touray Breaks his Silence," August 28, 2007. 
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6.5 Mutinies Lead to a Contentious Caretaker 
Less than a month after news of Njie's departure, the government announced that 
the Nigerian Army Training Assistance Group (NATAG) would soon be arriving in The 
Gambia to help train and equip the army. The especially unusual aspect of the NATAG 
arrangement was that the top Nigerian officer, Colonel (later promoted to Brigadier 
General) Abubakar Dada was appointed Commanding Officer of the Gambian National 
Army. 
Soldiers at the time remember being "shocked" by the decision.66 Media 
reporting had a similar reaction, stating that the news of the NATAG "came as a 
thunderbolt from the blue. "67 The decision to bring in another foreign contingent was a 
controversial one from the start and the idea of having the national military headed by a 
foreign officer was especially contentious. One local paper published commentary 
stating, "One can understand having foreign military advisors or trainers. Having a 
foreign military commander for a sovereign republic appears strange." The story then 
went on to list every individual in the Gambian military from the rank of Captain and 
above, pointed out their long and decorated service and then posed the question "Is the 
government telling us that none of these people are competent enough to head the 
army ? "68 The departure of Colonel Njie was due to the fact that he had lost the 
confidence of his men. However, Jawara did little to restore this confidence in Gambian 
military leadership. By appointing Nigerian leaders he was essentially confirming the 
rank and file statement that they could not trust their Gambian officers. 
Although the government announced the NATAG plan almost immediately after 
the mutiny in June of 1991, it took about nine months for the seventy -nine member 
contingent to arrive.69 In the meantime The Gambia endured its second mutiny. The 
second contingent from the ECOMOG mission returned from their deployment in 
December 1991. On February 3, 1992 thirty-five soldiers from the unit left Yundum 
66 Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier), September 2012. 
67 Foroyaa, July 15, 1991. 
68 Foroyaa, July 15, 1991. 
69 The Point, March 23, 1992. 
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barracks in a military vehicle around 9:00 am.70 At least one account of the event 
claimed the soldiers were armed after stealing weapons from the armoury and fired shots 
into the air.71 However this detail is questionable as the published accounts of the court 
martial do not show any charges of stealing or unlawfully discharging weapons. 
The mutineers soon disembarked from the military vehicle, took over a bus and 
ordered the driver to go towards Banjul (a distance of roughly thirty km). This bus high 
jacking by uniformed soldiers was apparently witnessed by many people during rush 
hour and the news quickly spread and rumours grew. The Point newspaper reported 
"before the truth emerged, there was chaos especially in the Serrekunda area where 
people stampeded to collect their kids from school and their wares from the market. "72 
Other media outlets report similar reactions of the streets clearing out and shopkeepers 
locking up out of fear.73 In reality, the event turned out to be much less dramatic than 
the local population anticipated. The police and gendarmerie intercepted the soldiers at 
Denton Bridge. which connects Banjul to the mainland.74 Therefore, this group of 
mutineers never made it to State House. The thirty-five mutineers were arrested and 
court martialed. 
The soldiers were making their way to Banjul in order to express their grievances 
over unpaid allowances from their ECOMOG deployment. A Gambian newspaper 
covering the story commented that 
If the people mistake the soldiers demonstration for what it is not, it must 
be because nobody would have thought that they would be given a 
chance, through non -payment of allowances, for them to make a repeat 
performance of last year's march on the Presidency.7' 
In other words, why did the government not learn from the mutiny of the first ECOMOG 
contingent? 
The actual amount of money that the soldiers were owed was relatively small. 
According to news reporting they were owed a balance of 15 days of pay, totalling $45 
7° Foroyaa, February 15, 1992 
71 Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 129. 
72 The Point, February 10, 1992. 
73 Foroyaa, February 15, 1992. 
74 West Africa, February 10, 1992. 
75 The Point, February 10, 1992. 
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each.76 Interviewed soldiers explained that like the previous mutiny, the material 
grievances were linked to perceived corruption amongst the officers. The soldiers felt 
that they had gone on a dangerous mission, only to come back and have someone in their 
chain of command take their hard earned money. One soldier explained "Let's say you 
are from the warfront, there is stress, you are making sacrifices of your life, this issue 
makes you very aggravated. "77 Another former soldier explained that it was not just the 
ECOMOG soldiers that were upset about the non -payment; other soldiers and civilian 
alike thought it was disrespectful to refuse payment to soldiers who had undergone 
combat in the name of the country.78 A former soldier stated "soldiers on the ground 
must be paid better, they were facing war every day. They should be paid more. Why 
would anyone go risk their life for that ?" Another military interviewee explained that 
"they were in real war situations, so for them to not get paid was a real problem. "79 
These military interviewees all highlight the risks involved for the ECOMOG soldiers 
and show that there is a shift in the what is deemed acceptable treatment based on 
deployment experience. 
The trial for the mutineers began on February 25th. Whereas the case for the 
1991 mutineers was handled as an internal military affair, the 1992 mutineers were tried 
publicly. Local media covered the court martial and the judicial hall was reportedly 
packed to full capacity on the day of the trial. The soldiers were charged with eleven 
accounts including breaking out of barracks, conduct contrary to good order, 
insubordination, and wilfully obstructing police officers. The court marital (made up of 
three officers) deliberated for 2 days and found most soldiers guilty of at least some of 
the eleven accounts. The sentences varied from dismissals to fines.ß0 
The third contingent of Gambian ECOMOG soldiers arrived home in July 1992 
and by this time the NATAG was in The Gambia. The ECOMOG soldiers were paid 
their outstanding allowances immediately. At their reception ceremony the new 
Commanding Officer of the GNA (Nigerian) Colonel Dada warned the troops that he 
76 The Point, February 10, 1992. 
77 Interview with military source A (current officer), May 2012. 
78 Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier), September, 2012. 
79 Author interview with military source F (former officer), August 2012. 
80 Foroyaa, March 15, 1992; The Point, April 27, 1992. 
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would not tolerate any acts of indiscipline within their unit and expanded on the issue of 
loyalty within the armed forces. This speech apparently offended some people though. 
An article in The Point calls the speech "rude" and "unfitting" arguing that the returned 
soldiers should be treated as decorated veterans rather than with suspicion. It further 
criticized the implication in Dada's speech that the mutinying soldiers were disloyal, 
stating that the soldiers should not be faulted for demanding what was promised to them. 
Lastly, the article condemned the government for "expelling those experienced men 
from the army and having Nigerian troops in the country. "8 ' The "experienced men" is 
presumably referring to the ECOMOG soldiers who were dismissed following the 1992 
mutiny. This is another example where the media clearly took the side of the mutineers. 
There were no further mutinies after the NATAG arrived. Therefore, it could be 
assumed that the issues protested during the mutinies were fixed by replacing Gambian 
senior leadership with Nigerian officers. In fact, some media at the time congratulated 
the "new military management team" on rectifying the problem.82 However, replacing 
the top leadership did little to address the underlying problems in the military, in 
particular the problem of corruption and lack of trust in the leadership. 
6.6 The Unresolved Problems Grow 
The mutineers did something that was unprecedented at the time in The Gambia; 
they publicly exposed the internal problems of the military. The complaints about 
deployment payments was specific to the ECOMOG soldiers but their accusations of 
corruption and mismanagement resonated with others in the military, particularly junior 
officers. Former soldiers explained that these were issues that the military had been 
grumbling about amongst themselves for a while. Former soldiers explain that 
corruption had been apparent since the force's creation and was by 1992 a "cancer that 
had taken root and spread. "83 Promotions were seen to be based on favouritism, which 
81 The Point, July 27, 1992. 
82 The Point, July 20, 1992. 
83 Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier), October 2012. 
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further eroded the soldiers' confidence in the hierarchy.84 One former soldier states that 
the senior officers "did not have control and we did not respect them. "85 Lt. Col. (ret.) 
Sarr provides accounts of senior officers selling items confiscated from illegal fishing 
operations and bribing senior government officials.86 Similarly, senior officers were 
accused of selling food meant- for soldiers for personal profit.87 Soldiers believed that 
senior military officers did not fear that their actions would be punished because they 
were closely aligned with politicians.88 
In addition to these general complaints were more specific grievances related to 
the NATAG presence. San explains "the final straw was when the government reduced 
us to nonentities and brought in Nigerians to command and control us. "89 Although 
enlisted soldiers conducted the mutinies, the government response to bring in the 
NATAG, most affected the officers. Gambian officers complained about the better 
accommodations, cars, and pay the Nigerians received as well as other fringe benefits 
such as free fuel.90 The Gambians were not just envious of the Nigerians' material 
benefits; they felt that their presence was directly detrimental to their own careers. The 
Nigerians held all of the highest positions, with no Gambians above the rank of a 
Major.91 Therefore, the officers in particular felt that the Nigerians thwarted their 
potential for advancement. 
It appears that the junior officers were most offended by the Nigerian presence. 
The junior officers also began to look down on the Gambian senior officers, believing 
they were either complacent or complicit in the system that they felt disadvantaged 
them. An individual who was a junior officer at the time, said he and his cohort felt the 
senior Gambian officers were "useless" and there were serious internal tensions within 
the officer corps. He explained that because the junior officers worked most closely 
84 Author interview with military source D (former officer), September 2012. 
$5 Ibid. 
8G Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 55. 
87 Ibid., 32. 
88 Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier), October 2012. 
S9 Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 33. 
90 Ibid., 50. 
91 Author interview with military source D (former officer), September 2012; Sarr, Coup d'etat by the 
Gambia National Army, 19. 
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with the rank and file soldiers, their negative opinions of the senior officers spread to the 
enlisted ranks.92 
The senior Gambian officers may not have been as concerned or vocal about the 
Nigerians because they were closer to retirement and perhaps not as worried about 
moving up the ladder. A Gambian academic and former member of the Jawara regime 
has another hypothesis. He believes that the difference in reaction by the junior officers 
and senior officers in The Gambia represents a generational divide within the military. 
The junior officers at the time grew up in the 1960s -1970s and where thus more exposed 
to radical politics than their predecessors. He argues that they were more politically 
conscious and less willing to stand by what they saw as major injustices within the 
force.93 Abdoulaye Saine and Ebrima Ceesay have a similar assessment, stating that the 
divide was not necessarily one of exposure to radical politics but of having been more 
educated than their seniors who grew up in pre- independence years.94 
The strongly negative reaction that soldiers felt towards the Nigerian presence 
under NATAG contrasts with the generally more accepting attitude towards the 
Senegalese presence under the Condeferal Army agreement. By the arrival of NATAG 
the Gambian military no longer saw itself as inexperienced, especially after numerous 
iterations on foreign peacekeeping missions, and therefore less accepting of working 
alongside foreign troops within Gambian borders. A large part of the difference was 
cultural as several former Gambian soldiers explained that the Senegalese and Gambians 
share many similarities in terms of indigenous languages, religion, history, and culture. 
One soldier furthered the point by stating that every Gambian has a relative that is 
Senegalese and the Senegalese soldiers were seen as family.95 This family metaphor did 
not seem to extend to Nigerians who were viewed more as foreigners. Lastly, under the 
Confederal Army Senegalese and Gambian soldiers received the same pay and 
privileges. This was not the case with the NATAG. These complaints over foreign 
leadership are similar to mutinies seen in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire in the 
92 Author interview with military source F (former officer), August 2012. 
9' Author confidential interview, May 2012. 
94 Abdoulaye Saine and Ebrima Ceesay, "Post -Coup Politics and Authoritarianism in The Gambia: 1994- 
2012," in State and Society in The Gambia Since Independence: 1965 -2012, eds. Abdoulaye Saine, 
Ebrima Ceesay, and Ebrima Sall, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2013, 156. 
95 Author interview with military source D (former officer), September 2012. 
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early 1960s. In these incidents the foreigners were former colonial officers but there are 
similar patterns of soldiers feeling offended by privileges and responsibilities being 
given to outsiders over the national armed forces. 
One other important aspect of discontent among many Gambian military 
personnel at the time was the disbanding of the Gambian National Gendarmerie. While 
the gendarmerie and army trained separately they were relatively equally funded and 
served as a counter weight to each other.96 For example, it was the gendarmerie who 
countered the 1991 and 1992 mutinies amongst army members. However, in 1992 the 
government decided to disband the gendarmerie and merge the members into a unit 
within the police force called the Tactical Support Group (TSG).97 For those personnel 
who were in the gendarmerie, this was an unpopular decision because the police 
received less funding and equipment than the army and was generally seen as less 
prestigious.98 Soldiers blamed the decision to disband the gendarmerie on the Nigerians, 
who were advising the Gambian government on military matters at the time.99 
Furthermore, Gambian soldiers have retrospectively blamed the Nigerians for over- 
arming the Gambian National Army, introducing mortars, rocket propelled grenades, 
antiaircraft guns, heavy machine guns, grenades, and rocket launchers whereas the force 
had previously made do with smaller rifles and handguns.100 Numerous former soldiers 
argue that disbanding the gendarmerie caused the 1994 coup to be a "fait accompli" 
because there was no counterweight against the army.101 The unequal strength of the 
army compared to the police can be seen in the showdown between the two forces on the 
day of the 1994 coup as will be described below. 
While tensions were rising within the military, the civilian population was 
similarly expressing frustrations. In the early 1990s media grew increasingly critical of 
Jawara and the PPP, who by that point had been in power for nearly thirty years. 
Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 47; Chongan, The Price of Duty, 31. 
97 The Gambia Weekly, February 28, 1992. 
98 When the gendarmerie was converted into the TSG, many gendarmes requested a transfer to the army. 
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99 Chongan, The Price of Duty, 32. 
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Newspapers ran numerous stories accusing the government of inaction. For example, 
frequent news articles were published questioning why The Gambia still had no 
university.102 Other articles called the PPP "mere tax collectors" and showed pictures of 
garbage piling up and accused the government of failing on basic functions.103 The 
criticism did not just come from the media; citizens of various sectors of society began 
to take to the streets to express their grievances. Market vendors took their complaints 
about government eviction notices to State House, taxi drivers held strikes for better 
facilities, women in Bakau blockaded the street for the President's motorcade over water 
issues, and high school students protested over exam changes.104 Ongoing 
demonstrations in Brikama over the privatization of water taps grew increasingly large 
in the spring and summer of 1994, culminating in a march with an estimated 4,000 
citizens, which turned violent when protestors clashed with police forces (a rarity in The 
Gambia). 1°5 
Furthermore, corruption became a leading story in media in the early 1990s, with 
several high -level political corruption scandals uncovered.'06 One government 
interviewee explains that in the early 1990s "the whole atmosphere had changed, 
everyone started talking about change, even myself, we weren't sure what type of 
change we just wanted a change." He noted that at the time the military and civilian 
populations had a close relationship and speculated that "the military must have been 
aware of the grumblings of the civilians. "1°7 
6.7 The Third and Final Strike 
The mutinies in 1991 and 1992 had given Jawara two warnings of the problems 
within the military but more drastic measures were taken on the third revolt, which 
102 A sample of such articles include Daily Observer, May 30, 1994; Daily Observer, June 21, 1994; The 
Point, February 17, 1994. 
1°3 Daily Observer, July I -3, 1994; Daily Observer, July 14, 1994. 
1°4 Foroyaa, March 15, 1993; Foroyaa, April 28, 1993; Foroyaa, May 15, 1993; Foroyaa, May 30, 1994. 
1°5 Daily Observer, April 7, 1994; Foroyaa, July 15, 1994. 
1 
06 Wiseman and Vidler, "The July 1994 Coup d'etat in The Gambia: The End of an Era ?" 58; Kandeh, 
Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa, 183. 
1 °' Author confidential interview, May 2012. 
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occurred on July 22nd 1994. Almost twenty years after the incident, there is still major 
disagreement on whether this event was intended to be a mutiny or a coup. Even 
soldiers involved in the events give varying assessments as to the original intention. 
There are several published accounts of exactly what happened at a tactical level on the 
22nd of July.1°8 This assessment will only provide a summarized account, not 
necessarily to make a judgment about the original intent of the actions, but rather to 
show how the previous two mutinies were precursors to this event. 
In the months leading up to July 1994, it appears coups were on many people's 
minds. Interviewed former soldiers as well as President Jawara admit that there were 
numerous rumours about a pending coup. The local media had extensive reporting on 
neighbouring coups, in particular the 1992 coup in Sierra Leone and even ran a story just 
weeks before the Gambia coup titled "How Safe Are Our Leaders? "109 However, few 
people would have guessed this particular timing for a revolt because there was a 
bilateral exercise with the U.S. Navy scheduled to take place in and around Banjul. 
Announcements were made in the newspapers and radio to alert citizens to the exercise 
and warned people not to be alarmed by the increase in uniformed soldiers in the 
streets.110 Conducting the coup at the same time as a planned exercise, with American 
and Nigerian troops present, led some soldiers who were there on the day to claim it was 
a brilliant plan while others believe it was careless and suicida1.111 
On the morning of July 22nd President Jawara was at his office in State House 
when he received a report that there were accounts of a coup plot but the intelligence 
service deemed it just more rumours.112 Less than an hour later his aide de camp arrived 
and announced that armed soldiers were on their way to State House. They reportedly 
far outnumbered and out armed the small contingent of Presidential Guards at State 
108 For tactical level details of the coup see Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army and Chongan, 
The Price of Duly. 
109 Daily Observer, June 22, 1994. 
110 The Point, July 21, 1994. 
11 Ebrima Chongan is of the former opinion while Samsudeen Sarr is of the latter. 
112 Jawara had arrived home from England the day before and Gambian officers, including Yayha 
Jammeh, came to the airport armed to meet him. They were disarmed and sent away by the NATAG. In 
an interview just two days after the coup. Jammeh complains that at the airport he was publicly humiliated 
for "no apparent reason" and that this event "was the last straw." (Daily Observer, July 25, 1994) It 
remains unclear why the Gambian soldiers were armed but rumors began to spread that they had been 
planning to stage a coup at the airport. 
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House that day. Advisors recommended that Jawara and his family leave immediately 
and the American Ambassador offered to allow the president and his family refuge on 
the Navy ship which was anchored in Banjul port as part of the exercise. In Jawara's 
autobiography he makes a rather shocking admission by stating that this "was the first 
time I heard anything of a warship in our port." He later goes on to say 
It was strange that in all the official messages I had received daily from 
Banjul, my Vice President and Minister of Defence had not mentioned to 
me that he and our security chiefs had given permission for anything as 
massive as a joint GNA and US Navy training exercise, complete with a 
warship. I thought if the armed forces of another sovereign nation were 
going to engage with our national army in any kind of bilateral exercise, 
it would have been important enough for the head of state and 
commander -in -chief of the armed forces of the host country, at home or 
abroad, to be informed of such an engagement.L13 
This statement is representative of Jawara's disconnect with the military. Although a 
strong statesmen in many ways, he appeared very uninvolved in the military affairs of 
The Gambia. 
Jawara followed the advice to vacate State House and boarded the U.S. ship. 
When word got out that there was a group of armed soldiers heading towards Banjul 
confusion ensued within the armed forces, in part because people were uncertain if this 
was part of the exercise. The Tactical Support Group (TSG) from the police force was 
deployed to stop the soldiers from reaching Banjul. There was a standoff between the 
TSG and the soldiers near the Denton Bridge (the same location were mutineers were 
stopped in 1992). However, the police put up little opposition when it was confirmed 
that the soldiers were far better armed. Therefore with little internal resistance and a 
president who had already fled, the soldiers had no trouble taking over the state. The 
whole affair was over by midday, with no one injured. Thus marking "the demise of the 
longest continuously surviving multiparty democracy in Africa" at the time as well as 
unseating the continent's longest serving national leader.114 The soldiers made the 
obligatory announcement over the radio that the constitution was suspended and a 
113 Jawara, Kairaba, 380. 
114 Wiseman and Vidler, "The July 1994 Coup d'etat in The Gambia: The End of an Era ?" 53. 
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curfew was in place. The announcement listed "rampant corruption and the 
retrogressive nature of the country" as the cause of the coup. "5 
BBC interviewed Jawara while he was still on the U.S. ship and asked why he 
thought the military had overthrown him. He replied that he heard complaints about 
salary, corruption, and "bad food in the barracks" and urged the soldiers to discuss the 
problems with him as their Commander- in- Chief.16 However, he seems to have 
forgotten that soldiers did attempt to discuss these problems twice during past mutinies. 
Jawara also quickly learned that he could not count on international support. Although 
the U.S. military was docked in the port, Washington did not give permission for the 
U.S. Navy to intervene. Senegal also refused to come to the aid as they had in the 1981 
coup attempt but offered Jawara asylum in Dakar. Furthermore, the Nigerian 
contingent, who Jawara had trusted with his own protection and running the Gambian 
military, did not act to stop the coup. Numerous rumours and speculation continue to 
exist as to whether any of these three foreign powers were involved in planning or 
executing the coup, but there is little evidence to support the theory. 
The fact that Jawara left immediately, before the soldiers even reached Banjul, 
makes it difficult to tell if the initial plan was to arrive at State House to make demands 
or arrive at State House to take over."' In many ways the scenario in Banjul in 1994 
was similar to that of Freetown in 1992, as described in the previous Chapter. The 
events in Banjul in 1994 can serve as another example of the blurred line between 
mutinies and coups, particularly at the execution phase. 
Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh was announced to be the head of the new ruling 
council, named the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC). According to 
an officer involved in the events, this name was chosen based on the Valentine Strasser's 
military junta (named the National Provisional Ruling Council- NPRC), whom the 
is A text of the radio announcement can be found in Foroyaa, July 24, 1994. 
116 Transcript of the interview published in Foroyaa July 24, 1994. 
117 Military and police officers who were involved in the events explain that the key officers did not have a 
plan as to who would be in charge when the coup succeeded. This is confirmed with media reports that 
show that the new junta did not announce the council positions until days after the coup. Some take this to 
mean that they did not plan to take over and had to begin improvising when it turned out they were in 
control of the country. However, others note how heavily armed the soldiers were and conclude "these 
soldiers were not just trying to make a complaint." 
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Gambian officers admired.118 The AFPRC looked similar to the NPRC in terms of the 
members' age (AFPRC members ranged from 25 -30 years of age) and minimal 
advanced education and international experience.119 Gambia's AFPRC was even more 
junior in rank than Sierra Leone's NPRC, consisting of one Lieutenant (Yahya Jammeh) 
and three 2nd Lieutenants (Sana Sabally, Edward Singateh and Sadibou Haidara). 
The anger of the junior ranks towards their senior officers, which was 
highlighted during the 1991 and 1992 mutinies, was acted upon by these junior officers. 
The few senior officers that were either loyal enough or bold enough to stand by while 
the junior soldiers rebelled were rounded up and arrested. A senior officer at the time, 
stated that he was "shocked" to learn that a Sergeant was in charge of the arrested senior 
officers.12° Another former soldier also noted the officers' surprise at being the brunt of 
the enlisted anger but claimed this should not have come as a shock given the history of 
mutinies and complaints about officers' behaviour.121 In the months and years following 
the coup nearly all officers from the rank of Captain and above were retired, many after 
being detained and some having died or been killed in prison.122 
Reporting at the time, and assessments written years after the event, claim that 
the coup was an extension of the previous complaints over non -payment of the 
ECOMOG mission.123 However, I do not regard this as an accurate portrayal of the 
events. None of the key soldiers in the July 22nd coup were part of the ECOMOG 
deployments. In fact, most of those that orchestrated the coup were on the opposing side 
of the mutinies. Singateh was one of the soldiers that put down the mutiny on the 
Denton bridge in 1992.124 Sabally had the unfortunate luck of being on duty at Yundum 
barracks when the ECOMOG soldiers started the mutiny in 1992. He was investigated 
118 Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 131. 
119 Hughes and Perfect, A Political History of The Gambia, 281. 
120 Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 89. 
121 Author interview with military source C (former enlisted soldier), October 2012. 
122 Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 19; There have been numerous deaths of military 
personnel at the hands of the AFRC in later years of the regime's rule. For more details on this topic see 
Chapter 6 Abdoulaye Saine The Paradox of Third -Wave Democratization in Africa: The Gambia under 
AFPRC -APRC Rule, 1994-2008. 
12. Some examples include Africa South of the Sahara, 1995 edition and West Africa, August 1 -7, 1994. 
124 Sarr, Coup d'etat by the Gambia National Army, 41. 
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for involvement but found innocent.125 Jammeh was in the gendarmerie at the time and 
in charge of the military police and thus also involved in restraining the mutineers who 
were arrested by the gendarmerie.' 26 Furthermore, although the soldiers who overthrew 
the government did make complaints about pay when they came to power, they never 
claimed it was payment from the ECOMOG mission. There seems to be particular 
misperceptions about Jammeh's involvement in ECOMOG. In numerous conversations 
with Gambian civilians they have told me that Jammeh was a part of the ECOMOG 
deployment in Liberia. This is backed up by academics, for example, Adekeye Adebajo 
writes that Jammeh "himself served with ECOMOG in Liberia. "127 However, this 
appears to be only a rumour. Military sources that I interviewed say he never served in 
Liberia (or elsewhere abroad) and his official biography online does not list any 
deployments.128 Furthermore, in the first press conference conducted by the AFPRC a 
journalist specifically asked if the soldiers' grievances were related to the Liberia 
mission, to which Jammeh responded no.129 
There were individuals involved in the coup who had been on the ECOMOG 
deployments because by 1994 there had been numerous iterations of Gambian 
deployments to Liberia, but as earlier described not all former ECOMOG members had 
issues with their pay. San believes that even after the mutineers' payment issues were 
resolved, many of the soldiers still wished "doom and gloom" on the government and 
military hierarchy. Therefore it may have been easier to motivate the veterans but there 
is no indication that deployment payments were still a concern in 1994, particularly for 
the four officers leading the coup. 
The coup in 1994 should not be seen as a direct continuation of the 1991 and 
1992 mutinies but rather the mutinies were an early warning system for the discontent 
that fuelled the coup. All three groups of soldiers had similar complaints, particularly 
about leadership and corruption. The fact that the 1991 and 1992 mutineers and the 
1994 coup makers came from different sectors of the military (the former recently 
125 Ibid.,91. 
126 Ibid.,129. 
127 Adebajo, Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa. 143. 
128 President Jammeh's official biography can be found on The Gambia State House webpage at 
http://www.statehouse.gm/president.html. 
129 Transcript of the press conference can be found in Foroyaa July 29, 1994. 
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deployed rank and file, the latter junior officers) but had very similar grievances, shows 
that the issues were pervasive in the military, not limited to one particular unit or rank. 
The past mutinies may have actually aided the 1994 coup leaders in terms of 
logistics. The Assistant General of Police Operations admits that when he received 
intelligence about soldiers making their way to Banjul on July 22 he believed it was just 
"another mutiny within the military. "130 The Vice President reportedly also told the 
American Ambassador a similar account that the disturbance was just another 
demonstration. Since the top levels of the military and civilian hierarchies saw the event 
as a "mere" mutiny not a coup, it likely bought the rebellious soldiers more time. The 
government and military did not respond as forcefully or quickly as they could have. 
These comments also shows that leaders, both military and civilian, often do not take 
mutinies as a serious threat. This is understandable, particularly in the case of The 
Gambia, since mutinies on their own did not lead to major political upheaval or loss of 
life. However, this is a nearsighted view and treats mutinies as acts of indiscipline, 
rather than warnings of serious problems within the force. 
6.8 Potential Problems Below the Surface 
In the nearly twenty years since Jammeh came to power there are some tangible 
improvements in the country, such as a national university and improved roads and 
infrastructure. However, civil liberties and human rights have been abandoned, leading 
The Gambia to take the opposite path to most countries in the region, many of which 
have seen both improve since the 1990s. For example, The 2011 Economist Intelligence 
Unit's Democracy Index places The Gambia in the "Authoritarian Regime" category and 
places the country in the bottom quarter of all countries worldwide in terms of 
democratic practices (and furthermore Gambia's ranking has continually dropped over 
the last 5 years). ' 3 ' In 2014 Freedom House put The Gambia in its lowest category, 
''° Chongan, The Price of Duty, . 8. 
131 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2011, 
http: / /www.sida.se /G lobal/ About% 20Sida /Sá %20arbetar %20ví /EIU_Democracy_Index_Dec20 11.pdf 
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"Not Free," in terms of civil and political liberties, a downgrade from pervious years in 
which it was deemed "partially free. "132 Additionally, Amnesty International has 
continually issued reports about forced disappearances and unlawful killings. 1 33 
The repressive environment in The Gambia today, made it the most difficult of 
the three case studies to attempt to get an assessment of the potential for a future mutiny. 
It would be unwise for me to ask about future revolts within The Gambia and even more 
dangerous for an interviewee to offer a prediction. However, I was surprised that one 
individual who has long worked for the government in The Gambia openly explained 
"from the surface the military appears calm but inside it is not." This source went on to 
state "Gambians are very nervous at the moment, everyone is expecting a coup but no 
one will talk about it, some are wishing it, some are dreading it." The source concluded 
with a shadowy statement that "military boys" are "good at hiding what they are 
thinking until the right time. "134 
If the citizens within The Gambia are hiding what they really think, the opposite 
can be said about many of the Diaspora community, who are the harshest critics of 
Jammeh. Interviewees from this sector nearly all expressed opinions that a military 
coup is a likely scenario within The Gambia. However, when I asked if a mutiny over 
pay or conditions, without a goal.of taking political power was likely, most answered no. 
They commented that a mutiny scenario would be very dangerous for soldiers, 
especially given the large number who have previously been arrested and accused of 
plotting a coup, several of who have recently been executed for their alleged 
involvement. Some feared that a coup would be a violent and bloody affair, whereas 
another exclaimed that he thought it would involve an isolated attack.135 The 
commonality to the various guesses is that anyone with grievances within the military 
would not risk making those public through a mutiny, but rather would have to 
132 Freedom House, Freedoms of the World, 2014, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/gambia#.UOLgGShAE5s 
133 Amnesty International, Annual Report 2012, Gambia, 
http: / /www.amnesty .org /en /region /gambia/report-20 12 
134 Author confidential interview, May 2012. 
135 Many of the predictions involved comparisons to other African examples. One person said there would 
be a scenario like Guinea Bissau in 2009, another that it would look like Niger in 1999 and yet another 
predicted a situation like Democratic Republic of Congo in 2001. 
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completely remove the head of state from power. This supports the theory proposed in 
Chapter Three that mutinies are less likely under authoritative regimes. Mutinies require 
a reasonable chance that the government will respond and most seemed to think that 
Jammeh would be unlikely to do so. 
Yet all of these predictions are based on the premise that the military is 
discontented. The secretiveness of the military sector in The Gambia makes this 
difficult to assess. Soldiers interviewed in The Gambia had only positive things to say. 
One soldier exclaimed "we are extremely happy about what he (Jammeh) is doing for 
the armci forces. he is one of us. you know what we say, once a soldier always a soldier, 
ev er\ one is happy.'13' While this individual may indeed be happy, I would not have 
expec :cJ-1 a less enthusiastic response while at the military headquarters in Banjul, just 
blocks from St.-..e House. While interviews with soldiers in The Gambia uncovered 
some valuable info:-:-cation about past mutinies, they were not helpful in assessing the 
current star.: c f sZ :__ -s. This point was driven home by one officer telling me I could 
only ::s ` .; . :: scions to im and his men about events under the Jawara regime; any 
questie:-.._:'out the Jammeh regime was off limits. 
Still it could very well be the case that most soldiers in the Gambia are content 
and no-. c -. cc ut'. ytam interviewees note that the miIitary is very 
:. : ;. e of. _ -..::. .:1 s first -hand the danger of a disgruntled military and 
likely works to keep diner o satisfied. However, there are signs of instability. There have 
been numerous reported co p plots and many military arrests made as a result. There 
was a joke told to me on a couple occasions in The Gambia that starts by asking if I 
knew where. it 1 e Gambian Fourth Battalion is located. The Gambia only has three 
lhattations so dine s,w6er to the joke is Mile Two Prison. This dark humour shows that 
people aire widely aware of rÍlte fact that there are many former military personnel locked 
away inn the cot mi y.s only prison_ Jamtneh is also known for not shying away from 
tiring people.. both millitatry and ei is of any rank. Whereas this could leave a large 
number of venetian ;efull ex- nmilliit: - .: :embers. one source explained_ :.hat most military 
members of an olflioer rank who are reportedly "fired- are Usu .1 \ the r_given a job 
;,'-àuNihuur iumüaaiiLow i7JOurt-Itl' 1133 ((current enlisted soldier). May 2012. 
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within the government. One final point of potential discontent is that ethnicity within 
the military appears to be a growing issue. At the time of the coup, ethnicity within the 
military did not seem to be a major factor for promotion. The fact that the four members 
of the AFPRC were from four different ethnic groups can be seen to represent the ethnic 
diversity in the armed forces at the time. 1 37 However, in recent years there are many 
accusations that Jammeh's Jola ethnic group have been favoured for promotion and key 
positions (despite their minority status within the country). 1 38 
6.9 Conclusion 
The mutinies in The Gambia in 1991 and 1992 were initially triggered by salary 
complaints but underlying these grievances were accusations of corruption, 
mismanagement and general distrust of the senior ranks in the hierarchy. While the 
mutineers may have been the first to vocalize these complaints publicly, many of the 
issues had deep roots and resonated with larger sectors of the military. The government 
viewed the mutinies as a pay dispute, and largely treated them as such, a common 
pattern in mutinies and one which this thesis attempts to dispel. The government 
addressed the deployment pay issue but did not appropriately handle the more systemic 
issues. Little was done to develop more professional Gambian military leadership or 
address the accusations of inherent favouritism, nepotism, and corruption. 
The arrival of the NATAL contingent. which were invited bv e Gambian 
government following the first round of mutinies, fu her exacerhateä the t ruhJerns as 
the Nigerian officers were seen as another hindrance to advancement. a -ly by the 
junior officers. Whereas the 1991 and 1992 mutinies ere limited to enlisted s from 
a specific unit, the response to the mutiny actua?l. brT..ig t a v, r ran_:_ 
into the camp of disgruntled soiidi r=. The 
eadership ultimately led t.. a h 
d'eráect- Political Hd=:dory .' 
,:,.na4 , with Dr. Alxdoolaóe iice0,8 with US_ J 94-Aauimittp 
2e05 
case of mutinies in the Gambia demonstrates potential unintended consequences of 
mutinies. What was at the time viewed as simply a call for pay (and a fairly modest call 
at that) contributed to a cycle of events that drastically changed the country. 
The ECOMOG soldiers in The Gambia are similar to the Tiger unit in Sierra 
Leone, both in their complaints and their deployment experiences. The cohesiveness 
needed for a mutiny was likely developed during the shared deployment experience to 
Liberia. The Gambian soldiers returned with a heightened view of their own role and 
worth within the military, a trend discussed in Chapter Four. The Gambian mutinies 
also exhibit mutinies as a form of communication. Soldiers first attempted to open a 
dialogue with the government by bringing their complaints to the media. When that 
failed they went directly to the president. This tactic was aided by civil liberties in The 
Gambia at the time, which allowed for generally free reporting on the story and a fair 
trial for the mutineers. The lack of similar freedoms today as well as a neglect for human 
rights under the current regime may decrease the likelihood of mutinies in The Gambia 
in the near term. 
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Chapter Seven- An Escalating Cycle of Mutinies: Case Study of 
Burkina Faso 
7.1 Introduction 
In Burkina Faso in 2011, mass military mutinies followed widespread civilian 
protests causing many to speculate that the end of President Blaise Compaoré "s quarter 
century rule was near. A brief history of revolts in Burkina Faso will show that while 
the crisis of 2011 was exceptional in its size and thus severity, it follows a pattern of 
previous similar incidents. The chapter will then examine the civilian demonstrations 
that took place in Burkina Faso in order to set the stage for the military mutinies and 
illustrate how many of the themes expressed in civilian protests overlapped with military 
complaints. Next, the 2011 mutinies will be chronicled, showing the various ways in 
which the government attempted to quell the rebellion and how after over two months 
they finally succeeded in ending the unrest. 
The second half of the chapter will delve deeper into the internal tensions in the 
military. The large number of participants, their claims, and their history of mutinying 
suggests that there are significant tensions within the Burkinabé military structure. 
Similar to other violent mass mutinies, as described in Chapter Two, the Burkinabé 
soldiers were loosely united in anger and frustrations, rather than unified around a 
specific goal or experience. Corruption and favouritism in recruitment and deployment 
selection will be examined to show their relation to the lack of trust among ranks and 
general indiscipline observed during the mutinies. The mutinies were so widespread that 
sectors of the military that did not participate became the exception. I will examine the 
two main groups not involved, the officers and the gendarmerie, and speculate as to why 
these sectors did not join with their rebellious colleagues. 
This case study is distinct from the other two in that the mutinies occurred 
alongside civilian protests, a trend that is seen in other mutinies throughout the region. I 
will pay particular attention to the complex relationship between civilians and the 
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military (the junior ranks specifically) to explain why soldiers may have been inspired 
by the civilian movement. Additionally, I will evaluate how the civilian population 
interpreted the military revolts. President Compaoré took many measures to appease 
both the civilian and military dissatisfaction and this chapter will conclude with an 
examination of the changes that have occurred since the crisis, in particular to determine 
if they will be enough to put an end to the mutiny cycle. 
7.2 A Temporary Civilian -Military Union 
Our country is the champion of the coup d'état" exclaimed the editorial chief of 
a major radio station in Ouagadougou, and he was not exaggerating.' Burkina Faso 
holds the record, alongside Nigeria and Benin, for the most successful coups in all of 
sub - Saharan Africa, no small feat given the competition. In addition to six successful 
coups, one failed coup attempt, and at least six recorded coup plots, the Burkinabé 
military has also had its fair share of mutinies.2 
Until 2011, the most well known mutiny in Burkina Faso occurred in the 
southern city of Po in 1983. The incident was sparked by the arrest of Captain Thomas 
Sankara, a highly popular and revolutionary figure, over charges of treason.3 Upon 
hearing of his arrest, the soldiers in Po, led by Sankara's close friend Captain Blaise 
Compaoré. took control of the city, including police and customs stations and cut 
telephone communication to the capital. The mutineers set up road blocks and for over 
two weeks the soldiers had complete control of the city. Reports from the time claim the 
atmosphere was tense but there does not appear to have been any violence. The soldiers 
were clear in their demands; they wanted an unconditional release of their comrade, 
Captain Sankara.4 
Author interview with editorial chief' for private radio station, March 2012. 
2 McGowan, "African Military coups d'etat, 1956 -2001: Frequency, Trends, and Distribution," 367. 
3 Micheal Wilkins, The Death of Thomas Sankara and the Rectification of the People's Revolution in 
Burkina Faso," African Affairs Vol.88 No.352 (Jul 1989): 381. 
4 Africa Research Bulletin May 1983, 6849; Africa Research Bulletin June 1983, 6684; Africa 
Confidential June 8 1983, 7 -8, West Africa June 27. 1983, 1490 -1491. 
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At the same time that the commandos were mutinying in Po, students throughout 
the country were protesting on the street for Sankara's release.' The government gave in 
and released Sankara although still kept him under house arrest. However, this did not 
prove to be the end of the saga and tension between the government and Sankara, along 
with his many followers (both military and civilian), continued. Less than two months 
after the Po mutiny, the military overthrew President Ouedraogo (who had come to 
power in a coup just a year earlier) and established a ruling council called the Conseil 
National de la Révolution (CNR), headed by Sankara.6 The civilian involvement in 
demanding the release of Sankara and later supporting the coup, led Sankara to claim the 
overthrow of Ouedraogo was a popular revolution, not a simple military coup.' 
The civilian and military sectors developed a close relationship during this 
period, which can help explain the crisis in 2011, as will be detailed later in the chapter. 
Even before gaining political power, Sankara made efforts to break down the barriers 
between the civilian population and the military, causing an "unheard of change of 
attitude. "8 For example, when he was in charge of the commando unit in Po, soldiers 
were encouraged to integrate with civilians. They assisted with the local harvesting, had 
joint football teams and formed an orchestra together. 9 Sankara's integration of civilian 
and military sectors was more than just a social assimilation. This young, charismatic. 
figure espoused ideas that mixed populism. Marxism -Leninism, pan -Africanism and 
nationalism, similar to the ideas of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana at the time.' 0 His calls for 
class equality along with basics such as "food, clean drinking water, clothes, housing. 
schools, and health" made him highly popular among the masses in Burkina Faso, which 
was at the time ranked as the third poorest country in the world.'' He had a particularly 
strong following amongst the youth, a popularity that persists in Burkina Faso today. 
5 Victoria Brittain, "Introduction to Sankara and Burkina Faso," Review of African Political Economy 
No.32 (Apr 1985): 45. 
6 Pierre Englebert, Burkina Faso:: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1996): 55. 
7 Brittain, "Introduction to Sankara and Burkina Faso," 45. 
8 Ibid., 42. 
9 Ibid., 42. 
10 Englebert, Burkina Fuso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa, 152 -155. 
Ibid., 43. 
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Unlike Strasser and Jammeh, who also espoused populist ideas, Sankara proved 
his campaign was not only rhetoric, which increased his popularity, particularly among 
the lower economic classes. He made visible changes to remove symbols of government 
wealth and excess with actions such as auctioning the government's fleet of Mercedes 
vehicles and readjusting government salaries so that ministers and public servants all 
made the same salary. He did not exempt himself from the policy and collected the 
same wages as other civil servants. Even as Head of State he ate alongside the rank and 
file soldiers in the mess hall.' 
Sankara and the CNR made an effort to change the way the military was viewed 
by the population, as well as the way the military viewed its own role. Whereas 
traditionally the military in Burkina Faso (and elsewhere in the region) was seen as an 
extension of an often unpopular regime, Sankara argued that they should be a 
"component of the people ".13 He publicly stated 
the new soldier must live and suffer among the people to which he 
belongs. The days of the free -spending army are over. From now on, 
besides handling arms, the army will work in the fields and raise cattle 
sheep and poultry. It will build schools and health clinics and ensure 
their functioning.14 
Most military leaders who come to power in a coup make attempts to win the 
military over with added equipment, salaries, or prestige but instead Sankara in a way 
"demoted" the military to civilian roles. Furthermore, during this period the military 
became "juniorized ", giving unprecedented power and influence to the junior ranks. 
The shared grievances between civilians and military as well as the empowerment of 
junior ranks over their seniors are traits seen in the 2011 mutinies. 
Sankara and the CNR had plenty of critics at home and abroad and the 
implementation of their program was not without fault. The revolutionary ideas of 
Sankara never truly came to fruition and sections of the military can be seen to have 
¡2 Wilkins, "The Death of Thomas Sankara and the Rectification of the People's Revolution in Burkina 
Faso," 383. 
13 West Africa, August 20, 1983. 
14 Thomas Sankara, "Political Orientation Speech" presented by Sankara on behalf of the NCR, October 2, 
1983, from Thomas Sankura: Speeches from the Burkina Faso Revolution 1983 -87 (Pathfinder 
Press:2002): 47. 
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killed the revolutionary spirit, both figuratively and literally. In 1987, less than four 
years after coming to power, Sankara was assassinated. It is widely believed that 
Compaoré, Sankara's closest ally, was responsible for the order to kill Sankara but 
despite ongoing efforts by groups to prove this claim, it remains unsubstantiated. With 
the death of Sankara, Compaoré became president, a position he still holds today. By 
the time of Sankara's death, he had come under criticism for using repressive techniques 
to limit opposition. The harmonious relationship between the civilian sectors and 
military that Sankara initially envisioned did not last, and therefore it would be 
inaccurate to claim that there is an exceptionally strong civil military relationship in 
Burkina Faso. Instead, it is more realistic to say that the civilian and military sectors 
have a complex relationship and one in which there is a history of overlap between 
civilian and military movements, particularly at the lower economic class level. 
7.3 A Tested Tactic 
Compaoré retired his fatigues and was elected as a civilian in 1991, 1998, 2005, 
and 2010. His numerous wins should not be mistaken for overwhelming popularity. 
There are widespread restrictions on opposition parties and voter turn out in presidential 
elections is low. For example, voter turnout in the 2010 election was 54 percent, down 
from 57 percent in 2005.15 Despite Compaoré's military background and his history of 
leading military upheavals (both the mutiny in 1982 and coups in 1983 and 1987), he 
has not been able to keep the military satisfied. Soldiers in Burkina Faso have used 
mutinies as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction on a fairly regular basis since the 
late 1990s. 
In July 1999 soldiers who returned from Central African Republic after 
participating in the MINURCA peacekeeping mission staged a protest over unpaid 
" Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=BF 
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mission subsidies.16 The mutineers also claimed that while on the mission they made 
$230 a month while their counterparts from Mali made $610 and had therefore 
calculated that the government owed them (collectively) $20 million in back pay.' 7 This 
is consistent with patterns discussed in Chapter Four, in which dissatisfaction following 
peacekeeping deployments is often related to the ability of the soldiers to compare their 
conditions and pay with those from other countries. 
The protest quickly spread beyond the peacekeepers to other garrisons 
throughout the country and these soldiers added complaints about living allowances. 
They also made specific demands that the government return fees that had been 
deducted from their salary to pay for new soldier housing because the housing was never 
built. They accused senior officers of embezzling the funds that were meant for the 
housing project.18 During the mutiny the soldiers kidnapped Colonel Kouame Louge, a 
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.19 NCOs were used as liaisons between the 
protesting soldiers and the military hierarchy and the soldiers were paid at least part of 
the amount they demanded 20 The 1999 revolts were similar to the events in 2011 
because they occurred amidst ongoing demonstrations by civilians over the suspected 
murder of journalist Nobert Zongo by government forces2l 
There were also mutinies by soldiers in 2003, 2006, and 2007. The incident in 
2006 was the most threatening of this series. In December 2006, during a conflict 
between police and soldiers, a police officer shot and killed a soldier. In response the 
soldiers then attacked police stations (some of which they set on fire) and freed over 600 
prisoners from jail. As a result the ECOWAS Heads of State summit scheduled for 
Ouagadougou that week was postponed. A week after the incident began "a first 
meeting took place between soldiers and the MoD [Ministry of Defence]. Surprisingly, 
instead of complaining about their fellow deceased, they demanded for improvement of 
16 Col HL Nombre, "Civil- Military Relations and National Security in Burkina Faso: An Assessment," 
July 2008, 29. 
1' "Burkina Faso soldiers end protest," BBC, July 15, 1999. 
18 "Soldiers End Mutiny in Burkina Faso," AP, July 15, 1999. 
19 Ibid. 
20 
Nombre, "Civil- Military Relations and National Security in Burkina Faso: An Assessment," July 2008, 
29. 
21 
Ernest Harsch, "Trop, c'est trop! Civil Insurgence in Burkina Faso 1989- 1999" Review of African 
Political Economy 26, no.81(Sep. 1999): 401. 
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accommodation, welfare allowances and dressing. "22 As will be described below, this 
escalation of demands also characterizes the 2011 mutinies. 
Burkinabé Colonel Nombre argues that soldiers were never penalized for their 
participation in these events and there were never serious assessments conducted to 
determine the root causes of the mutinies. In a report he wrote in 2008 he expressed 
concern about the indiscipline within the military and argued that a major military 
restructuring was needed to address the problem.23 However it does not appear that 
significant changes were made in the military even after numerous demonstrations and 
mutinies. In response to the severed relationship between the army and police, the 
Ministry of Defence announced a plan to move the urban military bases farther outside 
of towns. The ministry believed that this would separate the soldiers from their rivals, 
the police, and reduce the chances of another altercation between the two. However, this 
angered the soldiers who wanted to remain close to their families in town. Soldiers 
added this to their complaints about military retirement age and demonstrated in October 
of 2007. A commission was set up and led by President Compaoré's brother, to 
negotiate between the soldiers and senior military leadership and resulted in the 
mutineers receiving part of their demands.24 The events in 2011 should be viewed in the 
context of these series of mutinies. Soldiers were likely emboldened by the immediate 
material success of their past revolts but also still dissatisfied that the larger issues, such 
as corruption, went unaddressed. 
7.4 Familiar Dissatisfaction Reignited 
22 Nombre, "Civil- Military Relations and National Security in Burkina Faso: An Assessment," 34; Similar 
account provided in "Fragile Democracy Being Tested," IRIN, December 27, 2006. 
23 Nombre, "Civil- Military Relations and National Security in Burkina Faso: An Assessment," 35. 
24 American Embassy Ouagadougou, "Burkina Faso: Military Retirees Surprise Government with 
Aggressive Demands for Improved Benefits, Movement of Camps Outside of Main Cities," April 28. 
2008. 
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The military mutinies of 2011 were directly proceeded by and overlapped with 
the largest civilian demonstrations seen in Burkina Faso since at least 1998 -1999.25 
During interviews in Burkina Faso, locals referred to the mutinies and civilian 
demonstrations collectively as "the 2011 crisis." The civilian side of this crisis began 
with protests following the arrest and death of a student named Justin Zongo in 
Koudougou in late February 2011.26 The government made an official statement 
claiming that Zongo died in custody of meningitis, while rumours that he was beaten to 
death by police quickly spread. Students throughout the country were outraged that no 
one was charged with Zongo's death. Within two weeks, the protests spread to dozens 
of cities throughout the country. 
As the protests escalated so did the scope of the grievances. It was no longer just 
about the perceived injustice of the Zongo case but about other suspected murders that 
had not been accounted for. Chrysogone Zougmore, President of Burkina Faso's main 
human rights organization, Mouvement Burkinabé des Droits de l'Homme et des 
Peuples (MBDHP), said "the crisis was one of years of injustice. "27 Bazie Bassolina, 
Secretary General of the confederation of labour unions, CGT -B, explained that the 
death of Zongo in police custody was not a one -time event but rather the latest in a series 
of suspicious deaths over decades, which many hold the government responsible for.28 
Other infamous examples he cited were the death of Thomas Sankara (1987), medical 
student and activist Dabo Boukary (1990), and director of the newspaper L 'independent 
Norbert Zongo. 
29 
Hamidou Idogo, editor and chief of Journal du Jeudi, expressed a 
similar opinion by stating "here in our country we don't trust authorities anymore. 
There is crime in every domain and no justice. "30 For many interviewees, like Idogo, 
the crisis of 2011 was first and foremost an issue of justice and human rights. 
25 Large country-wide demonstrations occurred in 1998 when government officials were suspected of 
killing journalist Norbert Zongo. 
26 Justin Zongo is not a direct relative of Norbert Zongo but some speculate that the matching surname 
brought back memories of Norbert Zongo's suspected murder, further fueling the anger of protestors. 
27 Author interview with Chrysogone Zougmore, President of MBDHP, March 2012. 
28 Author interview, March 2012; CGT -B is the abbreviation. for Confédération Générale du Travail du 
Burkina, a confederation of 12 national trade unions. 
29 Author interview with Bazie Bassolina, Secretary General of CGT -B, March 2012. 
i0 Author interview with Hamidou Idogo. Editor and Chief of Journal du Jeudi, March 2012. 
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In addition to the issue of justice, labour unions, civil society groups, and 
individuals began to protest over the high cost of living and low wages, grievances that 
much of the country could relate to. The demonstrations grew in size, location, and 
cause, with various groups expressing loosely related complaints. Cotton growers in 
Bobo Dioulasso demonstrated their anger at low cotton prices, while students in 
Koudougou took to the streets over police repression, teachers in Gaoua demanded 
higher living allowances and unions in Ouagadougou organized a march calling for an 
increase in public sector salaries.3 ' Although the specific requests differed, they all 
shared and expressed feelings of dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Burkina Faso. 
Tensions rose along with the grievances and the protests turned destructive. 
Heavy handed police responses led to civilian injuries and deaths, further incensing the 
protesters. Police stations, government buildings, and the ruling party headquarters were 
vandalized and some set on fire by angry mobs. The targets of destruction were a clear 
indication that the demonstrators placed the blame on the government. This was 
confirmed through interviews as well. When asked to explain the cause of the crisis one 
journalist said, "the crisis is complex but to say it simply, the explanation is bad 
governance." 32 The media drew attention to the fact that Compaoré has been in power 
since 1987 and implied that it was time for a leadership change, calling the events a 
"crisis of confidence. "33 Similarly, a Burkinabé academic explained that Burkina Faso 
is a "false democracy ", one in which real opposition is not allowed. He argued that it 
was the lack of democratic representation that led to the widespread demonstrations. He 
noted, "When people can't find a legal solution to their problems they find other 
ways... if citizens are not well treated and see their rights are in danger, we have a 
revolt. "34 
31 S. Coulibably, "Socio- political Crisis in Burkina Faso in 2011 From a Citizen Perspective," July 7, 
2011; "Mort d'un élève à Koudougou: Violence et répression excessives," Bendré, February 28, 2011: 
"Burkina Faso teacher's strike: Union Agrees Deal ", BBC, May 25, 2011. 
32 Author interview with editorial chief for private radio station, March 2012. 
33 Some examples of this type of rhetoric in the local media include L 'indépendent, N9 March 1, 2011, Le 
reporter, N66, I5 -31 March, 201 1 and L'observateur Paalga, N7840, 16 March, 2011. 
34 Author interview with Professor A, March 2012. 
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7.5 The Military Enters the Scene 
The situation in Burkina Faso went from bad to worse when after a month of 
civilian protests, the military started their own demonstrations. The initial cause of the 
military mutinies was not directly related to the initial cause of the civilian crisis, 
although both shared complaints about the justice system. Just as the civilian 
demonstrations quickly added grievances and participants, so did the military 
demonstration. As the mutinies grew, one trait that remained consistent was that all 
participants were amongst the enlisted ranks.35 
The initial mutiny was sparked by soldiers' objections to a court ruling. A group 
of five junior soldiers based in Ouagadougou were arrested after they allegedly beat and 
publicly humiliated a man who they accused of having inappropriate contact with the 
wife of a deployed soldier.36 When the soldiers were given sentences ranging from 
fifteen to eighteen months in jail, their fellow soldiers took to the streets, firing their 
weapons in the air and eventually looting local shops in protest of the sentencing. 
In interviews with Burkinabé soldiers, they explained that this unit was angry 
about the sentencing for two main reasons. The first is that they simply felt it was not 
deserved. They commented that the soldiers felt they were defending the honour of their 
colleague's wife and noted that any respectable man would agree with them. The 
second reason, and what one source called the most important reason," was that the 
rank and file soldiers felt they were being unfairly punished due to their low rank.37 One 
interviewee explained, "the guys had assumed that the higher officers would speak out 
on their behalf and they did not. "38 Another provided a similar account by stating "they 
were angry at their senior officers for not stepping in. "39 Through these statements it 
35 Author interview with military source AA (former officer, currently working in security sector), March 
2012. 
36 Military sources were intentionally vague in providing details about what the incident entailed. One 
source told me that I would need to find a woman to tell me. Nearly all media reporting refers to the 
incident as a 'sex scandal' and the International Crisis Group explains that soldiers felt the civilian was 
"too forward" with the soldiers' wife. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in security sector),. 
March 2012. 
39 Author interview with military source AA (former officer, currently working in security sector), March 
2012. 
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becomes clear that the military is accustomed to being above the law. This is confirmed 
in a leaked U.S. Embassy cable from 2009.4° The report details a series of nine military 
tribunals involving eleven military members that were tried publicly with press in 
attendance. However, the majority of the cases involved driving infractions and there 
was one case of "desertion during times of peace. "41 The report concludes that the 
"Burkinabé military has been put on notice...the soldiers are being told that they no 
longer benefit from total immunity." 2 This indicates that it was unusual for soldiers to 
be held accountable for even small violations. However, the report was overly 
optimistic in assessing that these public trials would result in major changes and military 
members in 2011 still believed they were entitled to immunity from the law. 
Soldiers explained that the mutineers were not only resentful that they were 
punished but also alleged that officers had done much worse in the past without having 
been charged. 43 For example, several different military sources told a story about an 
officer who had shot his wife and was simply moved to another base rather than charged 
with a criminal offense. Here the mutinying soldiers made similar accusations as the 
civilians by claiming that the law was selective. The soldiers never explicitly mentioned 
being inspired by the Justin Zongo case, but the movement likely fuelled the accusations 
of inequality within the legal system. It became easier for the soldiers to claim their case 
was mishandled when there were widespread public outcries about the poor state of the 
Burkinabé justice system. 
It is also likely that the arrested soldiers were particularly offended by having 
been detained by the police. One military source explained, "it would be almost unheard 
of for a police officer to arrest someone in the military, even a junior member.'44 There 
is a long rivalry between the military and police, as highlighted in the open conflict 
between the two groups in 2006. 
In order to calm down the mutinying soldiers, the authorities released the 
arrested soldiers. However this angered the justice department who went on strike to 
t0 American Embassy Ouagadougou, "Burkina Faso: Military Court Hands Out Sentences," October 2009. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Author interview with military source AA (former officer, currently working in security sector), March 
2012. 
44Author interview with military source CC (international officer in Burkina Faso), March 2012. 
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protest. Additionally, traders and shop owners whose merchandise had been looted or 
destroyed by the mutineers began to demonstrate. At this point "the regime was faced 
with a multipronged protest which included the movement against impunity, traders, the 
justice department, and the army." 45 Before the government could resolve this problem, 
a separate mutiny broke out in Fada N'Gourma, approximately 200 km east of 
Ouagadougou. 
Much like the Ouagadougou mutiny, which occurred just a week earlier, the 
soldiers in Fada N'Gourma protested a court ruling. In this case the arrested soldier had 
been convicted of raping a minor. The residents of Fada N'Gourma, who had surely 
seen reporting of the destruction caused in the Ouagadougou mutiny, immediately 
closed shops and left the streets.46 The soldiers fired weapons into the air and 
intimidated authorities into releasing their arrested comrade.47 Professor Yonaba argues 
that the release of the soldiers in Ouagadougou and Fada N'Gourma was a major setback 
for the rights of the Burkinabé people.48 Overruling the decision of the justice 
department due to the unruly behaviour of junior soldiers, further delegitimized the 
government who was viewed as extending the pattern of impunity for military personnel. 
It showed that the law was selective, justifying the civilian accusations about the Justin 
Zongo case and other previous unresolved crimes. 
Although the initial demands of these soldiers from the 32nd Infantry Commando 
Regiment in Fada N'Gourma were met, the following day (March 29) they rebelled 
again. This time they fired a rocket at the courthouse.49 The next day soldiers in Gaoua 
and Ouagadougou mutinied.5° Whereas the first round of mutinies in Ouagadougou 
involved random attacks on shops and traders, the second round was more targeted. 
This time soldiers vandalized the houses of the Mayor of Ouagadougou and the Defence 
Minister. In response, the government imposed a curfew and President Compaoré 
45 Lila Chouli, "Peoples' Revolt in Burkina Faso," in Firoze Manji and Sokari Ekine, eds. Africa 
Awakening: The Emerging Revolutions (Oxford:Pambazuka Press, 20120): 138. 
;G "Burkina Troops Free Rapist Comrade," AFP, March 28, 2011. 
" Ibid. 
48 S. Yonaba, "Mutineries de Militaires au Burkina Faso: L'Etat de droit mis à rude épreuve," Liberté n33, 
September 2011, 10. 
4° "Burkinabé Soldiers Fire Rocket at Court," AFP, March 29, 2011. 
50 Chouli, "Peoples' Revolt in Burkina Faso," 138. 
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agreed to meet with the discontented soldiers and civilians.51 Despite the meetings, 
which were mediated by religious and traditional leaders, another large strike took place 
on April 8, involving traders, civil society groups, political opposition supporters, and 
students. They expressed that they were still not satisfied with the government's 
response to their numerous complaints.52 
After two weeks of relative calm amongst the military, Compaoré faced his most 
serious threat on April 14 when his elite Presidential Guards (Régiment de Sécurité 
Présidentiel or RSP) revolted. This was the first time this unit had been involved in a 
mutiny.53 The unit claimed their protest was over payment and housing allowances. 
The mutiny quickly spread to soldiers at Camp Lamizana in western Ouagadougou.54 
There were also widespread looting, car thefts, and reports of rape.55 The chaotic 
atmosphere made it difficult to tell if the crimes were committed by military personnel 
or civilians, however is appears both sectors took part. Media outlets shut down adding 
to the residents' anxiety as they did not know what was going on. 
President Compaoré's response shows the severity of the situation. Within a day 
of the RSP revolt he left the capital and took refuge in his hometown of Ziniare, 30 km 
north of the capita1.56 Just one day later President Compaoré dissolved the government, 
appointed a new cabinet and Prime Minister, replaced the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, 
Air Force, and Police and named himself Minister of Defence. The impact of these 
changes will be analyzed in more depth later in this chapter. 
Compaoré quickly gave into the demands of the RSP and a spokesperson for the 
RSP publicly reaffirmed the unit's loyalty to the president. The spokesperson 
apologized for the damage caused by the RSP and called on other units to adhere to 
military discipline.' However, rather than calm the situation it seemed to inspire other 
units. Media reports quote soldiers stating that they wanted their pay and bonuses to be 
51 "Compaore to Meet Troops Amid Protests," AFP, March 31, 2011. 
52 Chouli, "Peoples' Revolt in Burkina Faso," 138. 
53 Ibid., 139. 
54 "Gunfire Spread in Burkina Faso Capital," AFP, April 15, 2011. 
55 "Compaore Leaves Capital Amid Army Mutiny," AFP, April 15, 2011: "Troops Loot Burkina Faso for 
2 11`1 Night," AP, April 16, 2011. 
56 " Compaore Leave Capital Amid Army Mutiny," AFP, April 15, 2011. 
57 "Burkina Faso gets New PM, Mutiny Spreads." AFP, April 19, 2011. 
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equivalent to that of the RSP.58 Soldiers in Tenkodogo, Kaya, and Po imitated earlier 
mutinies by firing weapons in the air, looting shops, seizing private vehicles and 
attacking the houses of senior officers.59 The mutiny at Po had symbolic significance, as 
this was the same base from which Compaoré had launched a mutiny in 1983. 
Not only did the mutiny contagion spread within the military, but it quickly 
infected the police force.60 By the end of April the Republican Guards also joined the 
trend.61 Therefore, within a month of the initial Ouagadougou mutiny, nearly every 
branch of the security sector within every region of the country had taken part in a 
mutiny. One exception is the gendarmerie, which will be addressed later. 
During this month of spreading mutinies, the civilian sector was also taking to 
the streets in a continuation of the protests that began over Justin Zongo's death and had 
escalated to economic and political demands for change. At times civilians and military 
seemed united in their calls for increased wages but in other incidents civilians directly 
protested against damage caused . by the mutinies and criticized the government for not 
controlling the armed forces. On April 28 (two months after the start of the turmoil) the 
Prime Minister announced a series of changes in response to the widespread civilian and 
military demands. Key changes included the elimination of the development tax, 
reduction in the salary tax, and salary increases in the public sector as well as promises 
to charge senior officials involved in corruption. However, these changes only affected 
a minority of the population and did little for the bulk of the people who make a living 
from agriculture.62 Still, it did represent a government response to the civilian demands 
and the widespread protests became more sporadic.63 
'$ Ibid. 
59 Chouli, "Peoples' Revolt in Burkina Faso," 139; "Burkina Army Revolt Spreads," AFP, April 17, 2011. 
G° "Burkina Faso troops and cops riot, loot," AFP, April 18, 2011. 
61 Chouli, "Peoples' Revolt in Burkina Faso," 140. 
62 Ibid. 
63 "Burkina Faso Lifts Curfew After Unrest," SAPA, May 17, 2011. 
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7.6 Mutiny Finale 
Although the government seemed to have made progress on the civilian front, the 
military continued to express its dissatisfaction. New mutinies broke out in Po, Kaya, 
Dori, Tenkodogo, Dedougou, and Koupela in May.64 It is difficult to tell how exactly 
these mutinies were resolved but it is likely agreements were made over salary or other 
material complaints. 
After months of dealing with unruly soldiers, the government reached its 
breaking point at the beginning of June when soldiers in Bobo Dioulasso joined the 
revolt. Bobo Dioulasso is Burkina Faso's second largest city and home to the second 
largest military base (the largest in both cases being Ouagadougou). The city has a 
sizeable university student population and a reputation as a rebellious town.65 After three 
days of destructive behaviour by soldiers which shut down the city, Compaoré sent 
members of the RSP, the Dedougou paratroopers and gendarmerie to "forcibly disarm" 
the mutineers.66 Officially the attack left six mutineers and one civilian (a girl caught in 
the crossfire) dead. However, according to several military sources, the number of 
military casualties was much higher. Following the attack the government announced 
the dismissal of 566 soldiers, 217 of which were brought up on criminal charges.67 
What is unusual about the Burkina Faso mutinies is not that they ended violently, 
but that they did not end violently sooner. There are few cases in West Africa in which 
mutinies continued for such a long period before being forcibly put down. One 
explanation is that the government wanted to use all possible methods before resorting to 
force. One military interviewee explained that peaceful negotiation is "the Burkinabé 
way. "68 This may be part of the story as Burkina Faso does not have a history of civil 
war or armed rebellions and most past coups and mutinies have been relatively non- 
64 Chouli, "Peoples' Revolt in Burkina Faso," 143. 
bs Author interview with military source AA (former officer, currently working in security sector), March 
2012; the gendarmeries that took part in the raid against the mutineers were specifically from the Security 
and Intervention Unit. 
66 Chouli, "Peoples' Revolt in Burkina Faso," 143; Author interview with military source BB (former 
enlisted soldier, currently working in security sector), March 2012. 
67 Chouli, "Peoples' Revolt in Burkina Faso," 143. 
G8 Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in security sector), 
March 2012. 
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violent. However, the massive scale of the mutinies was also likely a reason Compaoré 
was reluctant to use physical force against mutineers. With nearly every sector of the 
security apparatus expressing their dissatisfaction, there was no guarantee that his orders 
would be carried through. Soldiers throughout the country expressed more loyalty 
towards each other than to their commanding officers or the Head of State. 
This is the first time that mutinies in Burkina Faso have been dealt with in such 
a harsh manner. Whereas concessions were the norm in previous mutinies, perhaps a 
new precedent has been set, indicating a less tolerant attitude towards mutinies. Most 
respondents, both military and civilian, thought that the final attack on the mutineers was 
needed to end the months of ongoing revolts. For example, one military source 
explained, "the attack in Bobo was important because it helped the government reinstall 
confidence to the population. "69 However, there was also concern about the number of 
dismissed soldiers. This issue will be addressed in more detail in the final section. 
While the assault on the Bobo Dioulasso mutineers put an end to the 2011 
mutinies, it may have come with unintended consequences. The International Crisis 
Group found that 
The RSP's role in the repression of the Bobo Dioulasso mutiny has 
widened the gap between the presidential guard and the rest of the 
military, all the more so because RSP personnel who participated in the 
mutinies have not been punished.70 
Similarly, a Burkinabé professor argued that using one branch of the military against 
another has the potential to divide the force and to cause long term resentment. He 
believes that the incident in Bobo Dioulasso "is just accumulating problems for a future 
crisis. "71 
7.7 The Underlying Causes 
69 Ibid. 
70 International Crisis Group, "Burkina Faso: With or Without Compaoré, Times of Uncertainty," Africa 
Report No. 205, July 22, 2013. 
71 Author interview with Professor A, March 2012. 
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The massive scale of the Burkina Faso mutinies makes it more difficult to put a 
face to the mutineers than in the cases examined in Sierra Leone or The Gambia. As 
opposed to the earlier case studies in which soldiers were fairly clear about their 
grievances, in Burkina Faso it was often difficult to tell what the soldiers wanted from 
their revolt. Even military respondents often provided vague explanations. For 
example, one military source said he felt that the soldiers were simply taking advantage 
of the weak position of the government. He explained that the soldiers began making 
demands for material items such as uniforms, boots, and belts, items that they may have 
desired but would not have normally orchestrated a mutiny over.72 Another soldier 
shared a similar perception by stating that the revolt was simply a matter of human 
nature, of people always wanting more than they have.73 
Media reported that the mutinies were sparked because soldiers had not been 
paid; however several soldiers stated that this was inaccurate.74 Instead, they explained 
that the mutineers objected to a more nuanced issue of living allowances.75 Soldiers are 
entitled to a salary and a living allowance and the living allowance is easier to 
manipulate.76 The living allowance goes towards housing and food, which is often 
provided by the military and thus not paid in full. Soldiers perceived that they should be 
getting more /better food and housing for the amount that their living allowance is worth. 
Therefore, as one enlisted soldiers explained, "the main thing is the living conditions. "77 
There were also allegations that senior officers were taking part of this allowance for 
their own purposes.78 
While interviewees seemed to find it difficult to pinpoint the cause of the 2011 
mutinies, a more general question of "why is there so much indiscipline within the 
military" quickly led to detailed and animated responses. Most of the responses can be 
72 Author interview with military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
7' Author interview with military source Z (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
74 Author interview with military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012; Author interview with 
military source Z (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
75 Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in security sector), 
March 2012. 
76 Author interview with military source CC (international officer in Burkina Faso), March 2012. 
77 Author interview with military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
78 Interview with military source CC (international officer in Burkina Faso), March 2012. and confirmed 
in various other conversations. 
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summarized into issues of pervasive corruption and favouritism within the military. 
Numerous respondents, both civilian and military, stated that the problems begin with 
the recruitment process, which they argued has become very personalized. One military 
source went into great detail about a concept within the Burkinabé military called 
"Command Lists." He explained 
So say the military is recruiting 500 individuals. The head 
of the army will get to submit 10 names, then the regional 
commander submits 10, then the base commander, and so 
on, even down to the local chief. These individuals are 
hand selected based on their affiliation and do not have to 
pass the other requirements, such as the physical tests. But 
those that have no affiliation must pass strict tests. Then 
when they get to basic training, the trainers know who is 
from the list, they are concerned about being too harsh on 
those that were selected by top officers. So those 
individuals get a pass again, while the others are treated 
very poorly. Everyone understands the system and it 
creates major divides from the start.79 
Other military sources made similar accusations, one stated, "rich people send 
their sons and daughters to the military and no one can bother them. "80 Another soldier 
exclaimed "officers can bring their children into the military, this is a problem because 
their superiors are afraid to discipline them because they are the sons of their boss. "8 
Yet another soldier alleged, "there is favouritism in recruiting, they don't see who is 
best, they select sons of officers. "82 
The recruitment issue has become particularly relevant in recent years as Burkina 
Faso recruited 2,000 individuals between 2008 and 2011.83 This is a substantial number 
considering the entire force is between 7,000 and 8,000 (not including the gendarmerie). 
The increased recruitment was partially due to an aging force; however it was also a 
response to Burkina Faso's increased involvement in peacekeeping missions. Burkina 
79 Author interview with military 
2012. 
80 Author interview with military 
March 2012. 
81 Author interview with military 
82 Author interview with military 
83 International Crisis Group, "B 
source AA (former officer, currently working in security sector), March 
source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in security sector), 
source Z (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
urkina Faso: With or Without Compaoré, Times of Uncertainty," 32. 
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Faso currently has around ten percent of its military deployed on the Darfur missions 
alone.84 Considering the mutinies consisted of nearly all junior rank and file soldiers, it 
is likely that many were recruited within the last few years. 
Soldiers also alleged that there is not a fair method of rewards and promotions 
within the military. For example, one military source expressed anger that despite 
having the top aptitude score he was passed over for officer training by others who he 
claimed were connected but less qualified.85 Another raised specific concerns about the 
way individuals are selected for deployments. He complained that peacekeepers are 
chosen from among the senior officers' friends and relatives. He claims that even with a 
strong military record and twenty -six years of service he has never had the opportunity 
to deploy.86 Another military source backed this up by stating, "if you do not know 
someone, you will never be assigned to an important mission. "87 With Burkina Faso 
increasing its contributions to foreign missions, this is a concern that will likely continue 
if the hierarchy does not address it. 
Underlying these complaints is distrust towards officers who the junior soldiers 
viewed as endorsing and perpetuating a system that they perceive as based on 
favouritism. In interviews it was often unclear if they were referring to the officer corps 
as a whole or the senior officers specifically. When I asked one enlisted soldier if he 
could specify to me if the problems he was referring to were among the senior officers 
or all officers, he responded "some individual superiors are good, but as a group there 
are too many problems. "88 Interviewees were not shy to criticize senior officers, 
particularly. One soldier, speaking particularly about the senior officers stated 
officers are taking advantage of their positions, driving big 
cars, living in big houses in Ouaga 2000 always going on 
foreign training opportunities, gaining more profit while the 
others are living like normal Burkinabé. The juniors work 
the most and gain the least, while the officers work the least 
84 Ibid. 
85 Author interview 
March 2012. 
86 Author interview 
87 Author interview 
March 2012. 
88 Author interview 
with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in security sector), 
with military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
with military source AA (former officer, currently working in the security sector), 
with military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
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and gain the most, it should be the opposite. This creates a 
lot of frustration for privates and NCOs.S9 
A junior soldier believed that most individuals got to a senior position through 
means other than merit, and therefore he explained that there is no respect for the senior 
officers among the rank and file.90 The officers appeared to recognize that they had no 
control over their subordinates. When I asked soldiers where the officers were while the 
rank and file took to the streets, answers included "hiding" and "they ran away." No one 
indicated that the individual officers attempted to regain their authority. 
In addition to allegations of corruption and favouritism, some interviewees also 
felt that the indiscipline seen in the mutinies was a result of poor training. One military 
source specifically stated that part of the military training should be education about the 
role of the military. He stated "you have people that are trained and armed but not 
educated, they have no idea what being in the military means. "91 In his opinion soldiers 
need to be taught that the role of a soldier is to protect the citizens. The International 
Crisis Group also highlighted problems of training. They note that on average there is 
one officer and two NCOs to train 200 new recruits, suggesting that the quality of 
training is likely low.92 
A final contributing cause of the 2011 revolt, and previous mutinies, is the poor 
communication within the military. Colonel Nombre highlights the "communication 
gap between the bottom and the summit of the military" as a main cause for the 2006 
mutinies.93 This communication gap is somewhat intentional, as the pattern of internal 
revolts has created a culture of secrecy within the military. Information is spread more 
often through rumours than official means. Soldiers confirmed this trend by explaining 
that most of the news they were getting during the mutinies was from cell phone calls to 
$9 Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in the security 
sector), March 2012; Ouaga 2000 is the wealthiest area of Ouagadougou and houses the Presidential 
Palace as well as numerous Western Embassies and expensive hotels. 
9° Author interview with military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 11, 2012. 
91 Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in the security 
sector), March 2012. 
92 International Crisis Group, "Burkina Faso: With or Without Compaoré, Times of Uncertainty," 32. 
93 Nombre, "Civil- Military Relations and National Security in Burkina Faso: An Assessment," 41. 
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their colleagues at other bases.94 The International Crisis Group also focuses on the 
communication issues by explaining, "the rank and file rarely voice their day -to -day 
problems or express their discontent and so the administration never deals with even the 
most trivial issues, such as food quality."95 Insufficient communication contributed to 
soldiers' dissatisfaction and the act of mutiny also served as a remedy for the problem, 
with soldiers using the mutinies so express their many frustrations. 
7.8 The Exceptionally Uninterested Sectors 
With such widespread participation in the mutinies, groups that did not become 
involved were the exception. This section will examine the notable cases of those that 
did not partake in the mutinies: officers and the gendarmerie. 
During the crisis, media and security analysts were premature in their cries of an 
impending coup.96 Although the mutinies largely crippled the capital, at no point did 
the military attempt to oust President Compaoré. Interviewees, both civilian and 
military, were unanimous in their opinion that the soldiers did not have a goal of 
overthrowing the president. A sample of these responses includes 
The soldiers could have easily taken over but they didn't, 
their goals were not about political gains but about 
monetary gains. 
As a military man I can tell you these soldiers had no 
political ambitions. 
This was not a well -planned or organized event, our 
soldiers know how to do a coup and this was no coup. 
94 Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in the security 
sector), March 2012. 
95 International Crisis Group, "Burkina Faso: With or Without Compaoré, Times of Uncertainty," 33. 
96 A sample of such predictions include "Burkina Faso Next Regime to Fall ?" United Press International, 
April 15, 2011; "A Coup in the Making in Burkina Faso ?" Stratfor, April 16, 2011; Alex Thurston, 
"Burkina Faso's Compaore Facing Perfect Storm ?" World Politics Review, May 3, 2011. 
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The fact that they did not move to take control of the state was not due to an 
inability. There were numerous times throughout the months of mutinies that a coup 
seemed possible, if not probable. However, the mutineers were nearly all rank and file 
soldiers and they showed little interest in political power and did not appear to have a 
recognized leader amongst themselves.97 The lack of leadership and organization was 
likely a result of the dispersed geographic nature of the mutinies and the lack of a 
specific common goal. 
One junior soldier explained that "if there were officers involved there would 
still be problems now. "98 He was implying that there would have been a coup or coup 
attempt. While it is not unheard of for a coup attempt to be orchestrated from the 
enlisted ranks, it is rare (and a successful coup by enlisted soldier is particularly rare). 
No interviewees gave a direct explanation for why they felt the officers did not become 
involved. However, I think the reasoning is implied through their above descriptions of 
problems within the military. The mutineers were frustrated over a system that they 
believed favours officers or others with connections to political leadership. Therefore, 
there would be little appeal for officers to try to change procedures that they benefit 
from. Similarly, as many officers have links to political leaders, there may have been 
little motivation to conduct a coup. 
Additionally, if officers had considered making a move for political control, they 
may have had a difficult time harnessing the discontent of the rank and file soldiers. In 
the cases of Sierra Leone in 1992 and The Gambia in 1994, junior officers were able to 
utilize the frustrations of their subordinates but in both cases it was due to their direct 
links with the individuals. While enlisted ranks and junior officers appeared united in 
the 1980s in Burkina Faso, there is little indication of a similar bond in 2011. The 
explanation of military discontent, as explained in the previous section, as well as the 
actions during the mutinies demonstrates a divide between the enlisted ranks and 
officers. It is a divide that goes beyond the expected divisions in military hierarchies 
and is one which has become antagonistic. 
97 Author interview with military source Z (current enlisted soldier), March 2012; Author interview with 
military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
98 Author interview with military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
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As noted earlier, the gendarmerie was the only security branch that did not 
mutiny.99 Part of the explanation may have to do with the role of the gendarmerie in 
former French colonies in West Africa. The gendarmerie serve as a military police and 
regularly have a double affiliation with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of 
Defence. Niagalé Bagayoko explains that the continued existence of the gendarmerie is 
controversial because it is often seen "to represent the continuation of a military 
presence in domestic security and therefore legitimise the involvement of the armed 
forces in internal security matters. "100 A military source explained that due to this 
unique role the gendarmerie receive different, and in his opinion better, training than the 
other security services (Army, Air Force, and Police).101 Essentially they are double 
trained as soldiers and police officers, by attending both traditional military training as 
well as courses on internal laws and domestic matters. Therefore, this source believed 
the gendarmes are more conscious of their roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, the 
gendarmerie have arrest authority over both the military and the police (as well as other 
Ministries such as Customs or Forestry). Another source believed that because the 
gendarmes have a unique role in overseeing the discipline of the other security services, 
the gendarmerie leadership is much more strict than the other services.102 When I asked 
a military interviewee if pay was a factor in the difference in discipline between the 
military and gendarmerie, he did not seem to think it was a primary cause. He explained 
that the gendarmerie were paid a `little more' than the military overall but also noted that 
this was a hard distinction to make because the pay for both groups varies based on their 
duties. 1°3 
The unique and flexible role of the gendarmerie, as well as their arrest authority, 
has meant that the gendarmerie in many former French colonies have become closely 
99 Sources explained that there may have been a few individual gendarmes who revolted but no whole 
units. 
1 °0 Niagalé Bagayoko, "Security Systems in Francophone and Anglophone Africa," IDS Bulletin 43, N. 4 
(July 2012), 69. 
°I Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in the security 
sector), March 2012; confirmed in author interview with military source O (current officer), March 2013. 
1 °2 Author interview with military source AA (former officer, currently working in the security sector), 
March 2012. 
1 °' Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in the security 
sector), March 2012 
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linked to the ruling regimes.104 Burkinabé interviewees explained that recruitment for 
the gendarmerie is more stringent than the other services, a trend consistent within other 
gendarmeries.105 Discussing Francophone Africa in general, Bagayoko observes "The 
gendarmes generally enjoy a better reputation than the other security forces: they appear 
to be a disciplined corps respectful of hierarchy. "106 This is consistent with two sources 
that explained there is more respect for gendarmerie leadership amongst the rank and 
file, a trait that was demonstrated during the mutinies. While army units throughout the 
country were rebelling against their leadership, the gendarmes stayed loyal to theirs. 
Several individuals noted that Djibril Bassolé was previously in charge of the 
gendarmerie and used this to make the argument that the gendarmes have strong and 
respectable leaders. Bassolé is now the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso and a highly 
visible individual within the international community for his involvement in numerous 
conflict mediations, most recently between Malian rebels and the Malian government. 
The lack of gendarmerie involvement in the 2011 mutinies represent the unique role and 
training of the gendarmerie in Burkina Faso, which is consistent with other gendarmerie 
forces throughout the region. 
7.9 Crisis Effects 
The crisis of 2011 brought about many changes: some significant, some 
symbolic, and others unintentional. Although interviewees pointed out areas that still 
needed work, they were quick to acknowledge noticeable reforms since the 2011 crisis. 
Many interviewees commented on progress within the justice system, which was likely 
linked to several high profile cases against senior government officials that were 
ongoing at the time of the interviews.107 Additionally, interviewees noted that police 
1 " A good example of this trend can be found in Klaas van Walraven's description of the formation 
of the Nigerien gendarmerie. Klaas van Walraven, The Yearning for Relief A History of the Sawaba 
Movement in Niger (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2013): 581 -582. 
los Bagayoko, "Security Systems in Francophone and Anglophone Africa," 70. 
106 Ibid. 
1 °7 For example, in January of 2012 the Head of Customs, Ousmane Guiro, was arrested with $4 million in 
cash in his house and removed from his position days later. Guiro's case was particularly noteworthy 
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officers had been charged over the death of Justin Zongo, indicating less impunity for 
the security services. Other interviewees brought up economic changes such as 
reduction in prices of food. Government and military personnel noted that their salaries 
had been increased. Students observed that there was no longer a police presence on 
campus. 
In addition to the more concrete examples of salaries, food prices or trials, 
civilian interviewees commented on less tangible changes in attitude. There were 
numerous statements about an overall change in the relationship between the 
government and citizens. Respondents seemed proud that their efforts had been 
recognized and empowered by the ability to pressure government reform. Below is a 
sampling of such statements. 
Before [the events in 2011] you can do bad things with no 
justice, but not anymore....the government understands 
that they cannot rule like in the past.108 
Before the crisis the government didn't pay attention but 
since then they are more responsive, they now pay 
attention.109 
The citizens of Burkina Faso have also changed, they now 
know their rights... The government is now changed, it is 
now afraid.11 ° 
I am satisfied with the way it was handled, people now 
realize they have the power." 1 
As earlier noted, in the midst of the military revolts, Compaoré ordered the 
largest political shake up in his twenty -four years in power. He dissolved the 
because he had been questioned by the judicial department in 2008 for fraudulent tax evasion but never 
charged, allegedly due to his "well placed friends." (as quoted in "Ousmane Guiro, l'ex- directeur general 
des Douanes incarcéré, Jeune Afrique, January 8, 2012). Additionally days before the start of interviews 
the Minister of Justice was charged with abusing his employee. This case was particularly significant to 
people because the accuser was from a lower social class, symbolizing the rights of the lower classes. 
108 Author Interview with Burkinabé academic (lecturer in history), March 2012. 
109 Author interview with Bazie Bassolina, Secretary General CGT -B, March 2012. 
10 Author interview with Professor B, March 2012 
Author interview with Member of Ministère Chargé des Relations avec Le Parlement et des Réformes 
Politiques, March 2012 
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government and appointed a new Prime Minister, cabinet, and 13 new state governors. 
While on the surface this seems significant, in reality many of the same old political 
hands were simply reshuffled. For example, of the 29 member "new" cabinet, 13 were 
part of the previous cabinet. '2 This sleight of hand did not go unnoticed. For example, 
one student stated, "both the old and new government is here to preserve the role of 
Blaise Compaoré. So is there a change? Yes, but it is just as bad as before. "13 
Compaoré also appointed himself to the position of Minister of Defence, a move that 
gave him even more power than he had prior to the crisis. 
Despite acknowledging improvements, most respondents did not think the 
reforms went far enough. Many noted that the initial decreases in food prices have crept 
back up and there have not been changes in employment opportunities. Therefore, the 
cost of living complaints still resonated with most. University students were particularly 
vocal about needing to push for more change. In a heated debate on campus, students 
loudly applauded and cheered the statement that the reforms are "just a manipulation by 
the government to keep us quiet, we are only seeing our banks, our food, if we want real 
change we must look beyond that, all the government did was lower the price of rice and 
we are satisfied, we must go beyond this." Another followed this up by saying "we 
cannot talk about change when the same head is dictating the same body ", implying that 
it is time for the president to leave office. "4 While university students in Burkina Faso 
as well as worldwide often tend to be the most politically vocal sectors of society, in the 
Burkinabé context it is important to take their voices into account because past 
demonstrations have often started with university students. Similarly, university 
students are of the same age and peer group as the rank and file solders involved in the 
mutiny and thus students seemed particularly aware of the mutinies and often supportive 
of their grievances. 
Compaoré made similar changes within the defence sector as in the political 
realm by dismissing the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Air Force, and Police (the Chief of 
the Gendarmerie kept his job due to the gendarmes' loyalty during the mutinies). 
112 Simon Gongo, "Burkina Faso President Named Defense Minister in New Cabinet ", Bloomberg, April 
22, 2011. 
11' Student focus group conducted by author, March 2012. 
114 Student debate, University of Ouagdougou, March 2012. 
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Sources explained that although the Army Chief of Staff in particular was unpopular, his 
removal did not placate the mutinying soldiers :15 Rank and file soldiers are far too 
removed from the Chief's of Staff to be largely effected by a shift in personnel at that 
level. Furthermore, a military officer explained that the "fired" senior officers were not 
actually removed from service, just rotated into a different position.116 Military 
interviewees acknowledged that there have been some immediate benefits from the 
mutinies. Junior soldiers reported that their salaries had increased (along with civil 
servants) and that some of the food issues have been resolved. The request to allow 
soldiers to purchase their own food, rather than have it provided by the military, was 
granted. 
Another big change to come out of the mutinies, and one not expected by the 
soldiers, was the firing of hundreds of soldiers and police. Although the number of "bad 
seeds" removed from service was high, it is by no means all of those involved in the 
mutinies. It was likely meant to serve as a lesson for those contemplating a future 
mutiny as much as for punishment for those involved. 
A Burkinabé military source also noted that the government has taken measures 
to make it physically more difficult for soldiers to mutiny, or at least to cause such 
widespread violence. There was concern over how easily soldiers throughout the 
country were able to access ammunition. Therefore, the ammunition is now more 
centralized, most secured at one base rather than spread throughout the number of 
smaller bases and outposts. He claims that although soldiers still carry guns, few have 
any ammunition." 
High -level personnel changes, mass dismissals, and increased payments to 
soldiers do not address the systemic problems within the military. One military source 
summed it up nicely by saying "the problem is deeper than just removing a person, it is 
"' Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in the security 
sector), March 2012. 
'' Author interview with military source O (current officer), March 2012. 
' Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in the security 
sector), March 2012; International Crisis Group, "Burkina Faso: With or Without Compaoré, Times of 
Uncertainty," 33. 
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the same structures, the same people and the same philosophy." 
1 
1 
8 Another enlisted 
soldier noted, "there is still a part of the army that cannot be touched," suggesting that 
the elite units are still above the law.119 The indiscipline and lack of respect for military 
authority resulting from perceptions of corruption and favouritism will be a much harder 
fix, likely taking years. When I asked the military sources what changes they would like 
to see one responded "a new generation of officers" and another said, "we need new 
blood." Yet another military interviewee backed up these sentiments by explaining "we 
need new young officers with education, a new way of doing things, in one word we 
need new." 
As of 2013 the government was still in the process of reviewing options for 
changes within the military organization and working groups have been established to 
assess the situation and make recommendations. An annual conference to discuss 
ongoing concerns within the military has been established and two iterations have been 
held (in September of 2012 and 2013).120 A major restructuring of the military would be 
significant as well as unusual. Most militaries do not make large structural changes as a 
result of mutinies. It indicates that the government acknowledges that the mutinies 
represented severe problems within the military. Additionally, the theme for the first 
annual military conference was communication, which shows that the military hierarchy 
recognizes that there is poor internal communication within the military.121 
It is too early to tell if the soldiers will get the "newness" they desire but based 
on interviews it appears both civilians and military personnel are already growing 
restless. Unlike The Gambia where most people did not think a mutiny was imminent, 
in Burkina Faso both civilian and military respondents felt that another mutiny or 
civilian uprising was likely. Some individuals made bold statements such as "to be 
sincere, this is just the beginning" and "the crisis is not behind us, it is in front of us. "122 
118 Author interview with military source BB (former enlisted soldier, currently working in the security 
sector), March 2012. 
119 Author interview with military source E (current enlisted soldier), March 2012. 
120 "Forces armées nationales (FAN) du Burkina Faso: La discipline faisant la force principale," 
November 11, 2013, http: / /www.lefaso. net /spip.php ?article56669 &rubrique0 
121 Ibid. 
122 Author interview with Moussa Diallo, Secretary General of Social issues for CGT -B, March 2012; 
Interview with Professor A, March 2012. 
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A source within the Burkinabé military described the series of mutinies since the 1990s 
and pointed out that with each successive demonstration, the military has become more 
violent. He said he is worried that if this pattern continues the next round could be 
devastating to the country.123 Several other interviewees shared this opinion with 
responses such as "next time it will be worse" and "if it happens again I think it will be a 
full revolution." 
The most common prediction from both military and civilian interviewees was 
that another crisis could occur if President Compaoré ran in the 2015 election. Based on 
Article 37 of the Burkina Faso constitution, Compaoré's current term is the last he is 
eligible for. However, there is much speculation that he will attempt to change Article 
37 to allow himself to run for another term. Opposition groups have already been very 
vocal about opposing any attempt to change the constitution but Compaoré's party has a 
sizeable majority in the parliament, which could allow them to make changes without 
minority party support. Such a blatant manipulation of the law on Compaoré's behalf 
would likely trigger many of the same feelings of injustice as did the 2011 (and 1999) 
crisis. As noted throughout this chapter, the military and civilian sectors have a 
tendency to play off each other when it comes to countering the government and thus a 
strong opposition to modifying the constitution from either group could trigger a 
response from the other, causing another and potentially even more severe crisis.124 
There was also widespread concern and rumours that the hundreds of soldiers 
and police removed from their positions after the mutinies will cause more violence 
throughout Burkina Faso. These concerns came predominately from youth and students 
although several professionals mentioned them as well. Comments about this potential 
problem include 
The dismissing of so many soldiers can bring about 
insecurity. In the countryside I heard there is some [former 
soldiers] with bad intentions. 
12' Author interview with military source AA (former officer, currently working in security sector), March 
2012. 
124 Another scenario that many respondents thought likely was that President Compaoré could turn over 
power to his younger brother, Francios Compaoré. They mockingly called him "le petit président." All 
individuals who mentioned this potential move found it unacceptable. This scenario could be especially 
volatile as Francios Compaoré is largely speculated to have been involved in the death of journalist 
Norbert Zongo. 
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Former soldiers become thieves, we all know someone 
who is victim of them, they will not hesitate to attack this 
country. 
I met one of them [former soldier] out drinking, it is scary, 
they have a lot of training. 
Those that were arrested, we do not know what they are 
planning. They can come back. In the past they were 
shooting in the air but what if this time they shoot people. 
Soldiers have also expressed their concern over the dismissals by circulating pamphlets 
in the barracks in 2012. One called for the release and reintegration of "all dismissed 
soldiers. "125 Another denounced arbitrary dismissals, specifically noting that some of 
the dismissed soldiers were not in Burkina Faso at the time of the mutiny.126 
The fact that so many respondents felt another crisis was imminent or had 
specific scenarios in mind in which a democratic transition would be aborted shows a 
continued distrust in the government. Furthermore, there appeared to be a lack of 
confidence that the government could adequately counter a rebellion or wave of crime. 
Despite firmly remaining in power through the mutinies and protests, the "crisis of 
confidence" appears to still have a strong hold on the population. 
7.10 The Resilient Civilian Military Relationship 
The close links between the civilian demonstrations and military mutinies in 
Burkina Faso allows for an analysis of how the mutinies affected civil -military relations. 
Much of the destruction and violence caused by the mutineers was at the expense of the 
civilian population. There were dozens of injured civilians, numerous reported rapes, 
and large -scale damage to shops and private residences. The local media ran pictures 
daily of soldiers wielding heavy weapons on the streets, civilians with bloody injuries 
caused by soldiers, and shops trashed by mutineers. 
125 International Crisis Group, "Burkina Faso: With or Without Compaoré. Times of Uncertainty," 33. 
126 Ibid., 34. 
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Between those that experienced the mutinies first hand and those that heard of it 
through the extensive local media coverage, it would be easy to conclude that the 
mutinies severely damaged the civil -military relationship in Burkina Faso. However, 
based on interviews this does not appear to be the case. Many civilian interviewees 
were unexpectedly sympathetic towards the soldiers. Several interviewees expressed the 
opinion that although the violence enacted by the military was wrong, they were forced 
into the situation because they have no other way to express their complaints. A sample 
of such comments include: 
They [soldiers] should be able to strike, our government 
does not allow the soldiers to strike. 
We are a democratic country, it is unfair that they [soldiers] 
cannot participate. 
Those soldiers, they were fighting to claim their rights too, 
even a soldiers needs to take care of his family, the 
hierarchy is the problem. 
Many felt that the military is poorly treated. For example, a Burkinabé professor 
stated that he was not surprised by what happened because "those guys are abused, have 
no rights, they have bad living conditions, it is all they can do. "127 Another academic 
furthered this point by stating, "all Burkinabé should be treated equal but the military are 
often treated badly and they don't have their rights." He added that their actions should 
be condemned and they should have brought their case to the judge. He believes "all 
this happened because the military does not trust the justice system of Burkina Faso. "128 
Despite nearly every civilian interviewee stating that they were shocked and worried by 
the violence unleashed by the mutinying soldiers, they were surprisingly understanding 
of the causes and placed the overall blame on the government. 
It was also a trend for civilian respondents to deny the wrongdoings by the 
military. One civilian expressed the belief that criminals took advantage of the chaotic 
situation to steal and cause damage that the military later was blamed for. Another 
stated, "some gangsters spoiled the name of our military." 
127 Author interview with Professor A, March 2012. 
128 Author interview with Professor B, March 2012. 
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A final way to demonstrate the unique overlap between the civilian and military 
sectors in Burkina Faso is the way in which the mutinies featured in popular culture. 
Less than a year after the mutinies, there was both a play and a film released about the 
event. This fictionalized account, titled "Le Foulard Noir" was showing nightly at 
variously cinemas throughout the country in spring of 2012, indicating that the mutiny 
was of widespread interest in Burkina Faso and the story had commercial value. The 
movie focuses solely on the mutinies, not the wider civilian protests (which may have 
touched more on sensitive political issues). It follows a family in Ouagadougou and 
portrays how the mutinies affected their lives. The film does not censor what went on 
during the mutinies. It graphically (in slow motion) depicts civilians being killed by 
stray bullets from the weapons of mutineers and soldiers raping women. However, not 
all of the military is portrayed as villains. There are times when "Le Foulard Noir" also 
paints a complex relationship between the military and civilians. For example, there is a 
scene when soldiers visit the family of a civilian killed in the mutiny to offer 
condolences and another where soldiers explain that they also have relatives who had 
been victimized in the rebellion. 
There are several unusual aspects of the film. One is that it received partial 
funding from the office of President Compaoré.129 Whereas it is common for leaders to 
try to hide mutinies or at least not publicize them, Compaoré has done the opposite. 
Additionally, the movie used current soldiers as the extras in the film, allowing them to 
role -play as mutineers. At the end of the film there are pictures of the actual destruction 
caused by the mutinies throughout the country. In addition to having been shown at 
cinemas, "Le Foulard Noir" was also aired at barracks throughout the country. This 
thesis has highlighted mutinies as a form of communication and the role that 
communication can potentially play in reducing the prevalence of mutinies. "Le foulard 
noir" provides another form of communication and one in which the government can 
help shape the public narrative of the mutinies. While it is unclear what level of 
involvement the government had in the movie script, they seemed to endorse the film by 
129 "'Le foulard noir,' un film adapté de la mutinerie au Burkina a recu l'onction du president," 
http: / /burkina24.com/ news /2012/02/ 14/"le- foulard -noir " -un -film- adapte- de -la- mutinerie -au- burkina -a- 
recu- l'onction -du- president/ February 14, 2012. 
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having the Prime Minister, various government officials, and military officers in 
attendance of the film's premier on February 9, 2012.13° Additionally, the film was 
advertised on the official government webpage and included pictures of a cinema 
screening full of soldiers in uniform.131 
In statements to the press the director, Boubacar Diallo, clearly indicates that he 
has little sympathy for the mutineers. He said the mutinies injured the image of 
Burkinabé integrity.132 He noted the film is meant to expose the "ugliness" and allow 
society to "reflect together. "133 He explained that the film will help the younger 
generation raise its level of civic consciousness.134 In many ways the film seemed to 
shame the military and screening the movie at the barracks indicates that the government 
was keen to get the message directly to the military. As these mutinies had very direct 
effects on the civilian population, it may also serve as a valuable way to create an open 
public dialogue about the events. The Prime Minister, Luc Adolphe Tiao, noted that a 
film on such a hot topic presents difficulties but said the film should be seen as a call for 
forgiveness, not as a way to reignite resentments. 135 These statements, by both the 
director and top politicians, indicate that the film was meant to be more than just a 
cinematic reproduction of the event. 
In February 2013, nearly two years after the mutinies, a popular Burkinabé rap 
group called Waga3000 put out a music video, which recreates the mutinies. Whereas 
"Le Foulard Noir" appears to have been marketed mostly within Burkina Faso, 
Waga3000 has much wider appeal. They tour internationally and their music and videos 
can be purchased digitally on many major music sites. The song, titled "Voir sombrer 
ses fils," takes on a much more political tone than "Le Foulard Noir," criticizing both 
leaders and soldiers. They focus on the issue of injustice and one of the two rappers is 
wearing a shirt with Norbert Zongo's (the journalist killed in 1999) name on it. Similar 
130 Ibid. 
'31 The article can be found 
132 Director's statement can 
noir /c l u9 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 The article can be found 
'35 Director's statement can 
noir /clu9 
at this address: http: / /www.gouvernement .gov.bf /spip.php ?article920 
be found at this address: http: // www. trophees -francophones.org / #!le- foulard- 
at this address: http: // www. gouvernement . gov.bf /spip.php ?article920 
be found at this address: http: // www. trophees -francophones.org / #!le- foulard- 
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to "Le Foulard Noir," the military is not portrayed as one -dimensional. In some parts 
soldiers are shown attacking civilians and one scene implies rape. Yet, a final scene 
shows a soldier and civilian embracing. Additionally, the musicians are wearing parts of 
military uniforms, despite criticizing their actions. This supports earlier assessments of 
the overlap often seen between the military and civilian populations, especially among 
youths. 
These two examples, both of which are high quality productions, show that there 
is popular intrigue within the civilian realm about the mutinies. They also represent the 
complex relationship between civilians and military in Burkina Faso. The nuanced 
relationship between the two can be partially linked to the unique historic relationship, 
as previously discussed. Additionally, there was a shared sense of dissatisfaction 
towards the current condition, which both groups demonstrated against in 2011. 
7.11 Conclusion 
In the cases of Sierra Leone and The Gambia specific incidents (war conditions 
in Sierra Leone and peacekeeping non -payment in The Gambia) unveiled larger 
concerns within the military. However, in Burkina Faso for the vast majority of soldiers 
involved in the 2011 mutinies, there was no specific issue that triggered the response. 
There was no indication that soldiers were paid irregularly nor were there specific 
concerns over deployment pay or any immediate changes to military regulations. It took 
relatively little to ignite hundreds, if not thousands, of soldiers throughout the country 
into acts of indiscipline and often criminality, suggesting severe problems within the 
military. 
The 2011 mutinies in Burkina Faso help further the argument made throughout 
this thesis that mutinies need to be viewed as more than demands for material 
concessions. Soldiers were inspired to revolt, in part due to a sense of injustice towards 
a system in which they believed represented corruption and favouritism. These 
problems are deeply ingrained in the military and affect recruitment, promotions, and 
selection of opportunities such as deployments. The perception of corruption led to a 
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lack of authority and legitimacy amongst the officers in the eyes of their subordinates. 
The division among the ranks was demonstrated during the mutinies, in which only rank 
and file soldiers participated. Furthermore, the mutineers conducted targeted attacks on 
several high- ranking officers' residences. While the mutinies in Burkina Faso were part 
of a history of revolts, the government response in 2011 was unprecedented. The mass 
dismissals following the mutinies set an example for soldiers contemplating future 
mutinies, however more will need to be done to restore confidence and respect between 
the ranks and their officers. 
The sense of injustice amongst the soldiers was mirrored in civilian 
demonstrations. The two sectors did not show solidarity in their actions throughout the 
crisis, yet there seemed to be a mutual distaste for the top levels of the hierarchy, both 
political and military. The rank and file soldiers and working class civilians also shared 
mutual concerns over a growing cost of living. A sense of sympathy for the mutineers 
and their cause by many civilians was represented through interviews and examples of 
popular culture's portrayal of the events. In the case of Burkina Faso the relationship 
between civilians and the military (particularly the lower classes and lower ranks) is part 
of a history of overlap between the sectors. The inspiration that the mutineers likely 
drew from the civilian movements is also part of a pattern in the region, as explained in 
Chapters Two and Three. This trend will be particularly important if Compaoré decides 
to run for office in 2015 because opposition groups will likely attempt to mobilize 
people against a change to the Constitution, which has the potential of triggering a 
military response as well. 
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Chapter Eight- Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined a topic that is "under- analyzed" within military history 
in general and particularly neglected in an African context.' While existing mutiny 
research has been criticized for focusing only "on the particularities of historical 
examples," my research has veered from this trend by identifying and analyzing patterns 
of mutiny across a half century.2 The broad mutiny dataset was then supplemented with 
case studies, which allowed for a deeper understanding of the context of the mutiny and 
the viewpoint of those involved. This research design anchors microanalysis of specific 
events within broader patterns of military behaviour and the role of the military in 
African states. 
I have made a case throughout this thesis that mutinies deserve separate analysis 
from coups due to varying participants, tactics, and goals. The differences are visually 
highlighted when the two events are charted across time, as demonstrated in Figure 1.3 
of the Introduction. Here we can see that coups and mutinies have not followed the 
same patterns and there is an inverse relationship between the two, in particular in the 
1990s. However, despite attempting to make a break from coups, the divorce was never 
complete and coups continually appear throughout the thesis. For example, coups or 
threats of coups played a part in each of the case studies, although in a different manner 
in each case. This reflects the often -close links between the two events. Both mutinies 
and coups can be seen as actions that fall along a continuum of military indiscipline, but 
their trajectory on this continuum is not predetermined.3 A coup can be one potential 
outcome of a planned mutiny, either directly as the case of Sierra Leone demonstrated or 
it can intensify divisions within the military and contribute to a coup in a more subtle 
Ankersen, "Beyond Mutiny? - Instrumental and Expressive Understandings of Contemporary 
`Collective Indiscipline' 113. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa, 5. 
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fashion, as was the case in The Gambia. However, the majority of mutinies in the 
dataset were not immediate predecessors to coups, confirming my argument that 
mutinies are not simply the first stage of a coup. 
The line between coups and mutinies was drawn in the most distinct fashion by 
soldiers themselves, both during interviews and within their public statements during 
mutinies. The need to distinguish themselves from coup leaders can be seen partially as 
self -protection (since a coup is a more severe crime than mutiny) but the soldiers also 
clearly showed a belief (backed up with examples) that coups were often unhelpful in 
addressing their specific grievances. Therefore, while acknowledging the links between 
coups and mutinies, this thesis has examined mutinies as a distinct tactic used mostly by 
rank and file solders to negotiate their conditions. 
8.2 Research Contributions 
This thesis has contributed to filling gaps in the existing literature in three ways. 
The first is by adding Africa -specific analysis to the wider literature on mutinies. Most 
existing research on mutinies is Western- centric and often uses cases from past 
centuries. While there is overlap in the general themes of mutinies in a Western historic 
context and a modern African context, there are also key differences. The differences 
are significant because they deal with the more practical issues of when, where, and how 
soldiers mutiny. If existing studies were used to anticipate African mutinies, analysts 
and military leadership would look at battlefields and naval ships for warning signs of 
mutinies. However, as this thesis has demonstrated, African mutinies instead generally 
occur in capital cities during times of peace. West and Central African mutinies often 
coincide with civilian unrest, a pattern highlighted in Chapter Three as well as in the 
case study of Burkina Faso in 2011. Part of the explanation for the pattern is that there 
are often shared economic concerns between the civilian sectors and junior ranks of the 
military. Additionally, the duties and lifestyles of the junior ranks often place them in 
close contact with civilians, which facilitate "the transfer of habits and attitudes from 
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one to the other. "4 This may be particularly the case in a modern African context as the 
role of African militaries in protecting the regime (rather than the state), has resulted in a 
high number of military personnel in urban city centres, and capital cities in particular. 
While some of my broad findings are similar to mutiny research in a non -African 
context, the origins are often unique to West and Central Africa. For example, both my 
research and research on non -African mutinies have concluded that underlying most 
' mutinies is a sense of injustice. In West and Central Africa the perception of injustice is 
often closely linked to the elite status of many senior officers, which is at severe odds 
with the lifestyles of the rank and file soldiers. As Chapter Two explained, this divide 
has developed as a result of a history of military involvement in politics in the region. 
Understanding this context is significant because it shifts the fault of mutinies away 
from the dominant (Western) view of individual command responsibility to a more 
systemic problem involving growing gaps between the ranks. 
Secondly, this thesis has contributed to the military history of the case study 
countries. Many of the specific mutinies detailed in the chapters on Sierra Leone, The 
Gambia, and Burkina Faso were events that may have received short attention in the 
media or a passing remark in academic works but have never been examined in detail. 
This is perhaps unsurprising, as military hierarchies and political leadership often do not 
want to draw attention to a mutiny and regularly try to move on quickly after one has 
occurred. The case studies in this thesis have countered this trend by examining 
individual mutinies in detail and placing the events into political and military context of 
the time. Additionally the case studies have shown some of the longer -term effects that 
mutinies can have. In each case, a mutiny was not a lone event, but rather part of a 
series of mutinies or other acts of indiscipline. In many of the mutinies in the case 
studies only the material concerns of the mutineers were addressed and similar 
accusations of corruption or leadership complaints were a continual theme in subsequent 
mutinies. In several of the case studies, mutinies led directly or in the near term to major 
political changes. 
4 Parker, "Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders 1527- 1607," 51. 
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The final broad contribution, and the one I will focus on the most in this 
conclusion, is a new look at the junior ranks. Mutinies provide a unique glimpse into a 
group whose voice is normally and intentionally stifled through a system of strict 
hierarchy. Mutinies serve as rare insight into the way junior ranks view their conditions. 
Additionally, mutineers reveal what they expect from their military leaders as well as 
from political leadership, whom they often directly approach during mutinies. 
While scholarly work on African militaries was popular during the 1960s and 
1970s, the perspective was usually from the officer corps.' The "process of diffusion of 
force away from the state and official armies...on the African continent in the 1980s and 
1990s" coincided with decreased academic attention on militaries. Academic focus 
shifted from African militaries to rebel groups and non -state combatants. Within the 
structures of these groups the junior ranks have been acknowledged and in many cases 
researched (for example, studies on child soldiers or junior ex- combatants). However, 
the intrigue with these junior members did not lead to a similar academic focus on the 
junior ranks of state militaries, and enlisted soldiers continue to '`remain invisible. "6 
This is a significant oversight considering the junior ranks of the military are the 
"physical production of force. "7 They are the individuals that the international 
community is largely entrusting with peacekeeping missions and the junior ranks are the 
primary defence against an external attack. Therefore, it is important to understand 
common concerns within this sector as internal tensions and low morale can also hinder 
their effectiveness. 
This thesis has suggested that mutinies serve as a way for junior ranks to 
communicate with their superiors. By mutinying, soldiers draw attention to problems 
that have gone unaddressed through the normal chain of command. This assessment 
was supported in Chapter Two with an evaluation of common tactics used by mutineers. 
I demonstrated that mutineers usually use bold tactics, which the government would find 
hard to ignore. For example, kidnapping political leaders and holding strategic, public 
For example, classic texts from this period, such as Barrel of a Gun (1970) by Ruth First, The Nigerian 
Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt (1971) by Robin Luckham, and Military 
Regimes in Africa (197) by W.F. Gutteridge, all place heavy emphasis on the officer corps, with limited 
analysis of the actions of the rank and file. 
6 Hutchful and Bathily, "Introduction," in The Military and Militarism in Africa, VI. 
7 Hutchful, "Institutional Decomposition and Junior Ranks' Political Action in Ghana," 248. 
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locations are favourite tactics of mutineers. However, these are also tactics that usually 
do not cause long -term damage. This is also intentional because mutineers ultimately 
want to keep their position in the military. Mutineers often attempt a balancing act by 
trying to push the government far enough to force their demands but not to the point 
where the government will counter attack with force or issue severe punishments. In an 
attempt to force the government into a dialogue about their complaints, they threaten 
violence while often refraining from the use of violence. Yet this is a fine line to walk, 
especially in mass mutinies, which involve a variety of participants and individualized 
goals. As mutinies regularly take place in urban centres, civilians unrelated to the cause 
of the mutiny are typically the victims if mutinies turn violent. 
Since mutineers want to grab attention, the act itself is not particularly secretive, 
especially at the execution phase. However, eyen in the planning phase mutineers often 
send direct warnings to military or political leadership in hopes that their issues will be 
resolved before committing a mutiny. This thesis provided examples of Nigerian 
soldiers approaching the media to warn of a revolt and Sierra Leonean soldiers sending 
letters to the Ministry of Defence (and copies to foreign embassies) with similar threats. 
The pattern can also be seen beyond the West and Central African region. For example, 
soldiers in Tanganyika had approached State House twice prior to the 1963 mutinies in 
an attempt to seek an audience with the president over their grievances.8 Similarly, 
"anonymous letters of grievance had been emanating from the army for some weeks" 
before the 1963 mutiny, but "they were considered no cause for alarm. "9 
These early warnings that mutineers often give show that mutinies in many cases 
are not immediate reactions. This counters some of the classic studies on mutinies, such 
as work by Geoffrey Parker as well as more recent work by Joel Hamby, both of which 
portray mutinies as reactions to immediate hardships and place heavy emphasis on 
environmental conditions.10 Instead, my research has shown that in many cases mutinies 
in West and Central Africa are not spontaneous but instead logical and planned actions. 
8 Nestor Luanda, "The Tanganyika Rifles and the Mutiny of January 1964." 203. 
9 First, The Barrel of a Gun, 206. 
1° Parker. '`Forward" in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective, viii; Joel 
Hamby, "The Mutiny Wagon Wheel: A Leadership Model for Mutiny in Combat," Armed Forces and 
Society 28, no. 4 (Summer 2002). 
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Mutinying soldiers take risks in conducting the revolt, which is universally illegal under 
military codes, but they are also often cautious. Soldiers mutiny when they believe there 
is a reasonable chance of success and therefore it is not a reckless or impulsive action 
but rather a strategic one. 
If mutinies are viewed as a form of communication, the logical follow -up 
question is 'what are they trying to say ?' The thesis has shown that most mutineers in 
the region object to aspects of their daily conditions. Grievances over pay or military 
living conditions are the most common complaints amongst mutineers. However, I have 
also argued that too often military or political leadership focus only on these material 
complaints. Academics have also been guilty of simplifying mutinies to demands for 
material redress. For example in the conclusion of Barrel of a Gun, Ruth First writes 
As long as the army remains in the barracks, or drilling on the parade 
grounds, its command structure and military discipline hold it intact - 
short of the pay mutiny, that is. Once an army enters government, the 
possession of power proceeds to divide it: army cohesion disappears as 
soon as the army stops performing the function for which it was drilled." 
First acknowledges the significance of a mutiny by noting that it could challenge the 
cohesion of the military but also downplays the action by describing it as a "pay mutiny" 
and failing to give further attention to the act. The term `pay mutiny' does not require 
much explanation, as the cause and solution are both implied. This represents a 
common belief, especially in early independence years, that revolts by the rank and file 
are generally straightforward and do not require much investigation. 
My research has argued for a move away from 'pay revolts' and `pay mutinies' 
by showing that the material grievances are usually linked to perceptions of injustice and 
signal deeper discontent in the military. Junior ranks regularly blame their officers when 
they are unpaid, at times directly accusing them of stealing parts of their salary. 
Similarly, grievances over living conditions are regularly accompanied by claims of 
economic mismanagement by their superiors. Whereas material demands are relatively 
easy to address (assuming the government has the money), the divisions between the 
First, The Barrel of a Gun, 436. 
248 
ranks, which regularly form around accusations of corruption and favouritism, are more 
difficult and time -intensive to resolve. 
Chapter Two explained that the divisions between the ranks, which are often 
revealed in mutinies, correspond with the manner in which militaries have developed in 
the region. A history of military involvement in politics throughout West and Central 
Africa has resulted in close ties between senior military leaders and politicians. The 
relationship often includes significant financial opportunities for senior officers leading 
the military to be seen as a powerful, if not prestigious, organization in most African 
states. However, the junior ranks often do not share in the benefits and regularly live in 
meagre conditions. The rank and file soldiers are in an unusual position in that they are 
part of a powerful organization but they often do not see as many tangible benefits from 
their membership as the senior ranks. This becomes particularly problematic when there 
are limited opportunities to move up the ladder. Perceptions of injustice at a system in 
which they feel advantages the senior ranks often fuels mutinies. Senior military 
leadership have been a key complaint of the rank and file soldiers as well as a target 
during the mutinies. 
Mutineers often express the idea that their leadership have broken the implicit 
contract in which the hierarchy will take care of soldiers' welfare and pay in return for 
discipline and obedience. Mutineers then justify their disobedience with the observation 
that officers have also neglected their end of the deal. This trend appears particularly 
prevalent in deployment related mutinies due to soldiers' heightened sense of 
entitlement alongside the increased dangers of the mission, as explained in Chapter 
Four. 
Although a mutiny is a revolt against superiors, mutineers' actions should not be 
seen as an attack on the hierarchy itself. Mutineers regularly show respect for the 
hierarchy, while still objecting to individuals or particular behaviour within their chain 
of command. This affirmation of hierarchy was especially evident in the case study of 
the Tiger unit in Sierra Leone in both their obedience to their immediate officers and in 
the creation of the junta leadership based on rank. Nestor Luanda observed a similar 
trend in the 1963 Tanganyika mutinies when he stated that there was "continual efforts 
of the mutineers to recreate (rather than destroy) hierarchy- even to the point of 
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promoting themselves- while at the same time attempting to negotiate with `legitimate 
authority' over the heads of their officers. "12 Similar to the Tanganyika mutinies, in 
mutinies in West and Central Africa soldiers may exhibit bold tactics but their requests 
are generally not radical. For example, mutineers often request promotion but usually 
only one rank, not a severe increase, suggesting that they value the hierarchy. 
Mutineers do not ask for a system in which all ranks are equal but rather identify 
specific concerns within their terms of service. By doing so they can be seen as "appeals 
to authority, rather than rejections of it. "13 This provides an opportunity for the 
government or military leadership to address these issues and also provides the 
possibility for a stronger hierarchy to emerge from a mutiny. However, often only the 
material issues are addressed, allowing the divisions and suspicions among the ranks to 
grow. In cases like Burkina Faso, mutinies have become a pattern in which the same 
complaints are recycled and each subsequent mutiny has increased in violence. 
While dynamics between the ranks are an important aspect of mutinies, this 
thesis also placed emphasis on the relationship between junior ranks and civilians. 
Although the junior ranks are at times in direct opposition to civilians (for example, 
when tasked to put down mass protests), they are often also in close daily contact with 
them. As a result of military housing shortages, junior ranks often live in town (instead 
of bases) and spend their free time in the same places as their civilian peers. The ways 
in which the rank and file seem to straddle both the military and civilian sectors is 
apparent in mutinies. Mutineers often borrow tactics that are common in civilian 
demonstrations as well as utilize their military training. For example, they regularly 
gather in public spaces or near political offices and make public statements through 
spokesmen, similar to civilian organizations. However, their military membership is 
also regularly used to intimidate and warn of their ability to unleash violence, which 
they visualize by brandishing weapons. 
Chapter Three demonstrated that it is not just civilian protest tactics that 
mutineers make use of but in the 1990s particularly, mutineers also borrowed themes 
from popular political messages. Just as civilians demonstrated growing awareness of 
12 Luanda, "The Tanganyika Rifles and the Mutiny of January 1964," 203. 
1' Iliffe, Honour in African History, 245. 
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corruption and calls for political accountability, soldiers also expressed similar issues 
within their military environment. In public statements made by mutineers they often 
referred to elections, international organizations, and issues of rule of law, all topics that 
had gained attention in the civilian realm. My analysis of mutinies in the 1990s takes a 
slightly different perspective from scholars who argue that the democratization 
movement failed to attract the military masses.14 While I do not claim that junior solders 
were in strong support of the movement, I have demonstrated that junior soldiers were in 
some ways attracted to themes of the movement. They expressed their awareness of the 
popular political themes through public statements during mutinies and often 
instrumentalized aspects of the movement in their own campaigns. This trend extends 
beyond the 1990s and the case study of Burkina Faso in 2011 also showed an overlap 
between civilian and military grievances over the justice system. 
8.3 Future of Mutinies in West and Central Africa 
The original data in this thesis, along with the summary of historical studies of 
mutinies presented in Chapter One, show the remarkable durability of mutiny as a tactic. 
It is a strategy that has been used by militaries throughout the globe for centuries and 
shows no signs of ceasing in West and Central Africa in the near term. While the 
timeframe of my mutiny dataset concluded in 2012, in 2013 there were at least three 
new mutinies in West Africa, which is more than the average number per year in the 
2000s. In early 2014, soldiers in Sao Tome and Principe mutinied over grievances that 
are similar to other mutinies in the region. They called for better pay and living 
conditions, with specific complaints about the salaries and perks given to senior 
officers.'5 With a dataset of sixty -six incidents, this research has shown that mutinies 
are not particularly rare occurrences in West and Central Africa. Although the 
conditions for mutinies are in some ways unique to each country's history and military, 
14 Hutchful, "Military Issues in the Transition to Democracy," 608. 
15 Reuters, "Sao Tome Names New Military Chief Amid Army Unrest," February 19, 2014. 
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there are also mutiny trends, which span across the region. These patterns can help to 
anticipate when there is a heightened chance of mutiny in the future. 
Chapter Four, Five, and Six all highlighted the trend of mutinies linked to 
deployments, with particular emphasis on peacekeeping deployments. Peacekeeping 
missions have been widely supported by many African states for a variety of reasons 
including financial benefits, experience for the troops, as a means to relieve a bloated 
military, or as a gesture of goodwill. However, this thesis has also shown that these 
deployments often lead to increased grievances for a variety of reasons. The first is that 
soldiers on deployment have increased expectations and /or placed increased importance 
on previous expectations due to the heightened danger of the mission. For example, 
soldiers expect the hierarchy to provide them with proper equipment, logistics, and 
adequate leadership, which would be less necessary while stationed at home. However 
limited funding and logistical complications of deployments often mean that hierarchies 
are incapable of meeting these heightened expectations. Secondly, the significant pay 
increases that are earned on deployments lead to new complications. For example, 
soldiers have claimed the competition to participate in peacekeeping missions has 
created new avenues for corruption and favouritism. Examples throughout the thesis 
were given to demonstrate that soldiers often have false expectations about 
peacekeeping pay and conditions. 
Thirdly, the multinational environment allows soldiers to directly compare their 
conditions with soldiers from other countries. This is a rare opportunity for rank and file 
soldiers in particular, as normally they would be unlikely to have much extended contact 
with colleagues from other countries. In the examples throughout this thesis, it is clear 
that rank and file peacekeepers receive information about the pay and conditions of other 
soldiers through daily interactions and conversations with colleagues from other 
countries. The soldiers generally compare themselves to countries within their region 
that also have a shared language and often -similar culture. For example, Burkinabé 
soldiers compared themselves to the Malians while the Gambians compared their 
conditions to the Nigerians. 
The way the UN funds peacekeeping allows for easy comparison between the 
peacekeepers. The UN is transparent in their process of paying every country the same 
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amount per peacekeeper; however each country does not pay their peacekeepers the 
same amount. Soldiers from countries that pay on the low end of the scale often 
speculate as to why they receive less than other soldiers performing the same duties. 
These speculations and accusations are likely perpetuated by of a lack of official 
communication from the individual contributing countries to their troops. For example, 
soldiers in Sierra Leone have complained (in interviews for this thesis and to the media) 
that they do not understand what the surplus money is used for. 
While many of the deployment related mutinies are unique to the deployment 
setting, like other mutinies in the region they primarily involve grievances over pay and 
conditions of service. Significantly, mutineers on deployments also typically place the 
blame on their officers (as opposed to the funding institutions or politicians). Therefore, 
below the surface of claims of unpaid deployment salary are growing divides and 
resentments between the ranks, which has the potential to cause additional problems, 
even if the mutineers receive their material demands. 
The most recently formed mission on the continent, the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which took over from the African -led 
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in July 2013, has experienced many of 
the same complications described in other multinational missions.16 There have been 
reports about "woeful lack of cash and logistics" and shortages of food for the deployed 
troops. Similar to other African peacekeeping missions, MINUSMA has resulted in 
fatalities among the African troops, with at least thirty deaths for the Chadian 
contingent. ' 8 This mission already followed the pattern described in this thesis and 
experienced its first deployment related mutiny in September 2013 when 150 Chadian 
soldiers mutinied over pay and the length of deployment.19 With an increasing number 
of multinational missions on the continent, which involve international and regional 
16 United Nations Security Council, SC /10870, December 20, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10870.doc.htm 
"Jenny Vaughan, AFP, "Donors pledge $455.5 mn for war -torn Mali," January 29, 2013; Nicholas 
lbekwe, "Hardship hits Nigerian troops in Mali as officers solicit food from locals," Premium Times, 
February 12, 2013, http: / /allafrica.com /stories /201302130996.htm1 
18 Xan Rice, "Chadian death toll in Mali rises," Financial Times, February 25, 2013; "Chad says troops 
unsuited to guerilla war, quitting Mali," Reuters, April 14, 2013. 
19 "Chadian troops abandon north Mali posts in protest," Reuters, September 18, 2013. 
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organizations, research on peacekeeping related mutinies is particularly timely and 
valuable. 
Chapter Three demonstrated that mutinies occur more often in democratic states. 
Unlike the trend of mutinies following peacekeeping missions, mutinies that occur in 
democracies are not necessarily because democracies create new grievances. Instead, 
states that show respect for democratic principles and human rights provide a better 
environment for a successful mutiny. Democratic leaders are generally seen to be more 
responsive, which is necessary for a successful mutiny. Media freedoms, which are 
often associated with democratic states, can assist mutineers in delivering their message. 
Additionally, media can also serve to pressure governments to address the soldiers' 
grievances (as was the case in The Gambia in 1991 and 1992) or keep attention on their 
trials (as was the case in Niger in 2002 and Sierra Leone in 2013). States that show 
respect for human rights may also be deemed a physically safer environment to mutiny 
than states known to abuse human rights. In highly repressive regimes mutineers risk 
arrest without trial or execution. Although the international community and many 
citizens support and work towards a transition to more democratic political systems with 
increased civil liberties, this goal should not be seen as a cure for mutinies. 
Lastly, mutinies have been a durable tactic because it is also an adaptable tactic. 
This thesis has examined mutinies over a fifty -two year period, during which the tactics 
commonly used by mutineers have changed. Soldiers have consistently used tactics that 
gain the attention of the military or political hierarchy. However, new technological 
advances have allowed soldiers new opportunities to spread their messages. From the 
1990s onward mutineers have utilized the media more often and in recent years social 
media has gained traction within the military. These forums are particularly conducive 
to the desire of mutineers to spread the message about their grievances far and fast. 
Given the young age of many mutineers and increased internet access throughout the 
continent, future mutineers will likely increasingly turn to social media and new 
technologies as a means to communicate, both to their colleagues and to superiors. This 
trend could also be exciting and valuable for researchers of mutinies or militaries in 
general as it would provide more public insight into the internal workings of the state 
security organizations, which have always been exclusive. 
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New technologies such as cell phones have posed and will likely continue to 
pose new challenges to governments attempting to quell mutinies as cell phones make it 
much easier for soldiers to spread information quickly. For example, interviewed 
soldiers in Burkina Faso explained that mutinying soldiers in 2011 called their peers at 
other bases to find out what deal they had struck with the government. They explained 
that there were units that mutinied a second time after already making a negotiation 
because they found out, or at least heard rumours, that other units had received a better 
deal.20 New technologies also makes it increasingly important for military hierarchies to 
communicate effectively with the junior ranks to alleviate misunderstandings which can 
quickly grow and spread with increased use of cell phone calls, text messages, emails, 
and social media. 
My thesis has argued for two shifts in the way mutinies are viewed. I have 
suggested that they should be seen as signs of deeper problems within the military and a 
means of communicating these issues. However, this would not be a popular shift for 
many in the military. While I am using the rather neutral term "communication" to 
describe the desire for junior ranks to present their grievances to superiors, one soldier 
used the term "expose" to describe the goal of a mutiny. This single word highlights the 
divisions between the ranks that are often revealed in a mutiny and demonstrates the 
feelings of injustice that lie below the material demands of mutineers. Many in a 
hierarchy would not be keen to allow mutineers an open forum in which to elaborate on 
these perceived injustices, most of which they blame on their officers. It is therefore in 
the best interest of some to continue to treat mutinies as indiscipline or pay disputes in 
which the solution is punishment or payment (or a combination of both). 
Although mutinies can be seen as a timeless tactic, there are regions that have 
been successful at reducing their occurrence. For example, Lawrence James notes that 
"mutiny has become an unfashionable crime" in a modern Western context.2 t He 
explains that this is because "its causes have been removed" and hierarchies have often 
learned from their mistakes.Z2 However, mutiny has not lost its appeal within West and 
20 Author interviews with Burkinabé soldiers, 2012. 
21 James, Mutiny in the British and Commonwealth Forces, 1797 -1956, 3. 
22 Ibid. 
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Central African militaries and there is no indication that they will become passé in the 
near term. A significant reduction in mutinies in the region is not an unreasonable goal 
but reducing mutinies would entail more than simply addressing the tangible demands, 
as has commonly been the strategy for resolution. It would also require tackling the root 
problems, which are often ingrained aspects of the military structure. This would 
admittedly not be an easy task as many of the class issues and favouritism that contribute 
to mutinies have developed through a history of close relations between military and 
political elites. However, without a change to the way that mutinies are viewed and dealt 
with, they will likely remain an "unfailingly timely topic" in the region and hierarchies 
will be left anticipating the next revolt.23 
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List of Interviews 
Below is a list of interviews, in ascending chronological order, divided by country. This 
list only includes formal interviews, not casual conversations. Due to the sensitive 




Military Source G (Current Officer) 
Military Source H (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source I (Current Officer) 
Military Source J (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Valentine Strasser (Former Officer and President of 
Sierra Leone, 1992 -1996) 
Military Source L (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source W (Former Enlisted soldier, now works 
in security sector) 
Military Source Y (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source P (Current Officer) 
Military Source Q (Current Officer) 
Military Source T (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source S (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source V (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source R (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source GG (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source HH (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source JJ (Current Officer) 
Military Source K (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source M (Current Officer) 

























Interviewee Month/Year of 
Interview 
Gambian academic December 2011 
Gambian government source May 2012 
Military Source A (Current Officer) May 2012 
Military Source B (Current Enlisted Soldier) May 2012 
Military Source DD (Current Enlisted Soldier) May 2012 
Military Source F (Former officer) August 2012 
Military Source D (Former Officer) September 2012 
Military Source EE (Former Enlisted Soldier) October 2012 
Military Source C (Former Enlisted Soldier) October 2012 
Professor Abdoulaye Saine June 2012 
Military Source FF (Current Officer) November 2013 
Burkina Faso 
Interviewee 
Military Source O (Current Officer) 
Military Source Z (Current Enlisted Soldier) 
Military Source E (Current Officer) 
Military Source AA (Former Officer, now works in 
security sector) 
Military Source BB (Former Enlisted soldier, now 
works in security sector) 
Military Source CC (International Officer in Burkina 
Faso) 
Chrysogone Zougmore, President of MBDHP 
Bazie Bassolina, Secretary General CGT -B 
Moussa Diallo, Secretary General of Social issues for 
CGT -B 
Member of Ministère Chargé des Relations avec Le 














General Manger of National Radio Station of Burkina 
Faso (Radio Burkina) 
Hamidou Idogo, Editor and Chief of Journal du Jeudi 
Editorial Chief for Ouaga FM (private radio station) 
Professor A (Burkinabé Professor of Politics) 
Professor B, (Burkinabé Professor of Law) 







In Burkina Faso I also conducted a focus group with university students. The group 
consisted of 7 men and 1 woman. Additionally, I attended a debate at the University of 
Ouagadougou titled "Ministerial Changes in Burkina Faso: What Do You Think ?" The 
debate was specifically focused on the changes that followed the mutinies and included a 
lively discussion with roughly 30 university students in attendance. 
277 
278 
